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THE CAVALRY DIVISION

BY

COLONEL J. VON VERDY DU VERVÉRE

*Chief of the General Staff, I. Army Corps.
(Now General and War Minister.)*

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

W. H. HARRISON,

Quartermaster, 4th Battn., the King's Shropshire Light Infantry.

EDITED BY

COLONEL C. W. BOWLER

(Second Edition)

WITH SEVEN APPENDICES

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
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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

It should be observed that the attack formation of the Cavalry Division adopted in these studies is that in three equal lines (generally known as Von Schmidt's) which was prescribed in the German Regulations of 1876, and which is still retained by most of the foreign cavalries.

The Regulations of 1886 introduced certain important changes in the tactical formation of the Division which are briefly described in a note appended to the following translation. It must not, however, be supposed that these studies are therefore out of date.

The principles defined and illustrated in the following pages are as true now as they always have been and always will be; and whether the system of practically staking all one's chances on a single blow, which constitutes the chief peculiarity of the present German Regulation attack, is retained in the text or not, we may rest assured that in the majority of cases the attack of cavalry, both in Germany and elsewhere, will be carried out more or less on the lines advocated in the following masterpiece.

C. W. BOWDLER BELL,

Colonel.

WAR OFFICE,

June, 1890.

PREFACE.

THE last campaign gave the cavalry an opportunity of dispelling the many prejudices which, for some time past, had been formed as to its value in the field.

Whatever able and important services, however, were rendered by the cavalry in many cases during that campaign, they can only be looked upon as a preliminary step in the right direction. Far higher demands may be made on this arm; this refers not only to the cavalry itself, but also to those holding superior commands.


After the last campaign it was observed that great exertions were being made in this direction; but up to the present, on even the most important issues, no final decision has been arrived at as to the correctness or otherwise of the various views expressed. It is therefore thought that every one interested in the settlement of the matter should give his whole mind and energy towards the solution of the numerous points on which difference of opinion exists.

It is this motive that has prompted the writing of the following studies. I give them publicity in the hope that they may contribute in a small measure to the solution of knotty points and the clearing up of important questions, and may tend to the general settlement of the whole matter.

V. VERDY.

KOENIGSBERG,
24th December, 1873.

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CHAPTER I.

THE 29TH JULY.

The General Situation.

On the 29th July, 1870, the Third German Army—being then in the act of concentration, and consisting of five Army Corps and one Cavalry Division—was located in the Bavarian Palatinate (Rheinpfalz) and in the Grand Duchy of Baden.

The *V. and XI. Prussian Corps*, as *1st Line*, were effecting their concentration about the fortresses of Landau and Germersheim, having advanced guards pushed to the front as far as Billigheim and Rheinzabern, while the *I. and II. Bavarian Corps*, as *2nd Line*, were forming about the towns of Speyer and Neustadt, a detachment of the latter corps observing the road from Pirmasens to Zweibrücken.

The *Württemberg and Baden Divisions* stood on the right bank of the Rhine, at Carlsruhe and north of that town.

The *1st Cavalry Division* occupied cantonments within the rayon of the two Prussian corps.

It had been ascertained that the enemy was in the act of forming an "Army of the South" in Alsace.

It was also known that the *1st Army Corps*, which was concentrating about Strassburg, and consisted of four Infantry Divisions and one Cavalry Division, belonged to it, as well as a Reserve Division at Belfort. In addition to this, it was reported that a Reserve Cavalry Division was also on the march to join the Army Corps.

The remaining armies of the two belligerents were at the time as follows :—On the one side to the east of Metz, and on the other side between the rivers Nahe and Moselle, the whole in the act of advancing for the purpose of concentration near the river Saar and west of the fortress of Mayence respectively.

*Special Situation of the 1st Cavalry Division.**

The transport of the *1st Cavalry Division* from the interior to the frontier was completed by the 29th July, and the entire

* See General Map, Appendix II.

Division already at the disposal of the General Commanding the Third Army, although none of the larger units of that army had as yet completed their concentration.

As will be seen by the Appendix (No. 1) the Division consisted of twenty-four squadrons and twelve guns; it had further attached to it half a company Army Hospital Corps* and a Commissariat Column† from the V. Army Corps, as well as two Transport Columns‡; the exact date of arrival of the latter could not, however, at present be precisely stated.

According to the reports from Corps dated 21st July, each regiment consisted of about 600 horses; the total strength of the Division was about 3,910 of all ranks.

The cantonments, which were situated between the Hardt Mountains and the Rhine, were bounded on the south by the road Landau—Germersheim, and on the north by the Speyerbach.

The disposition of the Division in detail was as follows:—

STAFF OF DIVISION: LANDAU.

Right Wing.

2nd Cavalry Brigade. Staff: Landau. The regiments between the road Landau—Neustadt and the Hardt Mountains.

Centre.

1st Cavalry Brigade. Staff: Essingen. The regiments between the roads Landau—Neustadt and Landau—Speyer.

Left Wing.

3rd Cavalry Brigade. Staff: Offenbach. Regiments between the roads Landau—Germersheim and Landau—Speyer.

Horse Artillery. Staff: Landau.

2nd Battery: Knöringen.

3rd Battery: Essingen.

Army Hospital Corps and Commissariat: Edenkoben and a few outlying farms.

The alarm posts were as follows:—For the 1st and 2nd Brigades and the artillery, south of Knöringen on both sides of the road; for the 3rd Brigade, north of Offenbach.

The distance from the furthest cantonments to the alarm posts was about eight miles.

* Sanitäts-Detachement.

† Proviant-Kolonne.

‡ Führparks-Kolonnen.

As the rayon within which were the cantonments of the 1st Cavalry Division was also occupied by strong columns of both Prussian corps, the supplies necessary for the Division had at first to be drawn from the supply depôts at Landau and Germersheim. The 1st and 2nd Brigades and the artillery sent requisitions to the main magazine at Landau and the 3rd Brigade to Germersheim.

As regards firearms, it may be here mentioned that the whole of the light regiments were armed throughout with long range breech-loading carbines; the Uhlans had 32 carbines, same pattern, per squadron, while the Cuirassier regiments carried pistols only.

Mission of the Cavalry Division.

Lieutenant-General A. received at Landau on the evening of the 29th July the following orders from the Commander-in-Chief the Third Army:—

“HEADQUARTERS OF THIRD ARMY, SECTION I., JOURNAL NO. .

“*Headquarters, Speyer,*
“29th July, 1876. 8 A.M.

“On the 3rd August the Third Army will be in a position to take the offensive with its whole strength, at first towards the south. The present situation of affairs, however, allows of the cavalry preparing that movement at once.

“You will therefore concentrate your Division to-morrow, the 30th instant, by withdrawing it from cantonments and bivouacking about Landau, in order to cross the frontier the following day. (31st) 3 days ahead

“According to information received up to the present, the main body of the Army of the South is still about Strassburg; one Division only is reported as far advanced as Hagenau. Several movements of troops have, however, been observed between Saargemünd and Bitsch.

“It is believed that it is the 5th, or part of that Army Corps (belonging to the right wing of the enemy's main army, operating against the Saar), that is moving about the last-mentioned part of the enemy's country.

“The enemy's intentions cannot, however, at present be stated with certainty.

“It is not as yet clear whether the Army of the South is to remain on the defensive, or whether it is intended to take the

offensive. In the latter case it may, in conjunction with the troops near Bitsch, advance against the present position of the Third Army, or it may be intended to cross the Rhine and enter the Grand Duchy of Baden.

"It is the mission of the cavalry to clear up these uncertainties. The Division will therefore reconnoitre the plain between the river Rhine and the mountains, drive back, if possible, any advanced posts of the enemy's forces, and advance until it gains touch of the enemy's main forces, the movements of which it will closely watch. The division will at the same time watch the whole of the roads leading from the mountains into the plain.

"The lines of telegraph are to be interrupted; the destruction of the railways to take place only within the line of the enemy's movements as may be deemed advisable.

"The V. and XI. Army Corps have received orders to push on strong advanced guards towards Weissenburg and Lauterburg to form a support for the Cavalry Division, should the latter be obliged to fall back; you will therefore place yourself in communication with the General Officers Commanding these corps.

"The headquarters of the Third Army will probably be removed to Landau on the 1st August.

"You will be expected to furnish regular reports twice a day, noon and evening, besides reports of unusual events.

"THE GENERAL COMMANDING,
"N. N."

After a careful perusal of these orders, the General Commanding Division sent for his Chief of the Staff, who lived in the same hotel as himself. After Major V. had made himself acquainted with the contents of the above orders, he sketched out in accordance with the views of the General the following orders for the Division:—

"1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I, JOURNAL NO. .

*Divisional Headquarters, Landau,
29th July, 1870. 8 P.M.*

"The brigades will form up at their respective alarm posts at 10 A.M. the 30th instant, and will bivouac at or near these places. There is to be no alarming of the troops.

"The rations and forage still in the cantonments will be taken with the troops to their respective alarm posts by

means of requisitioned horses; all dismounted men, unable to march, will be sent to the hospital at Landau; sick horses to be handed over to the remount depôt of the V. Army Corps.

"The Horse Artillery, Commissariat and Army Hospital Corps detachments, will remain in their cantonments, but be ready to march off at a moment's notice.

"The Brigadiers will attend at the divisional headquarters at 12 noon to-morrow. Reports to be sent in by 1 P.M.

"A., LIEUT.-GENERAL,
"Commanding Cavalry Division."

The General declared himself satisfied with the proposed draft, and copies were at once prepared in the office. Meanwhile orderlies had been got ready, two of whom rode off to the 1st and 3rd Brigades respectively, and one to the 2nd Brigade and the officers commanding detachments quartered in the town of Landau.

The Commissary-General was also ordered to proceed at once to the quarters of the General Commanding.

After all the orders had been despatched, Major V. looked up the maps which contained the country as far as Strassburg, and both he and the General Commanding now set to work to study them.

Their task was greatly facilitated by Major V. having previously had all the main roads in the map coloured. After several discussions between General A. and his Staff Officer, the General gave his views of the situation as follows:—

"The enemy will no doubt make use of the main roads for his larger bodies of troops. Here he has two at his disposal: one from Strassburg along the Rhine to Lauterburg, and one *via* Hagenau to Weissenburg. I must therefore concentrate my attention upon these two roads. The plain between the mountains and the Rhine measures about twelve to sixteen miles across; if I place two brigades in the first line, each will have to occupy from six to eight miles. As long as no serious resistance is encountered, the strength of the Division will amply suffice for the scouting of that ground, and I shall let the 3rd Brigade follow as a reserve in the centre. In that position it would be ready to give assistance and support to either brigade should they encounter stronger forces, or, should we be pressed on one wing, to keep the

adversary sufficiently long in check to allow the other wing to be drawn in.

"But the question arises, whether, considering the presence of the enemy's troops at Bitsch, we ought not to secure our right flank most carefully, and if so, should we not advance in a different formation; our left wing is naturally protected by the river Rhine.

"It is most probable, moreover, that the enemy, should he advance against us, will do so by pushing his main forces *via* Hagenau towards Weissenburg in order to effect a concentration with the forces coming from Bitsch. This will necessitate placing our main force on the right, and leaving the weaker left wing to act more independently.

"I shall therefore advance myself *via* Weissenburg with the heavy and one of the light brigades, and direct the other light brigade to observe the main road along the Rhine. If I let this brigade advance on the road to Lauterburg, the distance between the two columns will be very considerable, and a ready mutual support out of the question. However, no necessity exists for the detached brigade to advance on the road itself; the principal object will be to see that it does not fail to observe everything that is going on on that road.

"This object will be secured if the extreme flank of its left wing has the road always under observation, as between that road and the Rhine large bodies of troops are not likely to move. The main body of the brigade can therefore keep a little more to the west of the road.

"If this is done, the communication between the whole Division can then be more easily maintained.

"Next it will be necessary for the main body of both columns to reach the river Lauter; this river is distant from the bivouacs about twelve miles. I believe that the patrols sent from the advanced guards have already pushed as far as that river without encountering hostile troops. The latter may, notwithstanding, appear at the river Lauter at any moment and dispute our passage. It will therefore be advisable to advance on a fairly broad front; in that formation we may succeed in crossing the river at some one point and obtain a glimpse of the enemy's situation.

"The Left Column will therefore direct its march on a point half-way between Weissenburg and Lauterburg, say on Schleithal.

"The Right Column will move to Weissenburg, and will,

prior to arriving before the town, secure itself in the direction of Bitsch. What the operations for the following day (that is, the 1st August) will be cannot be predicted to-day; we must wait until we have reached the river Lauter and see what we can learn there."

The General Commanding Division directed his Chief of the Staff to issue orders for the 31st July in accordance with these views; he, at the same time, pointed out that according to the present position of the cantonments the brigade of Hussars should form the left wing. Major V. proposed to attach one of the horse artillery batteries to that brigade, which the General approved of, adding that it was also advisable to at once communicate with the two Army Corps placed in first line. The headquarters of the V. Corps being in Landau, the General proposed to have a personal interview with the General Commanding that Corps the next morning, while as regards the XI. Corps the Chief of the Staff was to proceed to the headquarters of the Corps at Germersheim. By means of the railway, that town could easily be reached. Further discussion to take place next morning.

The Commissary-General had meanwhile arrived. He was informed of the orders received from Army Headquarters, also of the orders issued by the Division as regards bivouacs for the following day, and that the troops had been directed to remove all surplus rations and forage from the cantonments to the alarm posts by means of squadron carts, private vehicles, and horses, if necessary.

He was then questioned as to the rationing of the troops for the next few days, and as to how far it could be secured.

The Commissary-General explained that the iron rations had already been issued to the troops, in addition to which rations for two days were stored at the different cantonments.

From the last-mentioned stores one day's consumption would be issued to-morrow morning, leaving only one day's rations for the Division. The Commissary-General on his part would order the hired vehicles to take up three days' provisions from the victualling stores at Landau and cause the commissariat wagons to be fully loaded. The latter would be able to convey about two days' provisions for the Division.

The Commissary-General requested also that the troops might be directed to form the hired transports in column by brigades, and that each brigade might be ordered to detach a

half troop* as escort. The hired transport to remain with the Division until it could be relieved by similar vehicles requisitioned from the enemy's country.

The General asked the Commissary to draw up an order for publication, and left the latter and his Staff Officer about 11 o'clock. The latter did not, however, go to rest yet. It appeared to him advisable to draw up the orders for the 31st that evening, while the views which the General had laid before him were still fresh in his memory. He therefore sat down in his office and made a rough draft of the orders.

The orderlies who had been sent out with orders, &c., had meanwhile returned and handed over the receipts for the transmitted documents.

Major V. now took up the diary of the Division and entered in it as follows:—

"Landau, 29th July, 1870, at 7 P.M., orders were received from the headquarters of the Third Army to the effect that the Division, having bivouacked about Landau on 30th instant, would cross the frontier on the 31st July. Mission of Division:—To gain touch of the enemy and to watch his movements. The latter is supposed to be about Strassburg with the main body of his forces; one Division is reported to be at Hagenau, other troops between Bitsch and Saargemünd.

"In consequence of this order the brigades were directed to concentrate on the morning of the 30th at their respective alarm posts, and to occupy bivouacs in the close vicinity of these places."

OBSERVATIONS ON THE 29TH JULY.

Strength and Organization of the Cavalry Division.

The Third German Army referred to in these studies has at present at its disposal a body of organized cavalry, consisting of 24 squadrons with about 3,600 horses.

The number and strength of independent Cavalry Divisions which should be attached to an army must depend on the total available cavalry force, on the mission imposed upon the army, and on the ground upon which the movements are to be carried out.

The question as to whether for the army now under our

* The word "zug" in the original is throughout the book translated as "a half troop"; "two züge," as "one troop," and so on; the French term "peloton" is, however, used instead of "half troop" in the *Platè*, Appendix V.—EDITOR.

consideration *one* such Division was sufficient will be cleared up during the events as narrated in these studies.

Replies will also be found to the following questions, viz. :—

Whether a force consisting of six regiments is the most suitable for a Cavalry Division.

Whether it is preferable to form two brigades of three, or three brigades of two regiments each, and

What proportion of horse artillery should be attached to a Cavalry Division.

War demands the concentration of masses for one common object. The units placed at the disposal of the leader of the army will therefore be of such a strength as is found compatible with other circumstances which have to be taken into consideration. Among the latter may be mentioned the conduct and handling of such units by one leader, and, in the case of cavalry, the difficulty of securing ready means for the provisioning of the troops.

The capability of a leader will be put to the most severe test during the combat. During a cavalry combat events succeed each other so rapidly that, as a matter of principle, it is incumbent on the leader that he should not only be able to take in, as it were, *at a glance* the whole front of his troops, but also perceive anything that may happen to be going on in their vicinity. Otherwise, it will be impossible for him to exercise his principal influence, which consists in the skilful handling and well-timed movements of the reserves.

The nature of a cavalry combat, moreover, demands that the reserves should be held in hand, ready for immediate disposal as soon as the shock of the first line has taken place. Even with such a mass as six cavalry regiments deployed for battle, the ground would still permit the leader to act on the principle laid down above. *This, however, is not an easy task, and even a very clever leader will require a sound comprehensive knowledge of his duties and much practice.* Beyond the strength of a Division we believe it possible for a very skilful leader only to direct a combat successfully, and even then only when the commanders of the various corps and the troops themselves are in a high state of efficiency.

A Cavalry Division composed of fewer regiments, say four, is not to be recommended, on the ground that in almost all cases detached parties are unavoidable, which would reduce

the Division to a very low fighting strength. The tasks which will be demanded from cavalry during a great war could then scarcely be efficiently executed.

The further question arises, how shall the division be organized? Is it preferable to form these six regiments into two brigades of three or into three brigades of two regiments each?

For the combat as well as for manœuvring, the latter formation would appear to be most desirable. But it must not be forgotten that the question is that of the effective action of the *whole Division*, not that of one of its *brigades*.

During a cavalry combat each and every unit loses its individuality and formation the moment the *mêlée* takes place. In the case of a repulse the leader will regain the command over his men only when the adversary ceases to pursue or fresh troops arrive on the ground and hurl the adversary back. In case the troops are victorious and take up the pursuit, some time will still elapse before the leader can regain the command over his men. It is owing to this temporary loss of command that the influence of a second and third line entering the fighting group becomes of such greater moment in a cavalry fight than in any other combat. Of course, even with an organization of three regiments in each brigade, a second and third line may be formed; but the third line—the last reserve—must then either remain at the disposal of the Brigadiers, or the Divisional Commander must retain one regiment from each brigade at *his* disposal. In the first case the reserve will be taken out of the hands of the Divisional Commander, and is no longer a Divisional reserve. In the second case a third brigade is formed, but with this difference, that the former organic cohesion of the troops is gone the moment they are called upon to stand their *baptême de feu*, and instead of it they find themselves for the moment in a loose and strange formation.

It would therefore appear to be much better to adopt from the commencement a formation which is more suitable to the character of a cavalry combat; and as such must be considered the formation of three brigades for an independent Division.

In addition, an important factor in this question must be observed, namely, that two regiments must be regarded as the maximum which can efficiently be handled by the direct personal influence of *one* man,

The distribution of a Division into three parts comes further into play when the cavalry is made use of for the purpose of operations. In order to reconnoitre the ground it is necessary that it should advance on as broad a front as its strength will allow.

It does not as yet know where the enemy may be found, and must look for him. Should the troops be met with, be they his advanced cavalry or the head of his Army Corps, the broad front must cease, and the Division must assume a close formation preparatory to giving battle; otherwise, the latter would be exposed to the danger of having its front broken through in all directions.

It is quite a mistake to imagine that the formation of a Division once broken, the various parts of it would assume independent action, wheel towards the adversary's flanks, and there continue the fight. The superior adversary is quite capable of putting an effectual stop to this. Moreover, by acting as above, one's own army would eventually lose its frontal screen.

The dispersion of a patrol is, in most cases, an event of little moment, but the dispersion of a Cavalry Division must always be looked upon as a great calamity.

It is therefore necessary, when advancing to discover the enemy's whereabouts, to adopt a formation of some depth. The troops in the first line when pressed back should fall back upon the main body of *their own regiment*, and the latter, if the retirement continues, must fall back upon the main body of *its own brigade*. In no case is it advisable to extend a whole regiment in the first line in such a manner as to cover miles of frontage, this regiment being followed by a second one similarly extended, as a support to the extended squadrons in the first line. When it becomes necessary to advance on a broad front this should be carried out by placing the brigades, whether they consist of two or three regiments, side by side; and, should the General Commanding the Division desire to provide for any unexpected or unfortunate contretemps, he will necessarily require a large closely-formed reserve, which a third brigade will offer him most effectively.

An advance with the main body of the whole of the brigades or regiments in *one* line and without a common reserve should only be resorted to when large open tracts of ground in which no resistance is expected have to be traversed, and in similar exceptional cases.

It is very often pointed out that when a brigade consists of two regiments only, and one of these is detached on some particular duty, the command of the Brigadier lapses. This certainly is so, but only so because in real warfare whole regiments are far too often sent away on detached duties.

In order to observe, less than a regiment will generally suffice; but if the detached party is to be prepared to gain its information *sabre à la main*, a Division consisting of six regiments will act much more correctly by sending a larger force, *i.e.*, more than one regiment, in case other circumstances prevent it from pushing its whole main body towards the object to be reconnoitred.

The next point to be considered is the composition of a Division as regards *heavy and light brigades*; in this respect also reasons may be given which will be in favour of three brigades to each Division. It would, no doubt, be preferable to have light cavalry only for the duties of reconnoitring, but as we have heavy regiments as well, they must be taken into account. The fact of heavy men and big horses being drafted into the army necessitates the existence of heavy cavalry, unless we desire to see the total effective strength of cavalry reduced. A mixture of heavy and light regiments in a brigade neutralises the activity of the latter to a certain extent, and in a brigade composed of only two regiments would give no relief to the light regiment, and the whole of the reconnaissance duties would devolve upon it. A relief of regiments from this harassing and fatiguing duty is, however, necessary, not only within brigades, but also within Divisions.

We are therefore of opinion that the most satisfactory and efficient formation of a Cavalry Division is that of three brigades, one of which shall consist of two heavy, and two of two light regiments.

The two light brigades enable the General Commanding the Division to extend on a broad front, which is no doubt necessary as long as the enemy has to be looked for; once the latter is found, the formation in three brigades facilitates the necessary closing in of the Division, allows of the one brigade acting as an advanced guard being relieved in good time, and lastly, affords the best means of sending out strong and independent detachments, which latter are unavoidable with a Cavalry Division forming part of an army. Finally, it must be observed that the heavy brigade, in its position as

a reserve, is saved great fatigue, and can separately offer to the General Commanding the Division at all times a powerful compact force, ready to be thrown into the scale, either during the preliminary operations, or during a combat.

The formation of the Division has thus been exhaustively discussed in theory, in order to explain the special formation given to the Division concerned in these studies; whether this formation will prove itself practically correct must be judged from the events described in the succeeding chapters, and the observations based thereon.

The formation of our Cavalry Divisions during the war of 1870-71 does not allow of any conclusive lessons being drawn therefrom; and this is quite natural. We had not then and we have not now (1873) a peace organization for cavalry which forms this arm into Divisions or other large masses as required for war. It was therefore necessary to adopt in 1870 such formations as the peace quarters and the transport service offered. It was thus impossible to effect a rational formation for war. In consequence of this state of things the seven Prussian Cavalry Divisions were of various strength, some were composed of four, five, six, and some of even nine regiments of cavalry; the Divisions were also of various strength as regards the number of brigades composing them.*

The heavy and light regiments were also variously apportioned. Two Divisions (the 1st and 3rd) were entirely composed of heavy regiments, another (6th) of one heavy brigade of 3 regiments, and one light brigade of 2 regiments; the cavalry of the guard and the 4th Division were each composed of two heavy and one light brigade of 2 regiments each; the 5th Division consisted of three brigades, two of which had 2 heavy and 1 light regiment, and one 3 light regiments.

The Division under notice in these studies is formed after the 2nd Cavalry Division (Count Stolberg). As the Division "Stolberg" was the only Division so organized during the war of 1870, the question may well be asked whether such a

* The Cavalry of the Guards .. 3 brigades of 2 regiments each.

" 1st Cavalry Division	.. 2	"	3	"
" 2nd "	.. 3	"	2	"
" 3rd "	.. 2	"	2	"
" 4th "	.. 3	"	2	"
" 5th "	.. 3	"	3	"
" 6th "	{ 1	"	3	"
	{ 1	"	2	"

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formation should be taken as an example, as it is a formation which *by the constitution of our cavalry service must of course be exceptional.*

However, a brief explanation on this point will, we believe, show that this is not so much the case as may be at first sight imagined—nay, more, that this formation, as here shown, is quite possible, and can be taken by every Cavalry Division in our service, so much the more easily as our peace dislocation and organization are changed to suit it.

Leaving out of calculation the cavalry of the Guard, the cavalry of the Prussian Army consists of—

8 Cuirassier,

16 Uhlán, and

40 light cavalry regiments (Dragoons and Hussars).

From these numbers 27 cavalry regiments must be deducted to provide the 27 Infantry Divisions each with one cavalry regiment. If we take for this purpose 12 Uhlán and 15 light regiments, we have 37 regiments left, viz.:

8 Cuirassiers,

4 Uhláns, and

25 light regiments

This number will suffice to form six Cavalry Divisions of 3 brigades each, viz., 2 light and one heavy brigades (1 light regiment will remain). In addition there will be the cavalry of the Guard with 6 regiments, and considering the whole German Army as one (after deducting the Divisional Cavalry regiments), we have also 4 Saxon, 2 Württemberg, and 6 Bavarian cavalry regiments.

The re-organization of a force throughout cannot, however, be effected in a moment. Such a step has recently been taken with the artillery, and signs are not wanting that the cavalry will, before long, be re-organized also. The Cavalry Divisions must be regarded as the arm of the service which is always the first to close with the enemy, and further, a cavalry combat, owing to its rapid development, demands much more ability on the part of, and mutual understanding between, officers and men than is required for infantry, and unless we attain this during times of peace, we shall have during war to pay for the want of it with severe losses, and with great disadvantage to the general welfare of the army. The closer all peace organizations are assimilated to those of war, the more valuable they must become, and this is especially the case with the cavalry.

Exception may be taken to the proposal to attach regiments of Uhlans to Infantry Divisions as Divisional Cavalry, as for all reconnoitring purposes light cavalry regiments are as a general rule made use of. But it must not be overlooked that *the real duties of reconnaissance devolve upon the Cavalry Divisions if the latter are properly employed*, and that then Divisional Cavalry will be restricted to a much more limited sphere of action. Wherever Infantry Divisions act isolated, one cavalry regiment will not be found to suffice. For such cases the masses of cavalry must form the great reservoirs from which one or two brigades, or, according to circumstances, a whole Division, may be drawn.

We must not omit to allude to the horse artillery attached to the Cavalry Division. The use of this arm on the battlefield will be diversified. When one's own infantry marches to the attack, a special detail of guns will not be required to assist, as the attack will no doubt have already been prepared by the guns then in position, and these will continue to assist the attack; the same holds good for the pursuit, as here also those guns that are still effective will assist. Should, however, the services of large bodies of cavalry be called into requisition during a battle, to act on one of the wings, the number of guns which can be sent to assist it will no doubt depend on the actual situation at that wing.

For the battle itself it is not therefore necessary to attach artillery permanently to cavalry; on the contrary it might possibly lead to a withdrawal of guns which would probably be much more advantageously employed elsewhere during the artillery combat. Experience on battlefields has proved this assertion to be correct, and has also demonstrated that batteries will free themselves from the Divisions to which they are attached, and fight independently. Such a state of things is not correct, as the battle demands the union of all forces for one common object.

On the other hand, should large bodies of cavalry be called into requisition for certain operations, they will no doubt in most cases require the assistance of some guns. Small detachments of the enemy occupying a farm, defile, &c., may often delay the march of a whole body of cavalry, or exact from dismounted men sacrifices quite out of proportion, should the latter not be in a position to drive the enemy from his stronghold by means of a few shells. Columns of the enemy on the march are obliged to deploy as soon as the

artillery opens fire on them, and the advance of troops over ground in which cavalry cannot be made use of in large bodies can be delayed and made difficult only by artillery fire.

It is therefore necessary to attach horse artillery permanently to cavalry in all cases in which it is presumed that the latter will often be in positions in which guns will be of great advantage; otherwise, as guns are ready to hand during battle only, cavalry when acting independently would probably find the corps from which guns should be demanded far distant: the nearest Infantry Divisions are many miles, frequently two or three days' march in rear.

In the case under our observation we have attached, in conformity with the formation of the Division (Count Stolberg), two horse artillery batteries to the 1st Cavalry Division. Whether this number can be regarded as sufficient, or whether one battery would suffice, will be found answered in our description of the operations of the Division. It may here, however, be remarked that if more than one battery is attached to a Cavalry Division, a complete artillery Staff should also be detailed. If such is the case, the artillery will, during combats in which the whole Division takes part, act as one body under one leader, a proceeding which appears indispensable; during the battle itself this arrangement will also facilitate the co-operation of the guns in the artillery combat of the Army Corps.

It is, moreover, very desirable, considering the numerous demands made for artillery by the various commanders, that the artillery in a Division should be represented by a Staff Officer of that arm; and it is equally necessary that the duty of replenishing the ammunition for guns and carbines, often so very difficult a task during cavalry operations, should be placed in one hand.

As regards transport, Supply and Hospital Corps, a Division should be accompanied by a complete and independent detachment of each. For regulating transport and supply, an Intendant (Commissary-General) should be detailed; the Division should also have its own field post, clergyman, paymaster and medical staff.

The sanitary organization during the war was not uniform; some Divisions had a standing field hospital, others had half a company of Army Hospital Corps. The latter would be the most preferable, we think, for a Cavalry Division,

as it is continually on the move, and would not therefore be able to make use of a standing field hospital. It must further be taken into consideration that even in the enemy's country the wounded, of which there are not so many as during infantry combats, will mostly be cared for in the nearest towns, where quarters and medical attendance can always be found for them. There is more necessity for immediate aid on the battlefield, and such aid can be afforded only by a detachment of the Army Hospital Corps. For this object it will be requisite to allow the Bearer company men to follow the Division in ambulances, carts, or wagons, in order that they may be at the field of battle the moment their services are called into requisition. The wagons and carts can then be very usefully employed for the transport of the wounded.

For the provisioning of a Division *a permanent supply and transport column is requisite*. As already stated, thirty wagons of provisions will supply a Division for about two days. As regards forage for the horses, no arm of the service is in that respect better off than the cavalry sent out in advance of an army, and still finding storehouses and granaries of the country for the most part full of forage. But it is advisable that in this respect also a Division should make provision prior to its marching off, especially as regards oats. If it has no transport wagons attached to it, or if they have not arrived, the Division should organize a military transport column of regularly impressed wagons, or if in the enemy's country, of wagons demanded on requisition. The men and horses so obtained should be provisioned by the Division. A Cavalry Division would require a transport column of 180 wagons, each laden with one ton, to supply the Division with forage, more especially oats, for three days.

ARRIVAL OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION DURING THE CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY.

The 1st Cavalry Division had arrived, completely equipped and organized, at the place of concentration of the Third Army, on the 29th July; the remaining parts of that army would probably not be ready for active operations before the 3rd August. Such an early arrival of cavalry is especially necessary if the latter is required to fulfil its first mission, that of looking for and finding the enemy. It is

then only that cavalry can be at once put to its proper use; and it is obvious how important it must be for the commander of an army to have gained touch of the enemy, and to know that their movements are watched, prior to the movements of his own army taking place.

The cavalry should therefore not only be the first to be moved by railway, but they should be transported as close as possible to the frontier. The frontiers, on which the concentration of troops generally takes place, are, as a rule, protected by the troops in the nearest garrisons, or by the advanced guards of some detachments close at hand. There they are ready either for reconnoitring purposes, or as a protection against the adversary's flying patrols. Closely in rear of these troops, the Cavalry Divisions can be concentrated or organized. From the place of concentration they will be in a position to gain the best information as to the ground in their immediate front, and the events which are there taking place. To effect this, it will be necessary that the General Commanding the Division should place himself in constant and close communication with the commanders of the various advanced guards pushed to the front of the Army Corps. It is, however, advisable for the General Commanding Division, that he also should detach squadrons to the front to push beyond the infantry outposts and reconnoitre that part of the country if circumstances permit.

In the case under our consideration, Lieut.-General A. did not do so, probably because his whole attention was concentrated on the formation of his Division.

A reconnaissance of the ground as far as the river Lauter might, notwithstanding this, have been carried out, and would have proved all the more useful, as at the commencement of operations the country in question must under any circumstances have been entered.

The comparatively narrow space which must necessarily be occupied by an army after railways are left behind, will seldom admit of a special rayon being told off for the cantonments of a Cavalry Division. In most cases the Division will have to be quartered within the zone occupied by the other troops, which will also enable it to make use of all stables, &c., not occupied by infantry. When in close proximity to the enemy, the Division should, however, be so quartered that the area occupied is not so great as to prevent the concentration of the Division within a day. Should the

quarters available within such a distance be insufficient, nothing will then remain but to bivouac part of the troops.

It must not, however, be forgotten, that bivouacs entail more sacrifices upon cavalry than the enemy's bullets, and they should therefore be resorted to only in cases where there is no other way of quartering the troops.

We are unable to see any such urgent necessity for the order given by the General Commanding the Third Army, that the cavalry should occupy bivouacs on the 30th July.*

In the case in point, the Division is in cantonments within an area of about twenty square miles. It would not be advisable to extend the cantonments much further, as under present circumstances it might become necessary, not only to concentrate the Division in one day, but also to send it some distance to the front, in order to support other troops.

In a flat country, with plenty of villages about, the rayon alluded to above will no doubt suffice for cantonments for a Cavalry Division: it will not, however, do so if a great part of an Army Corps has also to be got into quarters within the same space. In such a case it must be considered whether a further advance of cavalry towards the front would not be advisable.

As the main body of the V. Army Corps would probably be arriving during the days of the 30th and 31st July, and the 1st and probably the 2nd of August, no necessity existed for giving up the cantonments of the Cavalry Division before the 30th July.

In allotting cantonments to the various brigades of a Division, regard must be had to the probable use of the brigades. It would, for instance, be a mistake to quarter the heavy brigade in first, and the light brigades in second and third line. Regard must also be had, according to the nature of the ground, to the probability of a light brigade being suddenly required on one of the wings. The light brigades are, as a rule, the first that are detailed for duty, especially when detached parties have to be sent out; the cantonments for the light brigades should therefore be selected with a view to avoiding the necessity for these brigades having to make great detours through the cantonments of the heavy brigade, in order to reach the place of alarm or rendezvous.

It will often be found most convenient and useful to

* We shall refer to this again in our observations on the 31st July.

define three rayons, as in the case under observation, viz.: one light brigade on each wing, and the heavy brigade in the centre.

It will generally be desirable to fix different alarm posts for the different brigades, and not a common one for the whole Division. A mass of six cavalry regiments and two batteries of horse artillery is a large body of troops, and they cannot, if only for the comfort of the troops, be moved on one road, but if available several must be made use of. If, however, the Division be marching with other troops, this latter proposal can hardly ever be carried out, and the commander of the army must then decide as to the road on which it is to march.

If several alarm posts are fixed, great care must be taken that they are not too far from each other; such measures should be taken as to ensure the simultaneous arrival of the various corps, and the ready delivery of any orders or instructions it may be found desirable to convey to the troops; as otherwise, owing to the separate places of rendezvous, great confusion may be caused should it become requisite to concentrate the Division for united action. In conclusion, it may not be amiss to point out that the alarm posts should always be fixed towards the front, that is, towards the enemy.

THE MISSION OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION.*

Although the leader of such a Division should himself be thoroughly *au fait* in the duties devolving upon him when sent in advance of an army, it appears notwithstanding very necessary that the special mission expected of him as regards the existing position of affairs should be laid before him by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, as the commander of a Division cannot always be in a position to be acquainted with this at the moment he is sent to the front.

The orders given to General A. by the General Commanding Third Army are framed in correspondence with this requirement.

* On receipt of his orders, the General endeavoured to gain a knowledge of the situation from the maps issued by the Headquarter Staff. It is, however, much more to the purpose, when taking a general view of the situation, to first make use of the *road* maps, and to study the general maps of the country for details.

He is informed by them that the army will not be able to take the offensive until the 3rd August, and also that it will advance in a southerly direction. At the same time General A. is enjoined to commence his operations on the 31st July.

In order to give General A. a clearer insight into the general position of affairs, he is also posted up in whatever is known about the enemy's forces at headquarters, and it is added that as regards the enemy's "Army of the South" nothing definite has been ascertained. In order to gain information on this point the Cavalry Division is to act.

To ensure that the leader of this Division may not form erroneous ideas, he is made acquainted with movements that may be expected from the enemy's forces. At the headquarters of the army all this has already been carefully considered and deliberated upon; but General A. has no knowledge of the present general position, he is not clearly aware of the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, nor does he know what the latter is most anxious about at the present moment.

These are the points which every instruction given to a Cavalry Division should contain, whenever it is called upon to act as an independent force. The leader will then be able to judge exactly what is required of him; as to the manner of carrying out such instructions, that is his affair.

The Commander-in-Chief in the present case rather assists the Divisional leader by giving a few general hints as to their execution. Should the commander of the Division be known to his General Commanding-in-Chief as a clever man, or have already given proof of his abilities, these hints would be superfluous. However, other hints are useful for the leader, such as the place to which his reports are to be sent, and when and where he can count on obtaining support from other bodies of troops.

These hints are given him here, and in addition others are thrown out which certainly are generally known, being laid down in the regulations for the army, but which it is very useful to call attention to at the beginning of a campaign. Such are the regulations regarding telegraphs and railways, as to the destruction of which great confusion of ideas prevails. Both telegraphs and railways may often be made very useful for one's own army. As regards telegraphs it will generally suffice to render them ineffective at the stations until such time as we can place our own telegraphists at work at

those places; it is therefore of great advantage that the advancing cavalry should have a detachment of telegraphists attached to it.

Should it happen that we are on ground which it is foreseen cannot be held for any length of time, it may become advisable to totally destroy the network of telegraphs in that particular locality; but such a proceeding should be undertaken only by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who alone is in a position to know the general state of affairs.

The same applies to railways; here also it is only the General Commanding an army who can decide whether the total destruction of a railway is advisable. In all other cases, a temporary destruction, such as destroying the line of rails for some distance, &c., may be carried out; but railway bridges, viaducts, &c., should never be destroyed, otherwise the line of railway may be rendered useless for one's own army hereafter.

Another special point should never be lost sight of, viz.: the gaining of information as to the various units of the enemy's troops in our front, and how they are combined.

The most important point for the General Commanding an army to know is, *Where is the enemy?* This point once cleared up, he will require to know his strength. The latter point can but seldom be satisfactorily cleared up when large bodies of troops are concerned, except by combination. To do the latter, we require as a starting point the *ordre de bataille* of the enemy's armies.

If this knowledge could not be gained before the commencement of operations it must gradually be obtained during such operations. Once attained, it will often be very easy, by means of interrogating prisoners of one regiment, to ascertain what other forces are in our front.

The more information we can gain in this respect from various sources, the more certain will be our knowledge of the dispositions and strength of the enemy's forces, and consequently the more accurate will be our conclusions as to his probable intentions.

During the war of 1870-71 the General Staff of the army was for a long time in uncertainty as to whether General Bourbaki was still at Bourges or whether he had already marched off towards the east. A feeling of uncertainty prevailed as to the measures that had been adopted regarding the

troops still at disposal; it was feared that they might possibly find themselves in a position fraught with much danger and likely to lead to serious consequences.

This uncertainty was, however, at once removed when a despatch from General v. Werder reported that—"This morning I had such and such regiments in front of me during the battle" (the troops indicated being known to belong to Bourbaki's force).

The necessary knowledge of the adversary's *ordre de bataille* becomes easy of attainment when, as with us, the peace organization holds good on active service; but it becomes more difficult when, as was the case with the French Army in 1870, the war organization is not resorted to until the last moment.

The *ordre de bataille* of the French Army which had been sketched out by the General Staff of the German Army at the beginning of the conflict, was therefore principally based upon combination; it being known how the French troops were quartered in their respective garrisons during peace, the most effectual way in which these troops could be formed into Army Corps—utilizing the various lines of railway—formed the basis for the sketch.

It is quite true that in course of time it was discovered that the above supposition had been wonderfully correct, but its correctness and the still doubtful points of the combination were ascertained only after the enemy had been encountered.

This shows the great importance of capturing prisoners at the beginning of a campaign, and of questioning them very closely. It is to this point that the particular attention of the Cavalry Division must be called, as it is most important to be able to enlighten the Army Headquarters upon the composition of the adversary's forces.

THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE DIVISION.

Instructions having been received from the Army Headquarters, the General Commanding Division issued orders to the brigades and directed them to take up bivouacs at or near their respective alarm posts the following morning. It must here be remarked that, more especially at the beginning of a campaign, the troops should not be alarmed, and that this caution should be given to officers commanding brigades; otherwise it may happen that one or other of the various commanders, owing to the cantonments of his troops being

distributed over a wide area, may summon his men to the alarm posts by trumpet sound. The consequences of such a step would most probably be that other corps in the vicinity would take up the alarm, and thereby cause confusion and useless fatigue to the troops.

As a rule useless alarms do take place at the beginning of a campaign, and cases have come to notice where the sound of horses' hoofs kicking against stable doors, &c., have been taken, during the night, for reports of guns, and the beating out of horse blankets for that of infantry fire.

When the General Commanding a Division has made himself thoroughly acquainted with his Brigadiers, and the latter have come to understand their Chief's ways and views during the course of a campaign, the former will only in exceptionally important cases have to issue personal instructions to them, although that mode of communicating orders will always be preferable to giving written instructions.

Personal interviews with the Brigadiers will moreover not always be possible, as it is undesirable that General Officers commanding brigades should be absent from their command for any length of time, which would necessarily be the case where brigades are operating at some distance from each other. In the case under our consideration there was plenty of time for a personal interview; Brigadiers could concentrate their brigades in good time the next morning at their respective alarm posts under their personal superintendence, and should events occur which would demand an immediate forward movement of the Division, such events could easily be communicated to Brigadiers while at Divisional Headquarters, from which place they could reach their commands in sufficient time to order any movements desired.

Written orders which demand immediate execution do not allow of any explanation respecting them being asked when cantonments are distributed over a wide area and at a long distance from Divisional Headquarters; a mission is, however, here imposed upon the Division, the execution of which it could not previously have had an opportunity of practising, if even its organization during peace had been the same as now; in addition to which, one of its brigades was required to act independently at the outset of the campaign in order to carry out the object in view. Considering these circumstances it was thought desirable that the General Commanding the Division should have a personal interview with his Brigadiers in

order to fully explain his intentions, and to give the Brigadiers an opportunity of clearing up any doubts or uncertainties in their minds, either as to the forthcoming operations or as regards service matters. It was for this purpose that General A. ordered the rendezvous for the following day.

The horse artillery is still left in its cantonments. General A. is apparently of opinion that, as the artillery is not a great distance from the bivouacs to be occupied to-morrow, it would be able to arrive within the lines of the brigades on the 31st July in time to march off with them.

This supposition might not always, however, hold good. It is not at all indifferent whether the artillery march four or five miles further than the cavalry on the 31st July or not, more especially as regard must be had to the fact, that, should the enemy's movements on the 30th July demand an immediate advance of the cavalry, the latter would trot off from its bivouacs and possibly lose all connection with its batteries. One of the batteries is certainly in cantonments in close vicinity to the bivouac of the main body; this battery might have remained in cantonments, but it would have been more to the purpose had the other battery been brought into the bivouac of the Hussar brigade on the 30th July.

It is a different matter with the commissariat and transport. These must never be allowed to follow an advancing Division too closely, but the distance between it and the troops must be much larger with cavalry than with other arms of the service. The cavalry often finds itself in a position demanding a sudden movement to other roads, and superior forces of the enemy's cavalry may compel our own to make a sudden and hasty retreat; in both cases the close proximity of transport, &c., would not only cause great confusion, but the latter might easily become exposed to great danger. It is therefore advisable, that when a Division acts independently, the transport and commissariat should always, during an advance, be at least four-and-a-half miles in rear of the main body. An exception must be made with regard to the Army Hospital Corps and its wagons; if they are to be useful they must follow the troops as closely as possible.

It was therefore unnecessary to concentrate the transport, &c., on the 30th July, and as it must also be considered that these detachments are often obliged to perform night marches, they should be allowed to have as much rest as it is possible to give them.

In conclusion, it should be observed that it is of the utmost importance that the troops should be informed of the places to which sick men and sick and lame horses are to be sent; this will prevent their being sent about from place to place, and all control over them being lost. The order issued in the case under notice, viz., to hand over the sick horses to the depôt of an Army Corps, is not always practicable; it would appear to be preferable that the Cavalry Division should form its own horse depôt, under superintendence of an officer specially detailed for the purpose; the depôt being placed under one of the "Etappen" commands in rear.

Of course the surplus rations in cantonments should be taken with the troops. Every officer commanding a squadron ought to take care that provisions for his squadron are always to hand for as long a period as possible; the rations and forage here referred to are those already received from the victualling magazines at Landau, and which should not of course be left behind in the cantonments to be used by the troops taking up their quarters, as all rations and forage must be accounted for by the troops to whom they were issued from store. It ought of course to be known to every commander that rations once issued to troops, and not used before quitting cantonments or bivouacs, should always be taken on by the troops; still it may not be amiss to call attention to these details at the beginning of a campaign; later on, when general routine is once established, the troops themselves will take care of these matters.

THE VIEWS OF THE GENERAL COMMANDING DIVISION ON THE
MISSION ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND ON THE PROPER
MODE OF EXECUTION.

Little remains to be said as to this, as the ideas given above seem to express everything that need be said about it.

The movements of corps and armies are carried on along the main roads and these are therefore first to be studied by the cavalry in its reconnoitring schemes.

The whole width of the ground must next be scoured within which the enemy's troops are known to be, or to which their movements can possibly extend.

In accordance with the breadth of the ground to be occupied, it must be determined whether one brigade will suffice in first line, or whether two, or perhaps even the three brigades will be required for that purpose. Of course

the less the resistance from the enemy that can be reckoned upon, the looser the first line may be, and the more extended the sphere of reconnaissance.

The main body of the Division should always be moved in the direction from which the most serious resistance is expected, or in which the enemy's strongest force is believed to be.

Should such a step necessitate the main body being placed in rear of one of the wings, and should the extent of front be such as not to allow of ready support being given to the other wing in good time, it must be so arranged that the extreme wing shall enjoy a greater amount of independence, and special instructions for its conduct will be issued; under particular circumstances, a special road of retreat for that wing must be indicated.

Generally speaking, a cavalry commander will endeavour to keep his forces as closely together as circumstances will permit, and will only split up his troops when necessity demands it.

Large detachments will, however, of necessity be required during reconnaissance, no matter how closely we adhere to the principle above mentioned; this will especially be the case when the extent of front, depth of ground to be reconnoitred, or strategical reasons, will not admit of a reserve following the centre of the Division. Attention is directed to the fact that General A., in his views and plans of execution, laid great stress upon a mutual advance of both corps of the enemy from Strassburg and Bitsch, and based his plans upon that supposition. Nothing was mentioned by General A. as to a possible crossing of the Rhine by the corps at Strassburg, and the ready discovery of such a movement by the Division. These operations should certainly have been considered, although the movements of the Division as arranged would not have been thereby materially influenced. No change in the original movements would have become necessary in considering this latter supposed movement on the part of the enemy's forces, because the cavalry in position on the right bank of the Rhine (Baden) would have been able to discover the enemy's movements earlier than the 1st Cavalry Division. Should the adversary purpose making an attempt to cross the Rhine at a point lower than Strassburg, say Lauterburg, he would necessarily require his army to advance towards the Lauter prior to carrying out his object.

Considering, however, the flank position occupied by the Third Army (German), an attempt to cross the Rhine near Lauterburg could not very well succeed.

It would perhaps have been better, in arranging the march of the Division, had the Hussar brigade been ordered to march towards St. Rémy instead of direct towards Schleithal; in that case the whole Division would be much more in the hand of its commander, should the enemy be met with on the main road, *i.e.*, at Weissenburg or vicinity. Moreover, the crossing over the Lauter would be more easily prevented by the enemy's troops on the direct road over Schleithal, owing to the Bienenwald—a thickly wooded forest—being situated close to the river, while at St. Rémy the ground is quite open.

As regards the Diary of the Division, it may here be said that it contained only the general purport of events, the details of which can always be easily supplied and arranged later on from the daily official returns and other documents. On the other hand, everything of importance should, for the reason given above, be entered, especially matters not ordinarily put on paper, such as verbal orders, discussions, &c.

THE 30TH JULY.

At 6 A.M. on the 30th July Major V. preceeded to his General's room, to submit for his approval the following draft of a Divisional Order proposed to be issued to the troops :—

“ 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I., JOURNAL NO. .

“ *Divisional Headquarters, Landau,*

“ *30th July, 1870.*

“ *Divisional Order.*

“ According to information received, strong hostile forces are in the neighbourhood of Bitsch and also at Hagenau.

“ In order to ascertain further details on this head, the Division, formed in two columns, will cross the frontier to-morrow, 31st July, as follows:—The heavy and Dragoon

brigades, under my own immediate command, by the main road to Weissenburg; the brigade of Hussars by the road leading to Schleithal.

"The first-mentioned two brigades will, in conjunction with the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery, be ready to move off from their respective alarm posts at 6 A.M. The brigade of Hussars, in conjunction with the 3rd Battery Horse Artillery, will move off to Schleithal at the same hour. Patrols are to be pushed forward towards the river Selz, and the road Selz—Lauterburg especially is to be kept under observation. The transport of the Division will assemble at Knöringen at 7 A.M., and will follow the Division, under the command of Paymaster G., along the main road.

"A., LIEUT.-GENERAL."

Having read the above, the General remarked that it appeared to him very advisable to establish communication at once with the V. and XI. Army Corps, in order to learn what information these corps had received since yesterday regarding the position beyond the frontier. In addition, great uncertainty still prevailed as to the exact position of our own outposts, and the information which had reached the General as to how far support from both Army Corps could be relied on was very meagre. The General was of opinion that it would be better if, prior to the issue of the orders, a personal interview took place with the General Officers Commanding the V. and XI. Army Corps, in order to learn their views and intentions.

General A. therefore directed his Staff Officer to proceed at once to Gernmersheim and interview the General Commanding the XI. Corps. It was now much regretted that Major V. had not gone there the previous evening, as then he might have returned in good time this morning. It was hoped, however, that, owing to the railway running a number of special trains with troops, he would have an opportunity of returning sooner than was now calculated upon.

Prior to his departure Major V.'s attention was again called by General A. to the principal points to be discussed :—

1st. The Army Corps to be informed as to the present intentions of the Cavalry Division, and as to the manner in which it is proposed to carry them out.

2nd. To enquire when and how far the XI. Army Corps
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would be ready to give support to the Cavalry Division. Major V. was especially desired to dwell upon the desirability of at once occupying Lauterburg by infantry, and also upon the necessity of close observation along the road from Lauterburg towards Selz by means of patrols from the Divisional cavalry.

3rd. Information as to the present position of the outposts of the Army Corps, also as to what had been learnt of the forces, movements, and intentions of the enemy beyond the frontier.

Major V. went direct to the railway station, in order to commence his journey at once, and an orderly was despatched by General A. to the General Commanding the 5th Army Corps, to inquire when he could have an interview with him.

Prior to the return of the orderly, the officer commanding the artillery arrived to inquire of General A. as to any orders for his two batteries.

The General told him that the Division would be ordered to move off next morning, crossing the frontier in two columns, that the Hussar brigade would march independently, and would probably, in order to carry out its mission, be separated from the rest of his Division for several days. To this end it would be necessary for the present to attach one of the batteries to that brigade and the other to the heavy brigade. Written orders would be sent to the artillery, but Major L., the artillery officer, might already take the necessary steps to carry these orders into effect, taking care to ensure the arrival of the batteries at Knürringen and Offenbach by 6 A.M., these places being those indicated to the brigades as rendezvous.

Major L. remarked that he would attach the 3rd Battery to the brigade of Hussars, and the 2nd Battery to the heavy brigade.

Meanwhile the orderly had returned and reported that the General Commanding V. Corps would be at his quarters until 10 A.M. General A. went to him about 8 A.M.; communicated to him his intentions as to the advance of the cavalry on the following day, and requested information as to the position of the outposts of the V. Corps and as to the news received regarding the enemy.

The General Commanding V. Corps then gave the following information :—

“The 17th Infantry Brigade, being the only one which

has as yet arrived here completely organized, has, in conjunction with two squadrons of Uhlans and one battery horse artillery, been sent as an advanced guard to the front. The main body of this force is at Klingenstein, Appenhofen, and Billigheim; the General in command, Major-General X., has his headquarters at the latter place. The outposts of the Division—strength, two battalions and one squadron—occupy the ground about Bergzabern, patrols pushing as far to the front as Weissenburg and the river Lauter. On the right flank of this advanced guard is a small Bavarian detachment at Dahn, with which communication has been established; on the left flank communication has been established with the advanced posts of the XI. Corps, the latter extending beyond Winden and Langenkandel up to the river Rhine. The railway junction at Winden is strongly occupied by my Corps.

“Nothing has as yet been seen of the enemy, except a few small infantry patrols in the vineyards around Weissenburg, and yesterday morning a party of about twenty mounted chasseurs was observed near Altenstatt moving off towards the south.

“It appears, however, as if Weissenburg were occupied; at least, an officer who rode up to the gates of the town found them closed, and he was fired upon from the ramparts. The town is open and can be taken by assault; it is surrounded by wet ditches, the walls are in good condition, but not armed.

“From the Bavarian detachments frequent reports of an alarming nature are received as to an advance of the enemy through the mountains; these can be explained by the frequent and strong patrols sent by the enemy across the frontier. There is no doubt, however, that during the last four days strong forces of the enemy have assembled near Stürzelbronn; a whole Division is said to have been sent thither from Bitsch. From the latter place it is reported that large bodies of troops are encamped there.

“I have learned that patrols of the XI. Corps are reconnoitring the Bienenwald, and have advanced as far as Lauterburg; they have, however, as yet seen no trace of the enemy.

“A rumour has been abroad among the inhabitants about here that within the next few days an Army Corps of the enemy is expected to arrive at Weissenburg, and that the heights south of that town are being fortified. I have

ordered the cavalry of the advanced guard to endeavour to do its utmost to clear up this point to-day. Anything further that may come to my knowledge shall be communicated to you."

Everything else that was known about the enemy had, of course, been communicated to both Generals through the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. They were therefore now in a position to exchange their individual views as to the intentions of the enemy.

They were both of opinion that the enemy would scarcely attempt to cross the Rhine now, as the concentration of the Third Army, so near the frontier, must be known to him. But on the other hand, there appeared great probability of his taking the offensive on the left bank of the river, in a direction down stream.

Indications of the latter project seemed clear from the whole political situation, from the fact that the adversary had taken the initiative as regards the declaration of war, and from the advance of the enemy's main army from Metz towards the Saar.

On the other hand, it was also probable that the troops massed in Alsace might only be intended to occupy that province and keep the Third Army in check while the main army took the offensive.

The Army Corps reported to be at Bitsch appeared for the present to be employed in keeping up the communication between the two great armies; since, if it were intended to reinforce the troops in Alsace, the corps would scarcely have been left for four days near Bitsch.

The whole of these matters had to be cleared up by the Cavalry Division. General A. explained how he intended to carry out this mission, and asked how far he might rely upon the support of the V. Army Corps. He appeared especially eager to obtain their support, to enable him to secure the possession of and, if necessary, to hold Weissenburg.

The General Commanding the V. Corps replied that he was quite convinced of the importance of securing Weissenburg, but that at present he was not in a position to offer sufficient support in that direction. His corps was still in the act of concentration; an advance with the whole force was therefore out of the question at the moment, and furthermore could not take place without the special sanction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army. The 17th Brigade

of infantry was at present the only complete part of the corps, and it was imperatively necessary for the security of the front of the Army Corps that that brigade should for the present remain intact.

General A. having remarked that it appeared to him that the security of the Army Corps was complete as soon as the Cavalry Division had taken up a position in front and covered the corps, followed closely by the infantry brigade, the General Commanding the V. Corps replied that this brigade would be necessary to him under certain eventualities which might occur on his right flank. It was to that flank that his special attention was directed, as the enemy could not be permitted to establish himself strongly in the mountains, and in case of a further advance on the part of the enemy in that direction, a compact body of troops would have to be interposed to stop his progress, for which purpose he had no other troops available than the 17th Brigade.

"However," he added, "I am quite willing to give you every support which lies in my power in accordance with the general position at the time you demand it, and in conformity with the instructions received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army. I will therefore order the 17th Brigade to direct two battalions and one squadron to follow up the main body of your Division, and I will also place a battery at the disposal of this force, but for the sole purpose of making a demonstration against Weissenburg should that town be held by the enemy, and eventually to surround the town should you advance beyond it. Colonel K., who will command that detachment, will, however, receive instructions that no attack is to be made on the place under any circumstances. If, however, the enemy quits the town, Colonel K. will be ordered to occupy it, in order the better to secure your right flank in the direction of the road to Bitsch. I, however, reserve to myself the discretion of recalling this detachment according to circumstances, as, should the enemy drive the Cavalry Division back, the town could only be held in case my Army Corps was sufficiently concentrated to enable me to support the detachment in good time."

General A. remarked that he should have wished for Colonel K. to be placed under his immediate orders, to enable him to use the troops beyond Weissenburg. The General Commanding V. Army Corps would not, however, consent to

this arrangement, and added that the detachment would not, in the first instance, be allowed to go beyond Weissenburg. As soon, however, as the Army Corps was in a position to send stronger forces towards Weissenburg, a further support of the Cavalry Division would be possible and would be ordered

After having arranged that the detachment of the V. Army Corps should be ready to march off from Bergzabern at 8 A.M. the next morning, General A. returned to his quarters.

9.30 am Arrived there at 9.30 A.M. he found his two aides-de-camp, the Commissary-General and the Division Auditeur ready to report to him.

The Commissary-General laid before the General the draft of the orders as to the issue of which he had yesterday been instructed. They were as follows:—

"The hired provision wagons taken from their respective cantonments are to be formed by brigades into columns of sixty wagons each; any wagons still required to make up this number will be furnished during the day by the Commissary-General.

"Each brigade will detail half a troop under an officer to act as escort to the column; the hired men and horses will be provisioned by the troops.

"The loading of all empty wagons will take place this afternoon at Landau and Germersheim respectively, according to instructions to be issued by the Commissary-General."

The Commissary-General also explained that his officers had already received special instructions to the above effect, and had been sent to the alarm posts of the several brigades, and that requisition for the necessary provisions had been forwarded to the victualling stores.

Next in order came the letters, &c., received by post; important among these was the receipt of a number of proclamations from the General Commanding-in-Chief, which were intended to be issued after entering the enemy's country. Several reports had to be considered, the orders mentioned above issued, and various matters of discipline to be decided, which filled General A.'s time up to 11.30 A.M.

12 noon The Brigadiers commanding the three brigades, according to previous arrangements, arrived punctually at 12 noon. The Staff Officer had not as yet returned from his mission; the two aides-de-camp, however, the junior of whom had mean-

while reported to the commandant of the fortress that the departure of the Division was fixed for the next morning, were directed to remain present at the deliberations in order to learn all necessary details.

The General Commanding Division now informed the Brigadiers of the mission the Cavalry Division was entrusted with, and explained on the detail map how he proposed to carry out his intentions, giving the Brigadiers at the same time a general outline of the news received as to the enemy's forces and movements, and also as to the position of the various outposts of our own V. Army Corps.

The General dwelt especially upon the mission of the cavalry for to-morrow, viz., to cross the Lauter and send from thence patrols as far as possible to the front in order to gain information as to the ground beyond that river. He at the same time did not conceal his opinion that it would be very awkward should Weissenburg prove to be occupied by troops, and that should such turn out to be the case, ways and means would have to be devised to isolate the garrison. The General added that for the main body of the Division special instructions were not as yet necessary, as he himself would be present with it. Both brigades were to be ready for the march at their place of rendezvous by 6 A.M., the brigade of Dragoons to lead; an advanced guard was not considered necessary for the present.

Regarding the measures to be taken after crossing the Lauter, they could not at this moment be discussed, but Major-General D. was informed by General A. that as the latter would probably not be able to have a personal interview with him for some days, he would now give him his, General A.'s, ideas as to the general rule to be followed in executing the instructions the Cavalry Division had received.

General A. said in effect as follows:—

"I have ordered the main body of the Division to the right wing, as I apprehend the principal forces of the enemy to be in that direction. It is, however, very necessary that the ground as far as the Rhine, to the left of the main road, and especially the road leading from Strassburg through Selz to Lauterburg, should be most carefully reconnoitred, the more so owing to rumours of an intention on the part of the enemy of crossing the Rhine.

"The simplest plan to carry this out would certainly appear

to be that of following the course of the road to and beyond Lauterburg, but by doing so you would run a great risk of losing direct communication with the remainder of the Division.

"The latter risk must, however, above all things be avoided, as I am bound to reckon upon the support of your brigade, or at least the greater part of it, on the right flank of the Division, should the enemy oppose to that wing any strong bodies of his cavalry. You will therefore, on reaching Schleithal, take the direction towards Nieder-Rödern along the Selz stream, and conduct from there the reconnaissance of the main road Lauterburg—Selz, and the ground as far as the Rhine, by flank patrols; for this purpose you will of course be required to detail a flank detachment for your left flank consisting of, say, one or two squadrons. The XI. Corps will give you an important support as soon as the troops of that corps have occupied Lauterburg. To effect this occupation I have sent my Staff Officer to Germersheim, and on his return I shall inform you of the result of his mission; if possible I will call for a few moments at the bivouac of your brigade during the afternoon.

"It is of course to be understood that you will take the necessary steps to keep up communication with the main body of the Division; the right column will be similarly instructed.

"I am unable at present to give you any idea as to the manner in which we shall advance beyond the great forest of Hagenau, as this forest stretches most awkwardly right across our path. Anyhow you will not be able to march with your main body beyond Nieder-Rödern, or to advance more than a few squadrons as far as Forstfeld and Selz, and into the forest.

"As soon as you have fixed your headquarters for each day, you will despatch an officer to me, who will report on the proceedings of the day, and also convey to me your intentions for the ensuing day; this officer must be acquainted with all necessary details. Any extraordinary occurrence you will of course report to me at once. In the enemy's country it will be necessary to despatch reports of this kind in duplicate or triplicate, and by different roads.

"The most advanced patrols should always be of sufficient strength—not too weak, as is most often the case during peace manoeuvres; never less than from five to eight horses."

Having given Major-General D. these special instructions,

General A. turned to the whole of the Brigadiers in order to call their attention to some other general points to be observed. He remarked as follows:—

“I desire to call your very careful attention to the special mission of our Division, viz., ‘to observe.’ I would also ask you to impress upon the junior officers the necessity of being very guarded as regards attacks when out independently; they are not to allow themselves to be carried away, as is so often the case during peace manœuvres, and to attack everything that happens to oppose their march. Fighting must be resorted to only when it will offer a ready opportunity to attain an object, or if no other means are available to obtain an insight into the enemy’s movements. Should a combat be inevitable—and this, gentlemen, will also concern you—great care must be taken, considering our isolated position, to reflect whether the situation will permit of throwing our last reserve into the combat. Should the attack of the latter fail, it will be difficult to rally the men again, and the chance of accomplishing our object will have been lost.

“I would also call your attention to the fact that it is of the utmost importance to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to gain intelligence as to the formation of the enemy’s forces. The regiments are in possession of the instructions from Army Headquarters as to the *ordre de bataille* of the enemy’s forces as far as can be ascertained up to the present. It remains, however, to be seen whether the information obtained is correct, and it is therefore necessary that every officer should make notes, and carry them in his pouch, as to the information in this respect already in our possession—that is, regarding the enemy’s 1st and 5th Corps—and should be careful to interrogate prisoners with a view to gaining all possible information on that point.

“It must also not be forgotten, that to-morrow we shall probably sleep in the enemy’s country, and care must therefore be taken to prevent surprise. Whenever possible, the horses must be brought under shelter for the night, but you must insist upon commanding officers taking every possible means to secure safety from surprise. It is also necessary that, considering our isolated position, measures should be taken to secure the transport and hired wagons. Should this not be requisite the first day of the march, as then we shall still be within the area of our own advanced posts, it will be quite necessary on succeeding days. The whole

of the wagons should remain together under escort of half a troop; the ambulance wagons and led horses, however, must follow immediately behind the troops, *i.e.*, in one body in rear of each brigade. As regards hired wagons, each brigade must form a separate column. Further instructions in this respect will be issued to you. Great care is to be taken that no wagons except those taken on the strength of brigades, or specially ordered, are to be allowed to follow the troops; the transport and other wagons are always to follow the troops at a distance of at least four-and-a-half miles. To these points I call your special attention."

This completed the principal points to be discussed; several matters of detail now came under consideration, and the Brigadiers returned to their respective brigades. The officers who had been sent from brigades to headquarters to receive orders as regards duties, interior economy, &c., had each been furnished by one of the aides-de-camp with a copy of such orders, and returned with their Brigadiers to bivouac. Major-General D. remained a little longer at the request of General A., in order to go with the latter over the map of the country about to be traversed, and discuss any doubtful point. Nothing noteworthy, however, occurred, and General A. was enabled to dine with his Staff at 2 p.m.

During dinner the Staff Officer of the Division returned from Germersheim. The General Commanding XI. Corps had been very pleased to see him. According to reports from the outposts of that corps about twenty chasseurs-à-cheval had for the first time been observed the day before near Lauterburg. The Army Corps, excepting a few details and the transport, had already completed its formation. The proposed advance of the Cavalry Division gave the corps the wished-for opportunity to occupy Lauterburg. The General said that he would prefer to have his advanced posts on the other side of the Bienenwald rather than on this side, as the wood concealed every movement of the enemy; and in order to carry out this object he proposed to advance the 41st Infantry Brigade, his advanced guard, early on the morning of the 31st inst. Major-General U., who commanded the brigade, would receive instructions to occupy Lauterburg and Scheibenhart with 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 1 battery, and to place outposts further south; the rest of the advanced guard would be placed in cantonments north of the Bienenwald. The advance would commence from Langenkandel at

6 A.M. The General Commanding would also instruct the advanced guard to observe with its cavalry the road towards Selz, and the ground between it and the Rhine.

The Staff Officer had further arranged that at 6 A.M. the following morning, a report from the outposts of the XI. Corps should be sent to Winden, with any intelligence gained about the enemy up to that time.

General A. expressed himself very pleased with the result of his Staff Officer's mission. While the latter partook of dinner, General A. acquainted him with the result of his interview with the General Commanding V. Army Corps. It was now undoubtedly confirmed that since yesterday the enemy's cavalry was approaching the frontier by the main roads. On entering the enemy's country the next morning, it would therefore be necessary to gain positive information as to the points from which these parties came, also the strength of the detachments, and the corps they belonged to.

Dinner was over at 3 P.M., and General A., accompanied by his Staff Officer, went to his quarters, in order to draw up definite orders for to-morrow, having regard to the knowledge gained during the day. Their deliberations resulted in the following orders being issued:—

“1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I., JOURNAL NO. .

“*Headquarters of Division, Landau,*

“*July 30th, 1870. 4 P.M.*

“The enemy's cavalry patrols (Chasseurs-à-cheval) were yesterday observed near Lauterburg and Weissenburg; the last-mentioned place is occupied by infantry—apparently, however, very weakly.

“Larger bodies of the enemy's troops are reported to have concentrated within the last few days near Hagenau and Stürzelbronn (road Weissenburg—Bitsch).

“The Division will cross the frontier to-morrow for the purpose of gaining information as to the whereabouts, &c., of the enemy, and will advance as far as the Lauter.

“In order to carry out this object the Heavy and Dragoon Brigades and the 2nd Horse Artillery Battery will parade at their rendezvous near Knöringen, and be ready to march off towards Weissenburg by 6 A.M.

“The Hussar Brigade and the 3rd Horse Artillery

Battery will march off at the same time from their rendezvous and move towards Schleithal, from which place they will establish communication with the advanced guard of the XI. Army Corps; the latter is ordered to move off from Langenkandel at 6 A.M., and to reach Lauterburg and Scheibenhart. The ground between the roads Nieder-Rödern—Lauterburg and Nieder-Rödern—Weissenburg is to be watched as closely as possible.

"The main body of the Division, which will be under the immediate command of the Lieutenant-General Commanding, will be followed up by a mixed detachment from the V. Corps as far as Weissenburg.

"The Army Hospital Corps detachment will follow in immediate rear of the main body, also the ambulance wagons and led horses. The remaining transport wagons, &c., of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, as also the requisitioned wagons with provisions, will follow the Division on the main road as far as Billigheim, and await their further instructions; they will march off at 8 A.M. from Knöringen.

"The whole of the transport will, until further orders, be under the command of 1st Lieutenant X., of the Cuirassiers.

"The Hussar Brigade will issue similar instructions as regards its own transport, &c.

"The headquarters of the Division will in all probability be at Altenstatt to-morrow.

"Each brigade will detail a galloper and a trumpeter to attend the Divisional Staff; the officers and trumpeters so detailed to report themselves at the rendezvous at Knöringen at 6 A.M. to-morrow.

"Unless the brigades are distant more than one day's march (fourteen miles) from headquarters of the Division, they will daily detail an orderly, who can read and write well, to report himself at the Divisional headquarters at 4 p.m. for orders. This order also applies to the artillery, Army Hospital Corps, and transport. The orderlies will bring all letters intended for transmission through the field post, ready tied up in a bundle, and will take back, giving their receipt, those letters that may have been received for their respective corps. Should the roads which these orderlies are required to traverse not be quite safe, they must be accompanied by a suitable escort.

"The brigade marching in rear of the main body of the

Standing order

Division (at present the heavy brigade) will take care that during the advance a line of connecting posts is kept up between it and the nearest strong post of the army in rear, and will publish the names of the places at which these posts are stationed. These posts will remain at their respective stations, even should the brigades be still further advanced, and will be drawn in only as they are gradually relieved by the army on its forward march.

"I expect from the Brigadiers a daily report, unless anything of a special nature should take place, giving a written *résumé* of the events during the past twenty-four hours. This will be brought by the orderly who comes for orders. Contact with the enemy, or any other important event, must, however, be reported *immediately*, and if of a special nature, *by an officer*, but in all cases *in writing*. This order will apply to detached brigades only in so far as the distance will allow of a direct report being made without changing hands.

"As regards the whole of the reports, even those of the most trifling nature, I beg to call attention to His Majesty's regulations on the subject, in accordance with which they are to contain: Place; date; hour of dispatch; clear indication of the party from which the report comes: *e.g.*, from the advanced guard of the—squadron of the—regiment of—; or from the patrol on the road to X; from the picquet No. 1, at or near Y, &c. Name, rank, and regiment of the sender must be written clearly, so as to be easily read. All reports written in pencil must always be wrapped up in a second paper; this precaution would, moreover, appear very desirable for all messages despatched on wet days. Officers Commanding regiments are held responsible that every officer and non-commissioned officer is always in possession of a sufficient supply of material to furnish necessary reports.

"A.,

Lieut.-General Commanding Division.

"To the—

"1st. 1st Cavalry Brigade.

"2nd. 2nd " "

"3rd. 3rd " "

"4th. Horse Artillery.

"5th. Commissariat Officer (original to be returned by the latter)."

The order of march for the transport had been issued

through the Commissary General. The baggage wagons of the Divisional and Brigade Staffs to be leading, followed by those of regiments by seniority; next the hired provision wagons, spare and transport wagons, and led horses as far as at present organized.

After General A. had signed the orders quoted above, and copies had been made, he directed his Staff Officer to prepare a report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army relative to the proposed movements for to-morrow.

The General himself, accompanied by one of his aides-de-camp, the latter taking a copy of the Divisional Orders with him to hand to the 3rd Brigade, rode to the bivouac of the latter brigade (about 5 P.M.). A number of copies of the proclamations received from Army Headquarters had already been despatched to the 3rd Brigade.

Arrived there, the Divisional Orders were handed to Major-General D.; General A. informed him at the same time what he had learnt from the XI. Army Corps, and called the Brigadier's attention to the necessity of finding out the place from which the enemy's Chasseurs were coming. He also informed him that at 6 A.M. the next morning a report would be sent to Winden from the outposts of the XI. Corps, stating if any further intelligence of the enemy had been gained up to that time; it would therefore be necessary to despatch an officer to that place, so as to arrive in good time. Should anything of importance be reported, the General Commanding Division was to be at once informed of it. He also said that the detachment of the XI. Corps sent to Lauterburg and Scheibenhard would consist of 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 1 battery, that direct communication must be kept up with that detachment, and that the latter should always be made acquainted with the whereabouts of the brigade, and any information gained of the enemy's movements.

General A. then assembled the officers and men of the brigade, and addressed them briefly on the duties about to be undertaken. After having made an inspection of the horses, he took leave of Major-General D., and returned to Landau, where he arrived about 7 P.M. The Staff Officer handed the General on his arrival a report which had been received from the General Commanding V. Army Corps, and also the draft of the proposed report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

The former stated as follows:—
(Copy.)

"5TH ARMY CORPS.

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION.

17TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.

"Bergzabern,
July 30th, 1870. 2 P.M.

"The 1st squadron of the 2nd Regiment of Uhlans, which had been sent this morning on a reconnaissance towards Weissenburg, reached Schweigen without meeting the enemy. From this place ~~half~~ a troop was detached towards Altenstatt, and ~~half~~ a troop towards Weiler: both detachments were met south of these villages by parties of the enemy's Chasseurs-à-cheval, forty to fifty men each, and by them compelled to retire. The enemy did not pursue beyond the Lauter, but occupied the bridges with dismounted men.

"The several patrols which had been sent as far as the town were fired upon from the walls, but no regular garrison could be observed; the drawbridges were also drawn up to-day.

"Neither movements of troops nor any entrenching work could be perceived going on upon the heights, which rise up very steeply close to the town.

"X., MAJOR-GENERAL."

Although from this report the presence of the enemy's troops at Weissenburg could not appear doubtful, yet it seemed as if only a small detachment of observation was left in garrison. The head of the Cavalry Division must, however, be prepared to encounter resistance. Some time back some geographical notes had been sent to the different corps from Army Headquarters, and on one of the aides-de-camp remarking that to the best of his recollection Weissenburg was mentioned in one of these notes, these documents were overhauled, and the following note on Weissenburg found:—

"Weissenburg, which has been discontinued as a fortress for some years, has still walls in fairly good condition, also a wet ditch, and may if required be converted into a *place de moment*. The town is important as a railway terminus and junction of the main lines of communication in this part of Alsace.

"The so-called Weissenburg 'lines' have no military value whatever; a few completely demolished trenches are still in existence here and there."

(T.L.)

D

This note confirmed the General in his view that he must make the attempt to occupy the place, if at all possible.

The draft of the report to the Headquarters of the Army read as follows :—

“1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I., JOURNAL NO.

“*Divisional Headquarters, Landau,*
July 30th, 1870. 5.30 P.M.

“In accordance with instructions received from Army Headquarters, dated 29th instant, Section I., No. , the Division will advance to-morrow, the 31st instant, with two brigades on Weissenburg, and with one brigade towards Schleithal; the latter will on the following day, August 1st, probably advance on the road Lauterburg—Selz.

“Arrangements have been made with the V. and XI. Corps, by which the former will on the 31st push a detachment of 2 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery beyond the present line of outposts towards Weissenburg, and the latter will occupy Lauterburg and Scheibenhart with a detachment of 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 1 battery.

“Weissenburg is occupied by the enemy—apparently, however, not in any force. The Division will attempt to occupy the place if it can be done without great loss.

“Stronger forces of the enemy’s Chasseurs-à-cheval, perhaps one squadron, have to-day been observed at Weissenburg, but did not cross the Lauter. No entrenching could be perceived going on on the heights beyond the town.

“Patrols of the enemy’s Chasseurs-à-cheval were also yesterday reported from Lauterburg.

“Should nothing occur to prevent it, the headquarters of the Division will be transferred to-morrow to Altenstatt.

“A., LIEUT.-GENERAL.

“The General Commanding-in-Chief,
Third Army, Speyer.”

This report, a fair copy having been made, was signed and handed over to the field post for transmission.

This appeared to complete the duties for the day. It was now 8.30 P.M., and the General dismissed his Staff.

Major V. made use of his spare time and made the following entry in the Divisional diary :—

*" Divisional Headquarters, Landau,
" Saturday, July 30th, 1870.*

"The brigades moved this morning into their respective bivouacs, the 1st and 2nd to Knöringen, and the 3rd to Offenbach.

"The Staff Officer was despatched to Germersheim in order to have an interview with the General Commanding XI. Army Corps, and to arrange for support from that corps. In consequence, a detachment of the 41st Infantry Brigade, consisting of 3 battalions, 3 squadrons, and 1 battery, will occupy Lauterburg and Scheibenhart to-morrow.

"On the part of the V. Army Corps, a detachment consisting of 2 battalions, 1 squadron, and 1 battery is also promised as a support.

"The orders issued for to-morrow direct an advance of the 1st and 2nd Brigades and 2nd Horse Artillery Battery towards Weissenburg, and the 3rd Brigade and 3rd Horse Artillery Battery towards Schleithal. The formation of transport columns will be completed by requisitions on arrival in the enemy's country; the wagons hired at present will remain with the brigades until replaced from the enemy's country.

"Special instructions were issued personally to the Brigadiers at the Divisional Headquarters."

OBSERVATIONS ON THE 30TH JULY.

As will be seen from the preceding narrative, General A. was unceasingly engaged in arranging details, &c., for the following day from 6 A.M. to 8.30 P.M.

Even the hour devoted to dinner was necessarily interrupted, and during that meal a discussion on service matters took place.

From this, therefore, it may be deduced how very desirable it is that the first forward movement of a Division of cavalry should not be made in too great a hurry, as otherwise neither time nor place will allow of making the preliminary preparations necessary for the movement.

This will be avoided if the cavalry is concentrated and organized in good time, and if the leader of the corps is supplied with every requisite information regarding the enemy through his army headquarters. If this course has

however, been neglected, or unforeseen circumstances have not permitted of its being carried out, and if the Cavalry Divisions have been necessarily organized at the last moment, concentrated within the rayon of operations, and immediately after despatched on their several missions, it will be found that the position will then become much more difficult.

The whole of the combinations and measures concerted by General A. prove how very necessary it is that the leader should be thoroughly *au fait* with the general situation, and that he should possess a knowledge of and understand the requirements of war on a large scale.

The leader of a Cavalry Division, acting independently, will frequently find himself with his troops in a position demanding a profound knowledge of strategy, much more so than a General Officer Commanding an Infantry Division, who in most cases is only required to lead his troops while they form part of an Army Corps, and has merely to follow the orders of the officer commanding the latter.

This is a serious reminder to all cavalry officers in the higher grades that they must study and make themselves thoroughly acquainted with those requirements of real warfare which peace manœuvres do not give opportunities of practising. If otherwise, a leader will achieve proportionately little or nothing with even the finest cavalry in the world, and this splendid and expensive arm of the service will never be made use of to its fullest possible extent and power.

There are no doubt many who think otherwise, who imagine that the qualities which every cavalry officer ought to possess will also be sufficient for him who is placed in high command. The love of danger, confidence in the high courage, and in case of need the speed, of his horse, the keenness of the dashing, bold horseman, who, although victor to-day and vanquished to-morrow, will still stick close to his adversary and attempt to gain in one quarter what he lost in another; all these qualities are insufficient for a leader of a large body of troops. No doubt *he should possess these qualities; these alone, however, will not suffice, least of all when a leader is placed at the head of about 4,000 horsemen, and is required to act independently.*

It is here presumed that General A. during time of peace made himself acquainted with every duty required of him in the higher operations of war, and that he possessed a sound knowledge of all those matters that are of importance to

the General Commanding the Army to which the Division belongs.

He will therefore know from which points important movements on the part of the enemy can be discovered in good time, and he will also be able to judge of the real meaning and importance of such movements.

The objects kept in view by him during the 30th July were principally the *securing of concerted action with the two Army Corps, and the instructions to be given to his own General Officers*; both these points require special observation and discussion.

Regarding the request made by the Lieut.-General Commanding the Division for the support of the two Army Corps nearest him, this matter had already been pointed out to him through Army Headquarters; but General A., during his interview with the General Commanding the V. Army Corps, appeared so very anxious to secure this support that it gives one the idea of a certain amount of anxiety and fear on the part of General A. lest the desired support should not be forthcoming. It will therefore be desirable to discuss as to how far such requests for support appear justified. We will suppose that the Cavalry Division would, under the circumstances depicted in these studies, encounter the enemy on the second day's march to the front near the forest of Hagenau, which is situated between the mountains and the river Rhine. The advanced guards of the Third Army would at that time still be at Bergzabern and Langenkandel, and one Infantry Division only would have followed in support of the cavalry. The reconnaissance of the latter we will suppose could be carried no further, as it finds the outskirts of the forest occupied by the enemy's infantry at all the principal points of entrance, and the cavalry patrols pushed further to the west are kept in check by hostile cavalry. Should under these circumstances the *whole* of the Infantry Division advance to the attack of one or other of these points along the outskirts of the forest?

This would constitute a reconnaissance in force which, as experience has proved, should never be resorted to, and is useless, unless the whole army is ready to advance and reap the full benefit of such a reconnaissance, which here, however, is not the case. On the other hand, there is the risk that, while the Division becomes engaged at one point on the border of a wood several miles long in a combat, the dimensions of which cannot be foreseen, and out of which it will be unable to disengage itself at will, the adversary may debouch en

masse at some other points along the border and thereby endanger the retreat of the Infantry Division in a most serious manner. To cavalry such a danger of having its retreat cut off does not become so serious, as its rapidity of movement comes into play, and it may, and generally can, extricate itself by making detours. If necessary, cavalry can retreat round the flanks, and even then need not lose contact with the enemy; should the troops pursuing the cavalry retire, the latter can resume contact and observation of the adversary's movements. The chance of encountering the enemy in superior force as supposed above is quite within range of possibility here, as the main body of the enemy's army is supposed to be in the act of concentrating in rear of the forest of Hagenau.

Under the circumstances as explained above it is therefore impossible to let an Infantry Division follow closely in rear of the 1st Cavalry Division. Such a measure should be considered especially unsafe, as the V. Army Corps of the enemy's army may at any moment debouch from the mountains in rear of our own right wing. The Cavalry Division is quite able to extricate itself *via* Lauterburg should an advance on the part of the enemy take place, but for the Infantry Division engaged in a combat near the forest of Hagenau this would not be quite such an easy matter.

Considering these circumstances, however, more closely, it will appear that it is of great importance to the Cavalry Division to be assured that the roads debouching from the mountains in rear of Weissenburg are secured by its own infantry, and that the same is the case with the bridges across the Lauter. If the latter are safe the cavalry may remain on the right bank of the river up to the last moment, as in such a case it is not limited to the crossing in its direct rear alone, but can throw itself against the flanks of the adversary's columns advancing towards this crossing by basing its retreat on some other passages across the river.

The infantry in rear of the defiles will be less endangered, as, should the enemy even force *one* bridge, it would take him some considerable time to bring larger bodies of troops across that one passage. The main body of the army would also, in that case, be so near that precautions could be taken to cover the retreat of the infantry in good time. It must not, however, be overlooked that, even under such circumstances as here represented, the cavalry is quite able by dismounting a few squadrons of the light regiments to dispense with the

support of the infantry, and can find within itself means to hamper the advance of the enemy through the mountain passes, as well as to occupy for its own security the bridges across the Lauter.

While, therefore, in the case under consideration, the support of an Infantry Division must be regarded as a doubtful measure during a further advance of the Cavalry Division, it may for defensive purposes—*i.e.*, for covering its retreat—be considered as probably useful, but not, however, as undoubtedly necessary.

It then follows, that a Cavalry Division armed with carbines can and must find within itself the power of executing such tasks as may be demanded of it during operations. The more it inclines to the belief that such power can only be exercised by leaning on the support obtainable from the infantry, the more it will habituate itself to look for that support, and by so doing we shall arrive at a reverse order of things, *viz.*: that infantry will be called upon to carry out reconnaissance in first line.

The conduct of General von Katzler, one of the most daring and clever officers, shows how small infantry detachments marching in rear of cavalry have always been regarded.

This experienced leader of advanced guards of the "York" Corps, during the wars of 1813 and 1814, often disposed of over twenty squadrons, about the strength of the Cavalry Division under notice. The peculiar mission imposed upon the army during operations in Silesia and Saxony, *viz.*, "to remain constantly with its whole force in close contact with the adversary, but to avoid all engagements as far as possible," naturally necessitated both armies being continually in such close proximity to each other as in the highest degree to hamper every free movement of the cavalry attached to the army. The infantry vanguards—two to three battalions—consequently followed the cavalry advanced guard at very close interval. The study of this advanced guard will show with how much care the General deemed it his duty to watch over and regulate the movements of the infantry. "With great precautions he protected it against any possible surprise, and always sent instructions from the head of the cavalry how far the infantry might advance with safety. If the ground allowed of it he would point out a certain point as a temporary halt."* Katzler would often instruct the commander

* Biography of General v. Reyher, published in the Appendix to the *Militär Wochenblatt*, 1861.

of the infantry as follows:—"I will give you notice in plenty of time to enable you to secure your retreat without difficulty."

The cavalry should therefore always make the greatest use of that freedom which its movements permit to secure *independent* action. Cavalry should be as far in advance of an army on the *offensive* as the enemy will permit, and infantry does not require to follow in the immediate wake of the cavalry, as the former necessarily moves but slowly and acts like a drag to the latter.

From the campaigns of Napoleon I. much may be learnt in this respect. He was a master of the art of making excellent use of cavalry during operations—before the flower of it perished in Russia. Strong columns, sometimes over 70 squadrons, would march a long distance in advance of his armies. Whenever the cavalry was brought to a halt through encountering the enemy, it would keep close contact with the latter until their nearest Infantry Divisions had come up. Then would follow a series of advanced guard combats, undertaken by the combined forces of the masses of cavalry and the heads of the leading infantry columns; *but the other Infantry Divisions would at that time be always in close proximity and ready to enter into action.*

So also when an army is on the *defensive*: the cavalry, at first alone and without regard to distance from its own army, will be required to reconnoitre the advance of the enemy and to delay it as long as possible; if pressed back by the advancing heads of the enemy's infantry columns, it will find shelter in its own infantry advanced guards. Whether the latter should be half or a whole day's march, or even further, in advance of the main body must entirely depend on the nature of the ground and strategical considerations.

It can only again be pointed out that, *as a matter of principle, the reconnoitring duties for an army must be performed by the cavalry independent of and without trusting to the support of the infantry. A large body of cavalry which, in order to carry out this duty, cannot emancipate itself from its infantry, is of no value, and will never pay for its keep.*

This, of course, does not exclude support from infantry in cases where circumstances may demand it without endangering the infantry.

For instance, a large tract of ground in which a few small, scattered, hostile parties still remain may require immediate occupation, either to frighten the inhabitants by the

appearance of our troops, to hinder any new organizations from taking place there, or to prevent the enemy from making use of such resources as may still be available; if in such a case even a small force of infantry is attached to a Cavalry Division it may be of great use. Such support will also be valuable when some important points, such as bridges across a river, are to be occupied, a railway tunnel to be secured, captured magazines to be guarded, or fortified places to be isolated, &c.

After the battle of Sedan one or two battalions were attached to each Cavalry Division ordered to march in advance of the army. Under the then prevailing circumstances it was not expected that the cavalry would suddenly be forced to retreat, and therefore no danger to the so isolated infantry was anticipated, as the enemy's forces then under arms were not able to take the field. For small infantry columns sufficient wagons for rapidly transporting them can as a rule always be found near any place.

An infantry support is, however, even in such cases as mentioned above, not absolutely necessary. The cavalry ought here also to be able to find within itself the necessary power to fulfil its mission. However, these supports are of great use so far, that they prevent small parties being constantly detached from the cavalry, and so leave it intact to carry out the object in view.

Among the many situations, where similar circumstances may present themselves, may here be mentioned the use of cavalry during the minor operations of war, especially when troops for the purpose of observation remain for any length of time at one place, or during a civil war—situations, for instance, which happened during the siege of Paris. Although cavalry armed with good carbines may be perfectly able to help itself under such circumstances, yet an infantry support will always be of great use. Otherwise the endurance of the horses will in time be put to a severe strain, owing to incessant alarms, and the numerous day and night patrols required during a siege.

In the study under our consideration, the early occupation of Weissenburg and Lauterburg is, however, desirable for other reasons. As already stated, the Third Army purposes, as soon as its concentration is completed, to advance in a southerly direction; for that purpose the Lauter must be crossed, and it must undoubtedly occupy both points indicated above. No great difficulties could possibly arise with

regard to Lanterburg, but Weissenburg would be under existing circumstances easily converted into a stronghold, which, should the adversary intend to dispute its possession, would require to be taken by storm; an undertaking the successful issue of which is doubtful, and which, even supposing its capture, would demand under any circumstances the most serious sacrifices.

At the present time Lanterburg is not occupied, and Weissenburg is apparently garrisoned only by a small detachment for observation; but during the last few days some of the enemy's cavalry patrols have been seen about both places, and a stronger occupation may every moment be expected.

The Third Army is not, however, as yet, ready to take the offensive. Those corps which have completed their formation might of course be sent to the front, in order to occupy those two places, but it is impossible to decide whether these corps might not at any moment meet with strong forces of the enemy and be drawn into battle, during which a support would not be possible. This being, moreover, the beginning of the campaign, when lost battles are of double importance, it appears much more to the purpose to let the Cavalry Division clear up the ground in front to the fullest possible extent before detachments of an army, not yet in a position to carry out operations, are exposed to the risk of contact with the enemy.

Should the Cavalry Division during its advance across the Lauter find small detachments of the enemy's forces only, Weissenburg and Lanterburg, as well as the principal crossings of the river between these towns, must then at once be occupied and held.

There is a great difference between the Third Army occupying these points after a severe fight, and taking possession of them, without fighting, with the advanced troops.

The Army is now in a position to carry out the latter plan, and can undoubtedly cover the concentration of the army with its advanced guard much more effectually by placing it near the river Lauter, than by keeping it more in rear on ground not so favourable for that purpose.

The general situation as known at present demands an occupation of the line of the Lauter by mixed detachments, should such occupation be possible without fighting.

The cavalry in advance of the army will gain much

more freedom of movement after the occupation of that line.

Taking this view of the situation, General A. would appear to be perfectly justified, during his interview with the General Commanding V. Army Corps, in laying great stress upon pushing advanced detachments as far as Weissenburg; *beyond the Lauter he would not, however, be justified in making use of the detachment, as far as can be judged at present. On the other side of the Lauter General A. ought to be able to secure his march with his own men.*

The way in which the two Generals accede to the request for support to the cavalry varies in each case, but when the present conditions of the two Army Corps are compared it will appear capable of explanation.

The V. Army Corps has at present only one fully organized brigade at disposal; there is no necessity to invite an engagement until the concentration of the Army Corps is fully completed; on the contrary, the Army Corps will be glad should the movements of the enemy be such as to save it from all combats for the present. The one brigade now ready is moreover, necessary to cover the concentration of the corps, and to secure the latter more in the direction of the mountains than towards Weissenburg. The corps commander is therefore unable to place more than part of that brigade at the disposal of the cavalry, and is perfectly justified in distinctly demanding that the battalions detached for the above purpose should not be used for further offensive operations, and that they shall be at the disposal of the Army Corps commander, who will thus be able to see that this is carried out.

The XI. Corps is, however, in a much more forward position. Its concentration is already completed, it is covered on its right flank by the V. Army Corps and the distance from the enemy, and on its left flank by the Rhine. Its whole attention may therefore be concentrated upon its immediate front, and for that purpose it is no doubt very desirable that it should be able to advance beyond the Bienenwald, which is very awkwardly situated right across the front of its outposts. The Cavalry Division consequently receives important support from this corps, as the whole advanced guard brigade will be pushed to the front, thereby lightening the work of the Cavalry Division considerably by taking a great part of the reconnoitring of the Bienenwald off its

hands on the first day, and the observation of the road Lauterburg—Selz on the second day's march.

The General's Instructions to his Brigadiers.

These instructions comprised the communication as to the mission the Division had been ordered to accomplish, the news to hand about the enemy's movements, General A.'s ideas as to the best way of carrying out the instructions received from Army Headquarters, and further, how far, in doing so, support from the nearest Army Corps could be relied upon.

The information imparted is quite sufficient to give each Brigadier an idea as to the present state of affairs, and is enough to enable them, should they be required to act independently, to readily understand the operations about to be undertaken, and how they are expected to carry them out.

This fact of one or other of the brigades having to act independently must here be calculated upon as liable to happen at any moment in the task about to be undertaken; *the Brigadiers must therefore receive much more detailed information and instruction than would be the case with an Infantry Division.* If an Infantry Division desires to detach a regiment or brigade while on the march, plenty of time will always be found to point out to the officer commanding such detachment the mission which lies before him, as well as to enumerate to him the various points it is desired to impress upon him. The communication between the main body of the Division and the detachment can, as a rule, be established at any moment, and the detachment influenced at will; but with cavalry, where the reconnaissance of a large extent of ground has to be made, and where all movements are executed with rapidity, a regiment or brigade detached is temporarily lost to the eyes of the Division, all influence upon the movements of the detachment ceases for the time being, and the detachment enters upon perfectly independent action, perhaps for a considerable space of time, much more so than can ever be the case with an Infantry Division.

It is for this reason that General A. gives special and more detailed information to the Brigadier whose immediate detachment from the Division will place him for some considerable time beyond his influence.

General A. cannot very well give instruction in detail to

his Brigadier as to how he is to carry out his mission, but he lays down some general rules for his guidance. Herein must be included his instruction that, although the brigade of Hussars is directed to watch the road Lauterburg—Selz, and its continuation towards Strassburg, a march *on the road itself* is not required. General A., in pointing this out, no doubt intends thereby to prevent any interruption of the communication between the different parts of his Division, and also to enable him, should he require it, to receive some support from the brigade during the course of a day's march or so. Such a support must steadily be kept in view as long as circumstances will permit of it. Should the latter demand a further extension of front, or should a difficult piece of ground intervene between the two columns, like the forest of Hagenau, all communication would of course be at an end.

General A. in his instructions dwells, however, upon the day following as well; this is not, as a rule, desirable, as it is seldom easy to conjecture what a second day may bring forth, and how materially situations may have changed by that time. Here, however, we may predict, of course not with perfect certainty, that the Lauter will be reached on the 31st July, and it is therefore not quite out of place to issue instructions beyond that day to the Brigadier of the Hussars at his personal interview with the General Commanding the Division. Of course one is hardly ever able to predict with certainty that a detachment must reach a certain indicated point which lies within the sphere of operations of the enemy's forces, as this will in reality depend on the movements of the enemy. But one can say: "March with your main body towards a certain point, but not beyond it."

The latter course was followed here. The brigade is ordered to reach Nieder-Rödern on the 1st August, but is not to press beyond it with its main body. The reason for this order will be found in the following views of the General Commanding the Division:—

The brigade of Hussars, arrived at Nieder-Rödern, will be in front of the eastern portion of the great forest of Hagenau, while the road which must be followed by the main body of the Division, viz., the road Weissenburg—Hagenau, debouches on to the central or western part of the forest. These large bodies of cavalry cannot of course penetrate into this dense forest, which interrupts the communication between the two

cavalry columns, until some advanced patrols have been thrown into it, and ascertained the whereabouts of the enemy in, or in rear of, the forest. Should, for instance, the main body encounter the enemy at or while nearing the forest, the latter disputing a further advance, the brigade of Hussars could not possibly advance with its whole strength on the road through Forstfeld towards Strassburg, especially as in such ground the enemy's strength could not very easily be ascertained. The advance of that brigade would similarly become impossible if meanwhile reports are received of any movements of columns of the enemy's troops along the mountain road leading from Bitsch *via* Reichshofen to Sulz, thereby threatening the right flank of the Division. It can already, therefore, be directed that, should the cavalry succeed in gaining the forest of Hagenau on the 1st August, the left flank column should remain temporarily halted at Nieder-Rödern. Arrived there, the General Commanding Division will require information as to the state of affairs in his front and right flank before proceeding to issue any further directions. In order to ensure this object he must see that the main body of the detached brigade is detained at some previously indicated point. As to the directions then to be issued, nothing whatever can be said at present, as the movements of the enemy up to that time cannot even be guessed at.

It is for this reason also, that the General Commanding Division does not give any directions on the 30th July as regards the main body of the Division, as nothing can be said as to how matters may stand on arrival at Weissenburg. Even if he were inclined to make some preliminary arrangements, they would not be of any use; he might, perhaps, say how he intends to act with the main body of the Division should half-a-dozen eventualities occur, and in the end a seventh or eighth eventuality may happen, most probably one which he did not in the least calculate upon. Such an issue of instructions serves only to confuse the various commanders, and to prove how little the leader is fitted to issue instructions. In the case under notice, such instructions would have been all the more useless, as the commander of the Division is marching with the main body, and is therefore always likely to be in a position to issue any special orders without much loss of time. Moreover, the fact that time and place of rendezvous have been

fixed is sufficient for the present. The formation of an advanced guard, the selection of special flank detachments, and similar matters do not, as yet, require immediate action, as both brigades will to-morrow march within the rayon occupied by the advanced guards of the V. Army Corps, and their advance will be therefore sufficiently secured. When once the outposts of the V. Corps are passed, other arrangements will of course become necessary for the continuation of the march, and to effect this, plenty of time will be found on the following day, especially so as some of the arrangements must strictly depend on the news of the enemy's movements received up to that time from the troops furthest advanced to the front.

The instructions of the Divisional commander touch also upon some points of general interest, and he calls the attention of the Brigadiers to them. Some of these points are, no doubt, matters of regulation with which the Brigadiers ought to be as well acquainted as General A. It must not, however, be forgotten that we are as yet at the beginning of a campaign, and that the enemy will be met with for the first time; and it does not therefore appear to be at all out of place to call attention to mistakes which are often committed, especially such as are repeatedly noticed at peace manœuvres. Later on, during the course of the campaign, both leaders and men will learn the routine of their work quickly enough by experience.

One of the principal mistakes committed during peace manœuvres—the utter contempt shown for artillery or small-arm fire—need not be specially referred to, as, during a campaign, fire from artillery, as well as from small arms, will soon make itself so respected that every one will get out of its way.

Another matter, however, which at peace manœuvres is noticed quite as often, viz., ill-timed, continuous, and useless attacks, deserves to be specially mentioned. It will often happen, for instance, that detachments sent out for reconnoitring purposes, or the body at the head of an advanced guard, will throw themselves upon every hostile cavalry party they encounter, quite unconcerned as to the enemy's strength or what may possibly follow him closely in support. Among young cavalry officers there is a prevailing idea that it is quite in keeping with the traditions of cavalry, and the proper thing to do, to attack when and wherever the enemy is met with. Frederick the Great's

words—"I forbid all cavalry officers, on pain of being cashiered, to allow themselves to be attacked by the enemy when in action, but the Prussians must always themselves attack the enemy"—do not, however, mean to convey that the enemy should be attacked at all times and in all situations.

A party of men pushed far to the front meets a superior force of the enemy's troops. Would not that party do better to retire towards its own squadron, and, supported by the latter, march to the attack, rather than to at once attack the enemy and probably be decimated prior to the possible arrival of support, or compel the squadron to disengage it possibly, even under circumstances which demand that every engagement should be avoided?

The commander of the Division is therefore quite justified in reminding Brigadiers that their main object is to "observe," and that combats are as much as possible to be avoided. They are to be accepted only when a blow can be struck at the enemy or when the general situation demands it. He does not, of course, mean that, for instance, half a troop marching detached and meeting a hostile party of similar strength should get out of the latter's way. Should the former succeed in driving the latter back and occasion him loss, the adversary will, of course, have the worst of it, and the combat is justified. The personal example of the leader, as well as his unshaken confidence in the courage and cleverness of his men, are decisive points; but the leader must always act with the necessary caution, and to that end he should always bear in mind that, when in an isolated position, he ought, if possible, to ascertain whether the party he is about to attack has or has not support in close proximity. It is not, however, intended to throw cold water upon or damp ardour for the fight, but to prevent and put down all ill-timed and useless attacks.

An unsuccessful combat on the part of a squadron, or smaller detachment, at some particular point, will have no influence whatever on the general situation; but it will be different should such a defeat happen to a larger body of troops. Should, for instance, the brigade of Hussars report that during its advance it has encountered superior hostile forces and taken up a position of observation, the commander of the Division knows that his two other brigades are still secured in their left flank. Should even the brigade of

Hussars be driven back it will still be in a position to counteract the enemy's march should he advance with strong forces, or at least considerably weaken its effect against that flank. If, however, the brigade of Hussars allows its whole force to be drawn into an engagement in which it is entirely defeated, its influence on that wing will be completely lost and the adversary left at liberty to march upon the main body of the Division, the further advance of which would then receive a decided check.

It is to prevent such contingencies that General A. calls attention to the principle that, during the combat of an isolated detachment, great care must be taken to retain the last reserves in hand, unless the situation permits of engaging them also. General A. omitted, however, to call attention to another point, viz., the support which is available from the fire of some dismounted squadrons. It is often a matter of difficult accomplishment for a reserve placed in rear to receive a body of cavalry which is driven back by a superior force. If both sides are engaged in a hand-to-hand fight it will mostly happen that during the retreat of the vanquished force the victorious one will follow and get mixed up with the former. In order to disengage the latter, the reserve will be obliged to advance to the attack and launch itself into the turmoil. Should the superiority of the still fresh forces of the adversary come into play now, the weaker must suffer great loss and will be difficult to rally. Different, however, will it be with the pursuit when bullets suddenly drop into the turmoil from all sides. As a rule, the pursuit then soon comes to an end. When, therefore, a brigade in an isolated position risks the chances of an encounter with a superior force, it will be well at the outset to accept an engagement on such ground only as offers some special advantages or when a few formidable points can be occupied by dismounted squadrons, the latter forming the necessary support to the brigade. In case of defeat, the small-arm fire from these points will do more good than the attack of two squadrons held in reserve, although no doubt the fire from one's own men will demand sacrifices from friend as well as foe.

The use of dismounted men has not in any way been alluded to by General A., although the dismounted combat of cavalry is likely in future wars to play a greater rôle than formerly; at any rate, in nearly every army the light cavalry regiments have been armed throughout with carbines. How

far the latter may be made use of will be apparent at various phases of the events narrated in these studies, but we may be allowed to make a few remarks on the subject at this point.

A loud demand for a better firearm for the cavalry frequently arose during the late war with France, especially when opposed to the franc-tireurs. But during combats with regular troops it will also be found that, considering the peculiar mission of cavalry nowadays, a good firearm will be of the greatest use as soon as we learn how and when to use it effectively.

A fear has been expressed on many sides lest the old spirit of chivalry so inherent to cavalry should disappear from the moment the men are armed with an efficient weapon for shooting. Such might be the case if, as regards the training in the use of the weapon, the proper instruction were not imparted. The moment you demand that cavalry should be trained on foot with a due or partial regard to the infantry field exercise, you will ruin the former by putting in its place inefficient infantry and unreliable cavalry. Wherever column formations, marching, movements and skirmishing are practised dismounted according to the infantry regulations, there skilled riders will become scarce, and men that can use their horses with celerity and throw themselves in serried ranks against an adversary will be found wanting.

If, however, we limit the instruction to a thorough training in the art of shooting, and teach the cavalry when dismounted how to avail themselves of all cover the ground may offer, the time necessary for such instruction can always be spared, and neither the training of the rider on horseback nor his spirit of chivalry will suffer. Neither is there any necessity to practise the advance of lines of skirmishers or their mode of retreat. The man who knows how to make the best use of cover, in order to protect himself and yet gain the greatest possible advantage for his fire, will soon find out the best way to get near the enemy, should he desire and possess the courage to do so.

As regards the retreat, as soon as it is sounded every one will naturally run as fast as he can towards the cover where the horses are placed. To carry out a retreating fight in perfect order demands a very high degree of training; it is in fact the most difficult kind of combat, and it is far better to leave it out of the regulations for the training of cavalry on foot, as for such exercises sufficient time will never be found.

It is, however, very necessary that all officers should be taught to readily understand how to make use of different descriptions of ground for the purpose of dismounted combat. They should know which to choose when various positions offer, how the ground should be defended, and also from which points the adversary may be approached to the greatest advantage. All this must be learnt to be understood.

The time available for foot drills should be used to impart a knowledge of musketry and the exercises referred to above, but these duties must be carried out with the thoroughness that they deserve.

Once the cavalry dives deeper into the infantry field exercise, there is danger of its being tempted to advance further and further into it.*

The dismounted combat of cavalry must always be regarded as an exception, not as a rule. Circumstances may, however, lead any regiment into such a position, and no doubt in the end the Cuirassiers will also have to be armed with firearms.†

In the same way the partial arming of the Uhlans will prove to be insufficient. The regiments of Uhlans which marched about France, armed with a long Chassepôt rifle slung across their back, proved that such arming had become a necessity.

ORDERS AND REPORTS.

The Divisional Orders for the 31st July.

As regards the contents of such orders, the necessary details may be found in the first part of the studies on the leading of troops—"The Infantry Division in its Relation to the Army Corps."

We will here shortly recapitulate what should be stated in those orders:—

First, it will be necessary to give a summary of all the information that has become known about the enemy, but only in so far as it will have regard to our own movements. (1)

* Frederick the Great says, in his *Cavalry Regulations of 1743*, para. 17, "The Dragoons must be well drilled on foot, in three ranks, bayonets must be fixed, and they ought to drill on foot as well as any regiment of infantry." It must not, however, be forgotten that in those days the military service was not limited to three years.

† See note, page 143.—EDITOR.

(T.L.)

After this general sketch the various commanders should be clearly and comprehensively informed of the plan which is to be pursued, but even this only in so far as knowledge thereof is required in order to act in conformity with the ideas and views of the General Commanding-in-Chief, should moments arrive when they may have to decide and act for themselves. Mention must also be made of any movements of our own troops in so far as we may come in contact with them.

The orders necessary to execute the proposed plan will now follow:—Distribution of troops, rendezvous, time of march, the roads to be followed, the point to be reached at the end of the march, mention of spot where the commander of the Division may be found, and instructions as to what should be done in case the enemy is met with by detached columns or parties.

The orders wind up with directions for the transport, &c. As the Cavalry Division is marching in an isolated position into the enemy's territory, and as, owing to the large extent of front, it will not be able to cover all the roads, an unexpected appearance of parties of the enemy's cavalry, especially of flying patrols, is quite possible. The transport therefore should be moved as closely concentrated as possible, instead of in columns at intervals as with infantry, and should also march under cover of an escort.

With equal precaution must the distance of the transport from the Division be regulated. The Division being pressed rapidly back, or perhaps obliged to suddenly evacuate the road they have hitherto moved on, may place the transport column, and according to circumstances even the Division, in a position of great danger, should the former follow the latter too closely.

It is for this reason that the transport in the case under consideration is relegated to the right column and directed not to march on the following day beyond the advanced posts of the V. Army Corps. Further orders will be issued as soon as the situation on the other side of the frontier is more clear.

It is, however, always well to leave the transport column as far in rear as circumstances will permit of, and to move up to the bivouacs those wagons only that are absolutely required for the time.

We may also mention the report to Army Headquarters. It is necessary, when issuing orders to commanders of troops

2^d line T.

1st line T.

detached from the headquarters, that care should be taken that such orders reach the office for which they are intended. For that purpose it would appear desirable, in place of transmitting such orders by the Field Post, to despatch them to their destination by an officer or orderly. In all cases a receipt for the document should be obtained, which, when telegraphs are available and the matter is of great importance, should be given by wire.

Every Army Headquarters Staff would of course be always glad to receive, together with this receipt for the orders, a short reply to the effect that the orders are understood and can be executed as desired. If this can be done by wire, precautions should be taken to send the message in cypher. The contents may be very short; for instance:—

“Orders of 29th received. Division marches morning of 31st July, in two columns, towards Weissenburg and Schleithal. Detachment of V. Army Corps follows right wing. Brigade will same time occupy Lauterburg.”

In the case under notice this report comes rather late, but good time was required for due consideration of the mission, and to learn all particulars necessary for its execution. The receipt of the order had already been acknowledged through the orderly who brought it.

The orders for the 31st July regulate in the concluding paragraphs the most important points of interior economy, and at the same time call attention to the forms laid down in the regulations regarding matters of detail.

As a rule, it will be found to the purpose to separate such orders entirely from those having reference to the movements of the troops. In the case under notice this course was not pursued, owing to the shortness of the time available and the haste with which the orders were despatched.

It may appear peculiar that attention should be called to matters which are the subject of regulations. It would not have been done did not experience teach how very necessary it is to do so. From the beginning of a campaign these matters must be rigidly insisted upon. As a rule, they are regarded as of secondary importance, and remain continually unattended to, while they are, especially for the cavalry service, of the utmost importance. During the course of events as hereinafter described it will be seen how very numerous these reports are that are sent in to headquarters, especially when the enemy is in contact along the greater portion of the front.

From these reports the Divisional Commander or his Staff Officer must gain information and knowledge of the situation, which in his isolated position must be of the greatest importance to him. From the piecing together of the information gained through these messages the report to the Headquarters of the Army is completed, a report which has considerable influence upon the operations of the army. How can such a report, however, be properly compiled when, of some dozen messages received, one-half omit to state the time at, and the other half the place from, which they are sent off; and some again are written so badly that it is difficult to decipher their meaning? No one under such circumstances will be able to form an exact opinion of the situation, as in order to do so he must have time and place as a first basis to start from. A message of the greatest importance, even if sent in by messenger at utmost speed, may easily, through some such omission as referred to above, become useless, and even occasion great anxiety, and perhaps the execution of wrong movements.

The instructions issued above as regards establishing a line of connecting posts in rear of the main body have been proved on actual service to be necessary. Of course the control and the establishing of these posts must be under orders from the commander of the Division.

THE 31st JULY.

At 5.45 A.M. General A., accompanied by his Staff, rode to the rendezvous of the two brigades, north of Landau. Prior to his departure a Staff Officer from Army Headquarters reported himself, having received instructions to accompany the Cavalry Division during the operations of the next few days.

When the General arrived at the rendezvous the brigades were in the act of forming up; the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery had just arrived.

The General assembled the officers commanding brigades and regiments, and gave various directions; he called their special attention to saving the horses from fatigue as much as possible, especially as during the past few days the

weather had been very hot, and to all appearance would be so to-day.

The General then, addressing the men, told them that he expected everyone to do his duty; and it being now 6.15 A.M. he ordered the light brigade to march off. This brigade received directions to take the road round the east side of Landau, which surrounds that fortress, running close to the outer walls, and an aide-de-camp was sent with the brigade to show the way. South of the fortress, this road joins the main road to Weissenburg, on which the brigade was intended to advance. The battery of horse artillery received instructions to follow the light brigade; the heavy brigade to form the rear of the column.

The General halted at a convenient spot in order once more to inspect the troops as they filed past him; as the march past of the whole column—4,500 paces in length—would take quite half-an-hour, he did not wait to see the last part of it, but hastened forward to the head of the column. The latter had alternately walked and trotted on, so that the General, notwithstanding his rapid pace, did not reach the leading troop until 7.15 A.M., when the latter had arrived at the junction of the main road with the road to Billigheim—Klingenmünster. The distance then traversed was five miles. Major-General C. therefore received orders to halt here for the first rendezvous; a galloper was sent with a similar order to the heavy brigade. As the General Commanding the Division was desirous of having an interview with Major-General X., commanding the advanced guard of the V. Army Corps, the second galloper had already been sent in advance to Billigheim to find out whether he was still at his quarters there.

This galloper returned with the report that Major-General X. had left for Bergzabern three-quarters of an hour ago.

The General Commanding decided in consequence to ride thither at once in advance of his troops, and he directed Major-General C. to resume the march on the main road to Bergzabern after the troops had had ten minutes rest; the pace to be walk and trot, according to the nature of the ground.

When General A., about 7.45 A.M., approached Bergzabern, distant about four miles from the last-mentioned rendezvous, he met one battalion of the V. Army Corps on the march

to that place, one battalion was in the act of forming up in the village itself and the battery and one squadron had already arrived. Major-General X. was still in the village at the quarters of Colonel K., the officer in command of the detachment from the V. Corps ordered to follow the Cavalry Division. General A. went there in order to have a personal interview with both commanders. The Brigadier informed him that nothing of note had occurred since the previous evening, and that at 5.30 A.M. this morning, half a troop of Uhlans had been sent on towards Weissenburg for a fresh reconnaissance; no report, however, had as yet been sent in from that party. Colonel K., being questioned, stated that the outposts were placed close around Bergzabern with orders to observe the ground as far as Upper and Lower Otterbach. General A. was specially anxious to ascertain what had been learnt as to the presence of parties of the enemy's troops in the woody mountainous regions on his right flank. Major-General X. said that his special attention had been directed to that point, and that his patrols were continually scouring that region, but that up to the present no signs of the enemy's troops had been reported. He alluded to the improbability of stronger forces of the enemy showing themselves there, owing to the very bad and impracticable roads, but added that to-day he would send a couple of companies into the mountains to make a more extended reconnaissance.

During this interview one of the aides-de-camp reported that the head of the column was visible (8.15 A.M.). General A. ordered his Staff Officer to proceed to Major-General C. and direct him to march the column through the village, and to form up on the other side at some convenient point. The brigade of Dragoons to detail the advanced guard, and to form up accordingly; one squadron to march, covering the left flank, east of Upper Otterbach to Schweighofen, and to establish, if possible, communication with the Hussar brigade; the march to be resumed as soon as General A. arrived.

General A. now consulted with Colonel K. as to the support to be given in case of necessity. The latter quoted the instructions he had received from the General Commanding V. Army Corps, but declared his willingness to follow the Cavalry Division as far as Weissenburg. General A. was, however, especially anxious to secure the support of the battery of the detachment as soon as possible after

arrival of the Cavalry Division before the town. Colonel K. concurred in this, and said that he would instruct the battery to follow in rear of the Division. He also undertook to secure General A.'s right flank with patrols from the Uhlans which were already in that direction.

After General A. had mounted and ridden off, he met the heavy brigade still defiling through the village (8.25 A.M.), the horses looking very hot. The General inquired the cause, and was informed that the galloper had delivered the message regarding the halt sent from the first rendezvous with the words "the brigade to halt until further orders." When the light brigade moved off again, no further order was received at the heavy brigade, and the Brigadier, after waiting for some time, had ridden forward to ask the General Commanding for further instructions. Arrived at the head of the Dragoon brigade he learned that General A. had left, but was also informed by Major-General C. that the advance of both brigades was intended. Some minutes had of course again elapsed ere the brigade received the order to resume the march, so that in order to make up for lost time, a sharp trot had to be resorted to.

The General Commanding directed his aide-de-camp to remind him of this later on. He then went to Major-General C. and inquired of him whether the advanced guard and flank detachment had been detailed and instructed. Major-General C. replied that the 1st Dragoons had been detailed for the purpose, that the 1st squadron was already formed up 600 paces in advance, and that the 4th squadron had been instructed to act as flank detachment.

The General Commanding then directed that the advanced guard should move off, and sent for the officer commanding 4th squadron. He required the latter to repeat to him the instructions he had received, which were: to direct his way towards Schweighofen by following the roads leading east of Ober-Otterbach across the Otter, in order to establish and keep up communication with the Hussar brigade, which latter was on the march from Winden towards Schleithal.

The General added to this, that in acting as stated above, he must not lose his connection with the main body of the Division. As soon as he should have heard of the arrival of the main body of the Division before Weissenburg, he might advance along the Lauter as far as St. Rémy, and occupy the bridge there. Prior to crossing the river, however, it

would be necessary to reconnoitre the ground beyond it most thoroughly, as only yesterday parties of the enemy's forces had been observed there. He was to await further orders at the entrance to the Niederwald on the road from Weissenburg to Lauterburg (8.45 A.M.).

The 1st squadron of the Dragoons had meanwhile trotted on, having sent ~~half~~ a troop at a gallop in advance; the remaining two squadrons now marched off at a walk, ~~half~~ a troop having been detached from the last-mentioned squadrons to cover the right flank; the 4th squadron now also marched off.

The 1st Dragoons were followed by the 2nd Dragoons and the Horse Artillery battery at a distance of 600 paces; the heavy brigade followed the latter at a distance of another 600 paces.

The advanced guard squadron (1st) arrived soon after 9 A.M. at Upper Otterbach.

The village was quickly scoured by the advanced party and found clear of anything suspicious. After information had been obtained from the village authorities that no soldier from the enemy's forces had as yet been seen near there, the advanced squadron marched round the outskirts of the village while the remainder of the regiment passed through the latter on the main road. General A. rode up to a little knoll to the east of the village, from which a very good view of the surrounding ground could be obtained.

The main road could be seen disappearing at some distance off into Rechtenbach, and further on could be perceived, rising from behind a low hill, and almost in prolongation of the road, the towers and tops of some high houses of Weissenburg. In rear of the town, an apparently steep mountain ridge ascended, running towards the east and descending with rugged slopes into a plain. To the west of the main road, mountainous ground, covered with many wooded knolls, rose up to a good height, whilst the ground east of the road was almost level, except a few slight undulations, the whole covered with standing corn, offering a most suitable field for the combat of large bodies of cavalry. In this ground a cloud of dust, that could be seen rising in the left front, indicated the march of the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons.

The General suddenly perceived that the advanced squadron came to a halt half-way on the road to Rechten-

bach, then marched off towards the flank and formed up. Soon after a non-commissioned officer of dragoons rode up and reported that a party of hostile Uhlans, strength about half a troop, was halted south-east of Rechtenbach. The General was annoyed, and directed his Staff Officer to ride over to the Brigadier and inform him that "the march of his Division could not be delayed because a hostile troop of cavalry stood in the way; the latter were to be driven back at once." The Staff Officer was at the same time ordered to remain with the advanced guard. Before this officer reached the main road, the head of the party commenced moving on again, and soon after a second message came in stating that the cavalry which had been signalled as belonging to the enemy was but a reconnoitring patrol of the advanced guard of the V. Army Corps returning from Weissenburg.

General A. rode off and met at the main road the officer in command of the half troop, who reported to him—"He had advanced as far as south of Schweigen, and had sent patrols from that place towards Weissenburg, one towards the Bitsch and Landau gates, and one towards Altenstatt. The former were received by the fire of some single infantry soldiers from the walls of the town, which wounded one man slightly and killed one horse. The third patrol encountered three of the enemy's Chasseurs-à-cheval at Altenstatt. After the return of the Uhlans sent towards the Bitsch gate he had trotted up to Altenstatt with his half troop, covering his flank towards Weissenburg; during this march two of the enemy's patrols were driven in. He drew fire from the outskirts of the village when attempting to advance into the place, and discovered on the other side of the Lauter a party of the enemy's cavalry, about one squadron strong. For this reason he halted at Windhof about half-an-hour, and as the enemy did not appear to desire to take the offensive, he was now on his way to return to the advanced guard of the V. Army Corps. No movements of troops could be seen on the heights in rear of Weissenburg."

The General inquired of the officer whether he had already sent back a report, and receiving a reply in the negative, directed him to do so; at the same time he ordered the troop to remain with him, as they knew the country.

The head of the column, which had left the main road at Rechtenbach, and had followed the country road which leads again into the main road south-east of Schweigen,

was met at this point by the General. He ordered a halt for a moment and gave Major-General C., who had already spoken to the officer of the Uhlans, the following instructions:—

“Advance with one regiment as near to the town of Weissenburg as you can, under cover, and make for the Landau gate. The officer commanding the battery must find a place from which he can fire at the gate with two guns. You will cover your right flank at the same time, reconnoitring the crossings of the Lauter higher up, closing the road to Bitsch, and reconnoitring towards the mountains. The patrol of Uhlans which has been there will point out the road. Do not commence the firing, however, until the return of my Staff Officer whom I shall despatch into the town as a parlementaire. You will advance with your other regiment and the remainder of the battery as far as Altenstatt and occupy the crossing there. The Lauter must at the same time be carefully reconnoitred. The heavy brigade will march with me as far as Windhof.”

Major V. received instructions to take the trumpeter of the Uhlans and another man, and to demand from the commander of the troops, still in Weissenburg, the capitulation of the town. The General added that, if necessary, the troops would be allowed to depart from the town, but only in case the capitulation could not be effected under any other conditions. One of the gallopers was directed to ride to the heavy brigade with orders to “follow up the Dragoons, which were ordered to advance to Altenstatt, as far as Windhof. The brigade is also to reconnoitre the crossings of the Russgraben (a narrow stream) in case the Division be ordered to retire across the latter instead of at Rechtenbach.” The galloper was ordered to reconnoitre this streamlet himself as soon as he had delivered his orders.

At this time a report was received from the Hussar brigade stating that it had arrived at Winden at 8 A.M., and had continued its advance to Schleithal; the XI. Corps had sent information that nothing had been seen of the enemy. The leader of the patrol was informed of the state of affairs with the right wing at this moment.

In accordance with the above orders, and the special instructions of Major-General C., the light brigade occupied the following positions at 9.30 A.M. (*vide* Appendix 4, Sketch No. 1).

1st Dragoons : the 3rd squadron was on the march north of the town, through the difficult ground occupied by vineyards, in the direction of the western gate (Bitsch gate); advanced patrols reconnoitring the Lauter above Weissenburg.

The 1st and 2nd squadrons were behind the mill on the road Schweighofen—Weissenburg, distant about 800 paces from the Landau gate, one half troop placed behind the farm buildings further west, another half troop on the left flank extending as far as the bridge crossing the Lauter; the two guns in position on the right rear. No shot had as yet been fired from the walls, but suddenly several flags with the Geneva cross were displayed on the church towers and a few houses. The parlementaire had entered the town.

The 4th squadron had arrived at St. Rémy, had driven in one of the enemy's patrols it had met there, occupied the crossing with ~~half~~ a troop, and resumed its march, as previously instructed, towards the point where the main road enters the Niederwald.

2nd Dragoons : the 4th squadron, which had formed the advanced guard, and had observed several of the enemy's Chasseurs, had arrived at the crossing over the Lauter at Altenstatt, and had, according to instructions, occupied the bridge with two dismounted ~~half~~ troops; the 3rd ~~half~~ troop was in the act of reconnoitring on the road east of the village, and the 4th ~~half~~ troop in and near the rather scattered western part of the village.

The head of the 1st squadron had just reached the railway bridge on the east which it was ordered to occupy; a patrol had been sent towards St. Rémy in order to establish communication with the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons, and to reconnoitre the Lauter.

The 2nd and 3rd squadrons had just arrived at the northern entrance to Altenstatt, followed up by the four guns, whose leader had ridden to the front in order to select a position east of the village, but still on the left bank of the river.

The heavy brigade was distant about 400 paces from Windhof. The reconnaissance of the Russgraben had shown that this streamlet could be forded everywhere at the western part; marshy meadows situated along the eastern part would, however, offer some difficulty in crossing there.

The General Commanding Division, accompanied by the Brigadier of the light brigade, had ridden to the height near

Windhof, from which a very extended view could be obtained. Some of the enemy's flankers could still be seen near Altenstatt, and reports were sent in that one or two of the enemy's squadrons were apparently behind the railway embankment.

Considering these circumstances, General A. sent orders to the Dragoons not to advance beyond Altenstatt, but to occupy that part of the village situated on the right bank of the river, until the situation about Weissenburg had been cleared up (9.45 A.M.). Soon after, the two squadrons stationed at the farmhouse near the mill in front of the Landau gate were seen moving off, and three minutes later the Staff Officer returned to the General Commanding Division and reported that—"the town was unoccupied and the gates had been opened. About thirty Custom House officers, who had been stationed there up to the present, had hastily left the town in wagons (which had been kept ready for them) as soon as the Division neared the town. He had asked the 1st Dragoons to occupy provisionally the Landau gate."

General A. ordered the Brigadier of the light brigade to occupy the town with the 1st Dragoons, and to reconnoitre at the same time the roads leading to Bitsch, Wörth, and Strassburg. The two detached guns were to rejoin the battery, the 2nd Dragoons to drive in the enemy in front of it, and the heavy brigade to follow up the regiment.

The latter received orders to that effect. Major-General C. sent a galloper with the necessary order to Colonel G., commanding the 1st Dragoons, and added that the regiment should at present limit its action to the occupation of the gates and the delivery of all arms now in the town. The Brigadier then rode to Altenstatt. The Commissary-General requested permission of General A. to ride into Weissenburg and take charge of any provisions that might be in the town, or failing that to requisition the authorities for some. General A. now sent a galloper with a message in writing to the detachment of the V. Army Corps, which was on the march hither, informing it that Weissenburg was evacuated by the enemy and could now be occupied by the infantry. The galloper received at the same time a telegram to be despatched to the Third Army Headquarters at Speyer, through the General Officer Commanding V. Army Corps. The telegram ran as follows:—

"TO THE GENERAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF THIRD ARMY."

"July 30th, North of Altenstatt. 9.45 A.M."

"Weissenburg occupied by us. Thirty Custom House officers who occupied it up to the present have retired. About two of the enemy's squadrons south of Altenstatt. To drive latter in, the Lauter, the bridges over which are in our possession, will be crossed at once."

"1st Cavalry Division."

The officer in command of the ~~half~~ troop of Uhlans of the V. Army Corps was now directed to place himself under orders of the 1st Dragoons until the arrival of Colonel K. and his detachment, and meanwhile to make with his party a reconnaissance along the road to Bitsch. The General Commanding the Division now rode after the heavy brigade, from which the Uhlans had been despatched to the railway crossing, and the Cuirassiers to Altenstatt. At the moment of trotting off, the officer commanding the light battery of artillery from the V. Army Corps, escorted by a troop of Uhlans, reported himself to General A., Colonel K. having sent this battery in advance of his infantry. General A. placed the battery under the command of his Artillery Officer, Major L., with directions to use the guns for the protection of the passage across the Lauter. The escort troop of Uhlans received the same instructions as the other ~~half~~ troop of that squadron had just received, and was directed to march to Weissenburg and reconnoitre the roads leading west and south of that town.

The situation at Altenstatt became rapidly developed. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons pushed as far as the southern outskirts of the village, which it occupied with about ninety dismounted men, who at once commenced firing against the enemy's Chasseurs, who, also dismounted, had lodged themselves upon the railway embankment opposite the village. Another party, about a squadron, mounted, could be seen further in rear. Under protection of this fire and the cover of the farm buildings at the mill, the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the regiment deployed on the eastern outskirts of the village after the Lauter had been crossed. The reconnaissance of Major H., commanding the regiment, had shown that the adversary could not very well be attacked in front, as the

railway was on a very high embankment, which would have to be ascended in face of the adversary. The Major proposed therefore to move further to the left, and to advance east of the Strassburg line, by doing which the first squadron could be again drawn in, as the latter could only pass slowly across the railway bridge over the Lauter owing to the embankment.

Before this plan could, however, be carried out, the adversary had retired.

The 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons (14th troops) had meanwhile reached the point where the main road from Weissenburg enters the Niederwald; as the squadron leader on arrival perceived the fire of small arms from near the outskirts of Altenstatt and the railway, he quickly decided to participate in the engagement, and rode at a gallop towards the railway crossing south-east of the Gutleithof. Owing to this movement the adversary saw himself compelled to retire, his strength, as could now be seen, amounting to one squadron only. The main body had just time to escape the 4th squadron by taking the road to Riedselz. The dismounted ~~half~~ troop near the railway was, however, unable to use the main road; they mounted quickly and rode towards the heights of the Geissberg, in the direction of the Selzbach.

During this retirement the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons hastened up from the outskirts of the village towards the railway embankment, on the other side of which they discovered one man dead and two wounded, left behind by the enemy. Prior to this squadron reaching the embankment, Major H., with the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the same regiment, which had meanwhile been joined by the 1st squadron, had already ridden up and mounted on to the embankment. The 2nd squadron was now directed to march on to the heights of the Geissberg; Major H., with the 1st and 3rd squadrons, followed the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons along the main road.

The battery of horse artillery had, from its position, sent two shells after the retreating troops, and then together with the light battery joined the Cuirassiers, who were trotting through Altenstatt and advancing as far as the Gutleithof, while the regiment of Uhlans took up a position to the left of the latter, east of the railway, and in alignment with the Cuirassiers. When these points had been reached, General A. ordered the heavy brigade to halt. As General A. had perceived the squadron of Dragoons, which was originally

intended to secure the left flank, advancing from St. Rémy towards the road leading to Strassburg, Major-General B., commanding the heavy brigade, was now ordered to advance one squadron so as to secure the direct road to Lauterburg; this squadron to be instructed to establish communication with the Hussar brigade on its way to Schleithal, by means of a strong patrol; General B.'s attention was also called to the protection of his right flank, which might be effected by sending a detachment to the plateau of the Geissberg. The Brigadier sent therefore one squadron of the Uhlans to the former and one of the Cuirassiers to the latter place. The Uhlans sent their 4th, and the Cuirassiers their 1st squadron.

Major-General C. was now directed to undertake the pursuit of the enemy with the troops still at his disposal, but not to advance beyond Riedselz, and to reconnoitre, at the same time, the roads leading to Fort Louis and to Lauterburg *viâ* Schleithal. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, which had been left at the railway embankment, received orders direct from the General Commanding Division to return to its regiment. It was now a few minutes after 10 A.M.

Lieut.-General A. rode up to the plateau of the castle of Geissberg, where he met the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons at the outwork Schaffbusch, having advanced scouts towards Steinsele. There he received in succession the following reports:—

First, from Colonel G., commanding 1st Dragoons at Weissenburg—

“1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, 2ND BRIGADE, 1ST DRAGOONS.

“Weissenburg,

31st July, 1870. 9.45 A.M.

“The gates of the town, the Post Office, and the railway station are occupied; ~~one~~ troop has advanced on the road to Bitsch to reconnoitre, while the squadron of Uhlans from the V. Army Corps will advance on the road to Wörth. Colonel K. (commanding detachment of V. Army Corps) has arrived here, followed closely by his two battalions. I request orders as to the place to which the regiment is to move.

“G., Colonel.”

The following reply was sent to him:—

“As soon as the infantry has arrived, the regiment will
(T.L.)

orders
march on the direct road Weissenfels-Riedselz to Schafbusch, where further orders are to be obtained from the General Officer Commanding the brigade, which is marching on the road Altenstatt-Riedselz. The troops sent along the road to Bitsch will remain on it until relieved by the V. Army Corps, and will reconnoitre the ground within four-and-a-half miles of Weissenburg."

The Brigadier received a copy of the report and of the orders sent out.

The second report came from Major-General C., and stated—

"The retreating squadron of the enemy has arrived at Riedselz and holds the bridges across the Selz. The head of the brigade has reached the outskirts of that village; the patrols which have advanced beyond Riedselz-Oberdorf report that at this moment a strong party of the enemy's troops, estimated at two or three squadrons, has trotted up on the road from Strassburg, and halted in rear of the village. The General requests permission to call up the horse artillery battery in order to dislodge the adversary, as the Selz and the meadows near it can only be crossed by means of the bridges."

orders
General A. directed the officer who had brought the report to return as rapidly as possible. "His Brigadier was not to accept an engagement at present; General A. would be with him presently. The artillery and the heavy brigade would be sent to his support."

The last-mentioned order was sent to Major-General B. by a galloper.

orders
General A. then sent to the officer commanding the squadron (2nd of 2nd Dragoons) close to him, and directed him to "cross at once the river Selz at Steinselz, and march from thence towards Riedselz. You must, however, proceed very cautiously, as a regiment of the enemy's cavalry is reported to be near there, and the proposed advance of your squadron is intended as a kind of demonstration only, which might possibly induce the adversary to give up the defence of the defile."

The General then took another look at the surrounding country. The ridge running along the opposite bank of the Selzbach was lower than the one on which the General stood at this moment. On the former, nothing but a few isolated cavalry patrols could be seen; the width of that ridge was however, about 1,500 paces only, and it appeared quite possible

that considerable hostile forces might have taken up a position on the reverse slope.

The ground further off also consisted of several small ridges—the spurs of the mountains—running parallel to each other, the crests of which rose one above the other at some parts, and so offered excellent opportunities for hiding considerable bodies of troops. It became, therefore, all the more necessary to act with great caution, as about a regiment of the enemy's cavalry had already been observed in this part of the country, and the consequent conclusion that other parties were in support, or concealed near, had much probability. In the open ground south of and close to Riedselz two squadrons could distinctly be seen halted, while heavy firing was going on from the northern outskirts of the village. The steep scarp which the ridge descending into the plain formed near Schafbusch did not allow of the position of our own troops being clearly observed; one squadron only could be seen near Riedselz-Oberdorf close to the railway.

The General rode at a hard gallop along the road and slackened his pace when he reached a hollow road branching off towards the plain; he had quite decided to dislodge the adversary at all hazards from Riedselz, as otherwise the Division could not very well occupy bivouacs between that village and Altenstatt. The defiles of the Lauter were too close in rear, and the whole extent of the ground from the latter to the outposts would not have exceeded two miles (10.30 A.M.).

When coming out of the hollow road on to the road to Altenstatt the General Commanding Division met Major-General C., accompanied by three squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, while the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons stood under cover in rear of Riedselz-Oberdorf (see Appendix IV., Sketch No. 2). On the road the two batteries could already be seen coming up at a sharp pace. Major L. directed the horse artillery battery to take up a position at the railway crossing north-east of Riedselz-Oberdorf, and requested Major-General C. to detail an escort for it. The latter officer detailed the three squadrons of the regiment of Dragoons, which could now more easily be disposed of, as the heavy brigade had just arrived at about 1,800 yards from Riedselz east of the road.

The light battery received orders to advance from the latter place a few hundred paces and to open fire on Riedselz.

(T.L.)

This battery was the first to open fire. The adversary, however, still occupied the outskirts of the village. About eight minutes later on the horse artillery battery, having taken up a flank position on a knoll south-east of the railway station at Riedselz-Oberdorf and east of the railway embankment, opened fire against a squadron and some led horses of a dismounted squadron which were visible on the opposite bank of the stream (10.45 A.M.).

After the first shot from the horse artillery gun the adversary evacuated his position and commenced to retreat. Owing to the artillery flank fire the retreat could not be effected along the road leading to Strassburg, but had to be carried out on a country road further west, which led to the farm of Diefenbach. The ~~two squadrons~~ of the 2nd Dragoons had meanwhile already advanced beyond Steinselz.

The adversary had detached a squadron from Riedselz on to the long mountain ridge in order to secure his flank, and to oppose the Dragoons there.

As the officer commanding the squadron of the Dragoons was not well able to judge of the strength of the adversary's party owing to the knoll (647) in front of him, he retired, in accordance with his instructions, as far as the nearest road leading to Steinselz. Both squadrons were now halted at a distance from each other of about 1,200 paces and threw out skirmishers; the latter fired, but without result. A non-commissioned officer of the Dragoons, who had been despatched to the slope running towards the Selzbach with special instructions to observe what was going on near Riedselz, now reported that the adversary was in the act of retreating, and as the enemy's main body could now also be perceived retreating down the road to Diefenbach, the leader of the squadron deemed this a favourable moment for an attack on the Chasseurs. This attack was carried out in front by the 2nd and 3rd half troop, and on the left flank by the 4th half troop, which had just formed up,* while the 1st half troop followed as a second line at 200 paces in rear. The Chasseurs wheeled about by half troops and retired at a trot; as their other two squadrons had not as yet, however, completed their passage across the Lehwies brook, the squadron after trotting 300 paces came to a halt, fronted, and rode straight to the attack, the shock of which caused both lines to be broken

* The 4th (left flank) half troop is usually employed for throwing out skirmishers in front of a squadron.—EDITOR

through. The right wing of the Chasseurs threw itself against the flank ~~half~~ troop of the Dragoons, while the outflanking wing of the Chasseurs partly surrounded the 2nd ~~half~~ troop of the Dragoons.

The 1st ~~half~~ troop of the Dragoons, which had up to the present been kept in reserve, now cut into the outflanking wing of the Chasseurs, and after a short *mêlée* the adversary, completely routed, retreated at full speed towards the bridge. The *mêlée* was cut short owing to the head of the 4th squadron 1st Dragoons from Riedselz having meanwhile debouched on the road leading towards Steinselz, as well as to the 1st squadron of the Cuirassiers coming up from Steinselz. The pursuit was kept up as far as the bridge, when the leader of the 2nd squadron caused the "rally" to be sounded, as he perceived the remainder of the enemy's cavalry in position on the other bank of the river to receive the routed squadron. The "rally" of the 2nd squadron had to be effected behind the brow of the hill owing to a continuous fire of skirmishers from the other side of the river. The 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons also arrived there, while the remaining three squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons and the battery of horse artillery advanced along the road through Riedselz in the direction of Strassburg; reconnoiters having reported that it was difficult to pass the railway crossing (11.10 A.M.).

General A., who had ridden as far as the cross roads on the main road north of Riedselz, now ordered the light brigade to cease the pursuit, but to keep "touch" of the adversary. The heavy brigade was directed not to cross the defile of the Selz rivulet at present. The two-and-a-half squadrons of the 1st Dragoons which had meanwhile arrived at Schafbusch were ordered to rejoin their brigade.

The enemy retired west of the main road as far as the village of Ingolsheim, in rear of which he took up a position of observation for a short time, apparently to collect any of his dispersed men, and then continued his retreat on the main road.

Major-General C. sent a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons (the 4th) as far as Ingolsheim with instructions to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy by means of patrols. The main body of the 2nd Dragoons made a halt about one-and-a-half miles south of Riedselz at 11.20 A.M. (*vide* Appendix IV., Sketch No. 3).

The General Commanding Division had meanwhile come

up through Riedselz and ridden to the height situated in front of it, as from this point the retreat of the Chasseurs could be observed for a long distance. The view, as already described from the height further in rear, could still be seen from here, viz.: various ridges, spurs of mountains, running parallel to each other across the landscape towards the south.

The main road, which as far as Riedselz had led along the plain at the foot of the ridges, now ran across the various ridges. A deep cutting running from north to south could plainly be seen further to the left; this was the valley of the Selz along which the railway also ran.

The slope of this valley on the left bank of the river appeared steep and wooded, the ground then rose gently up to a plateau, sloping towards the south, on which, in a south-easterly direction and at a distance of about two miles, the long and straggling village of Ober-Seebach could distinctly be seen.

West of the point where the General stood, various ridges, mostly wooded, rose gradually up to the foot of a high mountain wall which traversed the landscape from south to north.

From this direction nothing of importance was to be feared; a slight line of observation would suffice.

The plain of Ingolsheim in front could be made good use of, the road across it and the entry into the Selz valley only requiring special observation. The ground towards Ober-Seebach, however, demanded particular attention, as it was seen by the map that the road from Nieder-Rödern to Weissenburg (road to Fort Louis) ran past the eastern side of the village; and this was already to some extent visible to the naked eye. This road demanded, therefore, special observation.

(11.35 A.M.) General A. now said to the Brigadier of the light brigade:—"Considering all circumstances I do not intend to advance any further to day. You will form the advanced guard with your brigade and place outposts along the plain of Ingolsheim; the left wing will hold the railway crossing, the right will cover the flank towards the mountains. The heavy brigade will provide the outposts in the country east of the Selz. The main body of the brigade will bivouac near Riedselz-Oberdorf. You can retire with the main body of your brigade to Riedselz. I shall take up quarters myself at Oberdorf. All parties still detached will be drawn in. Touch must be kept up with the enemy at all hazards."

The aide-de-camp was sent to Major-General B. with these

orders:—"The heavy brigade to bivouac north of Riedselz-Oberdorf; the village might be occupied by men and horses, leaving quarters, however, for the Divisional Staff. Two squadrons to be sent into the ground between the Selz and the road to Fort Louis in order to cover the left flank; outposts to be placed there. Connection to be established on the right flank with the outposts of the 2nd (light) Brigade as far as the Selz, and the direct roads to Nieder-Seebach, Ober-Seebach, and especially that leading to Fort Louis to be watched. All detached parties to be drawn in."

The various points where the troops were to be placed were then pointed out to the aide-de-camp on the map.

A report was also sent to the transport, &c., directing them to proceed from Bergzabern to north of Altenstatt; the brigades were informed that the necessary baggage, provision carts, &c., might be drawn by them during the afternoon: to this was, however, added that the whole of the wagons must be sent back by five o'clock next morning. The detachment of the Army Hospital Corps was ordered to remain at Gutleithof.

When Major G. came up to ask for instructions for the artillery, General A. directed that the horse artillery battery should bivouac near the heavy brigade north of Riedselz-Oberdorf, but the light battery should be ordered to return to its detachment at Weissenburg. Major G. was also commissioned to express to the battery the General's thanks for the support it had afforded him (12 noon).

The whole of the necessary dispositions having thus been ordered, General A. rode over to the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons to express to them his appreciation of their conduct during the combat. The General learnt that the losses sustained were—2 men killed, 2 officers and 9 men wounded, 2 men missing. The two latter, who had pursued the enemy across the bridge, were, it was presumed, taken prisoners.

The enemy left behind—1 officer and 5 men killed, 1 officer and 13 men, mostly wounded, were taken prisoners, and in addition several horses had been captured.

Major-General C. reported to the General that he proposed occupying Ingolsheim in order to secure the bridge there; General A., having expressed his approval of the proposed step, rode to his quarters. On his road there he halted at the various places where the regiments were stationed. The spirit of the men was very high; they were now in the enemy's country, the adversary had been driven back, prisoners had

been brought in, and everywhere there seemed to be an eager desire to get face to face with the foe soon.

When the General Commanding Division arrived at Riedselz-Oberdorf, soon after 12 noon, he received a report from Major-General B., according to which the staff of the heavy brigade and two squadrons of the regiment of Uhlans had taken up quarters in the village; the other squadrons of the regiment (2nd and 3rd) had moved off for the purpose of placing outposts in the direction of Ober-Seebach. The regiment of Cuirassiers and the horse artillery had gone into bivouac close to the north of the village and east of the main road.

During the course of the next hour the General Commanding Division received in succession the following reports:—

“3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE, No.

“*Headquarters, Schleithal,*

“31st July. 11.15 A.M.

“The brigade arrived here at 10.45 A.M. without seeing anything of the enemy. Communication with the advanced guard of the XI. Corps, which has already occupied Scheibenhart and Lauterburg, has been established. The latter found one of the enemy's squadrons of Chasseurs in its front retreating towards Winzenbach. Outposts will be placed at Salmbach and also towards Siegen and Ober-Seebach.

“D., MAJOR-GENERAL.”

The officer who brought this report had also been instructed to say that the brigade, owing to the artillery fire which had been heard, had intended to march in the direction of Ober-Seebach, but as the fire soon ceased, the brigade continued its march.

Being further questioned, he stated that the brigade had arrived at Schleithal a little late, as it had made a long halt before crossing the Lauter, and had meanwhile thoroughly reconnoitred the wood on the right bank of the river.

At this moment the main body of the brigade was in bivouac at the east end of Schleithal, about four-and-a-half miles from Riedselz-Oberdorf; the ~~advanced guard~~, consisting of two squadrons, had been pushed one mile to the front near Siegen.

The officer was directed to remain for the present at Divisional headquarters. The aide-de-camp was directed to put down in writing, for the information of the 3rd Brigade, the position of the outposts of the right flank column. The special

attention of the brigade was also to be called to the necessity of keeping up constant communication with these outposts, and on its part it was to watch the road from Fort Louis very carefully.

As soon as the communication had been written, the General Commanding Division himself added to it the following:—"In future the brigade will report more frequently. The arrival of the brigade on the Lauter ought to have been reported at once; and when the brigade distinctly heard the firing from a westerly direction, although it soon ceased, patrols should at once have been sent to ascertain what was going on there."

The communication was then handed over to a non-commissioned officer, who, accompanied by two orderlies, rode with it to Schleithal. Prior to moving off, one of the aides-de-camp handed the non-commissioned officer a small road sketch he had just drawn, to enable him to find his way better (1 P.M.). Soon after the non-commissioned officer had ridden off, the Staff Officer, Major V., arrived, he having accompanied the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, which had been sent to the front to observe the enemy's movements. According to his report the enemy had returned to Sulz and placed outposts on both sides of Schönenburg on the west front of the village; their extent could not be observed owing to a large wood on the eastern front; the furthest advanced vedettes were about 1,200 paces in advance of the village on a plateau which descended very steeply on this side of it. It was not very probable that the enemy had received any reinforcements, as nothing could be observed to indicate it. The squadron of Dragoons had then returned to Ingolsheim, and had left patrols to watch the further movements of the enemy. Ingolsheim was now occupied by the light brigade; when passing through the village, the information was given him by one of the officers of Dragoons that one of the enemy's squadrons had been quartered there since the 27th. In consequence of this report Major V. had asked the squadron leader to make inquiries of the inhabitants and find out exactly what they knew about the enemy.

Meanwhile another report had been received, this time from Weissenburg, from Colonel K. General A. read it quickly through, but before he mentioned its contents he directed one of the gallopers to ride over to the two advanced squadrons of Uhlans at Ober-Seebach and tell them that the advanced guard of the Hussar brigade was at Siegen. Communication with them was therefore at once to be established,

and information was to be exchanged of any important events. The report from Weissenburg stated :—

"I beg to report to your excellency, that the occupation of Weissenburg has been regularly carried out. The surrender of arms is now being proceeded with. On the part of the Commissary-General of the Division, requisitions have been forwarded for provisions, and the bakeries have been taken charge of. A party of the Telegraph Detachment has arrived, and the line will be in complete working order this afternoon.

"According to statements of the inhabitants, a detachment of about 35 Custom House officers had occupied the town for about a week; they left this morning in wagons which had been kept ready for their use, and are said to have taken the road to Bitsch. The Dragoons who have advanced on that road report that they encountered in the mountains, about two miles from here, an enemy's infantry patrol—possibly the Custom House officers mentioned above. The Uhlans who are reconnoitring the road to Wörth report that nothing of the enemy has been seen as yet.

"I shall push one battalion as far as the junction of the roads to Bitsch and Wörth, near the village of Rott, and order it to occupy the nearest points where the roads debouch from the mountains. At the same time I beg to request your Excellency to permit me to retain for the present the two ~~last~~ troops of the 1st Dragoons.

"According to a rumour prevailing here, a strong detachment of the enemy was expected at this place in a few days.

"K.,

"Colonel Commanding Regiment."

The non-commissioned officer of Uhlans who had brought this report from Weissenburg received a written message to take back to Colonel K. informing him of the position occupied by the Division, and of the general situation as far as known at present.

Colonel K. was also desired to secure the bridge at Altenstatt as well as the railway bridge east of it. His request to retain the Dragoons was not granted, but they were ordered to at once rejoin their regiment. The General added, in conclusion, that he proposed to advance to-morrow as far as Sulz and Nieder-Rödern, and that at noon to-day Lauterburg and Scheibenhart had been occupied by the XI. Corps.

A telegram for transmission to the General Commanding-in-Chief the Third Army was also sent to Colonel K. This stated:—

"THE GENERAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF THIRD ARMY.

" *Riedselz,*

" *31st July. 1.30 P.M.*

"Division bivouacs to-day at Riedselz and Schleithal. Advanced guards, Ingolsheim, Ober-Seebach, and Siegen. At Riedselz 3 squadrons of Chasseurs-à-cheval were encountered. 2nd squadron of 2nd Dragoons made a successful attack, enemy retired to Sulz with outposts at Schöenburg. Our loss, 2 officers and 13 men. Enemy left 2 officers and 18 men in our hands.

"Weissenburg occupied by detachment V. Corps, Lauterburg by XI. Corps. Two miles from Weissenburg on road to Bitsch, passage blocked by infantry, probably Custom House officers retreating from Weissenburg.

"Division will advance to-morrow to Sulz and Nieder-Rödern.

" *1st Cavalry Division.*"

While this telegram was being written, mention was made that it would be desirable to add what regiment had opposed our forces to-day, and to this end the prisoners must be interrogated. As the latter were not, however, in the village, the matter was postponed in order not to delay the telegram to Army Headquarters.

2 P.M.—The necessary information was soon, however, obtained from the light brigade, as Major-General C. came personally to headquarters to make report on this subject as well as on the position of the outposts. The latter were being furnished by the 2nd Dragoons. The 4th squadron had occupied Ingolsheim, and was now in the act of strengthening its position by executing some hasty defences; a piquet of the squadron had been placed on the road as far as the nearest mountain ridge. The 3rd squadron was in position near the railway crossing over the Selz, the latter being held with half a troop, which had vedettes pushed towards Hunspach.

The 1st and 2nd squadrons were in bivouac half-way between Ingolsheim and Riedselz, close to the eastern side

of the main road, covered by the heights; half a troop of the 2nd squadron had been placed as a piquet on the height near Diefenbacherhof, another half troop being detached to the ridge south of Steinselz with orders to secure the right flank.

The enemy, who had taken up a position in front of these squadrons, was constantly watched by means of patrols; the substance of the reports received from the latter had already been communicated by the Divisional Staff Officer. The 3rd squadron had established communication to its left rear with the piquet of the 1st Uhlans posted on the left bank of the Selz.

The 1st Dragoons were in and about Riedselz. In order to complete this sketch of the position it may here be added, that according to messages received from the two squadrons of Uhlans detailed for outpost duties, the Uhlans were in bivouac with their main body at the junction of two country roads west of Ober-Seebach. Piquets were posted from the latter place, one in a southerly direction on the road to Aschbach, and one close to the outskirts of the southern end of the village; the patrols moving in the direction of Tombach, Nieder-Seebach and the Selz had not seen anything of the enemy as yet. Connection had, however, been established with the outposts on the right wing of the Hussar brigade, the flank piquet of the latter being in rear of a hilly projection north of Kleidenburg.

The notes which Major-General C. brought with him regarding the examination of the prisoners gave the following result:—

“The party which came in contact with the Division to-day consisted of three squadrons of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs-à-cheval, commanded by Colonel N., and belonging to the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Light Cavalry Division. The names of the officers commanding the brigade and Division were not known.

“The regiment had four squadrons and had been moved by rail from its garrison at X. to Strassburg on the 20th and 21st instant, where it had encamped on the ramparts for several days. Large bodies of troops were there, which received new additions daily. Of cavalry, a regiment of Hussars—some said the 8th, some the 9th—and Cuirassiers were in the place.

“The regiment had marched to Hagenau on the 25th, where also large bodies of troops were assembled, infantry and

artillery, in huts. On arrival there they had been received by several Generals, and one of the Generals had made them a speech.

"One squadron had been detached the following day, the three others had been sent together to Sulz, where one of the squadrons was sent further to the front. Inquiries of the inhabitants pointed to the fact of the first squadron having been quartered at Ingolsheim. Further information gained there established the fact that every morning troops were despatched on the road to Weissenburg, at first a small detachment, and later on all the remainder.

"The prisoners belonged to the 2nd squadron, which they declared to be about 120 men strong. This as well as the 3rd squadron had about 10 o'clock this morning been alarmed at Sulz, and having advanced on the road to Ingolsheim, where they had also met their 1st squadron, had soon been drawn into an engagement."

These statements were so far confirmed, as one of the gallopers had questioned one of the wounded found at Altenstatt, and the latter had stated that he belonged to the 1st squadron of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs.

These statements were now compared with the notes which had been received from Army Headquarters as regards the formation of the enemy's army. According to these, the knowledge as to the enemy's cavalry was of a very general nature. Up to the present it was known only that the I. Corps had one Cavalry Division, formed in three brigades, and that the 7th Chasseurs and 8th Hussars, 3rd and 4th Lancers, 10th Dragoons, and the 8th and 9th Cuirassiers belonged to it. The distribution of the various regiments into brigades was not known; the composition in detail of the Reserve Cavalry Division was also not known, but it was supposed that it consisted of four regiments of Cuirassiers.

Accordingly all that could be ascertained from these notes was that the 7th Chasseurs belonged to the Cavalry Division of the I. Corps.

General A. directed that these notes should be sent as an enclosure with the report to be made to Army Headquarters this evening. Prior to the latter being written out, however, it was thought advisable to prepare a draft of orders for tomorrow.

Scarcely had this been commenced when a message came in from the 2nd Dragoons—"that the enemy's cavalry was

again advancing, west of the main road, against the right wing of our outposts."

Major-General C. at once mounted and rode off to his outposts; the General Commanding Division also sent for his horse in order to ride to Ingolsheim.

In the bivouac of the Cuirassiers a certain uneasiness could already be perceived. Every one appeared to be prepared for moving off. General A. warned them not to disturb themselves prematurely in their preparation for dinner and feeding the horses. "If you are wanted I shall let you know in good time," he added. He then went at full gallop through Riedselz, where the 1st Dragoons were already in the act of forming up, and rode up to the height situated west of the village, from which point he could just discern on a mountain ridge to his right front near Diefenbacherhof a small body of cavalry. In the main road below, a squadron of the 2nd Dragoons stood already mounted at the place of bivouac of the main body of that regiment. The leader, having been sent for, informed the General that the party which could be seen in front was the 2nd squadron of the regiment, which had marched there by order of the Commanding Officer. The squadron had moved to the front as the patrols of the piquet on our right flank had been driven in by the enemy, and as it was feared that other hostile forces were following in rear.

Soon after Major-General C. sent a report to the effect that to all appearance the alarm was caused by a strong hostile reconnoitring party only, and that the latter had already retired along the outskirts of the wood of Schöenburg. The officer who brought this report had also received directions to order any parties of the brigade, which might already have turned out, to return to their bivouacs or cantonments. Major-General C. soon returned also. He had ordered the advanced squadron to remain on the height of the Diefenbach farm until its patrols had reported that the enemy's reconnoitring party had disappeared behind its own outposts. General A. recommended for future guidance that more care should be taken about alarming the troops: the case would frequently happen of enemy's patrols driving our own in and annoying our outposts, but the division must not on that account be needlessly alarmed. For such cases the reserve of the outposts was at disposal. The General Commanding Division then returned to Riedselz-Oberdorf, where he arrived at 3.15 P.M.

Some dinner was now partaken of, and then the orders for the following day to be issued to the 3rd Brigade were drawn up. They were as follows :—

"1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I. JOURN. NO. .

" *Divisional Headquarters, Riedselz-Oberdorf,*

"31st July, 1870. 4 P.M.

"The right column has arrived with the main body to-day at Riedselz-Oberdorf; its outposts occupy the ground near Ingolsheim and reach on the left bank of the Selz beyond Ober-Seebach as far as the road to Fort Louis.

"The enemy—three squadrons of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs—attempted to stop the advance, but were after a short engagement repulsed towards Sulz; his outposts are now near Schönenburg. According to the statements of prisoners, strong forces of the enemy's infantry and artillery had been already collected at Hagenau on the 25th instant, and troops were in the act of concentration at and near Strassburg.

"The right column will advance on the 1st August as far as Sulz; it will, however, halt with its main body north of the forest of Hagenau, and endeavour to reconnoitre the forest with advanced troops.

"The 3rd Brigade will march off for the same object at 5.30 A.M. to-morrow, and move *via* Tombach as far as Nieder-Rödern, observing at the same time the road Lauterburg—Selz. At Nieder-Rödern the brigade will halt to receive further orders, and will reconnoitre the narrow part of the forest of Hagenau (the Ober-Wald) in its immediate front as well as the ground beyond it.

"Should superior forces of the enemy compel the brigade to retire, the retreat is to be effected on the main road *via* Tombach towards Weissenburg.

"Communication with the right column must be kept up under any circumstances.

"The advanced guard of the XI. Corps must be requested to support the movements of the brigade by sending its cavalry along the main road from Lauterburg to Selz.

"A., LIEUT.-GENERAL."

4.45 P.M.—The galloper who had come in from the 3rd Brigade was sent back with the above-mentioned orders.

While Major V. was occupied in writing out the report

on the events of the day, to be sent off to the Headquarters of the Army, the General Commanding Division, accompanied by Major-General B. and Major L., rode to Riedselz, close by, in order to meet Major-General C., and to communicate to both Brigadiers his views and proposals for the ensuing day.

He spoke to them as follows :—

“To-morrow we shall endeavour to drive back the enemy in our front, and attempt to reach the forest of Hagenau. I have ordered the 3rd Brigade to advance *via* Tombach to Nieder-Rödern.

“The light brigade (2nd) will to-morrow again furnish the advanced guard, and move with its main body on the main road in the direction of Sulz; the squadron of Dragoons which is to-day in position at the railway bridge over the Selz can undertake the covering of the left flank by Hunsbach. The heavy brigade will follow on the main road. One of the two squadrons of Uhlans detached to Ober-Seebach may be drawn in; the other squadron, however, will advance with the general movement towards Rittershofen, in order to establish communication with the Hussar brigade, and observe, if possible, the road Forstfeld—Sulz, thereby covering the flank.

“The horse artillery battery will again be attached to the light brigade. The Division will march off at 6 A.M.

“The transport, &c., will be advanced as far as Riedselz.”

These instructions were very simple, but General A., notwithstanding, requested brigade majors to write the instructions in their note-books in the shape of a Divisional Order in order to prevent any mistakes.

The General added in further explanation of his views that, should the forest of Hagenau be reached, it would not be advisable, owing to the probable presence of large bodies of the enemy's troops in rear of the forest, to allow the main body of the Division to penetrate into it. A special reconnaissance of the western part of the forest must then show whether that part can be worked round by a part of the Division.

The General, having visited two men who were severely wounded to-day and located at Riedselz, returned to his quarters, where he found the Commissary-General and Principal Medical Officer of the Division awaiting his arrival.

The former reported that “by requisition in Weissenburg

and the villages in the vicinity, he had organised a column of transport wagons. They were now in the act of being loaded.

"For the provisioning of the troops to-day, the requisitions put forward by the various commanders in the surrounding villages would probably have produced the necessary rations, &c. Should some of the troops find them insufficient, the iron rations must be used. Report would be received during the evening as to the number of iron rations used, and that number would be replaced from commissariat wagons to be sent to the bivouacs to-night."

A Commissary-General of the V. Army Corps, who had arrived at Weissenburg, had already made arrangements for establishing a victualling depôt, and had undertaken the filling of it with rations and provisions. Colonel K., in conjunction with the Principal Medical Officer of the Infantry Regiment there, had arranged for establishing a hospital with 100 beds, and the latter officer would undertake its fitting up and supervision.

"As the provisioning of the Division was now secured for the four following days, it was proposed to send the whole of the wagons requisitioned from the Bavarian Palatinate back to their homes."

The Commissary-General was directed to act as he proposed. Nothing was as yet known of the supply arrangements of the 3rd Brigade.

The Principal Medical Officer, had, meanwhile, collected reports from the regimental surgeons. According to these the losses were as follows :—

1st Dragoons.

2nd squadron : 2 men wounded (during the advance on the road to Bitsch west of Weissenburg).

4th squadron : 1 man hurt (his horse falling with him).

2nd Dragoons.

2nd squadron : 2 men killed, 1 officer and 9 men wounded (during engagement west of Riedselz).

4th squadron : 3 men wounded (during engagement near Altenstatt).

Total, 2 men killed, 1 officer and 15 men wounded.

The second officer, and some of the men, who had been slightly wounded during the engagement near Riedselz, remained with their squadrons.

The whole of the wounded men were taken to Weissen-
(T.L.)

burg, with the exception of two men who had to remain at Riedselz, as the nature of their wounds did not permit of their removal.

The Principal Medical Officer had detailed a Hospital Assistant to remain with the two wounded men, should the Division quit the village.

The General Commanding Division also directed that the officer in charge of the connecting posts, which, according to previous instructions, were still to be furnished by the heavy brigade, should take steps to ensure the treatment of these men.

The report which the Staff Officer had meanwhile prepared was now read out as follows :—

“1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, SECTION I., No. .

“*Divisional Headquarters, Riedselz-Oberdorf,*
“31st July. 6 P.M.

“In continuation of the report furnished to Army Headquarters this morning by telegram, the Division has further to report as follows :—

“The enemy's squadron attempted to prevent our troops from debouching south of Altenstatt by the fire of dismounted men ; it was, however, driven in, principally owing to a flank attack of a squadron of Dragoons detached to secure our flank ; the enemy then made good his retreat on the main road. The enemy received a reinforcement of two squadrons at Riedselz, and here again attempted to prevent our passage across the river Selz.

“The horse artillery battery and the light battery of the V. Corps, however, having been moved to the front, soon, by their fire, drove the adversary back. During his retreat his last squadron was attacked by the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons (Captain Y.), and routed.

“The enemy left 1 officer and 5 men killed, at the place where the engagement took place ; 1 officer and 13 men fell, in addition, into our hands.

“The enemy retired to Sulz, placing outposts near Schönenburg.

“The Division bivouacs with the 1st and 2nd Brigades about Riedselz. Outposts near Ingolsheim and towards Ober-Seebach.

“The 3rd Brigade has reached Schleithal, the reserve of its outposts is near Seigen. Nothing is reported of the

enemy in that direction. But a squadron of the enemy's troops was seen by the advanced guard of the XI. Corps, which occupies Lanterburg; the squadron retired in the direction of Winzenbach.

"Weissenburg is occupied by a detachment from the V. Army Corps. The latter is watching the roads to Bitsch and Wörth.

"The enemy's troops met with at Altenstatt and Riedselz were three squadrons of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs-à-cheval.

"The losses of the Division are : 2 men killed, 1 officer (Lieutenant X.), 15 men wounded, 2 men missing; the whole belonging to the brigade of Dragoons.

"The Division will advance to-morrow *via* Sulz and Nieder-Rödern.

"The statements of the prisoners are annexed.

"A., LIEUT.-GENERAL,
"Commanding Division."

This report, having been copied, was despatched to Weissenburg for transmission through the V. Army Corps.

During the course of the evening the following reports were received :—

1st. From the 2nd Brigade.

"The enemy still maintains his outposts in the same position near Schönenburg.

"From time to time small patrols make their appearance in the ground in front of their outposts."

2nd. From the 3rd Brigade.

"The patrols which have pushed beyond Tombach and towards Winzenbach have not met any parties of the enemy's forces. Some of the enemy's Chasseurs—about 100 horses strong—were at the latter place about noon to-day, but retreated hastily towards Selz. According to statement of inhabitants the village of Nieder-Rödern and the forest north of Selz are occupied by the enemy. The outposts of the XI. Corps are towards Neuweiler."

From these reports it was concluded that the adversary had not as yet strong forces of cavalry at his disposal, as it was presumed that the enemy's party reported from Selz

(T.L.)

was probably the 4th squadron of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs-à-cheval.

Returns were also received containing—

Statements of the movements of the troops during the engagements of the day.

Statement of the ammunition used during the day. The horse artillery had used 8 shells; the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons 135 rounds of ball ammunition; the remaining part of the Division had used so few rounds on patrol and other duties during the day that a special statement was not considered necessary.

Statements were also received as to the non-effectives in men and horses; of the latter 7 had been killed, 5 had been so slightly wounded as to be worth treatment.

General A. passed the remainder of the evening partly in the bivouac of the Cuirassiers, and partly in his own room; in the latter he closely studied the maps of the ground which would probably be traversed to-morrow, and made mental notes of the various measures which might become necessary under varying circumstances.

The Staff Officer entered a general outline of the events of the day in the Divisional Diary.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE 31ST JULY.

TIME AND PACE.

The Division moved off from its rendezvous at 6.15 A.M. The head of the column had reached the junction of the main road with the road Billigheim—Klingenmünster, a distance of over six miles, at 7.15 A.M., and here the first halt of ten minutes was made.

The advance was then continued as far as the ground south of Bergzabern (about four miles), the head of the column arriving there about 8.15 A.M. The second halt here lasted until 8.45 A.M. At 9.30 A.M. the leading brigade of the Division was deployed in position about Weissenburg and on the river Lauter. Another distance of four miles had then been traversed, a total of fifteen miles in three hours and fifteen minutes, including two halts of ten and thirty minutes respectively.

Between 9.45 and 10 A.M. the advance was resumed, the

Lauter was crossed, and the enemy driven in south of that river. The leading squadron arrived near Riedselz (two miles) towards 10.30 A.M.; at 11 A.M. the defile near that place was passed, and about twenty minutes later the defile near Ingolsheim had been reached by the leading squadron, when the march of the whole Division came to an end for that day.

The Division had therefore with its leading detachments marched that day from the bivouac to Ingolsheim, a distance of nearly eighteen-and-a-half miles, and with the heavy brigade as far as Riedselz-Oberdorf, a distance of about seventeen-and-a-quarter miles. Beyond these points small parties and many patrols had been pushed to the front, bringing up their length of march to from twenty to twenty-two miles.

If we now call to mind that this was the first day of operations, and that the march was executed during a very hot day in the month of July, one must confess that, as a whole, under the existing circumstances, the march was a good performance.

As a general rule, cavalry can march longer distances than it is usually called upon to perform. To do so it will, however, be necessary that the troops be used to marching, and that the marches themselves be properly regulated as to halting places, change of pace, and sufficiency of rations and forage. Under such circumstances, and by adding a day of rest here and there, the marching power of cavalry can be taxed up to about twenty-eight miles per day on an average without impairing the efficiency of the horses.

At the beginning of a campaign, however, the horses should be gradually accustomed to undergo fatigues. Change of forage, different water, heavy loads being carried daily, repeated bivouacs, and unaccustomed exertions will otherwise soon reduce the efficiency of a force to a degree which no after care will ever again restore to its former state.

It must also be considered that by-and-by there may be no opportunity to save the men and horses at will, as the demands which operations require cannot be calculated beforehand, and when once they present themselves they cannot be refused.

It is but seldom that marches for the concentration of the troops precede the commencement of operations; and troops are often drawn into the zone of operations immediately they quit the railways; hence it will generally be difficult to

accustom troops gradually to long marches. Where circumstances will at all permit of it, it is advisable not to extend the marches beyond a distance of fourteen miles for the first few days. Certain parties of a column, such as advanced guards, flank detachments, patrols, &c., will always have to traverse a few additional miles.

In the case before us the Division might have halted at the Lauter, satisfied with the day's march; it was quite sufficient to seize and occupy with its advanced guard the bridges over the Lauter. In that case the main body need not have traversed a greater distance than fourteen miles. The inducement for a continuation of the march was given by the contact with a single squadron of the enemy's cavalry. This, however, being the first time the enemy was met with, and the latter acting in such a manner as to lead to the supposition that great loss might be inflicted upon him, it is easily explained why the forward march with the whole force was continued beyond the Lauter.

Later on, when the enemy is daily met with, the whole Division will not be called upon to ride after a couple of the enemy's squadrons, but care will be taken to give the troops as much rest as possible, and a few squadrons will probably be sent to the front to drive the enemy's patrols in.

As already shown, it took about half-an-hour for the two brigades and the horse artillery battery to march past a given point when quitting their place of bivouac. The length of this column on the march, allowing regulation distances, amounted to 4,500 paces.

This is arrived at as follows:—*

One squadron	202	paces; wagons	28	paces.
„ regiment (4 squadrons)	857	„	„	132	„	„
„ brigade (2 regiments)	1,774	„	„	278	„	„
„ horse artillery battery	506	„	„	14	„	„
A Horse Artillery Division						
of 3 batteries	1,562	„	„	56 „
Divisional Staff (and	branches)...		96	„	„	62 „
Army Hospital Corps de-						
achment...	264	„	„	28 „

* Inclusive of led horses and detachment Army Hospital Corps.

Columns of Commissariat and Transport—

Provision column	709 paces.
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Transport column	1,214 „
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In accordance with this calculation the whole 1st Cavalry Division of three brigades and two horse artillery batteries, marching on one road, would cover:—

1st. Troops (including led horses and Army Hospital Corps detachment).

Divisional Staff	96 paces.
Three cavalry brigades	5,822 „
Staff and two batteries horse artillery ...	1,020 „
Half detachment Army Hospital Corps ...	132 „
Intermediate distances	300 „

Total	<u>6,870 paces.</u>
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2nd. Wagons and Baggage Carts, Commissariat and Transport.

Divisional Staff	62 paces.
Three brigades	834 „
Battery horse artillery	40 „
Detachment Army Hospital Corps	14 „
Provision wagons	709 „

Total	<u>1,659 paces.</u>
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Grand total	<u>8,529 paces.</u>
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In the study under our consideration the Division advances, however, in two columns. The length of the right column is therefore—

Troops	4,500 paces.
Transport... ..	1,367 „

Total	<u>5,867 paces.</u>
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The left column would cover—

Troops	2,370 paces.
Transport	292 „

Total	<u>2,662 paces.</u>
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Taking these figures as a basis, the march off from the bivouac rendezvous at walking pace (130 paces per minute) would take—

For the Right Column.

Troops	about 35 minutes.
Transport	„ 11 „
Total					about 46 minutes.

For the Left Column.

Troops	about 18 minutes.
Transport	„ 2 „
Total					about 20 minutes.

or, should the *whole Division* march off from *one* rendezvous—

Troops	about 53 minutes.
Transport	„ 13 „
Total					about 66 minutes.

This does not, however, include any wagons that may be hired or requisitioned in addition to the regulation transport.

From this the conclusion may be drawn that with large bodies of cavalry it is very desirable that measures should be taken for the successive readiness and moving off of the various parts.

(*Vide* “Studies in Troop Leading: The Infantry Division,” Part I, p. 34.)

It is well, after moving off, to march at a walk for fifteen to twenty minutes, say about one mile, and then to trot and walk alternately before making the first halt.

This halt is required for the men's wants as well as for arranging the saddlery; for the latter it is quite necessary “to give the horses an opportunity of ridding themselves of any excess of wind.” It is useless to make a halt sooner, as the saddle and girth would not have loosened sufficiently.*

Suppose we calculate two trots of five minutes each, followed by walks of a similar length of time, and add the twenty minutes calculated above for the walk at the march

* *Vide* Bonie, “Fond et vitesse d'une troupe de cavalerie en campagne.” Paris, 1872. We here follow some of the points of this excellent work closely.

off, we have a march of about forty minutes and a distance traversed of about 7,000 paces before the first halt.

Of course this calculation is subject to various modifications as regards the times for "trot and walk" as well as the distance to be traversed. As a general rule, however, it may be taken that the first halt should be made after a march of from thirty to forty-five minutes, and before a distance of four miles has been traversed.

In the case under our consideration a distance of about six miles had been traversed, and the head of the column had marched an hour ere a halt was made. This happened owing to the General Commanding Division having remained behind at the rendezvous to see the Division file past him, and having neglected to give the Brigadier of the leading brigade instructions as to the first halt.

From the circumstances, however, as above described, it will be seen that a column of troops of such a length as a Cavalry Division represents cannot make its first halt with the whole of the troops at the same time. Otherwise the head of the column would make a halt after a march of forty-five minutes, while the rear of the column would at that time have just moved off. The length of the first halt need, however, be but of short duration: from five to ten minutes will suffice.

Regarding the pace at which the march should be continued and the various halts to be made, these matters must depend on the length of the day's march, the state of the roads, the weather, and especially the demands which the situation in which the troops then are will require.

As a general rule, an alternative trot and walk will be preferred; for troops that have not as yet become quite used to continuous marches, a trot of about ten minutes, followed by a walk of similar length, may probably be advisable; later on the quicker pace may be resorted to for a greater length of time. It is, of course, quite understood that unless the situation should specially demand it, all steep inclines are to be traversed at a walk.

From this it will be seen that the distances between the various bodies of troops must be much greater than is generally the case with troops marching in close mass of columns; the various parts of the whole column are hereby also enabled to ride at various paces. Owing to this circumstance the length of a Cavalry Division, as stated above, will not only

be greater, but will be very considerably increased as soon as the situation demands the formation of a special advanced guard, in which case a minimum length of from 1,500 to 2,500 paces may be added to the calculation given above.

When near the enemy, the various halts necessary during a long-continued march will in most cases take place as circumstances offer. As soon as the situation will allow of it the troops will dismount. When, however, a distance of only fourteen miles is traversed, a second halt of long duration is scarcely required. In the case under our notice a halt of about half-an-hour's duration was made after a march of about ten-and-a-half miles; this halt, however, was justified by circumstances. The halt took place before the chain of outposts of the V. Corps had been passed. Covered by these, plenty of time was given for a rest. When later on the adversary is met with, it will be difficult to judge how far the movements may have to be prolonged during the remaining part of the day, and whether time at all may be at disposal to give the troops a rest.

It may also here be of interest to calculate the rapidity with which a column of cavalry of the strength given above can form up for battle from its column of march.

If we calculate upon a distance of 300 paces between lines, and take as a basis the regulated movement of 300 paces at a trot, and 500 paces at a gallop in one minute, we shall have—

The right column (two brigades and one battery horse artillery) marching up and being formed in two lines—

at a trot in 14 minutes,

„ gallop „ $8\frac{1}{2}$ „

The left column (one brigade and one battery horse artillery) marching up and being formed in two lines—

at a trot in 7 minutes,

„ gallop „ 4 „

Suppose the *whole Division* (three brigades and two batteries horse artillery) to be on the march on a road, it would form up in three lines for battle—

at a trot in 21 minutes,

„ gallop „ $12\frac{1}{2}$ „

MARCH FORMATION FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

Formation of the Column on the March.

The Division, as soon as it had passed the cordon of outposts of the V. Army Corps, adopted the regulation formation for a column on the march on active service. With this object the leading brigade is ordered to form itself into an advanced guard, a course which as a rule is not followed by an Infantry Division consisting of two brigades. An Infantry Division will generally detail one complete regiment* with a detachment of cavalry, artillery, and pioneers (sappers) to form the advanced guard; the remainder of the infantry brigade from which this regiment is taken will then generally be attached to the main body of the Division, marching at its head.

An Infantry Division may, however, also depute the independent formation of an advanced guard to the leading brigade. But such a course would only be considered advisable under exceptional circumstances. The General Commanding a Division must have his eyes everywhere; it is absolutely necessary for him to watch the whole Division even during a march, and many circumstances will arise which will interfere with his constant presence with the advanced guard.

A Brigadier who has already placed a part of his force as an advanced guard, and has the remaining part of his brigade at his disposal, will, on the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances, at once independently dispose of the latter. So it may happen that the second regiment of a brigade will be sent in a direction quite legitimate and judicious according to the situation as viewed by the Brigadier; the General Commanding Division, however, who has more complete knowledge of the general situation, and must consider other circumstances as well, will probably differ very much from the views of his Brigadier. Messages received by him from independent flank detachments, events reported from neighbouring columns, or orders received from superior commands in rear, must give the General Commanding a Division a much clearer picture of the general situation than the Brigadier can possibly have, the latter having no knowledge of all of these facts and events. Should, therefore, a Brigadier dispose at once of his second regiment independently, as no doubt in such cases will always happen, the General Commanding the Division will suddenly discover that one-half of his forces have been

* The German brigade consists of two regiments; each regiment of three battalions.—EDITOR.

disposed of in a direction and for an object not quite in accordance with his views and plans, and therefore not desirable.

If, during the march, the second regiment is attached to the main body of the Division, and thereby entirely taken out of the Brigadier's control, it will be found that such a course will tend to greater economy in the application of the forces, and enable the General Commanding the Division to retain the greater part of his troops in his hands.

To this must be added that with an Infantry Division an opening engagement does not develop very quickly; ample time will almost always be found to observe, to dispose of troops, and to support the advanced guard in good time. On the other hand it must be observed that infantry moves proportionately slower, and that therefore, should a Brigadier have disposed of his second regiment in a direction different from that in which the General Commanding Division may desire to use it, it will take the latter some time to change the movement into the desired direction.

With the Cavalry Division, however, these relations, when in presence of the enemy, are of a very different order. If three complete brigades are to march on one road, it is of course quite plain that one complete brigade must undertake the duty of the advanced guard. For the march of such a mass of cavalry, however, more than one road will always, if possible, be assigned, and then it may not always suffice to cover the Division by means of one brigade only. It is quite possible to do so when the roads run, within short distances, parallel to each other, when regiments deployed from column of route are able to move in open ground across fields, or when special circumstances permit of pushing the advanced guard some few miles to the front. In the case under our consideration none of these courses could be followed.

The Division of Cavalry is ordered to reconnoitre the ground to a considerable distance and on a very broad front. A certain splitting up of the forces sent into the first line is therefore unavoidable; the Division does not advance in conjunction with other parallel columns like an Infantry Division, on the contrary it must extend its forces over the whole ground in front of the army. To effect this, patrols alone are of no use, as they are compelled to halt before every superior party of the enemy's forces they may encounter; knowledge is required as to whether strong bodies of the enemy's troops are in the immediate front, and that knowledge can be

gained only when the advanced troops are sufficiently strong to drive in, or disperse, the enemy's small parties. This requires, however, that the various patrols should be immediately followed by strong supports, in order to meet the above contingency. The strength of these parties to be despatched along the main roads must not, however, be such as to completely split up the whole Division; whole regiments cannot very well be spared for this purpose, but on the other hand the object will scarcely be obtained unless whole squadrons at least are sent out.

The number of the parties to be so detached can hardly be laid down in principle beforehand; it will mostly depend on the number of the main roads, but other circumstances and motives may also lead to their being necessarily furnished. At the beginning of a march it can hardly be determined to what extent these detached parties should be detailed, but as a general rule more than one squadron will be required for the purpose, as the situation of an isolated Cavalry Division is not quite so simple that it can always confine its advance to one road, and so require cover on that one road only.

In addition to this advanced reconnoitring sphere, the Division will always require a compact advanced guard in order to avoid a constant forming up of the whole force. For the latter a small party would not suffice, as it will also serve as a reservoir from which all the detachments must be sent off which from time to time may become necessary.

In most cases, one regiment will not be found a sufficient force to do duty as an advanced guard to a Cavalry Division, and *it will be well to detail for this purpose a whole brigade, even if the Division have two brigades only to dispose of.**

If we take the example of the advance of the Cavalry Division in our studies, we find that the right column has taken the light brigade for forming the advanced guard as laid down above, but the method pursued in carrying out the reconnoitring cannot be looked upon as satisfactory.

This duty is here carried out in the same manner as is generally witnessed at peace manœuvres, where, as a rule, owing to the close proximity of the opposing cavalry columns, a very narrow strip of ground only remains available for reconnoitring purposes.

* The writer evidently refers to the entire advanced force, viz., the advanced guard proper and the advanced reconnoitring detachments.—
EDITOR.

On active service, however, especially at the beginning of operations, the situation is generally quite different, and therefore requires different measures. There the masses of cavalry which are entrusted with the task of reconnoitring the ground in front of an army require to know as early as possible everything that has been discovered as to the enemy's movements and whereabouts. It is then, and then only, that the cavalry will be enabled to indicate to its main body the direction in which it ought to move, and circumstances may even arise which demand that the march of the Division should be quickly transferred from one road to another. In order, however, to carry this out, it becomes necessary *to push feelers far out to the front*. General A. had omitted to make use of such feelers on the 29th and 30th July as has already been observed, and even supposing that sufficient reasons could be adduced for the omission then, the neglect to take these measures on the 31st July cannot possibly be justified.

At a very early hour on that day single squadrons ought to have been sent in advance towards Weissenburg and St. Rémy; for the Cavalry Division should not on that day have depended on the reconnoitring of the outposts of the V. Army Corps, which had probably special and different missions to accomplish; *the Division should now have gained information for itself by means of its own forces*.

In the same manner the Hussar brigade should have sent a squadron in advance at an early hour in the morning in the direction of the bridge over the Lauter near Schleithal.

Supposing that one of these parties had discovered the enemy advancing this side of the Lauter, or beheld strong forces of the enemy's troops at some place on the other side of the river, the Division would have had ample time to move in the desired direction, or to concentrate its two separated columns, should it have become necessary to do so, in order to bring its whole force to bear upon any given point. On the main road towards Weissenburg, the simple observation of the road by means of the already advanced squadron would meanwhile have sufficed.

Following the above principle, and looking at the troops necessary to be detached from the right column, we find that two squadrons of the 1st Dragoons might have been detailed for that purpose, the other two squadrons forming the advanced guard of the Division. It could not, however, be

known beforehand whether further detachments might not be required to be sent out before reaching Weissenburg, for example on one of the roads on the right flank leading to the mountains. At Weissenburg the necessity of sending out detachments must arise, equally as when on the other side of the river Lauter, and that such would be the case could already have been known in the morning. Once near the town, the whole of the roads leading into it must be blocked, and on continuing the march south of the Lauter, detachments would be required not only for the main road to Hagenau, but also for the roads to Bitsch, Wörth, and Fort Louis, as well as to keep up communication with the Hussar brigade.

Such detachments should, however, always be furnished by the advanced guard. It would not be judicious to detail them from the main body of the column, as their effect would then be felt too late.

If the 1st Dragoons only had been employed as advanced guard, that regiment would have been completely broken up into detachments, and a new main body for the advanced guard would then have had to be furnished from the 2nd Regiment of the brigade.

It is clear then that it is most advantageous that a complete brigade should form the advanced guard* of the right column, although the latter consists of two brigades only.

According to this view the further advance south of the Lauter would have been made as follows, provided always that the enemy had not been at once met with at Altenstatt, and supposing that some squadrons had marched in advance of the column as far as the river:—

Advanced Detachments.

4th squadron of 1st Dragoons on the road Weissenburg—Sulz.

1st squadron of same regiment on the road Altenstatt—Fort Louis, ~~half~~ troop on the left flank in order to keep up communication with the Hussar brigade.

4th squadron of 2nd Dragoons detached to the right to observe the roads from Weissenburg to Bitsch and Wörth.

*Advanced Guard.**

Vanguard and Point, 2nd and 3rd squadrons of 1st Dragoons.
Main body, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd squadrons of 2nd Dragoons.

* See note, page 109.—EDITOR. † See note, page 113.—EDITOR.

*Main Body of Division.**Heavy Brigade.*

In a similar way the isolated Hussar brigade would have formed the advanced guard with one complete regiment, which would have also furnished the detachment marching in advance, the second regiment and battery forming the main body.

After crossing the Lauter we should imagine the best formation for the brigade to be—

Advanced Detachments.

4th squadron of 1st Hussars to the ~~right~~ front, to observe the road Lauterburg—Selz.

1st squadron of same regiment in front in the general direction towards Nieder-Rödern, ~~half~~ troop detached to keep up communication with the right column.

Advanced Guard.

2nd and 3rd squadrons of 1st Hussars, of which one ~~half~~ troop for the vortrupp and point.

Main Body of Column.

Four squadrons of 2nd Hussars and horse artillery battery.

It should be laid down as a principle that the advanced detachments and the advanced guard should be taken, if possible, from one and the same regiment, or at least from the same brigade; of course this may not be possible in all cases.

Of the *advanced guard* it should also be said, that it should be formed in accordance with the elementary principles laid down on this head, viz.: it should be divided into main body (reserve,) support (vorhut, or simply vortrupp, as the case may be), and point (advanced party). The principle is of course liable to variation according to the strength of the advanced guard.

The point should consist of one non-commissioned officer with from two to five horses, according as the ground is open or covered, or the road makes numerous turnings; the officer of the leading ~~half~~ troop (vortrupp) will, as a rule, be near the point; his ~~half~~ troop following at a short distance.

We do not consider it necessary to place a connecting link between the point and the vortrupp.

The strength of the vanguard proper of a large column must entirely depend on the strength of the advanced guard.

Should two squadrons only be available for the advanced

guard, they will follow the ~~half~~ troop (vortrupp) in one body without further subdivision. Should three or four squadrons be available, one of them forms the vorhut (vanguard), including the vortrupp, and the remainder follow at some distance from it.*

Flanking patrols are detailed according to circumstances, but even in open ground it is necessary to let a few flankers accompany the column at a few hundred paces from each flank. If this principle is not adhered to, and attention should be rivetted on some event happening in the immediate front, it is obvious that anything going on on either flank will escape observation unless some men are specially told off to continually watch the flanks.

Lastly it may be added, that during the course of operations, a relief of the advanced guard should take place.

We must consider that the advanced guard on the whole will execute a longer march, and probably undergo more fatigue, than the main body of the Division. Some parties of the advanced guard will daily march many miles further than the main body. The former should, therefore, be relieved before the men and horses are too much knocked up.

The main body of the Division will follow the advanced guard at a considerable interval; the former will also act wisely by detailing some flanking patrols to accompany the Division during the march. The advanced guard will not always be

* According to former German Regulations the "Gros" (main body or reserve) of the advanced guard was usually preceded by a "Vortrupp" (a ~~half~~ troop, corresponding to our "support"), which pushed forward the "Spitze" (point or advanced party); but advanced guards which consisted of several squadrons threw forward from the gros a "Vorhut," of which the main part was termed the "Haupttrupp," and the more advanced portion the "Vortrupp" (a ~~half~~ troop) with its "Spitze." Again (Meckel's "Elemente der Taktik," p. 210) if this vorhut were much stronger than one squadron, the leading squadron or so formed the vortrupp and haupttrupp, as above, and the rest of the vorhut followed the haupttrupp as "Hauptkörper der Vorhut." In rear of these bodies followed the gros of the advanced guard. Thus to the whole of the fractions (exclusive of the point) in advance of the gros, when they consisted of more than one body, the term "Vorhut" was applied, and this may conveniently be translated as "vanguard." It should, however, be remarked that in the most recent editions of the Felddienst-Ordnung the term "Gros" is only applied to the main body of the marching troops, and the word "Vorhut" is not used. The advanced guard consists of a "Haupttrupp" and, in front of it, a "Vortrupp" preceded by the "Spitze"; but if the vortrupp be strong it may detach a portion (= the old "Vorhut") to follow the Spitze.—EDITOR.

in a position, especially during a very long march, to detach men for the observation of every road branching off to either side, as otherwise its formation would soon be completely broken up. It may very easily happen, that after the advanced guard has passed some bye-road, one of the enemy's parties suddenly breaks out of another bye-road, and throws the column of the main body into confusion. The sudden appearance of a few of the enemy's cavalry close to an infantry column is of less moment, as the latter is always in a position to check them very quickly. With cavalry, however, the covering of the flanks plays a far more important rôle, and we shall have an opportunity of returning to this subject later on.

A cavalry column does not require a *reserve* during the march with cavalry it is of even less use than with infantry.* Should circumstances happen which render an encounter with the enemy very probable, the first thing to be done would be to deploy the whole Division as quickly as possible from a column on the march into a fighting formation. It will then form up in several lines, and within those lines the reserve is contained which, with cavalry, cannot be kept in rear at such a long distance as with infantry.

The rear of a cavalry column, however, *when marching isolated*, must always be brought up by a detached party. With large bodies of troops it is advisable not to make these parties too small; a squadron even might under some circumstances be detailed for that purpose, being followed by one of its ~~half~~ troops. The mission of this rear guard consists not merely of police duties; it must also unceasingly watch in order to observe and report anything unusual that may be going on in rear of the column. Should the column be threatened, the rear guard must unhesitatingly throw itself upon the assailant, however superior he may be; the object is to give the nearest regiment time to form up for defence. When clouds of dust are observed coming nearer and nearer, their meaning must be ascertained at once; villages in the enemy's country that have just been passed through must be watched for a short time, in order to see whether suspicious gatherings are taking place, whether signals are given from church or watch-towers, windmills that have stood still suddenly commence to move round, or people on horseback, in carriages or

* *Vide* Verdy du Vernois' "Studies in Troop Leading: The Infantry Division," Part I., . 22, (English Translation).

carts, leave the villages by bye-roads. Nothing, in fact, that takes place in rear of the column must escape observation.

For the formation of such a rear guard special instructions are not required; it will suffice to lay down the rule that the regiment or detachment marching in rear of the column will invariably furnish the rear guard.

When artillery is added to the column on the march, it is to be taken as a principle that, as far as possible, that arm should be placed towards the front; but this does not mean that the artillery should march in the reconnoitring zone. During peace operations one sees the horse artillery batteries with two or three squadrons taken to the front, and preceding the advance—a practice which, even during peace operations, often leads to many awkward contretemps.

The squadrons must of course spread out, and part of the whole only will remain in a compact mass, which as soon as the enemy comes in sight, must quit the main road. The artillery then follows over fields, hedges and ditches, the horses thereby getting unnecessarily exhausted, and this, for the most part, at a time when this arm of the service is not at all in a position to make an effective use of its weapon. The artillery also always requires some little time in order to find the range. The enemy's cavalry, however, which is visible at this stage of the fight, offers but few small, isolated, and continually moving objects to aim at, which in addition can easily find cover, and, even if reached by a shell, soon gallop off to some other hiding place.

To this must be added that such a small body of cavalry is greatly hampered in its movement owing to its being required to cover the guns. A battery should therefore be attached to an isolated regiment under exceptional conditions only. With the right column the place of the battery would of course be with the advanced guard, with the 2nd Dragoons; while in the Hussar brigade the battery should be with the second regiment. In principle, the artillery should not be attached to parties which are to carry out the reconnoitring proper, and are at every moment liable to be weakened by providing detached parties. But even here exceptional cases will occur—for instance, when the enemy can dispose of but a small body of cavalry, or marches in loose and scattered formations.

Distances.

As regards the advanced squadrons, it is impossible to lay down a certain limit of miles within which they are to move. They are required to gain contact with the enemy, and having once done so, to maintain it without interruption. Theirs is not a mission of fighting, but they have merely to drive back all patrols they may meet with upon their supports; they are also not bound to retire on the same road on which they advanced, or upon which the division may be marching; they may move on this or that road, as may be most convenient and advantageous in order to get information of the enemy's movements, but correct and early information must be rendered at all times.

These squadrons must endeavour, without troubling about their distance from the main body, to gain touch with the enemy as soon as possible. As soon as the main body arrives at the river Lauter, it will be of the utmost importance to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and to the General Commanding the Division, that these squadrons shall have already advanced as far as the forest of Hagenau, should the enemy not have previously opposed them with superior forces.

With regard to this matter, a study of the method pursued by Katzler's advanced guards will be of great assistance, and very instructive. These advanced guards, once they had become accustomed to the work, always left two squadrons of Hussars to preserve the touch. These squadrons were perfectly independent as to their movements; they had no need to trouble themselves about the main body of the advanced guard, but were simply required to send frequent correct and early information.

From these considerations it will, however, be clear that a Cavalry Division must, in addition to the advanced detachments, form its own advanced guard, and that it cannot dispense with the latter because some few squadrons are pushed to the front at a considerable distance. The latter may not only have been compelled suddenly to evacuate the road on which they advanced, but parties of the enemy's forces may reach the main road from the flanks, and suddenly appear in front of the main body of the Division.

The distances to be observed between the various parts of the advanced guard, and again between the latter and the main body, cannot very well be laid down.

As a general rule, it is never advisable to allow large bodies of troops to follow too closely the head of the column. Otherwise in close ground it may easily happen that the head of the column, through the sudden attack of a hostile force, is driven back, putting the nearest parties in rear to confusion, before they have time to form up for defence. The same thing may happen when the head of the column is unexpectedly fired upon by hostile artillery. All these events are far more dangerous to cavalry than to infantry.

The distance between the parts of the advanced guard should therefore not be less than 600 paces; but they should not extend beyond 1,000 paces, as the leading body must not only always be under observation, but be able to rely upon a ready and immediate support. In close ground it is advisable to make the distance for cavalry rather greater than less, in order to give the advanced guard time to reconnoitre the ground in front and to the flanks.

In Appendix V. a sketch is given of the formation which the right column would have assumed, after the outposts of the V. Army Corps had been passed, in accordance with the principles recommended above. The distances are here calculated for ground which, although undulating, affords a fair view over it.

A thorough searching of the ground during the advance, especially of villages and hamlets, is requisite. A special halt in order to carry out the duty is not necessary as long as the leading detachment observes certain precautions. If the point were to ride into a village without due precaution, and were immediately followed by the ~~half~~ troop and the next leading squadron, it would no doubt happen, especially when debouching, that a small hostile force, by making a sudden attack, would cause confusion and losses. It is therefore recommended that the leading squadron, when the enemy is expected, should rapidly search the village by means of patrols, and march past the outskirts of the village on either side.

Every search must commence by the sending of patrols to the exits nearest the enemy, in order to observe the ground in front, and then the search at the village itself may be begun. The remaining columns in rear, after the advanced guard has marched a sufficient distance to the front, may quietly remain on the road, and so pass through the place.

Great delay would be caused by making inquiries of the

inhabitants. For this purpose, officers should be specially detailed, while the column continues its march.

OPERATIONS OF THE DIVISION PRIOR TO GOING INTO BIVOUACS.

After these general remarks let us now look to the conduct of the leader of the Division and to that of his various parties from the time they arrived at Bergzabern, the position of the outposts of the V. Army Corps.

It was no doubt quite judicious on the part of Lieut.-General A. to hasten on in advance of his troops and so gain an opportunity of making personal inquiries of the officer commanding the outposts, and to communicate with Colonel K. As a general rule, however, the leader of a large body of cavalry should be most careful to avoid quitting his troops even for a short time.

Should misunderstandings arise, or orders arrive from superior authority during the leader's absence, it may happen that the troops, instead of following him, will come to a halt, or, instead of halting, march away in a wrong direction, and thus owing to the rapidity of cavalry movements get completely out of the control of the leader. Such a case happened during the Battle of Solferino, when an Austrian Cavalry Division returned inopportunately towards the Mincio while the leader had ridden in advance of his Division.

In the case under observation in these studies, the temporary absence of the leader was of less moment, as the Division could scarcely mistake the main road and consequent direction of its march, and being a long distance from the enemy it was hardly likely that anything of importance would suddenly occur.

The information to be obtained of Major-General X., although useful and necessary, might, however, just as well have been obtained by the Staff Officer of the Division, and as regards Colonel K., it was certain that he was to be found at Bergzabern at 8 A.M., so that there was time for General A. to have an interview with that officer without losing connection with the Division. As the interview with Colonel K. would involve important arrangements, it was of course advisable that General A. should have a personal interview with that officer.

The desire expressed by General A. to have the support

of the battery of field artillery, should it be deemed necessary, appears quite justified. Should Weissenburg prove to be occupied, an impression sufficiently strong to force the evacuation of the town could be effected by means of artillery only, and the more guns could be placed in position the more effectual would that impression be upon the garrison.

The mistake which arose when marching off after the first halt, and which, when discovered, was rectified by the heavy brigade breaking into a sharper trot, must be attributed to the fact that the troops had not sufficiently practised the marching of large masses of cavalry. The Brigades, however, become accustomed to it after they have accomplished a few marches together; the issue of orders also becomes easier and the troops themselves come to understand each other better. It does sometimes happen that, at the time of moving off from a rendezvous of considerable extent, some part of a Division is overlooked. During the war of 1866, on the 27th June, it happened that the 2nd Infantry Division, marching from Schömberg to Parschnitz, on arrival at the latter place discovered that it had lost a part of its forces. The General Commanding the Division hastened personally back to look for it. It may be guessed that by doing so his attention was completely drawn away from Trautenau.

It has been pointed out on a previous page that the greatest care should be exercised in detailing detached parties, which ought to be as few as is consistent with safety; it was, however, at the same time remarked also, that the security of a Cavalry Division will generally demand the employment of entire squadrons, except under particular circumstances in which a few patrols only may suffice. As these procedures, however, are of great importance, it will be better if we study each detachment separately.

The first detaching of parties commenced as soon as Bergzabern had been left behind and the Division had assumed a formation suitable for marching in presence of the enemy. The 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons undertook the formation of the advanced guard, and the 4th squadron of the same regiment was detailed to cover the left flank. The question now arises whether for the last-mentioned duty such a large detachment as a squadron is really required, or whether a smaller force would not have sufficed.

The orders for the 4th squadron were :—To keep up com-

munication with the brigade of Hussars, to occupy the bridge near St. Rémy, and to reconnoitre beyond the latter place as far as the point where the Weissenburg road enters the Niederwald.

The interval between the road Landau—Weissenburg and the road on which the brigade of Hussars marched may be calculated at four miles as the crow flies, and that from Weissenburg to St. Rémy about two miles. Although the brigade of Hussars would also detail patrols to keep up communications with the right column, yet in such close undulating ground, dotted over with numerous villages and farms, it requires several patrols to completely and effectually reconnoitre the ground and discover in good time the approach of any large hostile force.

The larger the extent of front, the greater the number of scouting parties to be sent out. In order, however, to prevent the latter from wandering purposelessly in all directions, it will be necessary to form a common directing support, which will follow the various patrols, and at the same time provide the means of increasing the number of patrols whenever the ground renders it necessary. During a march of from twelve to sixteen miles the ground may present very varying aspects.

Such patrols should not, however, halt before every superior hostile patrol they may encounter. There must always be a considerable difference between the conduct of cavalry patrols sent out from stationary bodies—*e.g.*, those sent from the line of outposts, in order to gain information of the enemy's movements—and such patrols as are sent out to screen the march of a Cavalry Division at a considerable distance from the latter. The former can move about for hours, or may even get out of the way in some other direction; should the enemy have meanwhile commenced the forward movement of larger forces, these movements will soon become known to the outposts or to some other patrols that have not advanced so far in the direction of the enemy; no danger can therefore arise to the troops in rear of them.

It is a different matter, however, with one's own advance. Time then becomes a most important factor. A not inconsiderable length of time will always be absorbed by patrols in attempting to gain information of the enemy's movements, in the delivery of their messages, and in the discovery of the whereabouts of the leader of the Division in the long column

of route. During all this time the Division will trot along the main road perhaps two miles, perhaps more, or the enemy during that time may possibly have made a movement on our flanks. In that case danger will arise to the whole column. It is therefore necessary not only to have the ground scouted by a sufficient number of patrols, but also to cause them to be followed by such a support as will enable them to drive in any patrols they may encounter stronger than their own, and so to attain the object they have in view. The reconnoitring of the ground on either flank should be carried on at the same time, and on a level with the ground patrolled in front.

The flanking parties of large isolated masses of cavalry are therefore not simply reduced to mere parties of observation, but they must also be in a position to hold their ground by fighting if necessary.

To effect this, it is not, however, always necessary to attack the adversary, as it will often happen that the presence of a single intact squadron in close ground, which cannot be thoroughly examined at a glance, will arrest and delay even larger bodies of cavalry, and thus enable its own side to gain time to carry out its plans. Should the hostile cavalry column observe one or two patrols only in its front, it will simply continue its march, but it will not do so when scouts can be seen at various points, with their support in their immediate rear, even if the latter consist of only half a troop here and there. Unless there is absolute necessity for it, no cavalry will engage in combat before it has formed up some of its larger tactical units and endeavoured to gain correct information of the adversary's strength. It is very probable that in rear of these supports, considerable hostile forces are present in sheltered positions. In this way every single squadron will be in a position to not only discover the approach of strong hostile parties, but also to delay their advance for some minutes.

Every minute so gained is here of immense importance. Should the main body of the Division gain only five minutes' time, this will give it an extent of ground of from 1,500 to 2,500 paces, a not inconsiderable space for greater liberty of movements.

As regards the necessity for strong detached parties, it must also be considered that these parties may frequently be entrusted with special objects. In the case under our observation, for instance, the 4th squadron has, as a special mission,

to occupy the bridge across the river Lauter at St. Rémy, to defend it if necessary, and to reconnoitre beyond that place. The ground there, with the Niederwald in close vicinity, and the necessity for extending the reconnaissance in the direction of Lauterburg as well as Weissenburg, will demand a large number of patrols.

In an enemy's country, however, it would not be judicious to form patrols of a strength of two or three horses only; it is much more to the purpose to make them up to not less than six horses. In the face of inhabitants unwilling to give information or assistance, two or three men will make no moral impression, especially as one or two will have to remain outside the village to watch the roads, while the others gain the necessary information.

The occupation, by a strong party, of the bridge over the Lauter becomes a necessity in order to keep open a retreat for the advanced patrols, should they be driven back by the advance of any stronger hostile party from some point, in addition to which the use of the bridge will be required during the further operations. The detaching of the whole of the 4th squadron is not therefore too considerable, and even a stronger party than a squadron would not seem to be out of proportion to the task required of it.

As to the advance of this squadron, ~~half~~ a troop would be ordered to form the advanced guard, another ~~half~~ troop to move one mile further to the east, and one non-commissioned officer and six men to march on the ground between the road on which the squadron marched and the road followed by the main body of the Division. This small party is here sufficient, as the interval between the two roads is short, and part of the ground will be scouted by other patrols from the main body.

The situation on the right flank is, however, different; owing to the close vicinity of the mountains to that flank, and failing any extensive lines of communication over them, an advance of any large body of hostile troops, especially large bodies of cavalry, was not at all likely to take place. In order, therefore, to drive in any hostile patrols, and observe and report any unusual occurrence, ~~half~~ a troop will suffice, preceding the advanced guard at from 1,000 to 2,000 paces, according to the nature of the ground and the state of the roads.

As the leader of the Division cannot always remain with

the advanced guard during the march, but must give his attention also to the other parts of the Division and make use of every available point from which a good view of the surrounding country can be gained, it would appear advisable that the Divisional Staff Officer should be constantly at the head of the column. This officer, being thoroughly acquainted with the general situation, will be in a position to readily judge as to the importance of any occurrence, and also during temporary halts be able to make the necessary reconnaissance of any point, and to interrogate to the fullest extent any prisoners brought in.

In the case under our observation this officer was not sent off to the head of the column until the advanced party came to a momentary halt owing to a cavalry party south-east of Rechtenbach being mistaken for a hostile force. There were times when the head of a column on the march—at least during times of peace—would halt, in order to report that a windmill or something of the sort had been seen. Such a thing may not occur now-a-days, but it may still happen that the leading party, observing some few horsemen at a great distance, will halt and wait to see whether they will come nearer, and so allow them to establish the fact of their being friend or foe. The mission of the advanced party, however, is to discover this in good time, and it becomes therefore a necessity, as soon as anything suspicious is observed, to despatch a few men at a sharp pace to the front or flank, as the case may be, to discover and report what the suspicious object may be; otherwise it may often happen that the long and even line of a hedge of dark foliage at a great distance off, or heavy clouds of dust raised by a very large herd of cattle or sheep, are taken for hostile columns or signs of the march of troops, and as a probable consequence the party may turn about, or, as in the case under notice, remain at a halt before one of their own parties. All such interruptions may, however, be avoided if, in addition to the advanced squadrons, the advanced guards will detail a few patrols to reconnoitre the ground in front. In the open ground under our notice these patrols might easily have been two miles in advance of the advanced guard.

In addition to the above, another mistake was committed.

The leader of the Division knew from the information he gained during the interview at Bergzabern that ~~half~~ a troop of Uhlans of the V. Corps had advanced in the direction of

Weissenburg this intelligence ought to have been communicated along the column to the leading party, in order to prepare it for the fact of the probable appearance of friendly cavalry in our own front, thereby avoiding the party coming to a halt.

The leader of the ~~half~~ troop of Uhlans in question also did not act correctly, as he should have reported much earlier, especially as he had encountered the enemy. It was of course quite correct to halt his party in order to observe the enemy's movements as long as possible, but this demanded all the more that he should send back a report as to his whereabouts, so as to prevent any fear or doubt being entertained as to his safety and position, which might possibly cause another ~~half~~ troop being despatched from the V. Corps to look after the first ~~half~~ troop. Had a message been sent back along the main road, the head of the Cavalry Division would of course have learnt from the messenger that a party of Uhlans were in front, and would also have gained information as to the actual state of affairs at Weissenburg.

The stay of the ~~half~~ troop of Uhlans on the line of the Lauter might, however, have been continued much longer. When hostile parties have been observed at all, especially at such a short distance from one's outposts as in this case—about six miles—they should never be lost sight of. This might have been carried out in various ways, either by means of the same ~~half~~ troop or by another ~~half~~ troop sent at noon to relieve it.

General A. being now with his regiments in sight of Weissenburg, and having learnt through the officer of Uhlans that the town appeared still occupied by a hostile party, and that hostile cavalry had been perceived on the other bank of the Lauter at Altenstatt, issued his instructions accordingly.

These orders were to the effect that the leading brigade should observe the nearest entrances to Weissenburg—to the east and west—with one regiment, and secure the bridges across the Lauter with the other, while the heavy brigade was directed to form a reserve in such a position as to be able to support one or other of the regiments of Dragoons if necessary.

It was, however, afterwards ascertained that only thirty Custom House officers were stationed at Weissenburg, and that the hostile cavalry reported as south of the Lauter consisted of one squadron only. It is a fact, therefore, that in presence

of comparatively insignificant forces, the march of the Division had been interrupted and detachments had been sent out. But it must also be observed that under existing circumstances no other course appeared open. The main body of the Division could not possibly be permitted to cross the Lauter without Weissenburg having been secured; as, should the enemy debouch out of the town suddenly and in force, such a proceeding might involve the Division, if already arrived on the other bank of the Lauter, in serious difficulties. It was therefore by no means sufficient to merely observe the gates, especially the Lauter gate, by means of patrols, but circumstances demanded that, until the arrival of the detachment from the V. Corps, parties of sufficient strength should be detailed to prevent, or at any rate delay, any possible sortie on the part of hostile troops. The parties were in addition destined to advance and reconnoitre by means of patrols on the important road to Bitsch, and they must also be of sufficient strength both to occupy Weissenburg should the enemy evacuate it, and to follow the latter up in pursuit.

As soon, however, as parties of sufficient strength had been detached to check any advance on the part of the enemy from Weissenburg, the main body of the Division was in a position to move at once towards the Lauter and cross the river with the 2nd Dragoons. *A longer halt of the Division was totally unnecessary.*

It was of course quite correct to cause the hostile cavalry on the Lauter to be watched while Weissenburg attracted the principal attention. From all that had been heard it could certainly be concluded that the hostile cavalry that had been observed was not a large body; but the advance of the Division could not possibly be unknown to the adversary, and should a larger body of his cavalry be at all near the frontier, which as yet could not be ascertained, it was possible for it to arrive at any moment and march across the Lauter.

It was therefore quite necessary, from this point of view, that parties should be ready to prevent a possible debouch of hostile forces across the Lauter. To this it must be added that the Division also intended to cross that river, and as the enemy did not at present hold any of the crossings, it was doubly necessary to profit thereby, and to rapidly secure them for our own force.

General A., when disposing of his force, ordered two guns

of the horse artillery to take up position against Weissenburg, and the other four guns to be employed in dispersing the enemy's cavalry, and also in securing the passage of the Division across the river. By doing so the battery was temporarily cut up in two detachments; this, however, appears necessitated by the then existing circumstances. At this point it may be observed that the object in view at that time rendered it very desirable that more than one battery should be attached to the larger body of cavalry. The Division had of course two batteries at disposal, but one had been attached to the brigade of Hussars. The question now arises, Was a battery necessary for the brigade of Hussars? and we are bound to say that it was. The brigade of Hussars was also ordered to cross the Lauter to-day, and should the enemy oppose it, the support of a battery of artillery would be of the greatest use.

The task required of the Division this day proves already how very desirable it is that each brigade should have a battery attached to it. The necessity of such a measure cannot, however, be determined by extraordinary events; during the further course of the operations we may have occasion to observe whether other cases crop up where the additional support of artillery would have been of advantage.

The remaining instructions issued by the leader of the Division consisted in the demand for the surrender of Weissenburg and the reconnaissance of the ground in rear and of the river Lauter.

The first appears called for, as nothing had as yet shown that any real defence of the town was intended. The latter became the more necessary, as, should the enemy debouch from the town, the retreat on the main road to Landau might be lost. Owing to its rapidity of movement, cavalry need not always have regard to keeping open the shortest road of retreat, but it is therefore all the more necessary that the whole ground in rear should be thoroughly reconnoitred in all directions, a matter which is often neglected owing to the rapidity with which event follows event.

In executing the Divisional Orders, three squadrons of the 2nd Brigade, from the leading regiment, are detached towards Weissenburg, and then four squadrons of the 2nd Regiment are sent towards Altenstatt and the railway crossing. It would have been more to the purpose if the Brigadier had detached his regiments in the reverse way,

as the 1st Dragoons would then have remained in communication with their 4th squadron near St. Rémy, instead of the latter continuing completely isolated for the remainder of the day.

Weissenburg had meanwhile been evacuated by the enemy, and the squadrons of the 1st Dragoons sent there now occupied the town. The half of the 3rd squadron advancing at once on the road to Bitsch, left two-and-a-half squadrons only at disposal, which were a little later on strengthened by the half troop of Uhlans from the V. Corps. The place being entirely walled in, it now remained to secure the gates of the town. The other half of the 3rd squadron remained at the gate leading to the road to Bitsch, the 1st squadron occupied the Landau gate, and half of the 2nd squadron the Hagenau gate, while the remaining half of the 2nd squadron was made use of to secure the telegraph offices at the railway station and in the town, the rolling stock at the station, the Post Office, and the revenue offices. The *maire* of the town had met the troops at the Landau gate, and he was ordered to cause all arms in the town to be collected, and to hand them over to the officer commanding.

The occupation of the town is of such great importance to the general situation that a telegram is immediately despatched to the Headquarters of the Army. The position of Weissenburg rendered it especially important, with a view to future operations, to establish there magazines of provisions and hospitals, and the Commissary-General was therefore directed to repair to the place at once and commence the establishment of victualling depôts.

As regards the passage across the Lauter, it may be remarked that it was judicious on the part of Major-General C. to secure the railway bridge across the river as well; large bodies of troops should always take care that more than one passage across a river be secured, if at all possible.

At Altenstatt it was, however, a mistake to remain satisfied with the one bridge only at the village itself. The object is to get across the river, but this cannot be quite so quickly effected because the enemy stands on the opposite bank. It is therefore not only requisite to place the artillery in such a position as to facilitate the march across, but advantage must also be taken of the fact that the village itself forms a natural bridge head. The 4th squadron therefore should at once have been entirely dismounted and the

men placed in positions on the southern outskirts and the side entrances of the village. This is one of the opportunities where the cavalry should make use of its power of fighting dismounted. It might here be said that, considering the weak force of the enemy opposed to the Division, the instructions issued, and the precautions taken, were of an unnecessarily detailed nature; but the precautions were quite necessary, considering the position of affairs. It was not possible to gain sufficient knowledge as to the real strength of the hostile force, and it would therefore appear unreasonable to march without further ado beyond defiles, and expose one's force to a possible check which could be avoided.

In open ground which is not intersected by defiles, such precautions need not of course be taken.

The main body of the 2nd Dragoons takes similar precautions while deploying on the right bank of the Lauter. Before, however, the regiment was enabled to advance to the attack, the adversary had been compelled to retire rapidly owing to the well-timed arrival of the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons from the direction of the Niederwald. The squadron covering the right flank (the 2nd of the 2nd Dragoons) acted similarly a little later on at Riedselz. Both cases are illustrations of the fact that the parties covering the flanks should not only not be debarred from bringing up well-timed support, but further, that these flank detachments may often be enabled to intervene in the most decisive manner, provided always that their leaders pay sufficient and constant attention to the events going on near the main body of the column.

The leaders of the detachments of the 1st Dragoons, which were stationed partly between Altenstatt and Weissenburg and partly at the railway station, did not, however, act in this manner. These parties might have operated with great effect against the flanks of the enemy's squadron as soon as they heard the fire of small arms near Altenstatt; they might even have cut off the retreat of the ~~half~~ troop across the Geissberg.

It is not sufficient simply to obey and carry out the instructions received, such as to occupy a certain railway station, but advantage should be taken of every opportunity to contribute towards the general good.

During the further advance towards Riedselz the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons, which had now gained the front, formed the advanced guard, followed by the 2nd

Dragoons and the horse artillery battery, while the heavy brigade directed its march across the two bridges over the Lauter. Such railway crossings should, however, always be specially reconnoitred ere troops receive orders to cross them. In most cases the railway will run across a broad valley on high embankments, and it is not always possible to reach the top of these embankments, with cavalry, near the bridge. Often the troops will have to make some detour to get on to the railway, and when such detour is a long one useful time will be lost. Should the reconnaissance of the railway under notice have shown such difficulties to exist, it would have been better to let the heavy brigade march intact on the main road through Altenstatt.

As soon as defiles are passed, it must depend on circumstances whether they should or should not be held any longer by means of detached parties. Should the enemy be near the defile, the cavalry will do well to secure the defile in case it should eventually be driven back. In the case under observation the weak strength of the enemy became known after the Lauter had been crossed. The Division had therefore nothing to fear from the party in its immediate front, and the further the column advanced the greater would become the distance between it and the defiles in rear. Should larger hostile bodies be met with later on, which might possibly compel the Division to retreat, there would then be plenty of time to send back a few squadrons at an accelerated pace, in order to secure the passages by means of dismounted men.

After the passage of the Lauter, the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons was detached to the heights of the Geissberg. A part of the enemy's cavalry having retreated across that hill, it was necessary to find out where he had gone to. The main body of the Division now followed the main road, on which not only the hostile squadron had retired, but on which the approach of stronger hostile forces might also be expected, judging from the situation as known at present. The main road runs, however, along the foot of the last spurs of the mountains, upon which the road from Bitsch also debouches; it became therefore imperatively necessary to ensure perfect security on that side. A detachment of one squadron is undoubtedly necessary for that purpose, as it will be able to reconnoitre the ground sufficiently far, and also to drive in any small hostile parties that may be met with.

An additional flank covering for the main body following in rear is not, however, required in that direction.

The squadron of the 2nd Dragoons just mentioned, and the patrols of the 1st Dragoons, must be considered quite sufficient to reconnoitre thoroughly the whole of the high ground as far as the mountains. The main body should of course despatch an officer and a few men on to the plateau of the Geissberg in order to obtain ready intelligence of anything extraordinary that may happen there, as the main road at the foot of the hills on which the heavy brigade marched did not allow of the least view being obtained of the ground on the right flank.

But it was not at all necessary to send the whole 1st squadron of the 1st Cuirassiers there.

It is a different matter, however, as regards the detached squadron of Uhlans on the left flank. The General Commanding the Division had observed that the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons, which had up to the present marched in that direction, had been drawn away from there owing to the engagement that had taken place, and was now marching on the main road.

Such cases will of course happen, and indeed cannot be avoided. The detached squadrons must always offer their support where it is likely to be most useful at the moment, and whenever their aid is required in sustaining an attack every other consideration must be put in the background.

The latter, however, must not be *completely lost sight of*. The object pursued up to the present must still be kept in view, but for the moment only the smallest possible force must be employed to attain it.

The mission of the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons, viz., to secure the left flank and keep up communication with the Brigade of Hussars, can therefore be carried out by means of a couple of advanced patrols only from the moment that squadron advanced to the attack. One of these patrols should be left on the road through the Niederwald, and the other should be pushed as far as the south-west corner of the wood, in order to observe from there the road leading to the south towards Lauterburg, and also the road to Fort Louis.

The leader of the Division cannot, however, at once determine whether these patrols have really been detached by the Dragoons, but he knows that the squadron, having come in contact with the enemy at another point, has lost the object of its original mission; it becomes therefore necessary to send another squadron in its place. This squadron is

taken from the regiment nearest to hand. As he, however, purposes to march further to the front as the Division is now situated, one ~~half~~ troop would have sufficed to observe the two roads leading towards the south-east. The only motive which might have justified the detachment of a whole squadron towards that flank was that there was a possibility of having to place outposts in that direction, in which case it would of course be better to have troops there already acquainted with the locality. It does not appear judicious to have left it to the discretion of Major-General C. to fix upon the strength of the parties required to cover the flanks. When instructions of this sort are issued by the leader of the Division, who alone can have a thorough knowledge of all the circumstances, it appears desirable that these instructions should also fix the strength of the flank coverings in order to avoid any useless splitting up of the force.

For the moment certainly the two detachments given by the 1st Brigade did not seem to be in any way objectionable, as their distance from the main body was but short, and they were therefore in constant and close connection with it; but it can never be known when this position may become changed, and whether it may not then be too late to call in the detached squadrons.

General A. next directed that the brigade should not advance with its main body beyond Riedselz, as he supposed that the weak hostile party would retire further without special pressure being brought to bear upon it, in which case sufficient ground would be obtained south of the Lanter to place the necessary outposts and bivouacs. This supposition soon proved erroneous, as the enemy received reinforcements when near Riedselz, and the Division was therefore again obliged to advance to the attack.

The leader of the Division had meanwhile gone up to the heights of the Geissberg, in order to gain personally a view of the ground all round.

He at the same time took care, as he had done previously, to make such dispositions as would bring in all those detached parties which he was of opinion were no longer required. For this purpose the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons had already been ordered to come up from Altenstatt, and now the 1st Dragoons were also ordered to join the Division from Weissenburg, as the arrival of the detachment of the V. Corps had completely secured that place.

(T.L.)

Major-General C. is also ordered not to engage in combat until the heavy brigade is prepared to support it. This precaution is more necessary with cavalry than with infantry, owing to the rapidity with which a cavalry combat is developed.

The passage through the defile near Riedselz, held by the enemy's chasseurs, was forced by means of the fire of the artillery. The field artillery battery having been brought up enabled the place to be attacked in front and flank and subjected to cross-fire. The latter might have been effected by the horse artillery battery alone, but would have necessitated detaching two guns, at a distance of about a mile. The latter had, however, to be brought up from the heavy brigade. Had the battery been with the Dragoons when they reached Riedselz the Dragoons might have undertaken the forcing of the defile at once. This will, however, often happen whenever several brigades have one battery only to dispose of; here also the necessity of having a battery attached to each brigade made itself felt. It was owing to this want of artillery that the march of the Division was unnecessarily and abnormally delayed by a force of only three hostile squadrons, and much valuable time thereby wasted.

In the case under observation the presence of the artillery also saved the cavalry from making an extended turning movement, which, even if undertaken, would still have left it doubtful whether it would have brought about the desired object, as the enemy, supposing him to have been strong enough, might have occupied the other passages across the Selz, a matter which could not at first be ascertained.

It is for this reason that the detaching of the squadron of Dragoons beyond Steinselz was ordered at first only by way of a reconnaissance, and the instructions issued to that squadron were to the effect that, "being in an isolated position, it is to avoid a combat, as no other party is at present in a position to support it readily."

Contrary to these instructions, however, this squadron happens to be the only one which to-day becomes actually engaged and successful. Here is a proof that the leader, notwithstanding such instructions as given above, must not thereby be entirely deprived of liberty to accept an engagement. The leader of the squadron, guided by his instructions, acts correctly in at first avoiding an engagement; but finding that the enemy is in the act of retiring by a flank march across the defile, he at once proceeds to the attack.

The chances are apparently equal—squadron against squadron; but then the adversary is in a position to receive support quicker than the assailant. Should, however, the attack succeed, the result, considering the close proximity of the defile in rear of the adversary, must be very decisive, and *a venture to gain a great result is never a mistake*. If we desire to avoid all risk during a war, we had far better avoid war altogether.

Here is the place to refer to one of the erroneous views so frequently entertained. It is often pointed out that cavalry retreating across or through a defile in the presence of the enemy, should make a final attack against the latter with the rear of its column. Such a measure can only be justified, however, in a case in which the retreating party can be attacked at the moment it is in the act of passing the defile. Nothing can be more disadvantageous than being thrown against a defile while engaged in a combat; the latter should not, therefore, be accepted in front of the defile, unless necessary.

Whether the rear body should or should not accept such an engagement must essentially depend on the strength of the opponents, the distance they are from each other, and the time that will be required in order to clear the defile with the last party.

In the case under observation the two squadrons were halted for purposes of observation at a distance of 1,200 paces from each other. The Chasseurs had to traverse a distance of 1,000 paces in order to reach the bridge in their rear; by breaking into threes the column would be 200 paces long, so that a total of 1,200 paces would have to be traversed in order to clear the bridge with the rear of the column, which at a trot as far as the defile and at a gallop across it, would take under four minutes. The Dragoons, in order to reach the bridge, would have to traverse a distance of 2,200 paces, and even supposing the whole of that distance to be traversed at a gallop, which, however, owing to the steep slope, was not possible, it would require four-and-a-half minutes. The squadron of Chasseurs was not, therefore, compelled to accept an engagement unless the attack took place while the other two retreating squadrons were still more than 400 paces from the bridge to be crossed. Even in that case the covering squadron might still at a trot join the rear of the other two before it could be reached by the attacking squadron going at a gallop.

From this it is clear that if the leader thoroughly understands the situation as regards space and time, he may easily arrive at a correct conclusion as to whether a party halting before a defile is or is not in a position to cross the latter before it can be reached by the adversary. Should the latter be the case, nothing of course remains but to attack him at once. In order, however, to be able to judge of such situations very frequent practice during time of peace is requisite.

The distance here given, 1,200 paces, appears a long one for two cavalry detachments observing each other. In future, however, a shorter distance will probably not be practicable for cavalry armed with a good shooting weapon, unless there is good cover. Firing mounted will always remain an uncertain method of using firearms; nothing will, however, prevent a few of the best shots being dismounted for the purpose of attempting at short distances—not necessarily in the most advanced line of skirmishers,* but covered by them—to dislodge the adversary's intact squadrons from their position.

Otherwise it will be necessary to traverse long distances in order to come to the attack.

The regulations provide that, during all movements, a few ground scouts (*éclaireurs*)—two non-commissioned officers per squadron suffice†—are sent to the front, in order to ascertain in sufficient time the difficulties of the ground. In following this rule it must not, however, be overlooked that a few men on the flanks are quite as necessary to ensure information of everything that is going on there.

The non-commissioned officer who was sent by the Dragoons towards the slope near the brook of the Selz had an important mission in this respect.

When the squadron of Dragoons got ready for the attack, the left (or skirmishing) ~~half~~-troop formed on the left and proceeded from thence to the attack, while the right ~~half~~-troop followed in the right rear as a support. To judge by the direction the retreat of the enemy was taking, a threatening of the left flank of the squadron was not to be expected; hence that ~~half~~-troop might at once be taken into the first line of attack. This does not, however, necessitate that the skirmishing half-troop should form up in line with the

* It should be borne in mind that the skirmishers here alluded to are mounted men.—EDITOR.

† Two men in each half-troop are specially instructed in the duties of ground scouts.—EDITOR.

other part of the squadron and so form a compact line. If one is sure of one's men, it is far better to form them up a little distance away from the flank, as the ~~half~~-troop would then be better able to take the adversary in flank.*

A support, to follow at a short distance, is necessary for every body of troops from a squadron upwards. There are many cases in which a leader cannot always ascertain what support may follow in rear of the adversary's first line; a fresh hostile party may suddenly break out from some unexpected quarter, and if even the ~~half~~-troop held in reserve may not be able to overthrow the new-comer, it may delay him and so give the remainder of the squadron an opportunity and time to seek a better position. In the case under observation, where the line of the Chasseurs outflanks the right flank of the Dragoons, *i.e.*, the 2nd ~~half~~-troop, and thereby throws it into confusion, the attack of the intact 1st half-troop a moment later becomes of great importance to the 2nd ~~half~~-troop, as the Chasseurs must already be in a state of disorder: one part of their left flank has wheeled inwards and attempts to take the Dragoons in flank and rear; another part, not having apparently conformed to the movement of the former, breaks loose and charges into the open. In this situation, when such a comparatively small party as a squadron only is engaged, the shock of a fresh intact support becomes of immense importance, as it is almost certain to drive back everything it comes in contact with. If during an engagement on such a small scale a part of the combatants is hurled back and the retreat commenced, it will soon communicate itself to the remaining part.

It must not be overlooked that every shock will produce more or less separation of previously intact bodies of troops, and that this fate will even overtake the side which is numerically stronger than the other; moreover, any compactly formed body of troops of even inferior strength, launched into a *mêlée*, will produce an effect far beyond its actual numbers. Of course there is a limit to this effect; thus, supposing two Cavalry Divisions to be engaged, one single squadron being launched into the *mêlée* would not produce any decisive effect. It will no doubt press back that particular part of the line where it charged for a moment or two, but will also in turn lose its cohesion and get mixed up in the *mêlée*.

* The German Cavalry Regulations of 1886 do not favour the breaking up of a single squadron in the manner here advocated.—EDITOR.

During the combat of two squadrons, however, such a small body as *half* a troop may well be able to turn the tide, and the same may be said of a whole intact squadron held in reserve when two regiments are engaged.

It may also happen that the outward flank gives way even before the shock has taken place, as soon as it is perceived that the adversary's advancing line is longer and is likely to outflank its own.

The effect of the flank attack of a small body may become more rapid still when it takes place before the actual shock of the two regiments or two squadrons.

The following plan has frequently been adopted. One party advances to the attack, but before encountering the adversary wheels about. The adversary, taking this for an intended retreat, now suddenly breaks into the charge, and pursuing headlong gets into disorder. This is the moment which the retreating party makes use of for fronting and proceeding to the *real* attack, having now the extraordinary advantage of charging with an intact body into loose ranks. Naturally such a course can be pursued only by a leader who can implicitly trust to the courage and discipline of his men, as well as to their skill in performing evolutions.

All these various courses, however, must vary according as the engagement is being fought by small or larger bodies of cavalry, and during the further course of these studies we shall again touch on this point.

The "*rally*" must in most cases depend on existing circumstances; the principle which is, however, always to be observed is that *the rally should be effected as rapidly as possible, and as far as possible in a forward direction*. Should this not be possible, as, for instance, in the case under observation, where it could not be effected owing to the heavy fire from the adversary's troops posted at a close distance beyond the brook, endeavours should be made to effect it at the spot where the first shock with the adversary took place. It should not, however, be forgotten that, even after a successful attack, the rally of our own troops at a point in rear will always produce upon them the effect of an unsuccessful encounter. Should the men not have been able to witness the fight from beginning to end, they will perceive only the disorderly retreat of a confused mass of troops, with which are mixed up riderless horses and a few hostile horsemen.

MEASURES TAKEN AFTER COMPLETION OF THE DAY'S MARCH
AND FIGHT.

The fighting at this point found a natural termination owing to the Division having reached the end of its day's march, the impossibility of doing any further damage to the enemy, and the opportunity which now offered to form suitable bivouacs.

The first duty which devolves upon cavalry under such circumstances is, that of *preserving the contact with the enemy which has just been gained.*

The detachments detailed for this purpose must continue to do so until more important functions call for their services elsewhere.

The manner in which contact with the enemy should be preserved must depend on the distance the latter has retired. Should he remain near the outposts, the patrols of the latter will suffice for the purpose; the relief of these patrols should be so arranged as not to interfere with an uninterrupted observation of the enemy's movements. Should the latter, however, retire further back, one or more squadrons, according to the extent of front, must follow him up and advance from four to eight miles, or even further, according to circumstances, sending advanced patrols from some suitable place to ascertain his halting place. Of course it is understood that such squadrons are sent in advance even if the enemy has not as yet been met with; the further the reconnoitring is extended the better.

A squadron of the Dragoon brigade was now ordered beyond the defile at Ingolsheim, and did not return until it had been clearly ascertained that the enemy had halted at Schönenburg. This return of the squadron is quite justified, as the enemy is so near that the patrols of the outposts can easily watch him.

It may, however, be said, and rightly so, that the Division, and especially the Commander of the Division, lost sight of other matters affecting the general situation, both as regards reconnaissance and the security and shelter of his own troops.

The enemy encountered in front of the right column had of course principally attracted attention; it was quite *en règle* that he should be closely followed up, and quite natural that precautions should be taken against any surprise from

his side; these precautions were effected by the 2nd Dragoons in front and the two squadrons of Uhlans near Ober-Seebach on the right flank. For this purpose the latter remained on open ground, while the former occupied the ground about Ingolsheim. Such ground offers the greatest possible advantage for a line of cavalry outposts, but the ground must in such a case be held by parties of dismounted men, as was done here. Beyond these men, mounted piquets may be placed.

In the case under observation the reconnaissance of the ground in which the enemy had not as yet been met with was, however, totally neglected. The measures which were taken in this respect by the right column, as well as by the brigade of Hussars, had more regard to their own security than to an extended reconnaissance.

Had the latter object been kept in view, it would have occurred that the further advance towards Schönenburg was barred by the enemy only on the road to Sulz; on the other main and bye roads such was not the case, and it was therefore incumbent to take as much advantage of this as possible. A glance over the ground in front would have shown also that the main roads ought not to be held by means of small patrols only, but by stronger detachments, which would not be so easily obliged to retire before hostile reconnoitring parties, and which would also have the advantage of being able to send advanced patrols into the ground further in front. Now, in the ground between Selzbach and the Rhine there are two main roads which come from the direction of the enemy: the road Forstfeld—Nieder-Rödern—Tombach, towards Weissenburg, and the road from Selz to Lauterburg. Main roads must always form the line of movement of large bodies of troops, and much depends, therefore, on these roads.

Under these circumstances single squadrons might have been pushed to the front as far as Tombach and Winzenbach, from which they might easily have extended their observations, and might have even penetrated into the eastern part of the forest of Hagenau.

Had to-day not been the first day of the march, and therefore demanded special consideration, these squadrons might have even advanced as far as Nieder-Rödern and Selz, if the enemy had not prevented it; of course they would then have had to be most careful as to their measures for security.

It was furthermore quite feasible to observe the road Fortz-

feld—Hatten—Rittershofen to Sulz, and that road must have been of special importance. The object was not so much to push the patrols themselves on to that road, as it would suffice to send them as far as the ground near Ober-Rödern, from which point the road in question could be sufficiently watched. Such detachments might very well have been found from the two squadrons at Ober-Seebach; and in case their patrols were kept in check by hostile parties, a stronger patrol, under an officer, might have been pushed to the front. It would then have been necessary to find out whether the enemy's patrols covered any movements, or whether they had stronger supports in rear.

It must be observed that as a general principle, whenever small reconnoitring patrols are held in check by larger hostile parties, thereby preventing any information of the enemy being gained, a short advance of stronger parties is requisite in order to gain that information.

In the position of the outposts, as given in the text, some additional mistakes may be noticed.

The road from Fort Louis, for instance, is watched from the two sides only. Now, should the enemy advance with large bodies of troops along that road on the following morning, he would not encounter any resistance on the road itself: the nearest Hussar and Uhlan patrols would retire divergently and the main road would be open, and this being so, the direct communication between the brigade of Hussars and the main body of the Division would be in jeopardy. Such a probability must have occurred to the mind of the leader of the Division, as in his orders for the next day to the brigade of Hussars he directs the latter specially to march on that road, and to move towards Tombach and Nieder-Rödern.

The whole of the brigade of Dragoons is on the right bank of the Selzbach, and the main body of the column, the heavy brigade, in its immediate rear on the left bank. The consequence of this position is that every alarm, such, for instance, as the advance of the hostile reconnaissance during the afternoon, will disturb the rest of the main body as well as that of the advanced brigade. Furthermore, the two squadrons of Uhlans detached to the left bank can be looked upon only as part of the whole outposts, as they are posted in line with the Dragoons. Should, however, an advance of a strong hostile force take place in that direction, if even

for purposes of reconnoitring only, the reserve of the proper outposts, *i.e.*, the brigade of Dragoons, would not be at all in a position to support the Uhlans, but such support must come from the heavy brigade. Both brigades will naturally be alarmed, and their rest disturbed, probably through a single hostile squadron only.

All these matters are, however, grave inconveniences, which, especially when they happen during the night, may entail serious consequences. The object of an advanced guard is to secure rest and security to the remaining troops, as far as its own resources will suffice for that purpose; should other results, however, be the outcome, it may be taken for granted that in most cases insufficient or faulty measures are the cause.

The position of the outposts when in presence of the enemy will, *should it not be intended to court any further engagements*, be influenced principally by the final halt made by the enemy.

In the present case the line of outposts could not, therefore, be advanced any further, but must be placed on the line Ingolsheim to Ober-Seebach.

The bivouacs of the rest of the advanced guard, as well as those of the main body of the Division, must be regulated by the position of the outposts. The position taken up by the main body of the advanced guard was greatly interfered with owing to the peculiar way in which the Selzbach divided the ground occupied by the outposts. If the main body of the advanced guard were placed on the right bank, it would have a defile in its immediate rear. As it was intended, however, to advance on the following day beyond that defile, it became imperatively necessary to secure it in such a manner as to make it easy for the remaining regiments to debouch from it.

On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that a sudden attack from hostile cavalry must, owing to the open ground on the left bank, become much more dangerous to the part of the outposts placed there, than to the centre and the right wing, the ground near Ingolsheim forming a natural barrier. If, however, the main body of the advanced guard had to pass either the defile in its rear or the railway bridge in order to support the left wing, it is clear that such support could not very easily be given—nay, more, if the left wing should be pressed back very rapidly, the passage

of the defile under such circumstances might become a source of great danger to the main body of the advanced guard.

Both these contingencies, however, would be fully taken into account if the main body of the advanced guard were located at Riedselz-Oberdorf, and if, in addition, Riedselz were occupied by a special detachment.

As a further consequence of such a proceeding, the main body of the Division, the heavy brigade and the horse artillery, would have been placed further back. By taking such measures, the various parts of the Division would have been allotted their proper places, and the errors in the position pointed out would not only have been avoided, but the road to St. Louis would also have been sufficiently covered.

An isolated Cavalry Division in advance of an army not only requires to watch the roads on which the enemy has been met with, but also all those directions from which it is possible he may appear later on.

During a campaign, however, two points will always exert an essential influence and cause considerable modification to be observed in such normal positions as are sketched above.

First, regard must be had to such ground as will give facilities for watering the horses, which sometimes may cause bivouacs to be brought close together and at other times placed further apart. Secondly, it must be considered where the various parts of the force may be at the time when the leader of the Division decides to end the march for the day. It is most undesirable to send troops again to the rear for the purpose of going into the bivouac, especially when they will have again to take the same road the following morning.

It was for the above reasons probably that General A. brought the heavy brigade back to the Selzbach. That brigade had not yet, however, reached the defile of Riedselz, and required therefore a march of only about a mile to the rear, when the order to form bivouac was issued, in order to place itself at a proper distance from the advanced guard.

Due regard to the vicinity of water and to the position occupied by the troops at the end of the day's march did not, however, necessitate bringing the two brigades so closely together into bivouacs.

A hundred times during a campaign it may happen that some injudicious measures are taken without the adversary becoming aware of the fact or getting a chance of taking advantage of it for striking a blow, and so making us pay for our mistake. But if once only such a blow is actually struck, the prestige both of the leader and his troops will suffer severely, in addition to the losses sustained and the injury it may cause to the general situation. Boldness does not preclude precaution; on the contrary, the bolder the deed the more precaution is necessary in the execution of it. If any one precaution is omitted, and should the neglect of it bring about grave situations which might have been avoided, then boldness amounts to thoughtlessness, and little will it avail, as an excuse for one unsuccessful act, to adduce a hundred similar cases in which a particular measure succeeded.

Had the main body retired as far as the ground near Altenstatt, it would then have been preferable to place the heavy brigade in cantonments in that large village instead of forming a bivouac.

We return once more to that important theme of bivouacs dwelt upon on page 25. If, in this respect, the Division continues as it commenced on the 30th and 31st July, it must not be wondered at if the horses soon fall off in condition and the efficiency of the Division is considerably reduced. The influence of the bivouac on the condition of the horses, on the saddlery and the blankets, is very great, and we cannot help quoting here the words of General von Schreckenstein, one of the most experienced generals in warfare: "I would rather make use of the smallest and most cramped quarters for lodging my troops than have recourse to the best bivouac," a saying which cannot be sufficiently taken to heart. Bivouacs should be ordered only when urgent necessity demands it, as the efficiency of men and horses will be more impaired by them than by the heaviest march.

The bivouac on the 30th July was ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army. The Headquarters of an army should, however, be most careful in issuing such orders; it is much preferable to give instructions to the troops as to what is expected to be done, and in most cases to allow them to take their own measures to carry out these orders. No doubt some special motive prompted the Headquarters of the army to issue such an order, and it is probable

that the following was taken into consideration :—As soon as the cavalry has passed beyond the line of outposts of the V. Army Corps it will necessarily reach the Lauter with its main body on the same day. In that case those parties who were most distant would march on the first day about sixteen miles from their cantonments, and as this appeared too long a distance, it was thought more expedient to reduce the march to twelve miles by assembling the troops the day before near Landau. Of course there is much to be said in favour of this measure, still it is very probable that it would have been better had the Cavalry Division been given *carte blanche* as regards the dispositions for the 30th July. It would then have been open to the Division, either to occupy close cantonments nearer to the front within the rayon in which it then was, or cantonments might have been chosen on the 30th July within the rayon south of Landau occupied by the advanced guard of the V. Army Corps. It will be found that, as a rule, more men and horses can be got into villages and farms for one night, if necessary, than are generally calculated upon. But even the lengthening of the march from twelve miles—for some parts of the Division—to sixteen miles was preferable to a bivouac.

As regards the dispositions for the night of the 31st July, we again find a part of the Dragoons and Uhlans, the regiment of Cuirassiers, and the whole of the heavy brigade placed in open bivouac. Some of the causes which led to this have already been referred to; it is very often, however, that another motive prompts the measure, viz., the feelings of a nervous, anxious leader, who feels himself thoroughly secure only when he has the whole of his forces closely round him. But it must be said that danger to a bivouac is oftentimes much greater than to troops in cantonments, especially as regards surprises; a small party of hostile cavalry surprising a bivouac, galloping between the horse lines, cutting picket and head ropes, may cause the greatest confusion and disorder, while the same party entering a village may easily be checked by men firing from their bedroom windows or stables; but of course cuirassiers* should never be billeted in a village without light cavalry. Surprises by infantry can, in both cases, be guarded against only by a careful and well-regulated patrol service.

* Cuirassier regiments in the German Army were not armed with carbines until 1889.—EDITOR.

Should, however, the approach of hostile cavalry be reported during daytime, a body of troops gathered at a bivouac is of course much more easily and quickly formed than the same body dispersed in cantonments. The adversary's cavalry, however, who cannot possibly be acquainted with the whole situation, changing as it does from day to day, will not advance quite so quickly and regardless of what may be in front of it when once the outposts, and soon after the main body of the advanced guard, have been encountered. Still the advantages of sheltering men and horses for the night are so great that every effort should always be made to secure them. If care is taken to push the advanced guard sufficiently to the front, if possible as far as the ground where it will be in communication with the squadrons sent in advance for reconnoitring purposes, if the patrol service is well organised, and if the position of the troops is regulated with regard to depth rather than breadth, it will be found that these dispositions are nearly always sufficient to guard against every danger.

The bivouacs ordered for the 30th, as well as those for the 31st July, cannot therefore to their full extent be regarded as necessary measures.

Moreover, all bivouacs that cannot be shown to be necessary must be looked upon as decidedly mischievous.

From the above it will be observed that we are not entirely in favour of the dispositions made by the Division at the end of the day's march on the 31st July. These dispositions, however, are not mere imaginary sketches, and we have introduced them here to show how often the situation as it presents itself at the moment only is taken into account, thereby causing critical, and in many cases quite insufficient, dispositions to be made; the fact being lost sight of that an isolated Cavalry Division has objects to gain which are of immense importance to the general situation of affairs. We should therefore have preferred the following line of outposts and location of the Division.

Advanced Detachments.

To Tombach: One squadron of 1st Dragoons.

To Winzenbach: One squadron of 1st Hussars.

Right Column.

I. Advanced guard :—The Dragoon brigade forming two outpost detachments.

The detachment of the right wing :—Two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, to place outposts on the right flank as well as in the ground about Ingolsheim, securing the village and railway crossing. The main body (support) of this outpost detachment—about one squadron—to remain at Riedselz.

The detachment of the left wing :—One squadron of the 1st Dragoons to secure the ground on a line from the railway crossing at Ingolsheim along the southern outskirts of Ober-Seebach *à cheval* of the road towards Fort Louis, by means of two piquets. The rest (support) of the detachment—about one troop—to remain in the northern part of Ober-Seebach.

Main body of the advanced guard :—Two squadrons from each regiment, at Riedselz-Oberdorf.

II. Main body of the Division :—Heavy brigade and battery horse artillery at Altenstatt.

Left Column.

I. Advanced guard :—Three squadrons of 1st Hussars at Siegen, sending piquets to the front, with supports.

II. Main body :—2nd Hussars and battery horse artillery at Schleithal.

From the preceding observations it is clear that in the handling of the Division on the first day of actual operations various measures had been adopted which did not quite correspond to the exigencies of the situation; and there is no doubt that such will mostly be the case at the beginning of every campaign. Theory can set up abstract points of view, but in practice the requirements of some cases will be opposed to these views, and it is the clear military mind that alone is able to decide which demand in a given situation and under given circumstances should be allowed the preference. In time of peace the military mind will have frequent opportunities of practice during manœuvres, but the handling of *large bodies of cavalry in extended operations* has not hitherto (with few exceptions) been sufficiently practised. We must again come back to the remark previously made, that—*it is therefore all the more necessary that cavalry leaders should not*

be content with a thorough study of the rules and regulations on the subject of their own arm of the service, but they should endeavour to make themselves acquainted by means of careful study with every possible situation to which cavalry is liable, so as to gain intellectual material which will enable them in critical situations to come to a ready and correct apprehension and decision. The necessary routine can be gained through practical exercises in the drill field and at peace manœuvres. The mistakes in the measures taken and the errors committed in the apprehension of facts to-day by the Cavalry Division must principally be traced to the few opportunities for practice accorded to leaders of large bodies of cavalry during time of peace, and partly also to the special circumstances of the Division in its isolated position.

The most important of these shortcomings are shown in the following recapitulation:—

- (1) The advance of the Division as a whole does not correspond to the requirements of such a large body of cavalry; no use is made of advanced squadrons; on the contrary, the march is ordered to take place in exactly the same fashion as at peace manœuvres, where, as a rule, there is not sufficient room to send squadrons very far to the front.
- (2) When unexpected events occur either too much or too little is done. We have seen that the measures taken at the Lauter, as well as those with the five squadrons before Riedselz, led to useless delay and loss of valuable time, while, after the passage across the Lauter, the whole Division rides after a single hostile squadron, and consequently advances much further that day than was originally intended.
- (3) The line of outposts and the bivouacs are ordered in accordance with the rules observed at peace manœuvres, and do not therefore correspond to the requirements of an isolated Cavalry Division.

In mentioning the above it is not, however, intended to convey the idea that the same mistakes are always committed at the beginning of a campaign; but where the above are avoided others will probably take their place, and whatever they may be they will be avoided only by gradual experience gained during the campaign; their commission, however, can to a great extent be prevented by careful study, instruction, and practice during time of peace.

The measures taken by the Division after going into bivouacs, the reports received, and other events, have already been described in the text.

It has been shown therein how the advance of a hostile reconnoitring party produced an alarm among the whole of the troops, the bivouacs of the latter being so close together.

Such will often be the case during the first few days of a campaign, owing to the excited state of the troops and the strange situations. In time this will, however, disappear. But in order to prevent all useless alarms and disorders from the very beginning, stringent orders should be issued to the effect that all officers and men carrying messages and reports should convey such messages or reports to those officers only for whom they are intended, and not, *en passant*, inform every one they meet what is going on at the outposts, &c.

After all necessary measures have been taken and perfect rest established for the troops, a report should be despatched to the Officer Commanding-in-Chief, containing the day's results, the positions of the Division for the night, and all the information of the enemy's movements collected up to that time. This should be done in writing, and in concise comprehensive language; if, however, the telegraph is available, an epitome should be transmitted by wire. All prisoners should be interrogated during the engagement, if possible, and the various replies received and the notes made thereof should be put into shape afterwards. The compilation of these notes will serve the Division as a basis regarding the enemy's movements, joined, of course, to the facts actually observed or gathered from the inhabitants. This result should also be made known to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

Great care must, however, be taken to avoid representing seemingly just conclusions as established facts; most information so obtained must be given as probabilities only which require further confirmation. For instance, it was known that the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs had detached a squadron whilst at Strassburg; three squadrons of that regiment had been met with this day in front of the right column, and a fourth squadron of Chasseurs had been reported as being observed on the road to Lauterburg. It would therefore have been quite natural to conclude that the latter squadron was the one detached by the regiment from Strassburg. Following up this calculation it might then be

presumed that at present but little hostile cavalry was in the immediate front, and that a force of less strength than the brigade of Hussars would suffice to operate towards Selz and the road to Lauterburg.

Later events, however, will prove how erroneous this assumption was, and that the 4th squadron of the 7th Chasseurs was in an entirely different direction from the road to Lauterburg.

It is quite in the order of things that communications as to everything that is going on should take place between the detached brigade of Hussars and the main body of the Division, especially those matters which related to the quarters taken up and the positions occupied by the brigades for the night. As may be gathered from the letter sent by the leader of the Division to the brigade of Hussars during the afternoon, the latter does not appear to have kept up the communication with the Division in as complete a manner as might have been done. The right column, on the other hand, also appears to have neglected its duty in this respect.

The inferior force is, of course, expected to lean upon the superior one, but the latter must still take the necessary steps for keeping up communication between the two columns and reporting on the situation.

There is no doubt that south of the Lauter, during the advance march, communication with the Hussars, at least with their patrols, was actually kept up by patrols from the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons at St. Rémy as well as later on by the 4th squadron of the Uhlans. The General Commanding Division was not, however, made aware of this fact.

Such things will frequently happen, and the amount of important information which becomes lost in its passage between subordinate leaders is not small. The general rule should be enforced, that every message received from detached parties must ultimately reach the commander who has ordered such detached parties, if even the messages contain no further information than that hostile or friendly forces have not been met with at a certain point. The squadrons referred to in the preceding paragraph should therefore have reported to the Brigadier as well as to the leader of the Division. On the other hand, the squadron of Dragoons at St. Rémy was not required to send reports to its own regiment, as it had not been detached by the regiment. The orderly carrying the

message might also have ridden about the roads for a long time before he found his colonel, who was at Weissenburg at the time, and by passing on the information through the regular chain of superiors the message would have been delayed for some hours before it could reach the proper quarter.

The first letter of instruction to the brigade of Hussars was despatched by a non-commissioned officer, accompanied by two orderlies.

The despatch of such a small escort is sufficient in this case, as the distance is but short, and the whole ground to be traversed completely commanded by the Division. The despatch of officers for such purposes must be as rare as possible; the number of officers is comparatively small, and their services should be preserved for important missions; otherwise, the latter will be carried out but inefficiently.

In this category must be included all missions which require observations being made or verbal explanations transmitted. In order, however, to effect this it will be necessary to establish a thorough system of instruction for non-commissioned officers, to enable them to execute at least the less important missions.

It is of the greatest service to them to be able to read maps. It is not always possible, of course, to give them General Staff maps for that purpose, but a small sketch of the country to be traversed can always be issued; or they may make a rough sketch from the map for themselves, sufficient to enable them to find their way to the place they are destined to reach. In the report received from the 3rd Brigade during the evening one part is especially striking—that, namely, where it is stated that, according to information obtained from inhabitants, the town of Nieder-Rödern and the forest north of Selz are occupied by the enemy. This sounds as if the Hussars had been satisfied with that information; if so, a great mistake had been committed.

Such information must be deemed sufficient only when the places in question are so far distant that it is impracticable to reach them at the time; for instance, if this information related to anything going on near or close to Strassburg. The ground about Nieden-Rödern and the forest near Selz, however, might have been easily reconnoitred by the Hussars that day, and that course should under any circumstances have been adopted. If no information about these places had

arrived by the time the report to the Division was despatched, then the remark to the effect that a party had been sent out in that direction would have satisfied the General Commanding the Division that every necessary measure of precaution and security had been adopted by the Hussars.

Whenever any news is received of the enemy from a point within reach, a reconnoitring party should at once be sent off to establish the correctness of the report.

The General Commanding the Division assembled the Brigadiers present in order to confer with them as to the instructions he was desirous of issuing for the following day; this is a measure much to be commended, as it is likely to prevent misunderstandings of orders and will at the same time afford the various leaders an opportunity of gaining a complete knowledge of the intentions of the Divisional commander.

It may here be mentioned what interruptions the advance of the Division would have been liable to had the enemy destroyed the bridges across the Lauter and adopted a similar course with regard to the bridges at Riedselz and Ingolsheim. In the latter case he might easily have remained quite undisturbed in front of the outposts of the Division, provided he placed his main body under cover in rear of the nearest height to protect them against artillery fire.

Such demolitions during a march will seldom, however, be possible on an extended scale, as the necessary time is not always available, and frequently the necessary tools and blasting material will be wanting.

It must therefore be of great importance to have a detachment of pioneers* attached to a Cavalry Division. On the one hand it is, however, desirable to encumber cavalry as little as possible with carts, &c.; on the other, not to reduce their mobility by attaching dismounted parties. If the pioneers are required to commence their task in good time, they should move with the advanced guard, where they will be in the way whether they are in carts or dismounted. It will therefore be found practicable to attach a party of pioneers to cavalry only for very special purposes, such, for instance, as the construction of a large bridge for the passage of troops following in rear. For the cavalry itself it is not of such

* Since this was written cavalry pioneers have been introduced into various European armies.—EDITOR.

great importance whether it can gain a passage across a river a mile above or below such a bridge; and again, cavalry can ford a river at places impracticable for infantry. On the whole, however, it is advisable for the cavalry to be in this respect also as independent as possible. Every year a number of officers and non-commissioned officers of infantry are instructed and pass through a complete course of field engineering; such instruction, that is, those parts of it more closely connected with cavalry service, appears quite as necessary for officers and men of cavalry.

THE CAVALRY OF THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH.

Before concluding the narration of the events of the 31st July, it may be of interest to study the conduct of the cavalry of the Army of the South, so far as has been ascertained up to the present.

It appears quite certain, from the reports of spies as well as from the interrogation of prisoners, that strong hostile forces were in the act of concentration about Strassburg on the 25th July, and that from that place a large force, probably an Infantry Division, had been sent to the front as far as Hagenau.

There are two reasons which may possibly have caused these troops to be posted at such a distance from the frontier, either that the formation of the Army Corps to which they belonged was not complete, or that it was contemplated to effect a passage across the Rhine in the vicinity of Strassburg. For the purpose of reconnoitring the district near the frontier, three squadrons of the 7th Chasseurs had actually been pushed to the front, north of the forest of Hagenau. One squadron had been in cantonments at Ingolsheim, the others had probably been at Sulz.

The former had reconnoitred every morning for several days past as far as the Lauter—probably, however, not until its advanced patrols had reported the presence of the Uhlans of the V. Corps reconnoitring on the opposite bank. The squadron had to-day also awaited the advance of the main body of the Cavalry Division near the river bank. That the bridges across the Lauter were not destroyed by the adversary may be attributed to the fact of there being a great number of crossings, and to there being probably a want of materials for effecting demolitions, or else to the fact that the Army of the South intended to take the offensive towards the

north, in which case the bridges would be necessary for its troops.

The squadron evinced great boldness in remaining for some time south of Altenstatt in face of the advancing masses of the Cavalry Division. No doubt the nature of the ground favoured this attitude very much; the railway embankment in its immediate front especially prevented any sudden surprise on the part of the adversary. Even if the embankment had not been there, the squadron might still have retired quite as rapidly as the adversary advanced.

If the situation were always so simple, every single hostile squadron might halt in face of a superior force; such is not, however, the case. The hostile cavalry detachments in front of the squadron cannot endanger the latter if it takes proper measures; but their flank detachments or neighbouring parallel columns may do so if the Division advances on a broad front. The ground that can be reconnoitred by a squadron is but limited; the main body must be kept together in such cases, and only a few patrols, or a ~~half~~ troop, can be made use of as detached parties on a comparatively narrow front. One single patrol being driven in, may possibly endanger the retreat; and the ultimate development of events before Altenstatt proves that the squadron barely escaped a dangerous situation.

Driven back as far as Ingolsheim, the Chasseurs again attempted in rear of the defile there to maintain a position in close proximity to the adversary. Although strengthened by the two other squadrons of the regiment who had meanwhile been informed of the state of affairs and had hastened up to the front, the squadron found itself again compelled to a hasty retreat on encountering flank fire from the artillery, and being threatened by the movement of a squadron of Dragoons on its flank. The retreat can now no longer be effected on the direct road, and one squadron is, *nolens volens*, obliged to accept an engagement with the adversary.

The weaker force will always be at a disadvantage whenever the superior force executes a flank movement. If large bodies of infantry are in such a position, the resistance the defending force is capable of offering must be taken into account, as, even if their number is considerably less than that of the attacking force, it will generally gain sufficient time to effect a retreat, even if with loss. It is different, however, with a body of cavalry on a reconnoitring expedition. The resist-

ance of a small defending force can be broken in a few moments, and the dangerous direction of the hostile flank movement has its fullest effect.

In such positions the weaker force will do best to keep up contact with the adversary by means of patrols only, and to keep its main body as far from the main body of the adversary as circumstances may permit. It is therefore further advisable that the small parties sent to the front for observing the adversary's movements should not be sent along *one* road, but on all available roads in the direction an advance is expected; thus several squadrons should be pushed to the front on a very extended front.

The nature of the ground, as well as the relations with the inhabitants and knowledge of the movements or efficiency of the enemy, will of course sometimes allow of more bold proceedings. But we must not, in this respect, allow ourselves to be carried away by a few brilliant examples culled from military history, and believe that such examples are applicable to all such cases, and should invariably be followed. When opposed to a bold, venturesome adversary, who understands how to handle his cavalry properly, such exploits will seldom remain unpunished. To judge from the position of the outpost line taken up by the enemy, it may be assumed that the main body of the Chasseur regiment had made a final halt in rear of Sulz—*i.e.*, had retired about four miles from the outpost line of the Cavalry Division.

CHAPTER II.

THE 1ST AUGUST.

ADVANCE AND ENGAGEMENT AT SULZ (UP TO 8 A.M.).*

DURING the night of the 31st July—1st August, the 1st Cavalry Division occupied the following positions:—

RIGHT COLUMN.

Light Brigade.

Outposts.—2nd Dragoons.

A piquet of the 2nd squadron posted on the heights north-west of the farm of Diefenbach. The 4th squadron at Ingolsheim, having a piquet pushed to the front along the main road.

~~Half~~ a troop of the 3rd squadron on the railway bridge over the Behlbach, the remainder of the squadron north of that bridge.

Reserve of Outposts.

half- 1st and 2nd squadrons of 2nd Dragoons (except a ~~quarter~~ of a troop) in bivouac between Ingolsheim and Riedselz.

Rest of the Light Brigade.

1st Dragoons—partly in Riedselz and partly in bivouac outside the village.

Heavy Brigade.

Outposts.—The 2nd and 3rd squadrons of Uhlans near Ober-Seebach, having piquets pushed to the front.

Main Body of Division.

Staff of Division and brigades, and 1st and 4th squadrons of Uhlans, at Riedselz-Oberdorf.

* See Appendix III.

The regiment of Cuirassiers and the 2nd Battery of Horse Artillery in bivouac near Riedselz-Oberdorf.

Army Hospital Corps detachment at the Gutleithof.

Transport and baggage at Altenstatt under escort of ~~half~~ a troop of the 2nd squadron 1st Dragoons, and ~~half~~ a troop of the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers.

LEFT COLUMN.

Outposts.—Extending from Keidenburg to Ober-Lauterbach, their reserve at Siegen—two squadrons of the 1st Hussars.

Main Body of 3rd Brigade at Schleithal:—

2 squadrons of 1st Hussars.

4 2nd "

3rd Battery of Horse Artillery.

According to the orders already issued at 4 P.M. on the 31st July, for the 1st August, the right column was directed to march off at 6 A.M., and advance on the Sulz road as far as the forest of Hagenau.

The brigade of Hussars was ordered to commence its march at 5.30 A.M., marching towards Nieder-Rödern by the Tombach road, observing at the same time the road from Lauterburg to Selz. It had also received orders to halt at Nieder-Rödern, and to wait there for fresh orders, scouting the wood to the south of the village during the interval. In case of retreat the retirement was to be made through Tombach.

It was known that three squadrons of the 7th Chasseurs were at Schöenburg; another squadron was reported to be on the road from Selz to Lauterburg; but its halting place was as yet unknown.

Owing to these circumstances the General Commanding the Division had again deliberated during the evening whether he should not order the brigade of Hussars to rejoin the main body of the Division. The natural desire to have all his forces as concentrated as possible, as well as the circumstance that no hostile force of any account had, as yet, appeared in the immediate front of the detached brigade, pointed to this. On the other hand, however, the intelligence he had received from the left wing as to the enemy's whereabouts was by no means complete, nor had the reconnaissance been as yet carried out

the advanced guard proper, under the direct orders of the Commanding Officer, and 600 paces in rear followed the 1st Dragoons with the horse artillery. The brigade of heavy cavalry left at the same time its bivouac at Riedselz-Oberdorf and took the main road through Riedselz; it was reinforced at Ingolsheim by the 2nd squadron of Uhlans, which had marched from Ober-Seebach.

The distance of the battery from the head of the heavy brigade was about 900 paces. In rear of the brigade marched the detachment Army Hospital Corps, with a certain number of wagons for the conveyance of the men of the detachment; the latter, through the forethought of the Commissary-General, having joined on the evening of the previous day.

The two squadrons of the Dragoon Brigade which the Brigadier had directed to march *via* Schöenburg and Hunsbach respectively, and which were already ahead, had been ordered to menace and drive in the outposts of the enemy in front and to fall upon their right flank, and also to ascertain the position of the main body of the enemy's force.

The ~~quarter~~ troop of the 2nd squadron, which had passed the night on the height near the farm at Dieffenbach, had received orders to direct its march to the western outskirts of the wood of Schöenburg in order to cover the right flank of the column, and to follow the main road Sulz to Worth *via* Retschweiler.

The two squadrons (4th and 3rd of 2nd Dragoons) which advanced soon after 6 A.M. did not encounter any serious resistance. A few skirmishers only exchanged shots with some of those of the Dragoons; but when they saw these detachments advancing at a trot, they fell rapidly back in rear of the height of Schöenburg.

Shortly after, a report was received from the 3rd squadron to the effect that from the height (185) to the south-west of Hunsbach, which up to the present had been occupied by the enemy's vedettes, a single hostile squadron only could be perceived, about 3,000 paces north of Sulz, which was evidently destined to receive the repulsed outposts.

The 4th squadron continued its march on the main road, leaving Schöenburg on the left, the 3rd squadron crossed the rather steep cutting situated south-east of the village, and directed its march towards Hermersweiler and the eastern exit of Sulz.

The enemy, seeing himself surrounded by this double movement, retired through the town.

At 6.35 A.M. the 4th squadron arrived before Sulz, which it searched and reconnoitred from all sides.

~~Half~~ a troop was detached to the right flank on the road to Wörth; several hostile cavalry soldiers could be perceived there, and it could not at this moment be ascertained whether the enemy had not effected his retreat in that direction.

The 3rd squadron marched along the western outskirts of the village of Hermersweiler; one of its ~~half~~ troops encircled the village on the east, and another ~~half~~ troop went at a trot towards the railway.

These parties, as well as the patrols around Sulz, soon found themselves face to face with a strong line of skirmishers who occupied the crest of the gradually ascending heights parallel to and south of the railway. These skirmishers occupied a far too extended line to belong to the *one* squadron which had been perceived, and which had retired towards Sulz. It was more probable that the whole of the regiment of Chasseurs was again present, and in rear of the heights.

It was thought imprudent to push on further without a more complete reconnaissance. The patrols which were halted in front remained in observation, while patrols from the two squadrons were sent towards the flanks of the enemy's troops near Nieder-Kutzenhausen and east of Hohweiler, in order to ascertain, if possible, the adversary's strength and position.

A report as to the present situation of affairs was sent to the Division.

The 4th squadron occupied the railway station south of Sulz with ~~half~~ a troop. The two remaining ~~half~~ troops halted quite close to the north of the town and east of the main road. The two ~~half~~ troops which formed the main body of the 3rd squadron attempted to place themselves under cover in rear of the projecting south-west portion of Hermersweiler. The fourth ~~half~~ troop was employed in scouting the line of railway, and the 3rd ~~half~~ troop took the road along the east of Hermersweiler to Hohweiler.

For some few minutes it was thought that guns could be heard at a great distance toward the east. The same fact was also observed by the Staff of the Division, who had at once despatched an officer with four men of the nearest regiment (Cuirassiers) to Tombach, to ascertain whether the

left column had met and accepted an engagement with the enemy.

It was then 6.40 A.M. At this moment the head of the column, that is, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, was at the main road, passing across the little stream which runs west of Schönenburg. These two squadrons had left their rendezvous 1,000 paces north of Ingolsheim, at 6.10 A.M. They had marched at a walk for twelve minutes, until their rear had arrived on the height south of Ingolsheim (6.22 A.M.), and had then commenced to trot.

After trotting about 3,000 paces they arrived at 6.32 A.M. in the proximity of Schönenburg, and there made a short halt. They marched round the western side of the village, as this shortened the road, and after eight minutes' walk they reached at 6.40 A.M. the bridge over the stream indicated above.

The main body of the light brigade, which had followed at 600 paces, that is to say, the 1st Dragoons and the battery horse artillery, were at this moment to the north of Schönenburg, and had already left the road, but the rear of it was still on the road 900 paces from the northern entrance of the village.

The head of the heavy brigade was 900 paces in rear, its rear just emerging from Ingolsheim; the Army Hospital Corps was still to the north of the village. With the exception of the latter, the various heads of the column had marched about 5,600 paces since they left their bivouacs; the column extended nearly $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles.

Major-General C., who marched with the main body of the 2nd Dragoons, having seen, soon after passing the stream already mentioned at Schönenburg, that the advanced squadrons were halted, and having immediately after received (at 6.42 A.M.) the report spoken of above, now ordered the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons to change direction to the left of the road, and to march to the centre of the heights situated between Sulz and Hermersweiler.

He at the same time sent the report he had received to the General Commanding the Division, who followed in rear, adding that he would advance with his brigade to drive back the enemy.

The 1st Dragoons and the battery horse artillery were ordered to come up at a trot, and to follow the two advanced squadrons.

The ground in front, between the stream already mentioned

as being south of Schönenburg and the railway, formed an elongated height, to the south and at the foot of which the railway ran.

The Brigadier went at a gallop to the crest of the height to have a view over the surrounding ground.

He saw at a glance that the height formed towards Sulz a strongly marked ridge, which towards the south and town descended with steep slopes, limiting cavalry movements to the ground south of Hermersweiler. On the other side of the railway the ground gradually ascended until it reached another height whose crest was distant about 2,500 paces as the crow flies, and which towards the west ended abruptly near Sulz. On the declivity of the heights in front a road planted with trees could be distinguished which ran through the compact little village of Hohweiler, situated about half-way up the declivity, and running along the slope descended towards Sulz, at which point the slope became very steep. Numerous hostile skirmishers could be seen in rear of that road, and the outlines of several horsemen were sharply defined against the horizon on the crest of the ridge.

Half a troop of the 2nd Dragoons was skirmishing along the line of railway, while another half troop was just approaching Hohweiler. Between these two lines of skirmishers continual firing took place, and the combat appeared to increase in intensity in the direction of the railway station at Sulz.

The General soon had his attention attracted to the third half troop of the 3rd squadron, which debouched suddenly from the gardens of Hohweiler for the purpose of throwing itself upon the enemy's skirmishers further west. These latter retired quickly towards the crest, pursued by the Dragoons; but a stronger hostile party, apparently a troop, concealed in rear of the knoll, now emerged suddenly and charged the Dragoons, who, however, had time to avoid the attack by wheeling about, and regained the line of railway. The enemy pursued them as far as Hohweiler, where he halted until his skirmishers had again taken up position on the road which they had previously occupied, and then returned to again take up a position in rear of the knoll.

The officer commanding the 3rd squadron, as soon as he saw his third half troop menaced by superior forces, had galloped off west of Hermersweiler with his two remaining half troops to disengage it; but the Brigadier, who was close to him, stopped the movement and ordered the squadron back to
(T.L.)

its original position. During these incidents the 1st and 2nd squadrons, led by the officer commanding the regiment, had approached at a trot to the point where the Brigadier stood; when nearing the enemy they had concealed their movements under shelter of the height, and had formed in squadron column while on the march. At 6.50 A.M. they had arrived at 300 paces north of the point where the Brigadier stood, and the commanding officer of the regiment at once joined him.

The General Commanding the Division soon after arrived on the heights, when a patrol of Hussars, coming from the left column, handed him the following despatch:—

SECOND REPORT OF THE 3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE.

*“ Mill south of Tombach,
1st August. 6.8 A.M.*

“ The Brigade has just passed through Tombach. The officer commanding an advanced squadron reports to me that he has advanced close to Nieder-Rödern, after having repulsed several weak Hussar patrols, but found that village to be occupied by hostile infantry.

“ A second squadron has advanced towards Selz. The Brigade continues its march towards Nieder-Rödern.

D.,
“ Major-General.”

The non-commissioned officer of Hussars was detained for the present with the Division to await an answer which it was intended to send back to the Brigadier. Some surprise was expressed at learning the presence of Hussars in front of the left column, where until now Chasseurs only had been observed. It was hoped, however, that soon complete information on this point would be forthcoming. During this time the head of the 1st Dragoons had quitted the main road at the point 186, to take the bye-road to Hermersweiler, with the intention of forming up in line of squadron columns at close interval to the right rear of the two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons. The two leading squadrons only had left the main road at that moment. Orders were sent to the battery to place itself in position on the height which is situated at the east entrance of Sulz.

The General Commanding the Division, after having made himself acquainted with the situation, said that "he did not think that the regiment of Chasseurs only was in front, but that it was very probable that the enemy had called for and obtained reinforcements." He added: "It is true the adversary has not as yet shown any artillery, and nothing but Chasseurs have been observed up to the present; but the closer we approach the main body of the enemy's forces the more should we be prepared to meet larger forces, and that with all the more reason because the enemy has known of the advance of the Cavalry Division for the last twenty-four hours.

"It is certain that if imposing forces are proved to be in our front, great difficulties will be experienced during a further advance, seeing that we are limited to a very restricted piece of ground suitable for the attack, and that we are bound to advance under the very eyes of the enemy, who has the advantage over us of being able to observe our movements while executing his own out of sight."

It was therefore thought necessary first to consider whether the adversary could not be enticed out of his position by means of manœuvring. To effect this it was requisite that the main road should be occupied at once by one of the brigades to ensure this road as a certain line of retreat should a check occur, and further to escape the danger of having to retreat through the deep valley of the Selz or over the heights, which would entail many inconveniences. One brigade only was available, therefore, for turning the enemy, or, more properly speaking, for making an attack on his flank.

The brigade to be employed for executing this movement on the right flank of the enemy's forces, according to the position then occupied by the troops, was the Dragoon brigade, which could easily execute the desired movement by taking ground a little more to the east.

From the point where the General stood, the deeply indented ground of Hohweiler, as well as the well-wooded and intersected ground south and east of that village, could easily be seen. If the Dragoons were directed towards the latter ground, and the heavy brigade left in rear to guard the main road, a timely mutual support of either of the brigades could scarcely be expected.

On the other hand, it could not as yet be distinguished whether the ground to the west of Sulz offered a better

chance for a manœuvre of this kind, in which case the heavy brigade could have been employed. To all appearances such was not, however, the case.

There remained nothing but to attack the heights in front, and the General Commanding the Division sent orders accordingly to Major-General C. to march to the attack.

Previous to this a report had been called for from the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons as to how far they had pushed their reconnaissance east of Hohweiler. It was now learned that the third ~~half~~ troop had at first been ordered to reconnoitre that portion of the ground, but that owing to the advance against the adversary which took place a few minutes ago, the reconnoitring did not take place. A small patrol only from that squadron had been left on the left flank. An officer of the squadron, with a few picked men, was at once ordered to move round by the east of Hohweiler and to discover the enemy's position, if possible, from the heights south-east of that village.

The General Commanding the Division now ordered the squadron of Dragoons stationed near Sulz to occupy that place. Major-General C., having sent for the officers commanding his two regiments, communicated to them the following dispositions for the attack:—

“The three available squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons will march in first line towards the heights, their left touching the western outskirts of Hohweiler, and from there will keep close to the ravine near that place. The 1st Dragoons will follow the movement as a second line, in echelon to the right rear of the first line.”

At 6.57 A.M. the 1st Dragoons had already completed their formation in squadron columns at close interval in rear of the main body of the 2nd Dragoons, outflanking the right wing of the latter with two squadrons. In consequence of the narrow space available, formation in inverted order had to be resorted to, the 1st squadron being thus brought on the left, and the 4th squadron on the right flank.

Shortly after, the battery took up a position on the heights to the east of Sulz, and fired several shells into the enemy's skirmishers. At 7 A.M. the head of the heavy brigade, still on the march on the main road, arrived at the junction of the footpath with the main road at the point 186, where it received orders to deploy to the east of the road.

Its deployment was executed at a trot in six minutes. The regiment of Cuirassiers, which yesterday had been in rear of the brigade was now at the head, and formed the first line, the regiment of Uhlans the second; these regiments were also massed in squadron columns at close interval.

In the meanwhile the officer commanding 2nd Dragoons had given instructions to his squadron commanders as follows:—

“The 3rd squadron will advance in its present formation in column, being the head of an echelon from the left. It will be preceded by one ~~half~~ troop.

The two other squadrons (1st and 2nd) will take full interval and follow in echelon at 300 paces to the right rear of the 3rd squadron; one ~~half~~ troop of the 1st squadron will precede these two squadrons.

The squadrons will conform to the movements of the 3rd squadron, which will direct its march to the point—easily to be distinguished—where the main road to Sulz emerges from the western outskirts of Hohweiler.”

The battery received orders to direct its attention to the heights situated in front, and to fire on any troops that might attempt to advance therefrom.

It was 7.8 A.M. when Major-General C. ordered his first line to move off. The 1st Dragoons, who were in second line, were ordered to follow in echelon on the right at line distance (300 paces), the squadron columns to take full interval during the advance.

The officer who had been sent on reconnaissance had not as yet sent in a report.

The squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons traversed the crest of the height, which had up to the present masked their movements, between Sulz and Hermersweiler. They descended the gentle slope at a trot, and crossed the railway which there runs at the foot of the height and is scarcely above the level of the bed of the valley; neither the railway nor the narrow stream which runs alongside it offered any difficulties. They then ascended the gradually sloping hill opposite, also at a trot, and still in the same formation. The enemy's skirmishers which still lined the main road quickly retired on the approach of the ~~half~~ troops which preceded the 1st and 3rd squadrons, and were pursued by them. The slope becoming a little steeper on the other side of the main road, the 3rd squadron only was enabled to continue its march

in the direction of height 208; the two others bore a little to the left in order to ascend obliquely.

The Brigadier was to the right front of the regiment so as to be able to see everything that took place in his front, and to facilitate his giving directions to the second line at the opportune moment. This latter had also at that instant crossed the main road. The General Commanding the Division was near the second line, also near the right wing. The front of the two lines extended from Hohweiler as far as the point where the ridge descends in a steep slope towards Sulz.

The heavy brigade, which had received orders to follow up as a reserve, now commenced to cross the railway at about 600 paces in rear. Major-General B. had massed his two regiments in squadron columns at close interval, the Cuirassiers on the right, the Uhlans on the left (total, $6\frac{3}{4}$ squadrons).

Arrived at the crest, the 4th ~~half~~ troop of the 1st and 3rd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons perceived a line of cavalry advancing towards them along the brow in the direction from Reimersweiler to Hohweiler. The 3rd squadron, which was leading, deployed at once, and threw itself upon the adversary (Appendix VI., Sketch 1).

The other two squadrons, which were at that moment still bearing half left, wheeled their heads half right and deployed by order of the officer commanding the regiment. The deployment was made to the right in order to avoid bringing the left of the 2nd squadron in rear of the 3rd. They then advanced at a gallop.

These two squadrons had not yet arrived at the crest when the retiring skirmishers of the 1st squadron reported that a force of cavalry was approaching from the right front also. The commanding officer therefore ordered the two squadrons to make a half right wheel. But in the meantime the 3rd squadron had come hand to hand with the hostile cavalry, which consisted of Chasseurs, and the commander of the 2nd squadron believed himself obliged on his part to support the 3rd squadron and take part in the engagement.

This order clashed with the one just given by the commanding officer of his regiment, and the 2nd squadron consequently separated into two parts; about one and a quarter troops followed the captain, and the rest, executing a half right wheel, conformed to the movement of the 1st squadron.

The officer commanding the regiment himself rode at a gallop with that portion of his regiment over the crest and charged the line of hostile cavalry, which had just been reported as approaching from the south-west. These latter were also Chasseurs.

The right of the Dragoons at the moment of the shock was outflanked and surrounded by the Chasseurs, but the fraction of the 2nd squadron which formed his left flank fell upon the flank and rear of the adversary. The two lines now came to close quarters at all points, and a violent *mêlée* ensued.

Major-General C., having observed the splitting in two of the 2nd Dragoons, had at once ordered the left flank squadron of the 1st Dragoons to throw itself into the open space thus produced. This order was so much more easy of execution as this squadron (1st) had arrived in rear of the group which the first line formed at the moment of the shock; however, the distance to the point where it was ordered to enter the line had now become considerably greater in consequence of the various movements that had been made.

Just a moment before this squadron entered the fighting line, the General Commanding Division arrived on the height and perceived in rear of the centre of the enemy's cavalry already engaged in the *mêlée*, a force of apparently about four squadrons of Cuirassiers who had followed as a second line, and now threw themselves, divided into two equal wings, upon the two distinct groups of combatants. Without losing a moment of time the General gave orders to the officer commanding 1st Dragoons to throw two squadrons on to the left flank of the Cuirassiers; the last (4th) squadron of the regiment he kept in reserve in order to ward off the attack of any fresh body of hostile cavalry, as clouds of dust which could be seen rising some distance off to the right front on the main road from Hagenau appeared to indicate the approach of another hostile force. At the same time a small group of hostile cavalry—about a troop—which had up to the present been halted close to and south of Sulz, was now observed to retire by the road to Hagenau.

Before indicating the other dispositions made by the Division it will be necessary to look a little closer at the details of the combat at present taking place.

The first shock of the three squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons with the enemy had taken place partly in front of the crest

and partly on the plateau itself, and had formed two distinct groups. To the left the 3rd squadron and one-and-a-quarter troops of the 2nd squadron, to the right the remaining half troop of the latter* and the 1st squadron. The lines were pierced through in both places, and were completely broken up; several horses were thrown down by the shock, and others by the nature of the ground, as the rising dust and the fact of every one's attention being directed towards the enemy had prevented the riders from noticing the inequalities of ground.

A great number of the Chasseurs had broken through the line of the Dragoons; most of them now turned their horses about and galloped to the point where the line of the Dragoons had arrived at the moment of the charge, engaging in individual combat, but others also, not being able to manage their horses, or having lost all self-control, galloped down the steep slope towards the railway. It was the same with the Dragoons who had penetrated the line of the Chasseurs. In the place of the long lines which had a moment before marched one against the other, with good alignment and well-closed ranks, two groups only could be perceived, which extended in length and breadth several hundred paces.

The centre of each group appeared to consist of a confused mass, from which incessantly small parties of combatants detached themselves, extending the individual combat over a still larger area. Between these groups isolated horsemen and riderless horses galloped about in all directions away from the combat; soon also were seen wounded and dismounted men running towards the main road and the village of Hohweiler. On the battlefield rose up great clouds of dust, from which arose shouts, mixed with the noise of carbine shots.

Such is the general description of this tableau; let us now turn to each separate group.

With the group *in the east*, the shock had taken place between lines of about equal extent of front, but, owing to their having met in a slightly oblique direction, the left flank of the Dragoons had gained more ground towards the south than the right flank. The entry into the line immediately after the shock of the one-and-a-quarter troops of the 2nd squadron caused the fractions on the right flank of the already

* A ^{half} quarter of a troop of the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons had been sent to Retschweiler, in order to secure the right flank of the Division.

broken line (3rd squadron) to be dragged with them on to the adversary's left flank, completely surrounding it. At this instant the two squadrons of Cuirassiers of the adversary's second line, which had come up, entered into the fighting line; the right squadron threw itself into the midst of the *mêlée*; the left squadron, on the contrary, completely surrounded the fractions of the 2nd squadron which the shock had disorganized.

The powerful shock of the Cuirassiers soon told its tale. Although the shock of the ~~one and a quarter~~ troops of the 2nd squadron had produced some effect on the mass engaged up to that moment, and had caused the latter to be pressed a little eastward towards the ravine, the combat, until now undecided, took at once an unfavourable turn for the Dragoons, and threatened to develop into a complete rout towards the north, towards which point a stampede of isolated horsemen had already set in.

At this critical moment the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons entered the fighting line. It had first marched with its regiment to within 300 paces of the right rear of the 2nd Dragoons, but the 1st and 2nd squadrons of that regiment having inclined to the left and marched to the attack, this distance had been considerably widened; the order to fill up the gap in the 2nd Dragoons had been given two minutes after the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons had come to the shock, and on the whole it had about 800 paces to traverse in order to gain the line. Having to deploy, and at the same time to ride in an oblique line across the slope, the squadron could not very well break into a full gallop; consequently it arrived in the fighting line four minutes after the shock of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons. The right ~~half~~ troop allowed itself to be dragged away into the midst of the group in the west, but the shock of the other three closed ~~half~~ troops took the Cuirassiers in flank, and the latter being already in disorder and galloping in a long straggling line owing to the movement they had executed in order to surround the Dragoons, were now compelled to turn about and hastily retire in the direction from which they had come. Their retreat not only disengaged the right of the 2nd Dragoons who fought at that point, but the effect of the shock was not long in making itself felt upon the other Cuirassiers and Chasseurs who were near that wing. They too turned about and fled, being now pursued by the 2nd

Dragoons, who had again fronted, and also by men of the 1st Dragoons.

The lucky counterstroke was felt at the left flank of the 2nd Dragoons a little later on; the latter, as we have shown, consisted of the greater part of the 3rd squadron. This wing had retired, mixed up with the Chasseurs and Cuirassiers, towards Hohweiler at a gallop; one part of it had even gone as far as the main road. The hostile cavalry here gradually began to observe the retreat of their own men, and also perceived how this increased the danger of their position, their escape over the steep slope on their right between Hohweiler and Reimersweiler being impossible. Those men only who perceived this danger in good time turned about; one party, however, was compelled to force a passage by fighting its way through, while a greater number galloped as far as Hohweiler, from which point most of the men turned towards the east for safety, making a great detour in the hope of reaching Reimersweiler; a few men indeed rode straight on towards Hermersweiler. The left wing of the Dragoons did not rally until the men had reached the foot of the height south of the railway.

In the meantime the right of this group, consisting principally of the 1st squadron 1st Dragoons, had continued to pursue the adversary for some 500 to 600 paces, when the signal to "rally" sounded from all sides and compelled them to halt. The squadrons now attempted to rally south of summit 208, but owing to some shells being thrown into their ranks they were obliged to retire in rear of the height in order to effect their rally in security.

In consequence, the adversary now came to a halt and also gained time to rally in a sheltered part of the ground near Reimersweiler.

As regards the group *in the west*, the combat there had also taken greater proportions. As soon as the shock of the 1st squadron and ~~half~~ troop of the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons took place with the Chasseurs, the two opposing lines at first reciprocally enveloped each other. The right of the 2nd Dragoons, but still more that of the Chasseurs, became strongly compromised, and the men on both these wings at one time threatened to steal away partly towards the main road Hohweiler—Sulz, and partly towards the highway leading to Hagenau.

At this point also the entry into the fighting line of about

two squadrons of Cuirassiers arrested the retrograde movement of the right wing of the Chasseurs, and one of the Cuirassier squadrons arrived in time to stop the progress of the Dragoons engaged there (principally the ~~half~~ troop of the 2nd Dragoons), and in concert with the Chasseurs succeeded in driving the latter a little to the rear; the *mêlée*, however, continued to be kept up for a short time longer at this spot. The other squadron of Cuirassiers, which was deployed in line on the left, was just prepared to reinforce the left wing of the Chasseurs which was pushing to the front, when Cuirassiers and Chasseurs were suddenly charged and taken in their left flank by the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the first Dragoons. These two squadrons, which were close at hand, had been thereby enabled to enter the fighting line sooner than the 1st squadron, as the latter having been directed towards the group to the east had much more ground to get over. The squadron of Cuirassiers had, it is true, found time to wheel to the left, and so been able to meet this flank attack by a fairly frontal attack; but they were unable to resist the superiority of the Dragoons, in addition to which the retreating Chasseurs dragged the right wing of the Cuirassier squadron along with them. The other Cuirassier squadron which, with broken ranks, was already engaged in the *mêlée*, could not afford any support. In this way the Dragoons at this point had also been enabled after a short scuffle to repulse the adversary.

The pursuit with this group was also sooner arrested by the sound of the "rally" than was the case with the group further east. The squadrons too were similarly compelled, owing to some shells having fallen near the place of *mêlée*, to rally for safety further to the rear on the northern slope of the plateau.

The adversary retired towards the main road in the direction of summit 219.

Let us now examine the position taken up by the heavy brigade during the interval, and let us study the causes which had everywhere compelled the rally to be sounded.

The shock of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons with the adversary took place at 7.18 A.M.; one minute after (7.19 A.M.) the 1st and 2nd squadrons entered the line; one minute later, at 7.20 A.M., the enemy's Cuirassiers arrived.

At 7.21 A.M. the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the 1st Dragoons threw themselves into the *mêlée* of the group to the west, which, together with the pursuit, lasted until 7.26 A.M.,

the moment at which the rally on that side was sounded. On the left wing, that is to say, *in the group to the east*, the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons had not commenced the engagement until 7.22 A.M., and at 7.27 A.M. the sound of the rally was heard.

In consequence, the combat on the right wing had lasted from 7.19 A.M. to 7.26 A.M., that is, seven minutes, and on the left wing from 7.18 A.M. to 7.27 A.M., that is nine minutes, reckoning from the moment of the shock until the sound of the "rally."

When, at 7.21 A.M., Major-General C. engaged the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the 1st Dragoons, he retained, as we have observed, the 4th squadron in reserve, because he had perceived in his right front, thick clouds of dust which seemed to indicate the approach of a fresh body of cavalry. The General Commanding the Division, who himself had quickly ridden to the height, having had his attention called to that side, at once gave orders to the heavy brigade to ascend at a gallop to the height which here formed a plateau. It was now 7.22 A.M. The heavy brigade at that time was stationed about 400 paces from the combatants, and waiting to see whether the still undecided combat in its immediate front would render it necessary to join in the fight, or whether the situation, as it became developed, would create other demands on the brigade. The 1st squadron of Uhlans only, which was stationed on the left flank, had wheeled to the left by order of Colonel F., and having deployed had thrown itself on to the body of cavalry which descended the hill on its extreme left, thereby compelling some of the Chasseurs and Cuirassiers to retire in an easterly direction through Hohweiler.

At 7.24 A.M. the heavy brigade arrived on the plateau, that is, at the moment at which the right wing of the Dragoons had already taken up the pursuit to their left front. The regiment of Uhlans, which now consisted of two squadrons only (2nd and 4th), had been placed in second line and followed the Cuirassiers in echelon to their left rear. The General Commanding the Division intended to meet the hostile cavalry which was approaching from the main road. He sent orders for the horse artillery battery to be brought up, as it was not yet possible to distinguish the strength and composition of this fresh hostile force, and himself rode on towards the front. The hostile body of troops at that moment

came to a halt at about 1,500 paces distance; the clouds of dust began to disperse, and between them puffs of white and blue smoke could now be perceived, and immediately after some shells fell upon the edge of the plateau. It was then that the General Commanding Division gave orders to sound the "rally." It was 7.26 A.M. The signal was not taken up on the extreme left wing until a minute later.

When the General had assured himself that the Dragoons had ceased the pursuit along the whole line, and were in the act of retiring and rallying, he ordered the heavy brigade to retire at a walk in rear of the edge of the plateau, and there take up a sheltered position. The regiment in executing this movement suffered a little loss from the hostile artillery fire. It was now 7.30 A.M.

The horse artillery battery shortly after arrived, preceded by the captain commanding, who received instructions to advance against the adversary's artillery; and at 7.36 A.M. the battery was in position at the point where the road from Sulz to Reimersweiler emerges on to the plateau. With the battery arrived also a ~~half~~ troop of the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, which had remained behind at Sulz. The captain commanding the battery had requested this as an escort for the protection of his guns, as a large number of dispersed Cuirassiers and Chasseurs were emerging from north of the railway and attempting to escape by the road winding around Sulz towards the west.

The General Commanding the Division ordered a squadron of the Cuirassiers to form the special escort for the battery.

The ~~half~~ troop of Dragoons was ordered to rejoin its squadron, and the officer commanding the party directed to inform the squadron commander that the General desired him to advance with his squadron along the railway line in a southerly direction, and at the same time to reconnoitre the road to Wörth by means of a ~~half~~ troop.

The non-commissioned officer of Hussars, who was still with the Staff of the Division, was at once sent back to the 3rd Brigade with the following despatch:—

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

*"Heights south of Sulz,
"August 1st, 1870. 7.40 A.M.*

"Victorious combat against two regiments of the enemy's cavalry south of Sulz. The enemy is being pursued along the road to Hagenau."

*"G., LIEUTENANT,
"A.D.C. of Division."*

Major-General C. had occupied himself during the interval with the rallying of his brigade.

The 1st Dragoons reformed north of the height 208, the 2nd Dragoons as well as the 1st squadron of Uhlans to the left rear near the western outskirts of Hohweiler, but south of the main road there. The Brigadier had meanwhile taken care to point out a separate rallying point for each regiment, which greatly facilitated the matter and caused the rally to be very rapidly carried out. Although a third of the men were still missing when the roll was called, the regiments were soon reformed, and the Brigadier again saw them with closed ranks and ready to enter into action.

The Army Hospital Corps detachment had also meanwhile arrived on the battlefield. It had marched through Sulz, in order to avoid an encounter with the adversary's dispersed cavalry, and thence had taken the road to Hohweiler, at which place it established a dressing station. By 7.40 A.M. the 2nd Dragoons had approached close to the 1st Dragoons, and the seven squadrons of the brigade were now again at disposal, being formed up in two lines in squadron columns at close interval.

The 1st squadron of Uhlans received orders to march through Hohweiler and emerge from thence at the eastern exit, at the other side of the deep ravine in the direction of Reimersweiler, as near the last-mentioned place a great number of hostile horsemen had been observed in the act of rallying. The squadron received instructions to threaten, as much as possible, the flanks of any troops which might attempt to rally near Reimersweiler. The regiment of Cuirassiers had sent two officers to the front; the Chief of the Staff and the A.D.C. of the heavy brigade had already gone there in order to observe and reconnoitre the adversary's position and movements.

The 1st squadron of Cuirassiers was charged with the protection of the battery.

The General Commanding Division, seeing the light brigade completely reformed, resolved to renew the attack.

The dust raised by the enemy's cavalry which had advanced on the main road had subsided, and it was now possible to estimate the strength of the force to be about one regiment.

The heavy brigade directed its right towards height 219, so as not to interfere with the fire of the horse artillery battery and at the same time to get out of the direct line of fire from the enemy's battery; the light brigade kept to the left rear, covering the flank of the first line against the troops rallying at Reimersweiler.

It was now 7.42 A.M., Major-General B. had just ordered the three squadrons of Cuirassiers to move off as a first line; the Uhlans with their two squadrons to follow the movements of the former at 300 paces distance, and to be ready to fill up any gaps which might occur in the first line, as well as to bring support to either of the wings which might require it. While this movement was being executed the A.D.C. of the brigade arrived and reported that the hostile cavalry near Reimersweiler was in the act of retiring towards the south, and that the Chief of the Staff and a patrol of Cuirassiers were following the adversary up in order to keep him under observation.

The advance against the hostile cavalry which was halted at the main road near their battery, and which had meanwhile been ascertained to be a force of four squadrons of Cuirassiers, now became much simplified. Major-General C. consequently ordered the two squadrons of Uhlans in second line to follow the first line in such formation as to outflank the right wing of the latter. At 7.43 A.M., that is, at the moment when the first line arrived at a trot on the plateau, the hostile battery limbered up and retired accompanied by two squadrons of the Cuirassiers (7.44 A.M.), and one minute later the other two squadrons in their turn retired (7.45 A.M.). Major-General B. sent the 2nd squadron of the 1st Cuirassiers from the right wing forward at a gallop, and himself followed at a trot with the rest of the brigade in the direction of summit 219.

The horse artillery battery also limbered up, left its position near the road, and under escort of the 1st squadron

of Cuirassiers, pushed on at a gallop so as to get in advance of the heavy brigade.

At 7.50 A.M. the 2nd squadron of the 1st Cuirassiers reached the height 219. The other two squadrons followed at 600 paces in rear, their right flank resting on the main road along which the horse artillery battery, escorted by the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers, was just galloping. The two squadrons of Uhlans followed the Cuirassiers, and the brigade of Dragoons followed the Uhlans in the left rear at 400 paces distance, the Dragoons being formed in two lines. At height 219 the ground contracted and formed a sort of defile, for the plateau was here bounded by two deep ravines, the western of which ran towards the line of railway, while the eastern ran towards Reimersweiler.

The Cuirassiers in first line made an attempt to cross the plateau, but as they were received by some shells from the hostile battery which in the meantime had again unlimbered and come into action at about 1,200 paces distance close to the village of Surburg, they sought shelter in rear of the height. The light brigade having at the same time come on to the ravine which runs towards the north-west from Reimersweiler, the General Commanding the Division, who was with the left wing of the Cuirassiers at the time, ordered the "halt" to be sounded (7.51 A.M.).

Only the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons, which had been sent towards Reimersweiler by order of Major-General C., and the battery horse artillery continued their movements.

The battery being unable to discover a suitable point on the height in front for coming into action, and as any ground there, moreover, would have been within the most effective range of the adversary's artillery, it was now led by its commanding officer to a point on the left of the main road, about 600 paces east of it (Appendix VI., Sketch 2).

The Chief of the Staff at the same time returned to the General Commanding the Division and reported that the hostile Chasseurs and Cuirassiers who had been engaged in the recent combat had now left Reimersweiler and retired first in a southerly and afterwards in a south-westerly direction; an officer of the 1st Cuirassiers still continued to watch their movements.

It was now 7.52 A.M. The General Commanding the Division went to the spur which projects between the two ravines ascending from Reimersweiler, there to take a

general view of the surrounding ground and situation of affairs.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS OF THE 1st AUGUST UNTIL 8 A.M.

Advance and Engagement at Sulz.

As may be gathered from the events just narrated, the first duty of the advanced troops is that of ascertaining during the earliest hours of the morning, by means of patrols, whether any changes have taken place in the enemy's position from that observed the previous evening. Should these patrols fail to find the enemy in their front, they must advance, search for him, and ascertain his whereabouts. They should not, however, be of too inferior strength if, in order to gain their object, they desire to push their reconnaissance in various directions. It may be that the enemy has drawn in his outposts and retreated, but it is quite as much to his interest to be well informed of the adversary's movements as it is to ours; his patrols will therefore generally be found within the zone occupied by him the day before, and these patrols will certainly endeavour to hinder ours from fulfilling their mission.

Here again we see how necessary it is to detail special complete and independent detachments (one or two squadrons) for the purpose of maintaining contact with the enemy. It is only when such troops are in constant readiness to move off at the first signal from their patrols that we are really in a position to repel the enemy's scouting parties, and enabled to extend the reconnoitring sphere sufficiently far and wide to pick up the trail momentarily lost, and to preserve the necessary contact.

But it causes great inconvenience to detail these special detachments from the outposts.

In the case under our notice, the reconnaissance executed by the enemy's Cuirassier squadron necessitated the troops nearest to hand being sent to the front to drive them back, that is, the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons.

It is therefore of importance that they should advance with complete squadrons; yet that could not be carried out in this case. Consider, for instance, the 4th squadron.

This squadron had ~~half~~ a troop detached as a piquet south of Ingolsheim, which for the moment found itself face to face

with the enemy. If the rest of the squadron were sent to support it—and that must be done here—the occupation of the village would become a necessity for a twofold reason.

It was not known where succeeding events might lead the squadron, and at any rate the bivouacs and cantonments of the Division could not be left without protection along the main road. Again it was necessary in case of a check on the other side of the defile to secure the retreat of the squadron. The village, which stretches obliquely across the front of the defile, and is about 1,000 paces long, has three roads running into it from different directions. The occupation of these entrances, with about twenty men dismounted from one ~~half~~ troop, would barely have sufficed. The squadron must therefore leave at least two ~~half~~ troops at Ingolsheim, which would leave it with one ~~half~~ troop only to send to the support of the piquet.

It is even doubtful whether a whole ~~half~~ troop would have been left to be so employed, as it might possibly have happened that from the main body of the squadron patrols had been sent out into the ground west of the forest of Schönenburg.

But if the squadron confines itself to driving in the enemy and discovering his position, it will be obliged to take every man with it. If the enemy retires in the direction of Hofen and Rittershofen, and the squadron follows him up as it ought to do, then the Division will remain unprotected along the main road to Hagenau. If, on the other hand, the squadron lays most stress upon the security of the Division, and leaves half its strength in the outpost portion, it will be separated from the other half for a long time. In addition, the sixty or seventy men who would then follow the enemy up, would not advance so far as the united squadron would be able to do.

This example will suffice to explain our idea, and it will also demonstrate the advisability of always having special detachments detailed, charged with the object of preserving an uninterrupted contact with the enemy—these detachments to be distinct from those told off to perform outpost duties, which latter will allow of maintaining contact within confined limits only.

We also think that it would have been more to the purpose to have employed the main body of the outposts—that is, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons—to drive in the

enemy's reconnoitring parties, than the 3rd and 4th squadrons of that regiment.

To sum up, these principles are in fact the same as those of Frederick the Great. He laid down that—"The duties of the supports are to hasten to the spot where an alarm is raised, to drive the enemy in, and to pursue him in order to ascertain where he is halted." The piquets and the vedettes were not allowed to stir, they formed the *standing* body for security and observation. But in front of the latter there were always Hussar posts placed on important points, such as villages, defiles, &c. The latter and the supports formed the moveable elements of security; in addition, squadrons of Hussars, sometimes a detachment of the strength of several squadrons, called "Partheyen," were pushed to the front, sometimes perhaps several days' march, and they again pushed their patrols still further out.

In our example, the outposts of the two opposing bodies have come so close that no space is left between them to throw out special detachments for uninterrupted observation. In this case their place would be on the flanks in the environs of Aschbach or Bremmelbach, or, if circumstances did not allow of that, they should retire in rear of the most advanced outpost line just north of Ingolsheim. From these points they would keep up by means of their patrols a constant contact with the enemy, and be always ready to follow his movements immediately they are signalled.

After the retreat of the enemy's reconnoitring party it was the mission of the 3rd and 4th squadrons to ascertain whether the main body of the enemy's force had meanwhile retired, or whether it was still in its former position. They had reason to suppose that it had not moved, seeing that its vedettes still occupied the same positions as before. It would have been imprudent to drive them in haphazard, and probably provoke thereby an isolated combat before the main body of the Division had commenced its forward movement. Nevertheless the still visible line of outposts might only be a veil to hide the enemy's movements in rear of the mountain ridge in front of Schönenburg. It would therefore have been well to push several detachments to the front, in order to ascertain whether the line in question had stronger supports in its rear. It must, however, be said that the two squadrons acted rightly in following up the hostile cavalry immediately the latter retreated towards Sulz.

But in doing so they nevertheless only half completed their mission as regards the duty of observation, inasmuch as they halted near the ravine of Sulz, and contented themselves with pressing back the enemy in front only. The mountain ridge which runs south of and parallel to the road from Sulz to Hohweiler does not permit a view of the ground on the other side, and it was very probable that some of the enemy's detachments were halted there.

Consequently, in place of halting and awaiting the arrival of the Division, it would have been far more correct for the two squadrons to have made every effort to ascertain the presence and strength of the enemy's forces which might possibly be found there.

The attempt to obtain this information by sending ~~half~~ a troop direct towards the height failed.

Nothing, however, would have prevented the squadron from attempting to gain their object by moving for that purpose round the flanks of the enemy's presumable position. To detach a few officers or patrols to effect this would hardly have sufficed, as the hostile patrols which the enemy no doubt would scatter about the neighbouring ground for his own security would scarcely allow of their doing so.

The 4th squadron, however, could easily have turned Sulz on the west, and attempted to send from thence ~~half~~ a troop to the heights in rear of the town; supposing even that the ~~last~~ troop could not have pushed up there, and that it had been prevented from so doing by some of the enemy's troops, the appearance of these latter would have allowed of forming an opinion as to whether considerable bodies of troops were really near that place.

If at the same time the 3rd squadron had crossed the Selzbach west of Hofen and attempted to gain the road between Hohweiler and Kùhlendorf, this squadron would then either have gained a view of the as yet unobserved ground, or the enemy would have opposed it with considerable forces to prevent the reconnaissance. In any case, therefore, it was of essential importance that reconnaissances should be made in these directions. The proposed movements were, besides, without danger; the 4th squadron could always retire to the west of Retschweiler, and the 3rd squadron even as far as the environs of Aschbach; the march of the Division along the main road would, moreover, exercise a great influence on the pursuit by the enemy's troops, and

would even permit the two squadrons to rejoin the main body by a circuitous route, should that course become necessary. Moreover, the Division would reap great advantage if, for instance, the 3rd Squadron were to draw large hostile forces away from the ground where the decisive shock of the larger masses was momentarily expected to take place.

The actual conduct of the two squadrons may be accounted for by assuming that owing to the position as outposts they had hitherto occupied, they would still consider that they belonged to the advanced guard of the Division, and would consequently believe their duty to be to cover the advance of the Division still further to the front.

Such a view might generally be entertained in similar circumstances, and for that reason again it appears desirable to have special and independent detachments told off to constantly observe the enemy; detachments which need not conform to the movements of the Division.

In the direction of Hatten, one squadron of Uhlans only had been employed to observe the road from Forstfeld to Sulz, and to reconnoitre the ground there. It might be thought that the two squadrons at Ober-Seebach should have been sent there, but it appears quite judicious to have sent a single squadron only. The object was simply to reconnoitre; had they discovered in that direction large hostile forces, a brigade or the main body of the Division would at once have been sent there to oppose them. As long as the enemy was not observed in that direction, it was important to keep the force concentrated at the point where contact with the enemy was already established, and to detach such forces only as might be absolutely and indispensably necessary. As to employing for a similar mission a single ~~half~~ troop only, or even small patrols, we have already shown that it would have been insufficient, and that it would have been necessary to devote a whole squadron to the purpose.

It may already be gathered from the above that from the moment large bodies of cavalry were expected to be met with, one Division of cavalry in front of the Third Army was barely sufficient to provide from its own proper forces for all the exigencies of the situation.

The support of the cavalry attached to the V. and XI. Corps had become very useful indeed by taking over the duty of observing the ground near the river Rhine as well as the

mountains, thereby saving the Division the necessity of reducing its strength too much by detached parties.

Owing to the early advance of the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, the Brigadier was unable to place the 1st Dragoons in front as advanced guard, as was originally intended. As a rule, such a measure is, however, to be recommended in many cases. By adopting this course a relief of advanced guard duty, with which outpost service is often closely interwoven, will be effected; and this will contribute considerably towards the preservation of the efficiency of the whole force. The troops employed day and night on these services have to satisfy many exigencies, and men and horses have to sustain great hardships in furnishing vedettes, patrols, numerous orderlies, &c., and in establishing piquets and supporting them. They undergo more fatigues in any case than those who quietly march in the column along the main road, or securely repose in the cantonments under protection of their outposts. Therefore, the more often the relief takes place, the better will it be for the efficiency of the whole force.

When, however, in the presence of or close proximity to the enemy, it is well not to draw his attention to the movements about to be commenced by relieving the outposts too early, as this might easily afford him an opportunity of pushing his patrols to the now evacuated points, and thus enable him to completely reconnoitre the position. In this respect also it is advisable not again to confide the duty of advanced guard to the already fatigued men and horses of the outpost line. It is far preferable to form the new advanced guard in rear of the outposts, and to relieve the latter only after they have been passed by the new advanced guard.

In every other respect the march of the Division is carried out this day as the day before; the two regiments of heavy cavalry have changed places in the column, a measure which cannot be too much recommended. When the roads are dry, the troops marching in rear suffer more from the clouds of dust than those at the head of the column; on heavy roads the former sink still deeper into the mire than the latter, the road being already cut up by the hoofs of hundreds of horses, and the march becomes more laborious. In general, it is much better to be at the head of a long column, where there is more fresh air, a better and more regular pace is observed, and there are fewer stoppages, &c., than in rear. For these reasons it

is also desirable during long and frequent marches to order an interchange of squadrons within regiments.

When, in close proximity to the enemy, the Division, or the greater part of it, marches together, the General Commanding the Division will regulate the order of march as regards rate of march and pace. It is then necessary, moreover, that he should march in front, or at least with the leading brigade.

As we have seen, the General Commanding Division was at 6.42 A.M. still in rear when Brigadier C., in his discretion, saw fit to quit the main road with the main body of the 2nd Dragoons, in order to lead them in the direction of Hermersweiler. But this movement was not effected without influencing the rest of the Division.

If the General Commanding Division desired to keep his forces concentrated and prepared for any eventualities which might present themselves, he was now no longer at liberty to take the heavy brigade in any other direction, but he was himself, on the contrary, obliged to let the heavy brigade follow the Dragoons to the ground east of the main road.

It was quite natural that the Dragoons should direct their march towards the side where they had the most chance of supporting the squadron which had already come in collision with the enemy, but it will often be questionable in such cases whether the direction so taken corresponds to the other intentions of the Divisional leader. Precious time would be lost if they thought necessary to look for him to obtain his orders, and the leading brigade is of course obliged to take at once such action as for the moment may be considered necessary. These inconveniences are only to be avoided when the General Commanding the Division is marching with the leading brigade.

As regards the 4th squadron, let us also remark that it does not forget, although in the presence of the enemy, to seize the railway station, and especially the telegraph. Under other circumstances this is always thought of in good time, but it will often happen that this wise precaution is forgotten the moment we allow our attention to be absorbed by the enemy's skirmishers appearing in our immediate front. To the enemy it will be of the greatest advantage to keep possession of the telegraph line up to the last moment, in order to preserve communication with his troops in rear.

The situation of the Division on arrival at the ground near Sulz merits particular attention.

As the main body of the Division followed the two advanced squadrons of Dragoons immediately, and at such a distance as is usual in the case of a column marching in the proximity of the enemy, it became necessary to deploy the whole Division into attack formation without being really certain whether hostile forces of any importance were actually present. Such a deployment must always take much time, and it is therefore well to ask whether such a measure is justified.

The nature of the ground was not favourable for forming an immediate estimate of the enemy's strength.

The distance from Hohweiler to the western outskirts of the wood of Ramsbach is over 4,000 paces. The access to the plateau south of Sulz is very limited, partly owing to the town in front and partly to some very deep slopes ascending to the plateau. As to turning the position, the surrounding ground was little suited to that purpose, in addition to which there were difficult roads in rear of it, should the Division be forced to retire that way; in any case such a turning movement would require much time. The Division is therefore reduced to the task of advancing against the enemy's probable front over some rather unfavourable conditions of ground, unless it is preferred to see its march arrested for an unproportionately long time by a few hostile squadrons of cavalry.

This situation, we repeat once more, was principally the result of the two advanced squadrons following in immediate contact with the enemy having badly fulfilled the mission entrusted to them. Had they advanced further to the front, and by doing so assured themselves that they had only one or two hostile squadrons before them, it would have sufficed to bring up and deploy the brigade of Dragoons which during the interval had arrived. As it was, judging from the actual position of the adversary at the time, the plateau would have been reached and the Chasseurs would have been repulsed before the latter could possibly have been supported by the two regiments of Cuirassiers.

(The advance to the attack could easily have taken place at least eleven or twelve minutes earlier.)

Instead of that, uncertainty prevailed as to what portion of the enemy's force was really present, and the Division was compelled to deploy and hold the whole force in readiness for a possible combat.

A Division of infantry can more easily enter into combat with the head of its column while the main body is still advancing, because it is in a position to sustain a temporising combat, even should the adversary attempt an offensive movement.

It is not the same with the cavalry. If the enemy advances, cavalry must attack or retire. As cavalry combats are, however, usually quickly decided, there is no question of sustaining a temporising combat for any length of time; the reserves must therefore be ready for immediate employment, and it is impossible to await their arrival and subsequent deployment.

Had the brigade of Dragoons attacked soon after its deployment—at 6.57 A.M.—the collision would then have taken place near the road from Sulz to Hohweiler about 7.2 A.M. If we remember that it was 7 o'clock when the heavy brigade left the main road to advance on the bye-road, that it had taken six minutes to deploy, and that after its deployment it had still more than 1,500 paces to traverse, it will be seen that the entire brigade could not have entered the fighting line until about nine minutes later on. Supposing that these regiments had gone singly to the front, the leading regiment would even then not have arrived in the line in less than five minutes. To this must be added that under similar circumstances all movements are unduly hastened, and disorders are frequently produced which cannot but considerably hinder the delivery of an attack with well-closed files. In such a case, moreover, suitable disposition cannot be made of the troops before they move off to the charge, including in this instance a formation in the direction of depth rather than of frontal extension; regiments then throw themselves into the *mêlée* at such places where the enemy is nearest to them, without due regard to the hostile lines following the first attacking line, or to the points where their action might be felt most beneficially.

The senseless rushing of second and third lines into a combat already commenced is a grave fault, one which has frequently happened in recent times, during the combat of large masses of cavalry, and which cannot be too severely censured.

The principal object which our troops should endeavour to attain during peace manœuvres is this:—Leaders should discountenance and prevent the repetition of that prevailing

practice of large bodies of cavalry acting as second and third lines engaging at a venture in combats which cannot be justified.

It cannot be denied that, notwithstanding the negligence of the two advanced squadrons of Dragoons in not endeavouring to gain sufficient information of the strength and position of the enemy by working round his flanks, other measures might still have been taken to gain the necessary knowledge of the enemy without having recourse to the deployment of the whole Division before a few hostile skirmishing troops. It must, however, be granted that situations will occur in which the surrounding ground does not admit of such a movement, and which may consequently force on a frontal advance towards ground which conceals or may conceal the presence of large detachments of the enemy's forces.

In such a case it would be well to make an attempt to repulse the skirmishers by means of small detachments, gaining thereby such points of observation as will permit of obtaining a view of the enemy's position, or perhaps some of his larger bodies may thereby be forced to quit their cover, and so obliged to reveal their presence.

This is what to some extent took place at the extreme left wing in consequence of the movement of the ~~half~~ troop of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons—this squadron pushing to the front beyond Hohweiler.

The squadron was enabled to ascertain that the enemy had large forces concentrated in rear of his line of skirmishers. Had the 4th squadron done the same thing at the same time on the right wing, the reconnaissance would have been more complete.

The execution of such movements demands, however, on the part of the leader, great forethought and prudence; it requires skill in the handling of the troops and ability to keep the men in hand. One or even two squadrons, according to the breadth of the front, could be so employed. Should the front be broad, these squadrons could push forward at different points, each squadron preceded by ~~half~~ a troop with its skirmishers out, who would be charged with driving in the hostile skirmishers, and endeavouring to gain a good point from which observations can be made. These ~~half~~ troops, as also the squadrons in rear of them, should not allow themselves to be drawn into an engagement. The instruction of the officers in charge of the ~~half~~ troops should

be simple, such as, for instance : " You will attempt to gain such and such a point to enable you to judge the enemy's strength and position. Conform exactly to my orders." If the commander of the ~~half~~ troop subsequently observes formed hostile detachments advancing towards him, he must at once wheel about.

During the whole of this operation he should take care not to make his movements at too smart a pace, especially if his men happen to see the enemy for the first time ; they easily lose their heads, and will set off at a sharp gallop in haphazard fashion.

The squadrons following in their rear are destined to support these skirmishers ; their presence alone will suffice, in most cases, to prevent a pursuit. If, on the contrary, the leading ~~half~~ troop allows itself to be drawn into a combat, and the squadron also takes part in it in order to disengage its ~~half~~ troop, such an event would in the end result in great loss if the affair takes place with an enemy superior in number, and it might possibly even oblige other corps of the Division to come up and successively join the combat.

This course is only admissible when a general attack with the whole force has already been decided upon, and when the whole of the troops have deployed from the column of march.

In the actual case before us, it is evident that there was no intention to engage with the whole of the force, which indeed could not be done ; the squadron of Dragoons had for its mission simply to reconnoitre, *i.e.*, to force the enemy as far as could be done under existing circumstances to display his troops. How many of the latter he would eventually show depended entirely on him.

Brigadier C. had acted judiciously, therefore, in arresting the movement of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons when already rushing forward at a gallop, since no apparent danger threatened the ~~half~~ troop which had made good its retreat.

The great extent of the line of the enemy's skirmishers, combined with the loud report of small arms which could be heard in a direction south of Sulz, and the sudden debouch of the two formed ~~half~~ troops of hostile Chasseurs, were sufficient to confirm the General Commanding the Division in his belief that he had before him the whole of the hostile regiment with which he had struggled the day previous. His supposition was, however, far from being so exactly correct when he assumed that the enemy had been already reinforced, although that also was later on confirmed

to the extent that the Chasseurs were every moment expecting the arrival of the brigade of Cuirassiers. The General's suppositions could only be based on the consideration that the nearer we approach the region where the enemy's main forces are supposed to be, the more we must expect to see fresh bodies of hostile troops enter his first line. Meanwhile it must, however, be remarked that if the enemy had considerable bodies of cavalry close at hand, he would have been enabled to hamper most effectually the advance of the Division by occupying Hohweiler with some dismounted cavalry. The Dragoons certainly could not then have advanced to the attack before taking the village, for the simple reason that they would not have found sufficient space in their front to deploy.

The Division advanced to the attack formed in three lines. The 2nd Dragoons formed the first line, the 3rd squadron of the regiment reconnoitring in front; the 1st Dragoons were in second line, the heavy brigade in third line, the latter as a reserve at the disposal of the General Commanding Division. It has already been seen from the account given of the engagement, that when working with large bodies of troops, the formation in three lines is absolutely necessary for cavalry combat.

One line is required to throw itself upon the enemy, then a second line is necessary to prolong, if required, the front of the first line, to protect the flanks of the latter, and to be in readiness to face and attack any fresh hostile force that may enter the fighting line. Lastly, the leader of the Division also requires a reserve to be at his disposal in order to meet any eventuality which may occur during the struggle of his principal forces and to paralyze the action of the enemy's reserves. With less than three lines the Division cannot be advantageously worked, but the number of lines may be increased in so far that each of these three lines can again be subdivided, as may be found expedient. Here, for instance, should the heavy brigade be required to enter into action, it could be formed into two lines.

When Lieut.-General A. saw himself compelled by the course of events to march against the enemy's front, he had two courses before him; he could either place as many squadrons in the first line as the ground permitted, deploy and follow with the rest in second and third lines, or he might prefer to march his troops to the attack formed in echelon.

In the case under consideration we do not believe the first


plan to be quite so advantageous as the second. The strength of the enemy was not as yet exactly known, nor even the direction from which he might suddenly make his appearance the moment the troops reached the crest of the height in front. It would therefore be better not to put too much strength in the first line, because that line would, especially if surprised by the sudden appearance of hostile troops, throw itself, without a moment's reflection, upon the first troops which it might meet, and in such a case regiments will easily slip through the commander's fingers, when, perhaps, one or two squadrons would have sufficed. As a consequence we shall possibly be short-handed when called upon to act against the enemy's reserves, as the advantage, as a general rule, rests with the side which can throw the last compact fresh body of troops into the balance.

Under circumstances such as the above it would therefore appear preferable to advance in echelon instead of in closed lines. The echelon which first encounters the enemy can, if needed, not only be directly supported by the troops following in rear, but also indirectly, as suitable directions can be given to the echelons in rear, against the hostile second and third lines.

The formation in echelon itself may be assumed in various ways.

Here we have three squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons and the four squadrons of the 1st Dragoons present. This brigade could advance with regiments formed side by side, each of them being preceded by one squadron, the other squadrons following at line distance,* outflanking the squadron in front on the right and left flank (each regiment would in this manner form double echelon, the leading squadrons having only to mask the movement of those in rear, and to reconnoitre the ground), thus:—

FIG. I.




* This "line distance" is 300 paces. In order to economise space it is not shown in the above figures.—EDITOR.

Or we could form an advanced line common to the whole brigade and let the remaining lines follow it in echelon placed in rear of its right and left flank, which method would allow of a certain number of combinations between squadrons. Among others the following:

FIG. II.




FIG. III.



Echelons could also be formed from a flank, as was done in the case under consideration.

FIG. IV.



En passant, we may here remark that we prefer all those formations which keep the squadrons of a regiment together, for instance, we believe those represented by Figs. I., III., and IV. to be better than that shown in Fig. II.

When we arrive at the study of the combat of larger bodies of cavalry, we shall have occasion to enter more fully and completely into the details of this subject.

It is evident that the principal mission of echelons which follow in rear is to cover the flanks of the lines in front. Consequently, when we advance against an enemy, and cannot quite distinguish his strength, the supports should from the outset follow the first line in rear of both wings. This will of course be unnecessary when one or both wings rest on other troops or gain support by accidents of the ground, and it must therefore be considered a great advantage when the nature of the ground offers such support; under such circumstances the wing is completely secured against all danger of being outflanked, and the troops which would otherwise have been employed here can be sent to reinforce the threatened or exposed flanks.

It therefore appears right that the brigade of Dragoons sought to profit by the ravine of Hohweiler, and during the advance rested its left wing on it while placing the rest of its force in echelon to the right.

In the studies on the Infantry Division* we have shown that the disposition of that arm in echelon has not the same importance to-day as it had in former days.

Hence it is all the more necessary to describe the advantages which that formation has for cavalry, above all when on the march to the attack without clearly seeing the enemy's first line; nevertheless it is well to observe that the different echelons—above all, those which are destined for the attack proper—should not be too weak.

Before continuing the description of the next phase of the combat we would also say a word on a subject which is of much importance, viz.:—the place to be taken up by the higher Commanders. Generals of cavalry should, as a general rule, avoid a frequent change of place in the column, otherwise they will expose themselves to the risk of missing the various despatches sent to them, and of losing sight of the whole of their force, and will be unable to preserve that continual *sangfroid* and calmness of deliberation which are so very necessary under these circumstances.

It will frequently happen that the commander is able to select such points of observation as will allow him to judge the whole situation, and to send off his orders under the most favourable conditions. In the present case, the commander of the Division could not have been in a position to

* Verdy du Vernois' "Studies in Troop Leading: The Infantry Division." Vol. II., p. 71 and *seq.* (English Translation).

do so had he remained on the height of Hermersweiler. He might certainly have observed from there the collision of his first line, but he would have seen the arrival of the enemy's reserves only after they had already become engaged in the fight, and his own reserves would then have arrived too late.

The talent necessary for the guidance of a cavalry combat consists principally in the skill which is required to bring into play one's second and third lines so as to neutralize the effect of the enemy's supporting lines and reserves, and also to bring up support to one's troops at the propitious moment, and at the decisive point of a fight already going on.

In our example the Divisional Commander has indicated to the leading brigade the direction it should take, and the mission which it was expected to accomplish.

The details of execution, the manner of engaging his echelons, and the points where they should enter the fighting line—all that is a matter for the Brigadier to determine. General A. had only to superintend the execution of his orders; his special *rôle* being rather to manœuvre the heavy brigade efficiently—*i.e.*, to determine whether it should be engaged wholly or in part only, as circumstances might arise.

To effect this it was necessary to ascertain in good time the state of things on the plateau, while keeping the heavy brigade in hand in such a manner as to prevent its being forced or drawn by succeeding events into the engagement contrary to his intentions.

The position taken up by the General Commanding the Division easily satisfied these exigencies. As the left flank of the Dragoons was secured by the conformation of the ground, the General went to the right of the brigade of Dragoons, and in advance of the heavy brigade, which latter he kept immediately behind him.

In his turn Brigadier C. finds his place, as already indicated, to the right of the 2nd Dragoons, and in front of the 1st Dragoons.

The point of observation to be chosen must depend on circumstances, but in every case the choice is of the greatest importance. General Officers should bear this well in mind, even at peace manœuvres; without, however, losing sight of the fact that the presence or the fire of the enemy does not always permit of their seeking the points most favourable for the general superintendence and guidance of the whole. We know well enough that to the higher leader the great seduc-

tion always offers itself to take part in every attack that develops itself, and to place himself at the head of every charge against the adversary in order to set a brilliant example to the men. Such an example may sometimes be admissible, but in many cases there is no justification for it. It will, no doubt, greatly contribute towards a successful issue, thus to lead the men against the adversary, but in most cases no necessity will exist for doing so. The colonels and officers of the regiments will lead their men just as well.

But the General, in allowing himself to be thus carried away at the head of his troops, and reducing himself to a mere trooper from the moment the collision takes place, does so precisely at the time when the situation makes the greatest claims on his aptitude to command; because now is the time when he should observe the movements of the adversary, and suitably direct his second and third lines, and it will devolve on him to give the signal to rally at the proper moment during the *mêlée* and pursuit.

Whenever the General Officer (and Officers Commanding regiments may find themselves in the same position) does not require to pay attention to the points above enumerated, he may march to the attack at the head of his troops. Such would be the case if one of the brigades of a Division, entirely deployed in first line, marches to the attack. If, on the contrary, the 2nd Brigade follows in echelon on one of the wings, its General should not allow himself to be drawn into the *mêlée* as long as he has yet a single echelon left to direct, nor should he accompany the last echelon unless a superior officer is present to give the signal to rally, &c.

Should the General Commanding the Division himself charge with the leading squadron of Dragoons, we may be pretty certain that the whole of his forces, Dragoons, Uhlans, and Cuirassiers, will speedily and regardlessly follow in order to "have a hand in it." Supposing even that they successfully repulse the Chasseurs and the supporting regiment of Cuirassiers with great losses, the Division thus disorganized runs the great risk of being completely overthrown by the arrival of the second regiment of Cuirassiers.

It is only the most perfect knowledge of his *rôle* and the greatest self-control that will prevent a General Officer from thus placing himself on all occasions at the head of his troops, but he must always remember that it is only exceptionally that he is justified in doing so, and that when he is so carried

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away, he, in most cases, abandons the guidance of his troops.

Attack of the 3rd Squadron of the 2nd Dragoons.

As regards the engagement near Sulz, an attempt has been made in the preceding account to picture the separate phases of the combat as they actually took place, including of course a certain amount of co-operation on the part of superior officers; this latter in reality is often found wanting, but is indispensable if we would not leave to mere chance every turn of a cavalry fight.

The two skirmishing ~~half~~ troops of the 1st Dragoons, when arrived on the height, perceived at once a line of cavalry advancing from Reimersweiler to Hohweiler, marching by the side of the ravine. As the entire Division is marching to the attack, the leading squadron could have had no hesitation as to what it ought to do.

It deploys and throws itself upon the enemy, quite unconcerned as to the strength of the force or the troops which may follow in rear of the enemy's first line. That must be a wretched cavalry which allows itself to be influenced by such circumstances as the superiority of the adversary's force and consequently turns about; good troops will follow their officers regardless of consequences.

The two opposing bodies which here came hand to hand were of equal strength, and the shock of the 3rd squadron took place before the other squadrons of the regiment had arrived at the same level. It is indispensable that all the details of this combat should be taken into consideration if we desire to arrive at the most useful and effectual way of employing the successive lines of troops.

In every age it has always been considered that the success of an attack lies in the impetuosity of the shock produced by squadrons charging with closed ranks at the greatest possible pace. The force of an attack executed with ranks, "knee to knee," mounted on well-trained horses capable of traversing a long stretch of ground at full gallop without exhausting their power, has always been held to be irresistible, and with reason; even to-day, although we do not ride closer than "stirrup to stirrup,"* an attack "like a stone wall" still preserves its whole value.

* The carbines and lances now carried prevent the men from riding more closely in the ranks.

It should, of course, not be imagined that a squadron launched forth to the charge under such conditions necessarily overthrows everything barring its way.

But what is certain is the fact that in an attack of two opposing lines, the advantage will always remain with the line which arrives at the moment of collision with the closest ranks and at the greatest velocity.

Its horses are less liable to turn about or to swerve to a flank. In these critical moments the best ridden horses will very easily swerve if they find room to do so, however small. Then the courage of a man who finds himself elbow to elbow with his neighbour is generally higher than that of one who perceives that he is separated by a wide open space from his next man.

On unsuitable ground it is very difficult to execute a charge at once swiftly and with closed ranks, although the degree of perfection attained by frequent drills will materially diminish the difficulty. In the field, the nature of the ground will often interpose obstacles to even the best exercised cavalry. Some part of the line may after a few paces encounter a deep morass which cannot be crossed, or large heaps of stones, or a deep ditch, &c., which cannot be leapt over; here and there some men are thrown, or worse still, the adversary's bullets come far too straight and rapidly thin the ranks; it follows as a consequence that the attack for the most part is finished with open ranks, that the line gradually opens out more and more, even if some of the men have not already turned about, and when the actual shock takes place, both ranks will completely break through each other. Several horses will penetrate with full force into the living wall marching against them, others cannot get so far; the adversary is driven back on some points where the charge was delivered in a compact mass and with the necessary vigour, while at other points the adversary on his part will break through the open spaces left for him.

In the midst of the general over-excitement many of the men cannot turn their horses round, and many are carried away on their steeds, which they can no longer control.

In this manner the mass soon forms itself into a series of single combats, and groups of six, eight, or more men cling together. The latter, again, by-and-by subdivide in their turn into man-to-man combats, or perhaps several fight against one, as chance may bring them together, and wherever a

wounded man wavers in his saddle there will generally be found several men rushing towards him and cutting him down.*

A great number of the men seek to escape their opponents if hard pressed by them, and attempt to renew the combat at some other point; some again, whose courage begins to fail, seek safety in flight.

In this way, in place of the two long thin lines which marched against one another, the combatants soon assume the form of a great disorderly crowd of troopers, thickest in the centre, whence small groups of men and isolated troopers escape, covering the battlefield at various points. Riderless horses, wounded men, some still mounted, others dismounted, run in all directions, the latter for the most part seeking shelter in the nearest thicket or gaining some hollow road where they run the risk of being ridden over.

This is, then, the picture which we must imagine to have been presented at the first shock of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons with the hostile Chasseurs.

*Entry into the Line of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the
2nd Dragoons.*

The 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons next enter the line; these squadrons followed the 3rd squadron at 300 paces—line distance; had they marched at the same pace as the 3rd squadron, they ought to have reached the fighting line in about three-fifths of a minute. It will certainly often happen that the second line will take to a gallop at the same time as the first line; that, however, is not always judicious. The horses become unnecessarily fatigued before the collision, the ranks open out, and in addition to the gradually increasing desire that each man has to join in the attack, the line is tempted to rush prematurely and thoughtlessly into the fight, owing to the enemy's men after the clash of the first line appearing at once in front of the second line. In the first cavalry fight of a campaign the men are over-excited, and have therefore less tendency to remain quietly in the ranks and at close files; the officers themselves are obliged to master their own feelings, and it

* Experience has proved that a sword-cut seldom, but a point with the sword as a rule always, throws a man off his horse. The latter should therefore be chiefly practised at sword drill.

becomes therefore all the more difficult for them to keep their men in hand; so it happens that the gallop is generally assumed too soon, a certain number of men rush forward, and the ranks are consequently loosened.

But the greatest fault which can be and really is continually committed during a cavalry engagement is that of launching the second and third lines at haphazard into the combat going on in front of them. A cavalry officer is certainly actuated by a very proper feeling when he says: "there is something going on over there, and we must have a hand in it," but such a feeling can only result in complete dissolution of our forces and cause them to be abandoned to the caprices of chance, if it is not tempered by cool reflection and consideration as to the proper moment and point at which the support to the first line would be most useful.

We are of opinion that the necessity for regulating the engagement of the supporting lines is greater than in the case of the first line. To judge the question correctly, we must take into consideration every available means which can be employed in order to keep the troops of the second line in hand, and should profit by lessons of experience which teach us to avoid and prevent all premature and senseless charges of the supporting lines.

To effect this object, squadrons or regiments of the second line should generally follow the attacking line at a trot until the very moment when circumstances demand their participation in the fight. For example, if the first line had in its front a space of 1,500 paces, and had traversed 1,000 paces at a trot before it breaks into a gallop, the attack would require four-and-a-third minutes, and the distance between first and second lines would then be increased by 500 paces if the second line remained at a trot; so that the second line would then enter the *mêlée* two-fifths of a minute later than it would have done had it set off at a gallop at the same time as the first line.

In order, however, not to delay the entry into action still longer, by having further movements to make, the regiments of the second line, if they outflank and follow the first line in echelon, are recommended to open out their squadron columns to full deploying intervals; if, on the contrary, the second line march directly in rear of the first line it is preferable to allow the squadrons to adopt the formation of squadron columns at close intervals, because in that formation

they are more handy and better under the leader's control enabling him to impart simultaneously any direction to the whole line as may become necessary under the circumstances.

It must depend on the whole situation whether supporting lines should march immediately in rear or on the flank of the first line.

The position on the flank is preferable from the moment the lines have arrived within the zone of the attack; but under other circumstances it will often appear desirable to adopt the former course and to let the support follow directly in rear of the first line. The latter course makes things easier for the support when, for instance, it would have to traverse fields of standing crops of corn, &c.; it is evident that in such a case the second line would pass over the ground much more easily by following the traces of the first line which has already trampled the corn down, and it will also make it more difficult for the adversary to judge of the exact strength of the supporting line.

In our example, this consideration did not come into play, because from the height on which the adversary stood, he had already been able to survey completely the strength of the Division of Cavalry from the moment it crossed the level ground of Sulz.

When the two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons in following their 3rd squadron received the notification of the approach of the enemy and perceived hostile squadrons advancing against them, they at once took up the required direction, deployed and pushed on at a gallop. Notwithstanding all that we have said on this subject above, the squadrons appear to have acted correctly in breaking immediately into that pace, considering the circumstances in which they then found themselves; being close to the enemy it was above all things necessary that they should rapidly ascend the height and gain the plateau. It is another question whether it would have been better to have executed this movement while still in squadron columns and then to have deployed, or to have deployed before ascending to the crest of the height; it being here, however, a case where a few seconds were of immense importance and where it was necessary to gain the crest at any price, we should ourselves have been inclined to prefer the first-named method.

The attack of the 1st and 2nd squadrons offers opportunity also for some other remarks.

Let us first consider the deployment. As it is every moment expected that the enemy will be met with, it becomes necessary to advance in line of squadron columns at full interval, but the appearance of the enemy at any moment may possibly also render necessary some change of direction; it is therefore convenient to remain in squadron columns and to advance without deployment into line. In every case where the situation is not already clearly understood, it is advisable to preserve as long as possible the former formation and to deploy only at the last moment. In this manner the frequent rupture of the line and the inconveniences of all sorts resulting therefrom will be avoided. By reason of this act of deployment, some part of the line will generally diverge into an improper direction, as happened in the case under notice, and this gives to the adversary's second line an opportunity of throwing itself successfully upon our flanks and rear.

As we attach, and with reason, so much importance to an attack with closed ranks, it is well that we should, by means of a disposition analogous to that employed in our example, or by some other method, endeavour to have the means in our hands which will enable us to fill up those gaps in the ranks which will never fail to occur. They will not only be produced by some one or more parts of a line, already deployed, inadvertently changing direction, but also, during an advance to the attack, by the necessity of turning obstacles, or by some of the parts of the line losing their proper direction, or by the attack being directed by the enemy on different points.

From the foregoing it is clear that we have here a need inherent to cavalry combat which we cannot escape, and which demands that a succouring body should follow immediately in rear of the first or attacking line.

As the special object of the succour detachment is to fill up the gaps occurring in the first line, it need not be very strong.

It is certainly very desirable that the regiment marching in front should provide such succour from its own squadrons, by placing, for instance, three squadrons in first line and the fourth in rear of them. In this manner it would be much easier to prevent different corps getting mixed up, and the practice of this precautionary measure in time of peace will be greatly facilitated; but we must, nevertheless, not lose sight

of the fact that such a course will necessarily produce a reduction in strength of the first line, and thereby possibly cause some of the troops of the second line to be drawn into action sooner than would otherwise have been the case.

We cannot, however, see therein any great inconvenience. Even should the regiment in the second line find itself obliged to advance one of its squadrons a little earlier into the first line, this method would yet answer better according to our ideas than that which demands that a squadron of the regiment in second line should immediately follow the first line as a succour squadron, thus causing it to be thrown into and melt away in the *mêlée* produced by the collision.*

There is yet another point to be elucidated concerning the entry into the line of the two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons, viz.:—Was it at all necessary to engage *immediately* the whole of the two squadrons? It is incontestable that the right squadron had no other choice than to throw itself against the 2nd squadron of Chasseurs advancing from the south-west. But should the 2nd squadron of Dragoons also have taken part immediately in the combat of the 3rd squadron as well as in that of the 1st squadron, which latter had developed at the same moment on the right of the 2nd squadron? From what we now know of the situation of affairs, it was not at all necessary to do so, but it must in extenuation be observed that it is not always possible to judge the strength of a hostile force when it makes such a sudden appearance, even as regards his first line, and that in such moments of over-excitement we are often apt to over-estimate the opponent's strength. Above all things it is important to preserve cohesion between squadrons and for the commanding officer to keep one of the squadrons as long as possible in reserve. It must, of course, be evident that the question will be much more rapidly decided, and with more chance of success, if we can oppose *two* squadrons to the adversary's *one*, provided always that the adversary receive, prior to the affair being decided, no other support. In the contrary case the arrival and the compact charge of this second squadron on our two already broken ones would give him a sure

* Succour squadrons ("*Unterstützungs-Escadrons*") detached from the 2nd or 3rd line, and following the 1st at 150 paces distance, were authorised by the Regulations of 1876, but are not alluded to under that name in the recent (1886) issue. Compare "Note on the German Cavalry Regulations of 1886" at the end of this work (p. 423).—EDITOR.

advantage. We are of opinion that this fact is too often lost sight of.

We believe, therefore, that there was too much precipitation on the part of the commander of the 2nd squadron when he threw himself with his squadron into the combat as soon as he perceived the collision with the enemy of the 3rd squadron on his left. The latter did not for the moment require support, at least not in a pressing manner. But it became more needed when it was threatened by the arrival of the enemy's reinforcements, and the 2nd squadron could now have afforded a powerful help in keeping these reinforcements at a distance. Nor was there any necessity for the Officer Commanding the regiment to throw at once the 2nd as well as the 1st squadron on to the second body of Cuirassiers which rapidly advanced from the south-west. (It is true that this movement was not completely executed, but it was none the less the intention of the Commander of the regiment to do so from the moment he could exactly distinguish the strength of that new body.)

Here then it would have sufficed to launch the right flank squadron only. He would then have retained the 2nd squadron at his disposal to ward off any hostile troops that might arrive in support, or if such should not appear, to throw it into one or other of the fighting groups at such points where they might happen to be of most use.

A few moments delay of the 2nd squadron before sending it to the attack would have sufficed for this object.

But these few moments would also have given time to observe the advance of the enemy's Cuirassiers and so have allowed of sending the squadron against them.

By the formation adopted by the brigade of Dragoons, the right wing of the 2nd Dragoons was sufficiently secured by the echelon following in rear; the rôle of the 2nd squadron was therefore fully indicated, viz., to make such effort as would prevent the Cuirassiers from entering the fighting line on the left flank.

If this had been done, the collision of the 2nd squadron with the right wing of the regiment of Cuirassiers would have taken place a little more south of the point where the other Dragoons were already engaged.

The superiority of the adversary would certainly not have failed to make itself felt, but probably it would have been very clearly seen how great an influence a fourth squadron

would have exercised had one been placed immediately in rear of the 2nd Dragoons and had it now come up to succour it.

This support would have been so much the more useful as the help brought by the 1st Dragoons to the right flank of the 2nd Dragoons did not at first produce any effect on this part of the battlefield, as they threw themselves upon the two left flank squadrons of the hostile Cuirassiers.

It is impossible to represent in a sufficiently clear manner at peace manœuvres the details of a cavalry combat. It is therefore necessary to picture the reality in the most detailed manner if we desire to arrive at the precise manner in which the troops we have to dispose of should be employed.

It is true that even when we understand what should be done we may be a long way from being able to put it into execution. But given two minds equally endowed, the advantage will evidently rest with him who has most profoundly studied and mastered the details of his subject.

We may here already call attention to a point which, to our mind, is most important. As long as the standing regulations do not distinctly lay down that second lines would often do well by halting, wholly or in part, after the collision of the first line has taken place, and so long as we do not make this the object of constant practice, so long shall we be unable to avoid the ever-recurring fault of second lines being launched into action without due regard to surrounding circumstances or sent off to support an already developed combat at inopportune moments.

Let us now see what is going on in the eastern portion of the battlefield. There about 300 men of the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons and the 1st squadron of Chasseurs are mixed up in a hand-to-hand fight similar to the one described above. About one minute after the first shock, the leader of the 2nd squadron executing a half left wheel, threw himself with his ~~24~~ troops (about 90 men) with closed ranks into the *mêlée* formed by the above two squadrons of Dragoons and Chasseurs. The shock of this mass of horsemen was directed against the west flank of the combatants, while the squadron also partly surrounded the southern side of the *mêlée*, at first principally encountering the small groups of riders who had detached themselves from the *mêlée* and proceeded in that direction. Those of the Chasseurs fighting at this point who had observed this fresh attack, and now see themselves quite isolated in the presence of this compact and threatening

mass, for the most part attempt to get out of the danger; some seek flight by turning about towards the direction from whence they came, while others can see no other way out of the difficulty than by throwing themselves right into the centre of the fighting mass. All those who had perceived the approach of this fresh line too late—the Chasseurs as well as the Dragoons—are, for the most part, carried away by the impetuosity of the collision, and the result at these points is a momentary rush towards the common centre as well as towards the south of the plateau, which movement ends by bringing a stronger pressure upon those already fighting there and by driving a mass of Dragoons upon and around the few Chasseurs still engaged in the centre. It was unavoidable that the closed ranks of the 2nd squadron should open out and break the moment the groups in their front became thicker and more numerous, and that they should eventually melt away in a series of individual combats, thereby still further increasing the tumult. The effect produced by the sudden arrival of such a detachment will mostly depend upon its strength. In the case before us, unless through some unaccountable *contretemps* a panic had occurred, it is probable that the 90 Dragoons would soon have decided the fight. Here there is, however, a characteristic inherent to cavalry combat which merits our special attention.

In a yet undecided combat, the effect which the entry into the *mêlée* of a fresh body of troops produces will manifest itself first by setting those already engaged in the scuffle in motion towards one or more points, in fact it sets the mass afloat.

The question now arises in which direction will they move? According to the direction from which the attack of the 2nd squadron was delivered, the Chasseurs would have been driven towards the ravine, had not the hostile Cuirassiers subsequently taken part in the combat, and as there was no escape for the Chasseurs in that direction they would no doubt have made an attempt to wheel towards the south or north, the direction towards which some of the men during the engagement had already drifted. Had the Dragoons on their part delivered their attack from the north, it would have caused the Chasseurs to retire towards the south; had they, however, still further enveloped the southern side of the *mêlée*, the whole group of combatants would have been driven towards the north, and then the Chasseurs would have

endeavoured to escape by making long detours towards the east and west in order to rejoin their own troops. Had the attack ended in the manner last described, everyone standing on the height of Hermersweiler would certainly have received the impression that the combat went unfavourably for the Dragoons, as the latter would be retiring towards the point from which they delivered their attack. We should not, therefore, in similar cases, let our judgment be carried away by the general aspect of the fight as it may present itself to the eye, as otherwise we may often credit the victorious cavalry with defeat instead of victory. Attacks which end as last described will undoubtedly nearly always finish with the dispersal and often with the complete annihilation of the enemy's cavalry engaged.

We see, therefore, how important it is that the point at which the supporting line should come into play is well chosen. Great results may be obtained if the leader of the supporting line correctly judges his point for attack; to this end however great *sang-froid*, a quick eye, and a rapid and thorough understanding of the position are necessary qualifications. That leader who can resist the temptation to place himself at the head of his squadron or regiment and rush by the shortest way into the *mêlée*, who can restrain himself to wait half a minute or so before rushing into the combat, and then perhaps do so at some more distant point of the fighting mass, will generally secure the greatest effect for his action.

Let us now turn to the group which has formed itself more to the west. In order more readily to understand our observations, it should be noticed—although that did not become known until after the history of the war was written—that at the beginning of the combat the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the Chasseurs were halted close to and south of Sulz. One *half* troop of the latter was detached on the road to Würth, two other *half* troops of the same squadron were posted dismounted on the edge of the height opposite the railway station, from which point they kept up a constant fire of small arms. The 4th *half* troop had taken part in the attack in conjunction with the 2nd squadron of Chasseurs. It happened, therefore, that when the collision of the latter with the right wing of the 2nd Dragoons took place, both parties were of equal strength (about 185 Chasseurs against the same number of Dragoons).

Owing to the sudden appearance of the enemy, at the moment that the Dragoons reached the crest of the height, the latter were unable to oppose the adversary on a perfectly parallel line, and the left flank of the Chasseurs consequently completely outflanked and enveloped the right wing of the Dragoons, while the left wing of the Dragoons, which a few seconds later came into collision with the Chasseurs, in a similar manner outflanked the right wing of the latter.

Let us now clearly observe the effect of a body of cavalry taking another body in flank.

If we put ourselves in the place of the men riding on the flank of an attacking line, and perceive that to all appearances we shall not only become engaged with that portion of the opposing line in our direct front, but also with a part which overlaps our own flank very considerably, we shall find ourselves obliged to avow that such a state of things is not exactly calculated to heighten one's courage.

Every man feels at once that he will not only soon find himself face to face with the men in front of him, but that in a few moments the apparent superior numbers of the enemy will make themselves felt and he will be attacked in his rear and flank as well as in his front. Even should the excitement of the moment and the man's fine spirit prevent his entertaining such a feeling, the evil of the position will soon make itself practically felt.

Such a position may produce very different effects. It may happen that the flank which finds itself so threatened turns about to a greater or less extent. This giving way of even a part of the attacking line may, however, influence little by little the rest of the line and cause it to follow the example thus set. If, on the contrary, the rest of the men continue the attack, they must all the more feel the adversary's superiority of numbers.

Again, especially when the two opposing lines are still at a great distance from each other, the flank thus threatened may attempt to re-establish an equality by a flank movement or a half wheel, and even endeavour to outflank a superior hostile line. A clever leader who knows exactly the point at which he must stop his flank movement, and when he must again execute his inward wheel, will often, when his men are well disciplined and opposed to a less skilful enemy, be able to minimise and even equalise such a danger. The closer, however, the opposing lines have approached each other, especially

if they are already deployed in line, the less chance there is of warding off or equalising the danger threatened by an outflanking adversary. Sight, however, must not be lost of the fact that if, for instance, the squadron on the right flank even succeeds in such a flank movement, thereby equalising the danger which threatens it from the enemy's left flank, its separation from the rest of the regiment will have the effect of causing its own left flank as well as the right of the next squadron to it to be surrounded by the enemy; under such circumstances a squadron of the second line following in immediate rear is alone able to fill up the vacant space thus created.

It is evident that a third case may also happen, viz.: that the threatened flank may penetrate into the part of the line in its immediate front, and so in fact find itself completely enveloped. It is clear that at this point the combat must then become an unequal one: the men, pressed on all sides, will partly succumb or attempt to cut themselves a way back out of the *mêlée*, or they will be jammed against their comrades still fighting in the line.

We may, then, conclude that the attacking line will only in very exceptional cases succeed in avoiding the danger which threatens it from an outflanking opposing line; we have also seen that even with a superior force the adversary will not escape the disorder resulting from the shock, and that a closed body of our second line arriving in support has every chance of reversing the state of things. On the other hand, we have attempted to show how even the simple threat of such a danger may alarm the first line, and even cause it to turn about *before* the collision takes place, leaving the adversary's line unbroken; it would, however, always be better to avoid showing one's heels to an adversary, and we must rather endeavour to find means to ward off such a danger in good time. It may of course be suggested that the remedy is easy, viz., always to outflank the enemy's line with your own. But, in order to apply this principle, we could scarcely ever place sufficient squadrons in the first line, and by so doing the subsequent guidance of the combat would be taken out of the leader's hands. On the other hand, it is very difficult to estimate the strength of the enemy's first line when at a long distance from it, as, during the advance at a trot he can at any moment order troops from the second line to gallop up and reinforce the first line.

It is therefore not sufficient to lay down as a principle that we should place in our first line an equal or even superior force to that of the enemy. On this principle we should never arrive at the desired object.

At a distance of one thousand or more paces, nothing can be perceived of the adversary but a mass of troops, and we cannot as yet know what will be the extent of his line until he has deployed. Nothing therefore remains for the moment than to place, according to the strength of the force at disposal, a regiment or a brigade or even more in the first line, according to the impression produced by the appearance of the adversary's forces.

The best means of warding off the danger of having the first line or part of it outflanked at the moment of collision will always be found in strictly preserving closed ranks during the attack, and in constantly watching for the opportune moment at which the supporting line of troops should be made use of.

Should a regiment in the first line be obliged to direct one or other of its flank squadrons during the advance to the attack to take ground to a flank so as to outflank the enemy, the squadron held back—as proposed above—will then be available to fill at the most critical moment—wholly or in part—the vacant space thus created in the first line.

Before drawing general conclusions from these observations as to the best formation to be adopted, we will first examine the conduct of the troops placed in second line on both sides during the combat detailed in our narrative.

Entry into the Fight of the Enemy's Regiment of Cuirassiers.

As we have already seen, the regiment of the enemy's Cuirassiers had not succeeded in preventing the Chasseurs already engaged (1st squadron) from a collision with the $2\frac{1}{2}$ half troops of the 2nd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons belonging to the second line.

That was partly due to the great distance of the regiment from the Chasseurs, but it must also be observed that the former had only just neared the battlefield and that they were not at proper line distance. The fight already going on at two places on its arrival, it sent its 1st and 2nd squadrons to the support of the group to the east and the 3rd and 4th squadrons to that of the group to the west of the plateau.

We may now ask whether it was really necessary to engage immediately both wings of the regiment. It cannot be denied that, as could be perceived from the state of the fight, the taking part in the *mêlée* had become a necessity for the Cuirassiers. In the group to the east the Chasseurs could at that moment be perceived hard pressed and driven back by the arrival of the 90 Dragoons of the 2nd squadron; it became therefore necessary to support the Chasseurs, and to judge by appearances the same support was imperatively required by the group to the west.

In reality the Commander of the Cuirassiers could not very well distinguish the favourable turn the combat had taken at the latter place with the left of the 2nd squadron of the Chasseurs; but the right of the squadron appeared to be already enveloped by the Dragoons, and here and there Chasseurs could be perceived retreating rapidly towards the south, and more still towards the west.

If asked whether there was any necessity for at once engaging the *whole* of the regiment, we must reply in the negative. The confused fighting mass in front, the clouds of dust rising up, and above all the nature of the ground, did not allow the Commander of the regiment of Cuirassiers to distinguish whether fresh forces were coming to the aid of the Dragoons, and of what strength they might be; for this reason he should have engaged such of his forces only as were strictly necessary. Judging from the extent of ground taken up by the fighting mass before him, it was easy for him to judge that the support of two squadrons would suffice for the moment.

The Dragoons directed their charges chiefly upon the inward flanks of the two groups. It was at these points that the Chasseurs appeared to be principally in danger, and it was here, consequently, that the two squadrons should have brought support.

To our mind it would have been preferable if the regiment of Cuirassiers had advanced at a trot to within 500 paces of the combatants, launched from there their 1st and 2nd squadrons to the attack, then moved their two remaining squadrons a little to the left and with them taken up a position of observation ready to cover the left flank of the 2nd squadron of Chasseurs as well as to take the adversary in flank should the combat at the right wing take an unfavourable turn.

In this position it would have been able to oppose

effectually the movement of the 1st Dragoons the moment the latter entered the fighting line, as the disposition actually taken subsequently by the Dragoons proved.

As we know, the whole of the regiment of Cuirassiers was at once launched into the fight. Its 1st squadron penetrated the mass near the ravine, and gave the Chasseurs there engaged such support that the Dragoons on that side were effectually repulsed, the greater part of them retiring even beyond Hohweiler. The same result will generally appear whenever a fresh body of troops engages in an undecided combat, provided the new-comer is not too inferior in numbers to those already taking part in the fight.

It must however be borne in mind that in executing such a movement from the rear, there is always a certain amount of of danger if the combat has already lost its stationary character before the movement is carried out, and the whole fighting mass is rushing in a body towards the new assailant.

If such be the case, then the moral impression produced by the unfavourable collision of the first line, joined to the physical one which results from the mixed and confused mass of combatants of both sides having the appearance of double its numbers, and the circumstance that the retiring friendly troopers in their recklessness overthrow friends and foe alike, will combine to the advantage of the adversary. It will then generally happen that the second line, if advancing in direct support of the first line, and especially if it is already deployed, will be overthrown and carried away by the general retrograde movement, unless it is formed in strong and well-closed masses—that is, columns—of sufficient strength to enable it to arrest the rush of the combatants and to hurl them back again in an opposite direction. As a rule it would therefore be well to bring up the support, whenever the combat is still undecided or a retrograde movement has set in, from one of the flanks in a direction oblique to that in which the original attack of the first line was delivered.

The 2nd squadron of Cuirassiers charged against that fraction of the 2nd squadron of Dragoons which had under the command of its captain surrounded the left flank of the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers, and now pressed the latter very hard: it went therefore to the exact point where its support was specially needed, and where it obtained all the more success as these Dragoons were already completely broken up and scattered about in the *mêlée*. We shall speak a little

further on of their collision with the 1st squadron 1st Dragoons, and will content ourselves with saying that the fight at this point threatened at that time to end to the decided disadvantage of the Dragoons. It must be added, however, that on this flank there were 240 Dragoons of the 1st Cavalry Division fighting against 450 Chasseurs and Cuirassiers.

As regards the entry into the *mêlée* of the 3rd squadron of Cuirassiers, which went to support the group in the west, that squadron threw itself upon the Dragoons, especially the half troop of the 2nd squadron which had enveloped the right flank of the 2nd squadron of Chasseurs. The fight here must have resulted in a complete *mêlée*; reckoning from a direction north to south, Dragoons were followed by Chasseurs, these again by Dragoons, and these by Cuirassiers, and the latter must also have surrounded the eastern side of the whole group. It can easily be explained that the arrival of the Cuirassiers did not only disengage the Chasseurs, who were already hard pressed here in the *mêlée*, but tended also at the same time to set the whole mass afloat towards the north, which was again however immediately brought to a standstill when the right half troop of the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons took part in the fight at that point.

The 1st squadron of Cuirassiers on its part, desirous of supporting the left flank of the Chasseurs (2nd squadron and one half troop of 1st squadron), here came in contact with the 1st Dragoons, of which we will speak presently.

Entry into the Fight of the 1st Dragoons.

As soon as the Brigadier perceived that the 2nd Dragoons was separated into two parts, he sent the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons to its support. But that squadron being at some distance to the right rear of the 2nd Dragoons, its arrival in the fighting line occurred a little later than it ought to have done. Although its right half troop was drawn into the group fighting in the west the moment it passed in rear of the group, the remaining 110 fresh troopers could not fail to produce a most decisive effect on the group fighting in the east. There the right flank of the 2nd squadron of the enemy's Cuirassiers was engaged in the *mêlée*; its left flank, on the contrary, had thrown itself into the opening between the two groups, where they met some few isolated troopers only, who were incapable of offering much resistance. As the

Cuirassiers during the last few moments prior to the collision had commenced to gallop as fast as the horses could go, the squadron soon formed itself into a wedgelike shape, the best horses in front of the mass. The horses for the most part were already blown, as the gallop had lasted unusually long, and as soon as the three half troops of the 1st Dragoons fell with closed ranks upon the flank of this mass, one part of the Cuirassiers made for the group in the east, and the rest turned about.

It so happened that at the same instant the men on the eastern side of the group broke off towards the north, those of the group who were more to the west were falling back towards the south. As owing to the proximity of the ravine the Chasseurs and Cuirassiers could find no further opening towards the east, the majority of the men joined those who moved southward.

The result of the combat on this part of the battlefield became all the more favourable to the 1st Cavalry Division as the latter was in a position to send a squadron of the heavy brigade to the support of the 2nd Dragoons at the point where the latter had been repulsed.

As the combat ended favourably for the Dragoons (of whom there were 360 only against 450 Chasseurs and Cuirassiers), this result must be attributed to the fact of the former having kept a compact squadron in hand to launch into the fight at a moment when the result of the combat was still in the balance.

Brigadier C. took yet another measure as soon as he perceived the approach of the Cuirassiers, viz., he sent two other squadrons of the 1st Dragoons to the support of the group in the west, retaining, however, the 4th squadron as a reserve in his hands.

This precaution appeared all the more required as new masses of troops could be seen approaching along the road, and the heavy brigade was still a long distance off. This is one of the situations when it becomes indispensable to keep in the hands of the leader fractions of the second (or third) line, and when, above all, one must avoid engaging the whole of the available forces without the fullest consideration. It must at the same time be remarked that a comparatively rapid rally on some given point can only be reckoned upon when some reserve body has been placed in position to form and indicate the rallying point.

The already developed combat was supported by the Brigadier in a direct manner in so far only that he sent the 1st squadron of his reserve regiment into the fight, which course was apparently imperatively demanded of him. Indirectly, however, he afforded most effectual support, by sending his 2nd and 3rd squadrons against the hostile second line. These two squadrons had the advantage over their adversary, not only from being superior to him in numbers, but also by reason of the direction from which their attack was delivered.

The squadrons being formed in echelon and having the ground clear in their front, it was an easy matter for them to deliver their charge against the flank of the Chasseurs already engaged in the scuffle as well as against the Cuirassiers which followed in immediate rear of the latter.


It was only owing to the Cuirassiers not being at proper line distance from the Chasseurs that the left flank squadron of the Cuirassiers was just able to execute a wheel, and throw itself upon the Dragoons. As regards respective strength of the combatants, it may be observed that at the first collision of the group in the west, 185 Dragoons had thrown themselves against the same number of Chasseurs. These were followed on the part of the 1st Cavalry Division by a ~~half~~ troop of the 1st squadron, three* ~~half~~ troops of the 2nd squadron, and the 3rd squadron of the 1st Dragoons. On the part of the adversary two squadrons of Cuirassiers were thrown into the *mêlée*, thus making a total of 500 Dragoons against the same number of Chasseurs and Cuirassiers; the strength of the opponents was therefore equal.

The victory was gained by the brigade of Dragoons, principally owing to its being able to repulse part of the support brought up by the hostile second line with a superior compact body.

The General Commanding Division observing the appearance of fresh troops along the main road, caused the pursuit along the whole line to be arrested after a few minutes' duration.

By adopting such a course, the favourable result of the fight would of course be considerably modified. The action of the General must nevertheless be approved of, as he was not then in a position to ascertain the exact strength of

One ~~half~~ troop was employed as a baggage guard.



the new force of assailants, and as he had moreover only six squadrons of the Division left with him at that moment.

Should these squadrons prove hereafter to be insufficient to check the attack of the new assailant, the success just obtained might soon transform itself into a reverse, resulting in the complete rout of the entire Division.

It must be granted that the power of judging correctly the exact moment when the rally should be sounded is a grand talent for a General to possess.

If the order is given too soon, the results of the victory may be compromised; if it sounds too late, the whole success may be jeopardised.

In any case the pursuit must be arrested as soon as the leader observes the approach of fresh forces, and more especially so when he is unable to satisfy himself whether the force still at his disposal will suffice to check or repulse the new arrival.

It may also be said that when a force of detached cavalry is engaged in combat and has launched its last reserves into the action, every endeavour should be made to form as soon as possible a fresh reserve by calling in some of the troops that are already engaged in the fight.

The danger which will always threaten when the pursuit is carried out with the whole of the now disordered troops, as well as the evil resulting from a pursuit not pushed sufficiently far, can only be provided against by making it an imperative rule, "never to pursue after a victorious combat with more than a portion of the troops engaged."

It will be argued, and with reason, that however good in theory such a rule may be, it will be a very difficult one to carry out in practice. No doubt it is difficult, but not at all impossible. The cavalry of Frederick the Great knew this principle well; it practised it and conformed to it on nearly all occasions, although instances may be cited, such as the engagement at Prague, where the pursuit was taken up *en masse*, the troops having slipped out of the leader's hands. This phase of the combat will always, however, be most dangerous, and the remedy against disorder most difficult to provide, in a fight of cavalry against cavalry. As soon as the adversary retreats, nothing remains to be done but to give the signal to "rally" and to at once detail certain troops for taking up the pursuit, if special parts of the force have not been previously told off for that purpose. It is evident that

we cannot expect to see the whole of the men rallying immediately the signal is sounded; that, however, is of less consequence so long as some fresh solid nucleus is quickly formed ready at the disposal of the leader, and so long as the pursuit does not come too soon to a standstill.

Had such a step been taken in the case under our notice, it is most probable that the Chasseurs and Cuirassiers would have been annihilated near the steep ravine of Reimersweiler.

The fresh regiment of hostile Cuirassiers which arrived from the side of the main road was, according to our idea, in a good position to effectually disengage the pursued Chasseurs and Cuirassiers. We have at any rate already seen in our narrative of the fight that its sudden appearance, accompanied by the fire from the battery, was sufficient to induce its adversary to give the signal to rally. The mass of victorious riders galloping in pursuit towards Reimersweiler would probably, however, have been stopped sooner, would perhaps even have been forced to turn about, if two or three squadrons of the Cuirassiers had debouched from the main road and taken the pursuing horsemen in flank.

The battery with the remainder of the regiment, protected on its flanks by steep banks and in a position and on ground most favourable to artillery fire, might also have most materially assisted in preventing the heavy brigade from coming to the support of the Dragoons for a considerable time.

The Dragoon brigade having rallied, the General's decision to lose no time in taking measures for the repulse of the new hostile forces is warranted by the whole situation as it then presented itself.

He now orders the heavy brigade to the front, retains the Dragoon brigade in reserve, and directs the latter to follow the former in echelon on the left; these dispositions were requisite owing to the actual position of the troops at the time and also to the circumstance that the retreat of a portion of the enemy's forces had taken place in the direction of Reimersweiler.

That the 2nd battery of Horse Artillery, attached as it was up to the present to the right column of the 1st Cavalry Division, should remain in its position, this side of Sulz, cannot but be approved of, as the regiments having to pass beyond the latter ground, it was enabled to protect their retreat. Had the battery followed the brigades direct and

been suddenly shelled by the enemy's artillery stationed on the plateau south of Sulz, it would have been very much compromised without being of any use whatever to its own cavalry.

It must be added, however, that as soon as the Division had gained the plateau it became a matter of necessity that the battery should take up a position which would not only allow it to cover the retreat of the Division, should a check unfortunately occur, but also enable its guns to give direct support to the regiments which were stationed on the plateau against the hostile reserves. This double duty for a strong mass of cavalry could not well be expected to be performed by one single battery of Horse Artillery, but would have required two batteries; one battery only was however available, and from the position which it occupied north of Sulz it could not well perceive what was taking place on the plateau; the General Commanding Division was therefore obliged to order it to come up. The battery arrived too late, however, to be of any use against the adversary's last supports, which were at a great distance.

Contrary to the principle admitted for infantry combats, that particular support or protection to batteries during an engagement is not required, we have endeavoured to show in these observations that protection of such a nature to batteries of Horse Artillery is under certain circumstances indispensable during cavalry combats.

The battlefield will often be completely scoured by numerous bodies of hostile horsemen, and should it occur that a battery of artillery is without a special escort, it will often vainly look for protection in the immediate vicinity; such situations will frequently occur in cavalry combats.

If we sum up *the result of our considerations of the engagement at Sulz*, for the purpose of establishing *fixed principles*, we shall arrive at the following conclusions:—

The formation in three lines offers a large body of cavalry the best method of making use of its strength, without prejudice however to the sub-division of each line.

Should we not be in a position to judge exactly of the enemy's opposing force, it is well to let the first line be preceded by some detachments, under some circumstances even by whole squadrons.

Every attacking line should have its flanks secured by detachments following in rear of the flanks. Should the

flanks of a line not be covered by other troops, they must be protected by portions of its own troops.

In addition to the ground scouts, &c. in front destined to reconnoitre the enemy and the ground, fighting patrols from every line should always be detached to the flanks.

The squadrons in the first line should invariably remain in column formation as long as possible.

The second and third lines have a twofold mission :—

The direct support of the troops in the first line ; and

The indirect support afforded by attacking the hostile second and third lines.

It is often convenient and advisable to allow the rear lines to follow the first in a direct line in rear until the latter breaks into the charge, especially so when, by adopting this method, the adversary can thereby be prevented from distinguishing our exact strength.

In all cases, however, the second line must deploy to the right or left flank of the first line, as the case may be, as soon as the latter has had indicated to it the object to be attacked.

When *within the zone of the enemy's attack* it is advisable, as soon as sufficient space is cleared in front, to form the succour squadrons directly following the first line, as well as those squadrons composing the second line, in line of squadron columns at deploying intervals ; for the lines following them, however, especially if they have not yet been moved out to the right or left flank, it would be better to remain in line of squadron columns at close interval.

The direct support, *i.e.*, succour of the first line, may consist of comparatively small parties, as their object consists only in the filling up of any gaps in the first line or in repulsing such of the troops as may have broken through the line at the moment of collision.

Should further *direct* support be employed, say, in strength equal, or almost equal, to the force already engaged, it would no doubt have the effect of setting the mass of combatants on the move towards the opponent's side.

But, on the other hand, it must be observed, that, should the second line not reach the fighting line until the latter is repulsed, it will easily be drawn into the retreating mass and compelled to turn about and follow their movement.

It is, therefore, always preferable, provided there is sufficient space, that the second line should not, after the first line has come into collision, remain in its immediate rear, but

should rather be moved out on one of its flanks. Should the accidents of the ground not permit of this, it is advisable to direct the second line to follow the first as closely as possible, say at from 300 to 500 paces, so that it can at any moment be sent into action should it be perceived that the combat threatens to develop towards the flanks or to come to a standstill.

If the second line is on the flank, its rôle at first is to prevent the first line being outflanked. More squadrons should not, however, be sent in support at a gallop to the front than appear absolutely necessary for the succour of the first line.

The object of the remainder of the second line should be to oppose the second line of the adversary when attempting to enter the fighting line; this should be effected by advancing to meet the enemy. It will very often be found useful, and sometimes even indispensable, to manœuvre* to do this.

Should an immediate support on the part of the adversary not be perceived at once, it will be well to let the second line halt for a few moments until it has been ascertained for a fact that an immediate arrival of some fresh hostile troops need not be feared for some short space of time.

In the contrary case, or if on the certain approach of the adversary's fresh troops, our own troops are still able to counterbalance them by the presence of some other force near the spot (say a third line), it is nevertheless not recommended as a rule to at once engage the whole of the squadrons of our second line for the purpose of sustaining the combat. It would be better even here to take such action as will economise one's forces as much as possible. To settle a still undecided fight in which a regiment may be engaged, it will generally suffice to send two squadrons into the *mêlée*: one even will often be enough for the purpose.

It is of course evident that the more troops are thrown into the combat the quicker it will be decided, but the disorder resulting therefrom will communicate itself to the victors as well as to the vanquished; moreover, at the beginning of a combat we cannot divine what may turn up a few minutes later on and how many fresh closed bodies of troops we may then stand in need of. We should, therefore, husband our force as much as possible.

The greatest attention should be paid to the point where the supports are made to take effect. It should be taken into consideration that when operating with a sufficiently strong

* The evolutions to be executed by the first line during the attack will be examined in detail in another cavalry combat.

body of troops, the shock of the support should invariably be made to take effect in the same direction as that in which the whole fighting mass is already floating to, and that it is not always advantageous to force the hostile cavalry upon the rest of our own troops.

As to the *third* line, it forms the reserve proper in the hands of the Divisional Commander; it should, therefore, always be ready to support the preceding lines.

Here also it becomes necessary to observe that we should beware of engaging it too soon, as is too often the case during cavalry combats, and we should be careful to make a halt of some few moments' duration while the first two lines are engaged, a precaution more frequently necessary for the third than for the second line.

It will depend on the turn the fight is taking whether the whole or only part of the reserve should be launched to the attack, with the object of repulsing the enemy's troops that have either broken through our first line or forced some portions of our troops to turn about.

Similarly, this reserve may be employed either to cover the flanks of the preceding lines or to give direct support to one of the flanks; often it may become necessary to turn the mass of combatants and make an attack on their flanks or hurl itself against fresh hostile troops.

The pursuit should always extend as far as possible, but the troops which execute it, and whose ranks are naturally open, should be followed up by a compact reserve ready to support if required.


If it becomes necessary to use this reserve, it will be indispensable that those who are already pursuing should be recalled in order to be formed into a fresh reserve, and this should be done as rapidly as possible.

In case of an isolated body of cavalry coming into collision with the enemy, a special escort for the protection of the batteries of Horse Artillery becomes necessary.

The proper place for the battery, whenever it is possible, is in line with the first line of attack, and on a flank, but sufficiently distant from it not to interfere with the movements of the cavalry. Should the first line move off to the attack, and the battery is no longer in a position to act against the first line of the enemy's forces, it should choose such a flank position as will enable it to act upon the adversary's second line and reserves.

The battery should never take up a covering position in rear of the cavalry, except when it can be of no use in first line or when cavalry is fighting during a retreat.

The elementary principles which we desire to lay down here, and which we have developed during our narrative, have to a great extent been acted upon during the combat at Sulz; a few slight changes only are required to completely comply with them. In order to conform entirely to these principles, the advance of the two brigades present on the occasion (14 squadrons less two half troops) should have been carried out according to the following sketch:—



NOTE.—This sketch is not drawn to scale. The squadrons of the 1st and 2nd Dragoons are supposed to be at full intervals, those of the heavy brigade at close intervals.—EDITOR.

(The three ~~half~~ troops of the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers are intended to act partially or as a whole as an escort—should it be required—to the battery of Horse Artillery which is in rear.)

We will add a few special remarks :—

The 2nd Dragoons form the first line, its 1st squadron acting as a direct support (succour squadron) to the two others; had its 4th squadron also been present, the place for that squadron would have been in the first line or under the present circumstances in front of the latter.

The 1st Dragoons follow as a second line, in echelon on the right, ready for any emergency, as, while ascending to the height, it could not be perceived whether or not the right flank of the first line might be threatened by the advance of hostile troops from the right front. The regiment is also in a position to send one or more squadrons in support of the first line, should it be necessary to extend the front of the latter. One squadron of this regiment is also kept back, as it is possible that some of the squadrons of the regiment may be compelled to break off in different directions, either to directly support the attack of the 2nd Dragoons or to act to the right front.* The 4th squadron follows in rear of the right wing, as there it is more handy either to reinforce or prolong the front of the first line, and is at the same time able to ward off any hostile flank attack.

The brigade of heavy cavalry is formed as a third line in rear of the 1st Dragoons, to eventually support, if required, one or other of the Dragoon regiments, and at the same time is ready to advance to the attack round the flank which the accidents of the ground may have left unprotected.

It must be borne in mind that the particular formation here indicated is based upon the circumstances connected with this Cavalry Division; its left wing leaning against a ravine, it had consequently to look to the protection of its right wing only, and the Division was advancing against an adversary whose strength and position were unknown.

Under other circumstances we should be obliged to adopt

* Should it be considered necessary to dispose of the first line as indicated, it would be an inconsistency not to adopt the same measure in the formation of every portion of the force which moves into the immediate presence of the enemy. This disposition, however, only becomes necessary when that moment arrives.

modifications of the elementary principles which have here been laid down.

We propose to return to this subject in the after part of these studies, when we shall specially examine in detail whether it will be better to place the two leading brigades in line side by side or to form them one behind the other—a most important question, and one which requires to be answered whenever the nature of the ground does not afford a *point d'appui* for either of the wings.

EVENTS BETWEEN 8 AND 10 A.M.

We left General A. at the moment when he rode towards the defile near the Graswald for the purpose of reconnoitring the ground and position. In front of him—east of the main road—the ground rose in a steep slope, and formed on the side opposite Reimersweiler, a mountainous ridge running towards the south, but descending by a gentle slope towards a village (Schwabweiler) in the south-west, distant less than one-and-a-quarter miles, and opening out a view of the forest of Hagenau, which latter extended in an uninterrupted view as far as the eye could reach. A squadron of Dragoons could be perceived moving at a trot towards Reimersweiler, while south-west of that village a small body of horsemen could also be seen. The latter was easily recognised as a squadron of Uhlans, and this must be either the 1st squadron, which had advanced beyond Hohweiler, or the 3rd, which, on hearing artillery fire, had hastened up from the environs of Rittershofen. A large body of cavalry could also be distinguished to the west of Schwabweiler trotting towards the plains; they were probably the hostile squadrons which had retired beyond Reimersweiler.

In the south-west, the main road, after quitting the narrow defile of the Graswald, could be seen running along the eastern edge of a small plateau and then disappearing in Surburg. The plateau on which this village is built gradually ascended towards the south, but appeared to terminate quite abruptly near the forest of Hagenau; so far at least as could be judged from a very steep cliff down which the road descended, and which could be perceived from the point from which the General made his observations. North of that village, one of the enemy's batteries was placed in position, and in close proximity were two squadrons of Cuirassiers.

It was evident from the first glance that the defile of the Graswald could not be traversed under the fire of those guns. If it was not therefore desirable to await the result—in any case most doubtful—of the artillery combat which had just commenced, it seemed a natural conclusion that the attempt must be made to turn the position through and beyond Reimersweiler.

The brigade of Dragoons being the most handy, could be employed for that object, and Brigadier C. received orders accordingly.

To make success doubly sure it was imperatively necessary to secure the command of the main road; to judge from the nature of the ground, the battery of horse artillery and the regiment of Cuirassiers appeared for the moment to suffice for that purpose. The squadron of Uhlans now present might also have been allowed to follow the Dragoons. The General still believed, however, that the enemy would not maintain his troops on the plateau of Surburg, as there the conditions for his retreat appeared very unfavourable.

It was, moreover, evident that, had he not had the intention of evacuating the plateau, the squadrons which had retired beyond Reimersweiler would certainly have been ordered to turn about on reaching the opposite end of that village.

The General Commanding Division was soon confirmed in his views by the verbal report of the officer of Cuirassiers who had been ordered to observe the enemy's right flank. From that officer's observations it was clear that the enemy's squadrons had continued their retreat and were apparently directing it towards the point where the main road enters the forest of Hagenau. He also reported that the 1st squadron of Uhlans had arrived south of Reimersweiler, and still continued to watch the enemy's retreat. It also reconnoitred the border of the forest of Hagenau towards Schwabweiler, Ober- and Nieder-Betschdorf. It was now 8 o'clock. Whilst this officer made his report, several cannon shots could be heard in the direction of Schwabweiler; they were evidently directed towards the squadron of Uhlans, because the shells could be seen bursting in their vicinity, and the squadron was observed to move off at a trot in an easterly direction. The battery at Surburg ceased firing about this time and retired with the Cuirassiers towards the south along the main road.

At this moment, the defile of the Graswald being now open, the 2nd squadron of Cuirassiers set off and followed the enemy along the main road, the rest of the brigade (two squadrons of Cuirassiers and two of Uhlans) taking up the same movement.

General A., however, saw fit to abandon his first plan, and now sent off an orderly to arrest the movement of the brigade of Dragoons.

The brigade was close to Reimersweiler when this order reached it.

The distance from the Graswald and Reimersweiler to the borders of the forest of Hagenau was not more than $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles. It was almost certain that the nature of the ground between the southern slopes of the mountain ridge and the border of the forest would not permit the enemy to offer any resistance in that narrow space. His retrograde movement appeared to indicate that he was anxious to gain the shelter of the forest, and the advantage of being some distance ahead of the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division rendered such a retreat safe. Should he delay his retreat, however, the artillery would be able to harass him.

The general situation was not as yet sufficiently cleared up to justify a pursuit into the forest with the whole force. Neither the squadron of Uhlans marching along the main road from Rittershofen to Forstfeld nor the patrols moving along the road to Wörth had as yet furnished exhaustive information. Were the Division to penetrate imprudently and notwithstanding the absence of complete reports into the forest, the enemy's advance from one or other of the directions indicated above might seriously compromise the retreat of the whole Division. Besides, the guns in action at Schwabweiler indicated that we were in contact with fresh hostile forces. It was therefore very probable that the principal roads traversing the forest were occupied by the enemy's advanced guards or by troops destined to cover the retreat of his cavalry.

Owing to these considerations and observations, the following orders were issued by General A., at 8.2 A.M.

1. "The battery Horse Artillery with the escort squadron will advance beyond the defile of the Graswald as far as Surburg, there take up a position, and open fire upon the retreating hostile troops."

2. "The main body of the heavy brigade will remain in

rear of the defile of the Graswald, but still maintain contact with the retreating enemy, and will also reconnoitre the passages across the stream running along the borders of the forest of Hagenau, on both sides of the main road, and on the west as far as the railway."

3. "The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons (which was then advancing with three ~~half~~ troops along the line of railway) will reconnoitre the borders of the forest of Hagenau, from the railway as far as Biblisheim, and will also scout on its right flank the Niederwald and the ground beyond that wood. It will preserve contact with its ~~half~~ troop advancing along the road to Wörth."

4. "The brigade of Dragoons will not cross the ravine at Reimersweiler, but will cause the borders of the forest of Hagenau south of the villages in front of that place to be reconnoitred by advanced parties. The 1st squadron of Uhlans, which is detached to that side, is now placed under the orders of the Major-General Commanding the brigade of Dragoons. The squadron of Uhlans will establish communication with the 3rd squadron of Uhlans near Rittershofen."

8.6 A.M. The General Commanding Division personally gave orders to the battery and also instructed the Brigadier Commanding the heavy brigade, who was at that moment close to him.

An aide-de-camp was sent to the brigade of Dragoons, and a galloper to the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons.

General A. now intended to move towards Surburg across the defile of the Graswald. At the moment of his departure a non-commissioned officer of the 3rd squadron, escorted by six Uhlans, arrived and delivered the following despatch:—

"2ND REPORT OF 3RD SQUADRON OF 1ST UHLANS.

"*Heights north of Hatten,*

"1st August. 7.30 A.M.

"The ~~half~~ troop of the enemy's hussars has retired beyond Hatten along the main road. The point where the road enters the forest of Hagenau is occupied by infantry. The squadron will remain at Hatten until further orders."

"X., CAPTAIN."

It was noticed with surprise that this report was marked "2nd," as no previous report from that squadron had as yet come to hand. The non-commissioned officer being questioned on the subject stated that to his knowledge the first message had been despatched about 7 A.M., and had contained the report of the arrival of the squadron at Rittershofen, that nothing but hostile cavalry patrols had been encountered in front, and that a patrol had been pushed towards the east, from which direction artillery fire had been heard.

Judging by recent events—since the orderly was despatched with the first message—it was most probable that the messenger had fallen amidst that portion of the enemy's cavalry which had retired beyond Hohweiler.

The non-commissioned officer was entrusted with the following written reply:—

"1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

"Heights west of Reimersweiler,

"1st August. 8.8 A.M.

"The squadron will remain in its present position and will continue to watch the enemy. Should it be necessary it will retreat towards Hofen. The brigade of Dragoons is near Reimersweiler; the 1st squadron of Uhlans is reconnoitring the ground south of that village; keep up communication with both these forces.

"By order,

"P., CAPTAIN, A.D.C."

The non-commissioned officer was also directed to ride over to the brigade of Dragoons, to inform the Brigadier of the events which had occurred, and to communicate the position of his squadron.

Whilst the above despatch was being written, another report arrived, brought in by a non-commissioned officer of the 1st squadron of Uhlans. It stated:—

"Parties of hostile infantry occupy the borders of the forest opposite Ober- and Nieder-Betschdorf. Some weak cavalry patrols are still to be seen this side the forest. A battery which is in position south of the first-mentioned village has fired upon the squadron, several shells falling near it."

The non-commissioned officer was directed to impart to the Brigadier Commanding the Dragoons the information he had
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just brought, and to inform his captain on his return to his squadron that he was to place himself provisionally under the command of the Brigadier Commanding brigade of Dragoons for further orders.

The General Commanding Division went towards Surburg at 8.10 A.M., arriving at that place at 8.17 A.M. The 2nd squadron of Cuirassiers had searched the village, the houses of which are rather scattered, had placed some scouts in the gardens situate on the slope south of the village, for the purpose of watching the ground in front, and had also pushed a few patrols towards the west. The squadron itself was stationed close to the entrance of the village west of the main road.

The battery had taken up a position on a projecting point of the plateau east of the main road, the escort, the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers, being a little in rear.

The battery had arrived too late to seriously harass the enemy's retreat; its guns were just able to send a few shells after the rear of the hostile cavalry, which then disappeared on the main road in the forest of Hagenau.

Two of the enemy's batteries, however, were observed in position west of the main road, in a re-entering bend of the forest, opening fire at a distance of 2,000 paces.

The bridge on the main road across the stream was apparently occupied by numerous hostile sharpshooters, supported by closed groups of infantry posted in rear and hidden in the border of the forest.

The General Commanding Division, who had gone through the gardens as far as the southern outskirts of Surburg, having observed that no possible result could be obtained by a continuation of the fire from the battery of Horse Artillery, now ordered "cease firing," and directed the battery to retire a short distance to the rear.

The hostile batteries in their turn also ceased firing, but still remained unlimbered in their positions.

The General had convinced himself that the borders of the forest of Hagenau in his front were thickly lined with infantry skirmishers extending in groups to about 1,000 paces on each side of the main road. A larger detachment, perhaps two companies, was stationed near the main road at the point where the forest forms an inward bend; there could also be seen a group of horsemen towards which mounted men galloped every instant and again departed.

Throughout the enemy's position much active movement appeared to be going on; at several points small supports could be observed entering the line of skirmishers, and a small column was also perceived directing its way towards the west, along the borders of the forest.

There was no doubt that contact with the enemy's infantry had now been established, and the idea of attacking with dismounted Dragoons could no longer be entertained in presence of the apparent forces of the enemy, the nature of the ground, which was very favourable to him, and his superiority in artillery.

To penetrate into the forest, which extended as far as the eye could reach, was not possible. Apart from this, it was now known that the nearest approaches to it, more to the east, were also occupied by infantry.

While the General continued his observations he received at 8.28 A.M. a report from the 3rd squadron of the Uhlans which announced "that the brigade of Hussars had taken Nieder-Rödern. Opposite Hatten, however, the enemy still held the entrance from the main road into the forest, apparently with one or two companies."

Soon after, at 8.38 A.M., the officer of Cuirassiers who had two hours previously been sent off to the brigade of Hussars also returned. He had left Nieder-Rödern at 7.38, and pushed on in advance of his men after leaving Reimersweiler. Brigadier D. had sent by him the third report of his brigade, which was to the following effect:—"At 7.15 A.M. I took Nieder-Rödern with dismounted Hussars; the place had been defended by a company of Rifles; the enemy is in retreat towards Forstfeld; our losses are not inconsiderable. A squadron of Hussars has established communication with the cavalry of the XI. Corps advancing along the main road, and has taken up a position before Schaffhausen and opposite the entry of the road into the Niederwald. These points are feebly occupied by hostile infantry; the battery has arrived and is attempting to dislodge them. Contact with the retreating enemy will be maintained. I am in communication with the 3rd squadron of Uhlans at Hatten."

The Chief of the Staff called the attention of the General Commanding Division to the fact that during the last five minutes fresh artillery fire could be heard from a great distance in an easterly direction.

Judging by the news that had just been received, it was
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believed that there was an engagement at Schaffhausen. The General, feeling it incumbent on him to calmly weigh and consider the whole situation, now returned to the defile of the Graswald, 8.45 A.M., having previously strongly impressed upon the leader of the 2nd squadron of Cuirassiers to immediately inform him of every movement that might be made by the adversary.

From the Graswald, he first of all sent a telegram to the Headquarters of the Army informing it of the victory at Sulz.

He at the same time reported that the Division having reached the forest of Hagenau opposite Surburg and Hatten, had now come in contact with the enemy's infantry, and that the wood of Selz and also Nieder-Rödern were occupied by infantry, but that the latter place had been stormed and taken by the brigade of Hussars.

About this time several despatches from the brigade of Dragoons and from the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons were received. The contents of these despatches were as follows :—

1. "The strength of the hostile detachment on the border of the forest opposite Schwabweiler and Ober-Betschdorf appeared to be about one battalion and one battery."

2. "The point where the railway enters the forest as well as the entrance into Biblisheim were also occupied by infantry."

3. "Dragoon patrols had reconnoitred the Niederwald north of both places mentioned above, but had not encountered the enemy."

At 9 A.M., however, a patrol of Uhlans sent news of great importance, viz. :—

"3RD REPORT OF 3RD SQUADRON OF 1ST UHLANS.

"On the main road 1,000 paces S.E. of Hatten,

"1st August, '70. 8 A.M.

"The enemy has evacuated the borders of the forest south-east of Hatten, probably in consequence of the occupation of Nieder-Rödern by the brigade of Hussars, and is retiring along the road towards Forstfeld. His strength is about one company of Chasseurs-à-pied and 40 Hussars. The squadron is halted on the borders of the forest, and is in contact with the enemy by means of patrols.

"X., CAPTAIN."

The following despatch in writing was sent by the non-commissioned officer of Uhlans:—

“The border of the forest in front of the Division is strongly occupied on each side of the road Sulz—Hagenau. The squadron will send scouts to the west of the road Hatten—Forstfeld, in order to reconnoitre that region, and to ascertain how far the enemy extends in that direction.”

It could now no longer be doubted that the enemy attached great importance to the command of the main road Sulz—Hagenau.

The right column of the Division had observed three cavalry regiments in its front, which according to the information to hand concerning the enemy's *ordre-de-bataille*, belonged to the Cavalry Division of the 1st Army Corps. The Hussars which had been encountered at Hatten, Nieder-Rödern, and before Sulz were probably part of the same Division. The mounted Chasseurs reported to have advanced during the previous day towards Lauterburg had been observed from a long distance, which had probably not permitted their uniform being properly distinguished, and these troops were no doubt the Hussars which had been reported as having been observed by the 3rd Cavalry Brigade.

It might therefore be supposed that the adversary had originally pushed a light brigade towards the frontier for reconnoitring purposes, viz., the 7th Chasseurs to Sulz, and the 8th Hussars to Selz. Some squadrons had even advanced further, and had in the morning pushed a part of their forces in reconnaissance as far as the frontier.

The infantry which occupied the borders of the forest were undoubtedly destined to assure the retreat of this brigade.

To judge from the reports received, and from personal observations, it was tolerably certain that this infantry occupied the two sides of the road from Weissenburg to Hagenau with strong forces (say three to four battalions and one battery). A smaller detachment covered the right of the enemy's position from Hatten to the Rhine. The appearance of the Chasseurs-à-pied and Hussars near Hatten and Nieder-Rödern and their common retreat towards Forstfeld, led to the supposition that these troops belonged to the same tactical body. Besides these, up to the present, comparatively small detachments of infantry had been reported from Selz also. The total strength of the hostile forces on this wing of

the enemy's position might therefore be estimated, and with some reason, to be a few battalions and four squadrons. The advance that was now being made towards Schaffhausen—from which direction a cannon shot now and again could be heard—would, no doubt, soon yield further information.

If, in viewing the enemy's defensive position, it is further taken into consideration that the mounted Chasseurs had the support of a brigade of cavalry on the road leading to Hagenau, and that this latter brigade had made good its retreat on the same road, we must be convinced that the adversary considered the possession of the road from Weissenburg to Hagenau to be of the highest possible importance.

It was, therefore, almost certain that the enemy did not at present intend to cross the Rhine or he would certainly have considerably reinforced his right wing.

The General Commanding Division, however, would not content himself with this conclusion, nor could he do so.

The Division had *de facto* been arrested in its forward movement by hostile infantry in position near the forest of Hagenau. But, up to the present, advanced detachments only had been met with; as to the enemy's main body, it could only be *supposed* that that mass of troops was at Hagenau and along the road leading thence to Strassburg, but this was not *positively* known. The General now believed it to be his principal duty, and properly so, to assure himself of the correctness or otherwise of this view, and also to observe and watch the movements of the enemy's main body.

This object could only be attained in two ways; after Nieder-Rödern had been occupied and the forest defiles of Hatten and Selz had been evacuated, the reconnaissance on that wing could be extended beyond Forstfeld by taking advantage of the open ground in that direction; or an attempt might be made to turn the enemy's left wing in order to gain a view of the two roads, Hagenau—Worth and Hagenau—Reichshofen (See App. II).

To execute the latter movement successfully, however, sufficient forces were not at hand.

It was known that a not inconsiderable body of the enemy's cavalry was in front of the Division, and that in addition the enemy had also at his disposal a cavalry brigade of about three regiments, whose present whereabouts was not, however, known. It became, therefore, necessary to guard the main road Weissenburg—Hagenau by means of a large

body of troops in order to ensure the retreat of the detachments to be employed in the operation.

The object in view could not, however, be attained by means of despatching a few isolated officers only, as it was already known that hostile cavalry were at Biblisheim, patrols from which were moving about that neighbourhood. To assure the movement it was at the same time necessary to guard the main road to Wörth, the more so as towards that road parties of hostile cavalry had retired from Sulz.

Great uncertainty was also felt about the Dragoons who had been advanced in that direction, and of whom nothing had been heard; it was feared that their despatches had met with the same fate as that of the 3rd squadron of Uhlans, which had never come to hand. A galloper was therefore sent to the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons to find out all about it.

It was clear, in any case, that in order to observe successfully the two roads leading from Hagenau to the north-west, it would be necessary to place a stronger detachment upon the ground lying between the roads Wörth—Sulz and Wörth—Hagenau, in order to serve as a supporting and rallying point to the troops employed in the reconnaissance.

The stronger this detachment was, the easier it would be for it to repulse the enemy's patrols, as some squadrons might be pushed to the front for the purpose, and under their protection a few enterprising, well-mounted officers could be sent further ahead to reconnoitre the position.

On the other hand, again, the strength of this detachment had to be limited owing to the necessity of guarding under all circumstances the line of retreat of the Division. The ground which extended from the Graswald to Reimersweiler permitted the two brigades present to oppose under very favourable conditions the advance of a superior body of cavalry, but then these two brigades could not conveniently be weakened by detailing detachments from them. One regiment was requisite to close the defile of the Graswald, a second to bar that of Reimersweiler; if we reckon a third regiment as a general reserve and two squadrons to guard the railway and the road Forstfeld—Sulz, at the most two squadrons only remained to execute the projected turning movement on the enemy's left flank.

It also remained to be seen whether, as soon as Selz was taken, a view of the enemy's position could not be obtained

from the extreme left flank. But considering the presence of the enemy's forces before Surburg, it would have been very imprudent to venture the whole Hussar brigade into the narrow zone comprised between the forests and the Rhine. Nothing therefore remained to be done but to occupy with the brigade the line Selz—Nieder-Rödern, and to be content with sending from there some few squadrons towards the south to clear up the situation on that side.

In consequence of the receipt of a report from the 3rd squadron of Uhlans at 9.30 A.M., it became certain that more detailed directions for the action of the detachments on this flank could not for the present be given. This report, which was marked No. 4, and had been sent off at 8.30 A.M., from the point where the main road enters the forest south-east of Hatten, stated:—

“The hostile Chasseurs-à-pied slowly continue their retreat on the road towards Forstfeld, fronting however from time to time.

“But on the road Forstfeld—Nieder-Rödern the enemy has again advanced, and the brigade of Hussars is at this moment engaged in a brisk musketry fire at the latter village, which it holds up to the present. “X., CAPTAIN.”

The non-commissioned officer was sent back to his squadron at a gallop and ordered to inform his captain:—

“To observe without interruption the combat in which the Hussars were engaged, and to inform the General Commanding Division of the turn which the combat is taking.”

General A., sent for the brigadier commanding 1st Brigade, as well as for the officer commanding the regiment of Uhlans, to the latter of whom he gave the following instructions:—

“We cannot get on any further in front, but we must try and see whether we cannot obtain a view of the enemy's position by turning his left flank west of the forest of Hagenau. You will therefore march with your two remaining squadrons into the neighbourhood of Gunstett and Oberdorf through the Niederwald which you see in the west. You will find there patrols of the Dragoons; a ~~half~~ troop of Dragoons has also advanced on the road towards Wörth, but it has not sent in any report as yet. Your special mission will be the reconnoitring of the main road from Hagenau to Wörth. You will push your patrols in the direction of Wörth and as

far as possible into the forest; should circumstances permit of it, they will also observe the road from Hagenau to Reichshofen. Should the enemy make a forward march beyond Surburg, the Division will attempt to stop him. Should we be obliged to retire, your retreat might easily be compromised in case you delay it too long. Remain therefore continually in communication with the squadron of Dragoons posted at the line of railway and keep yourself well-informed of all that is going on there.

"According to reports received from Biblisheim, that place is occupied by infantry; several cavalry patrols have also been seen there."

The officer commanding the Uhlans immediately rejoined his two squadrons (2nd and 4th) and trotted off with them towards the west. It was now 9.54 A.M.

The artillery which had been heard in the east had for some time ceased its fire.

The General Commanding Division now took the necessary measures to concentrate his forces as much as possible. He ordered the brigade of Dragoons to send the 1st squadron of Uhlans back to the heavy brigade near the Graswald, and to cause one of its own squadrons to take up the duty of reconnoitring about Schwabweiler and Ober-Betschdorf. He then ordered both brigades, which hitherto had remained dismounted at their respective halting places, to make use of the provisions to be found at Surburg and Reimersweiler, and to feed.

The General Commanding Division remained near the main road north of the Graswald.

He did not think the time had yet arrived for orders to be given appointing the bivouacs and outposts; the enemy was in reality far too close and the day too young yet to suppose that the troops would not again be alarmed during the next few hours.

At 10 A.M. the orders last referred to for the two brigades were being executed.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS BETWEEN 8 AND 10 A.M.

The period we have just attempted to describe embraces the cessation of the pursuit on the part of the Cavalry Division and its halt in the immediate presence of the enemy's infantry.

As long as the enemy held the command of the defile of the Graswald by means of his Artillery, within very effective range, it was quite clear that nothing remained to be done but to attempt to turn the adversary's position by a movement round the village of Reimersweiler, just evacuated, and so induce him to hasten his retreat. As, however, the enemy voluntarily retired, General A., in place of following him up, contented himself with sending the battery and its escorting squadron as far as Surburg with orders to harass his retreat as much as possible.

Generally speaking, it is difficult to approve of such action. When the enemy is *advancing* it would certainly not always be prudent to keep *large bodies* of your cavalry too close to his columns; scouts are in front of these bodies, and it is their duty to see that close contact with the enemy is maintained; but an enemy in retreat should always be followed up with the main body itself as closely as possible, if it is desired to profit by the numerous opportunities which an adversary's retreat will always offer. Then is the time to cut off patrols or detachments which loiter too long, to profit by momentary halts caused either by deployed troops having to form column of route in order to pass defiles, or by their meeting with destroyed bridges, or missing the road, or by the hundreds of other accidents to which an adversary will always be exposed when retreating before a victorious force.

In the case we have just described, the General Commanding Division was not in a position to distinguish from his point of observation all that happened with the enemy's troops between Surburg and the forest of Hagenau; but his map and what he saw before him, the defile of the forest beyond which the enemy's troops debouched from the high ground of Surburg and Reimersweiler into the plain, all this was sufficient to determine him to carry out a close and strong pursuit of the retreating enemy. Even if no greater result had been gained by such a pursuit with the whole force than was obtained by the battery of Horse Artillery opening fire upon the retreating foe, yet that would not have justified the General's not adopting the former plan, as the failure of the pursuit could not be foreseen.

From the moment that the border of the forest of Hagenau opposite the main body of the Cavalry Division was discovered to be lined with hostile infantry, from that moment the first task which falls to every body of cavalry

charged with reconnoitring the ground in advance of an army was accomplished: viz., *to drive the enemy's scouting or covering cavalry back upon the advanced guard of its army, and to establish an immediate contact with the enemy's infantry.*

As we have seen from the development of General A.'s ideas, very important indications of the intentions and situation of the enemy had been brought to notice. It was evident that the enemy placed greater value on the main road from Weissenburg to Hagenau than on the region near the Rhine, and it was consequently difficult to believe that he had any present intention to cross that river.

The General Commanding Division, however, did not think that he ought to be satisfied with the result gained, and with good reason; it was now his duty not only to observe unceasingly the movements of the enemy's detachments in front of the Division, but also to endeavour to obtain some accurate information as to his main body.

A simple frontal march, such as had been carried out up to the present, could not lead to any further result. In face of the enemy's not inconsiderable strength in infantry, and the good position he had taken up, there was no hope of the least success from a *frontal attack* by dismounted cavalry.

It was only by undertaking further operations that the desired object as regards the enemy's main body could be gained.

The nature of the operation to be executed by the cavalry would evidently depend on the accidents of the ground and the general state of affairs.

Had not the cavalry found its movements limited in the east by the Rhine, and in the west by the presence of the enemy's forces on the road to Bitsch, which latter prevented any detachments being pushed between the enemy's separated masses, nothing would have stood in the way of an attempt on the part of the Cavalry Division to operate against the flank of the enemy's force now in front of it. By the latter means it was possible that the Division would also come in contact with other hostile troops, and thereby be enabled to complete the reconnaissance which it had hitherto failed to make as regards the position of the enemy's main body.

Under the peculiar circumstances in which the cavalry was now placed, the General Commanding Division had no other course open to him but to hold the command of the main road Hagenau-Weissenburg with strong forces, and to

detach only a small body of his troops for the purpose of reconnoitring the enemy's left flank. As this detachment, however, was ordered to take the greatest care in providing for its own safe retreat, as otherwise it might be compromised, especially in case the Division should be driven back by a superior hostile force, only a very limited turning and reconnaissance of the enemy's left wing could be expected from it. Still some such operation offered the only available means of gaining any further knowledge of the enemy on this side. On the other hand, should the Hussar brigade succeed in penetrating into the eastern part of the forest, it was possible that from that point also some fresh news might be gained of the enemy's dispositions.

As regards the personal movement of the General Commanding the Division during the period under consideration, it should be remarked that he went to the front in order to reconnoitre personally, that he ordered the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery to cease firing, and that afterwards he quitted the first line to return to the main body of the heavy brigade.

To "ascertain for oneself," to "see things personally," is one of the principal duties imposed upon all General Officers. But that does not, however, imply that a General Officer should continually be galloping to the front; should he do so, the probability is that his troops would soon be without any guidance. It is during the momentary pauses that happen during a combat and during operations that personal observations may be made by the leader with the greatest advantage; these moments should be made use of to their fullest extent, as nothing—not even the most clear report—can replace personal observations of the neighbouring ground or the enemy's position.

During the engagement with the two hostile batteries, our battery had the advantage of a more protected position, and a more complete view of the enemy. Under other circumstances, therefore, it would have been advisable to continue its attempt to silence the enemy's artillery and shell his infantry; although, as a general rule, such artillery duels should be avoided if no other results useful to the whole body can be foreseen or obtained. Considering, however, the circumstances in which the Cavalry Division was placed, we cannot but approve of the action of the General Commanding Division in ordering the battery to cease fire, and to move to the rear. The issue of artillery combat is very doubtful. In the most favour-

able case, the most advanced troops of the enemy will be driven back without compelling them to evacuate the borders of the forest, and he will sustain some losses; in an unfavourable case, the only battery at disposal may be put *hors-de-combat*, and the adversary, profiting thereby, will soon perhaps take the offensive, a movement for which the Division is not prepared. But in any case much ammunition will be consumed, which perhaps it may not be easy to replace. Besides, any instant the position may change, and demand the greatest efforts on the part of the battery, especially if attacked by infantry. The artillery of an isolated Cavalry Division, particularly if, as in the case under notice, it consists of one battery only, should always be as economical as possible with its ammunition, although economy in the use of ammunition is always to be enjoined.

The General Commanding Division, after having personally examined the situation, left the front line in order to calmly examine and deliberate upon the dispositions which might now become necessary. In reality it is not quite such an easy task to tear oneself away from a point of observation when in immediate presence of the enemy, and when every movement—even the most insignificant one—is being most closely watched. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, this precaution really cannot be sufficiently recommended, especially to the leader of a Cavalry Division. He must not only embrace in his observations and deliberations that which passes immediately before him, but events which may take place at several miles distance from him have quite as much interest for him, and it is important that he should not lose sight of them. New reports continually arrive, and in much greater numbers than we have given here in our studies, as we mentioned the principal ones only. These reports, which are of all classes, from those of importance to the most insignificant, written and verbal, cross and follow each other in quick succession, and come from points situated at great distances from each other. The result is that the events are brought to the notice of the leader in another order than that in which they take place, and it requires a most searching and careful study to arrive by their help at a fairly correct idea of the whole situation. For instance, a despatch is received at 10 A.M. from a very distant point, stating that the enemy has advanced and was at 8 A.M. at such a place; this does not, however, enable the leader to

guess where the enemy may be at 10 A.M., when the despatch is received. He must then carefully examine and judge at what point the enemy may now have arrived, supposing him to have continued his march. Again, as already remarked, these reports concern not only that part of the ground which can be seen and examined, detail map in hand, but they are often of the greatest importance to the whole of the operations. Consequently, the larger general district maps have often to be consulted in order to connect the events taking place within the small radius with those of the larger operations. Lastly, we must add, that it is necessary to search on the map for every small place from which a report comes to hand, and that often such a place is traced with great difficulty only, or possibly not found at all.

It is recommended that all reports, as they arrive, should be handed to one and the same officer, who should be charged with the task of being prepared to lay before his General at any moment a view of the then existing situation of affairs, the time and place at which events occurred being carefully distinguished. This duty should preferably be performed by the Chief of the Staff, who, for that reason, should but rarely absent himself from the main body of the Division. All reports should pass through his hands, as, owing to the relation in which he stands to the General, he only is in a position to form them into correct and convenient groups, and to draw therefrom the warrantable conclusions.

The incessant arrival of a considerable number of reports and despatches is most confusing, and constant and careful attention must be paid to the course of operations considered as a whole. It is for these reasons imperative that General Officers should seize every moment that offers for calm reflection.

EVENTS FROM 10 A.M. TO 2.10 P.M.

Retreat of the Cavalry Division to Sulz.

The repose momentarily enjoyed by the Division towards 10 A.M. was not however of long duration.

About 10.20 A.M. the following report was received from the 2nd squadron of Cuirassiers:—

' 1ST REPORT OF 2ND SQUADRON OF 1ST CUIRASSIERS.

"Surburg, 1st August. 10.15 A.M.

"About two companies of infantry are debouching out of the forest between the main road and the railway, marching towards the western side of Surburg.

"P., CAPTAIN."

Five minutes later—at 10.25 A.M., a second report from the same squadron was received:—

"2ND REPORT OF 2ND SQUADRON OF 1ST CUIRASSIERS.

"Surburg, 1st August. 10.20 A.M.

"Some hostile columns are debouching on the main road from Hagenau, and have commenced a forward march towards Surburg, being preceded by numerous skirmishers. Up to the present about one battalion only can be seen, but other troops follow in rear.

"P., CAPTAIN."

The General Commanding Division, who was at that moment with the brigade of Dragoons, and was just in the act of starting in order to make a reconnaissance towards Reimersweiler, galloped towards the height (219) south of the Graswald. There at 10.33 A.M. he met the squadron of Cuirassiers which was retiring from Surburg at a walk, being covered in its rear by skirmishers; from the west of the village a pretty heavy musketry fire had already been opened upon the retreating squadron. The battery under escort of the 1st squadron of Uhlans had also been recalled by the Brigadier of the heavy brigade, and had arrived at the defile of the Graswald at the same time as the General Commanding Division.

The battery unlimbered, the Uhlans occupying the Graswald with their 32 men who were armed with carbines.

The regiment of Cuirassiers, which was still a little in rear, was ordered to come up closer to the defile.

Whilst these movements were still being executed, the brigade of Dragoons reported that the hostile infantry was in the act of occupying Schwabweiler and Ober-Betschdorf, and

that one battery and about a squadron of cavalry were also observed there.

The brigade was ordered to watch the enemy closely and to prevent his emerging from the ravine of Reimersweiler, and also to keep the squadron of Uhlans at Hatten *au courant* with everything that was going on. This squadron, if necessary, to retire towards Hofen.

During the interval—at 10.32 A.M.—a report was received from the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons dated Railway bridge on road Surburg—Gunstett, 10.24 A.M., stating:—

“For the last quarter of an hour hostile columns have been emerging from the forest of Hagenau east of the railway, and others are debouching upon the main road marching towards Surburg. The former columns consist of about one battery and one ~~half~~ troop of cavalry; the others of from three to four battalions and one battery. Their advanced parties are already at Surburg. The squadron is watching them. The hostile force at Biblisheim is still quiet. Communication has been established with the regiment of Uhlans stationed further west

“The ~~half~~ troop detached on the road to Wörth has arrived in line with Preuschdorf. It reports having met no sign of the enemy in its front, except a detachment of mounted Chasseurs in the act of retiring towards Wörth.”

It now became evident that the enemy was taking the offensive with large forces, but no opinion could be formed as yet as to whether his object was simply to retake the villages of Surburg and Reimersweiler or whether he intended to push further on.

The General Commanding Division resolved therefore not to retire unless the movements of the enemy's forces should compel him to do so.

The enemy had meanwhile strongly occupied Surburg. The battery of the Division, on both sides of the main road, near height 219, opened fire, although it was much molested by heavy and increasing infantry fire, which did not slacken until some shells had set several buildings near the church on fire.

From another source—the brigade of Dragoons—a report was received that a large body of Cuirassiers had emerged from the forest of Hagenau into the plain between Schwabweiler and Ober-Betschdorf. A further report was soon after

received stating that strong columns of the enemy's infantry (about one or two battalions) were on the march from Schwabweiler towards Reimersweiler, and that the cavalry, which was of an estimated strength of about three regiments, had also commenced moving off east of the infantry.

It was now 10.45 A.M. General A. could already plainly distinguish on the plateau south of Reimersweiler the lines of skirmishers followed by small columns. One of the enemy's batteries attempted at the same time to unlimber north-east of Surburg, close to that village, but it was prevented from doing so by the fire from the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery, which, being already in position, had found the range; two of the enemy's guns came into action, but were soon obliged to retire beyond the houses of the village. On the left two other hostile batteries had meanwhile established themselves north of Schwabweiler, and had opened fire at 2,500 paces upon the battery of Horse Artillery. Fortunately the ground on which these two hostile batteries had come into action was twenty-five feet lower than that on which the Cavalry Division had taken up a position; hence the latter was easily enabled to mask the whereabouts of its regiments as well as that of the guns of the battery of Horse Artillery, while still permitting the latter to continue the fire against Surburg.

At 11 A.M. the situation was as follows: on the right the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery was in position and in full action against Surburg, between height 219 and the Graswald.

The latter was occupied by dismounted men of the 1st squadron of Uhlans, the remainder of that squadron being posted in rear. East of the main road, 500 paces further in rear of the above squadron, the regiment of Cuirassiers had deployed its four squadrons in line, so as to suffer as little loss as possible from the hostile shells falling near. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons had retired along the railway in line with the Graswald, and had taken up a sheltered position on a low knoll about 900 paces west of the line of railway.

The adversary not having succeeded in pushing his artillery to the front, arrested his movements on the right flank of the Division, and contented himself with the occupation of Surburg.

Opposite to the left flank of the Division the adversary
(T.L.)

had occupied Reimersweiler, from which place his skirmishers kept up a small-arm contest with the dismounted men of the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons posted along the edge of the plateau north of Reimersweiler. The rest of the brigade of Dragoons had formed in two lines at 500 paces distance in rear; the 3rd squadron of the 2nd Dragoons had occupied Hohweiler, and had sent from thence patrols into the ground lying towards the south and south-east.

The two batteries of the enemy had not yet left their position south of Reimersweiler, and still continued to shell from time to time such points as they supposed to be occupied by troops of the Division.

The enemy's cavalry had made a halt south-east of Reimersweiler, some squadrons only being pushed a little further north.

The General Commanding Division received during these events two important despatches.

The first came from the brigade of Hussars, and stated as follows :—

At 8.30 A.M. the enemy, considerably reinforced, had advanced to retake Nieder-Rödern, but after a very violent combat the three squadrons of the 1st Hussars had succeeded in maintaining the place with the help of the battery. At 9.15 A.M. the enemy had effected his retreat towards Forstfeld. He had evacuated Selz since 8 A.M., and the town had been occupied by cavalry from the XI Corps. The brigade was in contact with the enemy at both points.

The second, which was dated 10.45 A.M., and came from the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons, stated that besides the hostile columns already reported, no other troops had debouched from the forest of Hagenau.

The General Commanding Division had no time to reflect; he was compelled to take prompt action. He might either attempt to further oppose the enemy in his forward march or retire. He decided for the former course, but believed it necessary to that end to concentrate his forces still further. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons was already in communication with the right wing of the Division. The 3rd squadron of Uhlans had probably arrived at Hofen, and could easily be recalled; it only remained to consider about the two squadrons of Uhlans on detached duty under their commanding officer and the brigade of Hussars. Orders were sent to the former to fall back through Merckweiler

towards Feldbach. As to the brigade of Hussars, it would certainly have been very agreeable to General A. to have had it at his disposal at that moment. On the other hand, even supposing immediate orders were sent to the brigade, it would be difficult for it to arrive before two or three hours had passed; it would then probably be too late, and after all, such a measure would compel the brigade to entirely renounce their present object of reconnoitring the field of operations in the east. The brigade had there already done important work, but still only the first step had been taken to obtain a complete knowledge of the *ensemble* of the situation.

The General therefore preferred for the present to leave the brigade on the left flank.

Owing to the probability of a fresh advance of the enemy, the Army Hospital Corps detachment at Sulz was directed to send all the wounded who could be moved to Weissenburg, and orders were also given to the transport to hold itself in readiness to march off, and not to pass beyond Riedselz without fresh orders.

These orders were far from being superfluous, as it was scarcely 11 o'clock when the enemy commenced a serious attack on the left. Lines of skirmishers emerged from the outskirts of Reimersweiler and surrounded the edge of the plateau which faces the village, and which was held by about 80 dismounted men of the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons. The position these Dragoons had taken up was a very favourable one. The slope on that side being throughout very steep, was extremely difficult to ascend, notwithstanding which the hostile infantry made visible progress, being incessantly reinforced and extending more and more until at last from 300 to 400 men were placed in the skirmishing line. This induced General A. to send orders to the 1st Dragoons to bring up the remainder of their men in support of the dismounted combat. The officer commanding the regiment, in order to quickly decide the engagement, at once dismounted his three squadrons and reinforced and prolonged with the whole of his men the skirmishing line of the Dragoons. The fire of these Dragoons, who now amounted to about 350 men, rapidly drove the enemy back into the village. The Commander of the battery Horse Artillery had meanwhile placed two guns in action near the ravine north of Reimersweiler, in its prolongation towards the Graswald, the shells from which took that ground, as well

as the whole of the slope which the enemy attempted to ascend, most effectually in flank.

This combat on the left wing lasted but a short time, as at 11.30 A.M. the enemy had here already retired with considerable loss.

The situation on the right wing, however, although it had had a favourable commencement, had by this time become threatening.

The Graswald had up to the present been attacked by a small infantry detachment—one company only—which had advanced along the western slopes of the plateau of Surburg. The nature of the ground did not permit the Horse Artillery battery to open an effective fire upon them, and the 32 Uhlans occupying the Graswald, and already opening fire upon the infantry, were scarcely in a position to offer sufficient resistance; fortunately soon after they had opened fire they were supported by the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons. This squadron, which had occupied a sheltered position west of the railway, perceiving the enemy's infantry at the north foot of projection 211 under the fire of the Uhlans, at once sent two half troops at a gallop as far as the railway embankment, outflanking the enemy to such a degree that about 40 men, having quickly dismounted, attacked his support in rear; surprised by this sudden cross fire, the infantry lost heart, and quickly and in great disorder ran up the gentle slope.

But at the moment the men were within reach of plateau 211, they were charged by the other two half troops of the squadron, which, having crossed the railway, came up at a gallop and cut into the retreating infantry; the latter now fled helter-skelter towards Surburg, the more so as on gaining the plateau they were reached by the shells from the Horse Artillery battery.

Some of the Dragoons took up the pursuit as far as the village, but they mostly succumbed to the fire of the hostile infantry from the borders of the forest. The rest of the squadron rallied in its former position west of the railway, having taken 76 unwounded prisoners.

The Dragoons had suffered comparatively but small loss (17 men and 23 horses, as was ascertained later on); but the number of dead and wounded of the enemy left on the field was very considerable.

Whilst the cavalry here gained a partial success, the

enemy had advanced one battalion of his reserve under cover to the front, along the deep ravine which borders the eastern slope of the plateau of Surburg, the skirmishers of which gained the height 219.

Fortunately this movement had been observed in sufficient time to allow the battery to retire undisturbed. The General now believed that the time had arrived to retire his whole right wing, and he therefore ordered the heavy brigade to retire "without going so far back as to be unable to prevent the enemy from debouching through the defile of the Graswald."

Accordingly, Major-General B. retired the battery 1,900 paces from height 219, where it unlimbered on the road at point 215. The regiment of Cuirassiers, after having rallied the 1st squadron of Uhlans, retired with it at a walk, in line of squadron columns, fronted, and took up a position to the left rear of the battery. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons received orders direct from General A. to occupy the wood of Ramsbach with dismounted men.

It was then 12.15 p.m. Several moments before, information had been received that the 3rd squadron of Uhlans had arrived at Hofen, where it occupied the bridge across the Selz stream.*

Soon after, the ~~half~~ troop of Dragoons sent in the direction of Wörth had sent word that it had reached Preuschoorf, and that it had established communication with a squadron of Uhlans of the V. Corps, which had marched from Weissenburg and had advanced as far as Mitschdorf. The enemy's Chasseurs had retired towards Wörth.

But at the same moment also (12.15 a.m.) the following very important despatch was received from Colonel F. :—

"1ST REGIMENT OF UHLANS.

"*Height north of Gunstett,*

"1st August, 1870. 11.28 A.M.

"The two squadrons arrived here at 10.45 A.M. The patrols pushed towards Morsbronn just report the march of three or four regiments of the enemy's Lancers on the road from Hagenau to Wörth.

* This squadron had learnt at 11 A.M., that the enemy had debouched from the forest of Hagenau; it had then recalled its patrols and had retired on Ober-Rödern, carefully observing the ground between Rittershofen and Kühlendorf.

"The head of the column was at 11 A.M. at Hegenei. I have taken up a position under cover, and I am keeping up observation.

"F., COLONEL."

The Colonel must have meanwhile received the orders (which had been sent to him at 11 A.M.) to retire through Merckweiler towards Feldbach. It was certainly of the greatest importance to observe the fresh advance of the enemy; but, on the other hand, the two squadrons of Uhlans could not be left at Gunstett, since the enemy had taken the offensive and advanced towards Sulz.

Orders were therefore sent to him, "To halt at Merckweiler, there to attach to his force the half troop of the 2nd Dragoons, and to watch, by means of several detachments, the march of the enemy's column as well as the road from Wörth to Sulz."

At the same time he was directed to keep himself unceasingly informed of the doings about Sulz and to retire, if necessary, in the direction of Memelshofen.

After these general dispositions, the General Commanding Division turned the whole of his attention to the events which were going on before his eyes.

In presence of the large bodies of infantry who threatened him, he did not believe himself strong enough, if seriously attacked, to maintain for any length of time his position on the plateau south of Sulz; on the other hand, it appeared to him imprudent to retire without very pressing necessity. Meanwhile the urgency of the situation increased every moment. The hostile skirmishers already occupied the Graswald as well as the edges of the ravines east of the road, so that the battery and the five squadrons of the heavy brigade could no longer retain their positions without exposing themselves to great losses.

In addition there were in front not only the battery that had come into action west of height 219, but also the two batteries which had for a long time been inactive south of Reimersweiler and had now taken up a position under the protection of their cavalry brigade on the heights (204) east of the village, from which they were enabled to overlook the whole plateau south of Sulz.

General A., at 12.30 P.M., gave orders to continue the retreat, commencing with the brigade of Dragoons, which

was directed to retire as far as Hermersweiler; the brigade of heavy cavalry to remain until further orders in its position on the northern edge of the plateau, and from there to cover the movement and to ward off any sudden attack by the enemy.

To escape the fire of the artillery, which completely swept the plateau, the horses of the 1st Dragoons and the two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons had been retired in rear of height 208. The dismounted men retired in extended order and remounted behind that height, when the regiment marched at a walk as far as Hermersweiler, followed by the 2nd Dragoons, the 3rd squadron of which still occupied Hohweiler.

On the right, the 1st squadron of Uhlans had retired towards Sulz, where it occupied the entrance to the village.

The regiment of Cuirassiers and the battery Horse Artillery had been placed under cover at the northern edge of the plateau east of the road from Reimersweiler to Sulz. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons still occupied the wood of Ramsbach.

From this point the firing was continued by a few hostile skirmishers placed under cover on the projecting height north of the Graswald.

A line of skirmishers also surrounded the plateau north of Reimersweiler, pushing right up to the edge but keeping clear of the plateau itself. More to the east, some squadrons of Chasseurs could be perceived on the road between Hohweiler and Kühlendorf; these were the troops whose movements had already been reported by the 3rd squadron of Uhlans. The regiments of hostile Cuirassiers with their two batteries could also be distinguished on the height east of Reimersweiler.

At a few minutes after one o'clock the Division of cavalry had completed its general retreat as detailed above.

Whilst it was being executed, at 12.40 p.m., there arrived a report from Colonel F. which stated:—"That he had received at 11.30 a.m. the order to retire from Gunstett, that he had at once called in his patrols and was now executing his retreat, having arrived at Merckweiler at 12.15 p.m. He had left one ~~half~~ troop midway between that village and Gunstett. According to the last reports received from his patrols, the enemy continued his march towards Wörth

with three regiments of cavalry, two of which were Lancers, and one or two batteries. The ~~main~~ troop of the 2nd Dragoons was at Diefenbach."

To judge by appearances, the cavalry reported by the Uhlans had, for the present, no intention to take part in the engagement at Sulz, and were anxious, above all, to reach Wörth.

It was difficult, for the moment, to divine exactly the general intentions of the adversary. His troops in front of the main body of the Division appeared satisfied with the possession of the villages situated at the edge of the heights descending towards the forest of Hagenau, and desirous of avoiding any serious engagement. The cavalry which was distributed about there was evidently cowed through the check they had received at the unfortunate engagement in the early morning.

According to the reports sent in by the Uhlans as to the composition of the column of cavalry reported as having been observed, it was probable that that was no other than the brigade which belonged to the enemy's Cavalry Division of the 1st Army Corps, which had not yet been met with, and it could now with certainty be expected that the whole of the seven regiments of that Division would soon be encountered.

The proximity to the enemy would not admit of the regiment of Cuirassiers being left long in attack formation in such an isolated position; the General Commanding ordered it therefore (at 1.8 p.m.) to retire with its battery in rear of Sulz, leaving one squadron only for the purpose of observing the enemy's movements.

This movement was completed by 1.20 p.m. The battery took up a position on the projecting spur on which it had been posted during the morning. Three squadrons of Cuirassiers were placed in rear, in line of squadron columns at close interval; the fourth remained on the northern edge of the plateau which had just been evacuated.

The 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons was sent back to rejoin its brigade.

During these events the following reports were received. (1.10 p.m.) :—

"1ST REGIMENT OF UHLANS.

"*Merckweiler,*

1st August, 1870. 12.40 P.M.

"Enclosed is a report which has been received from the ~~half~~ troop of the 4th squadron which is still in the direction of Gunstett. The ~~half~~ troop of Dragoons which is towards Würth reports the march of a regiment of Lancers just debouching from that town, and marching towards Diefenbach."

"F., COLONEL."

The report of the ~~half~~ troop of Uhlans stated as follows :—

"1ST REGIMENT OF UHLANS, 4TH SQUADRON.

"1st Report of 4th Half Troop.

"Height, $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile N.E. of Gunstett.

"12.22 P.M.

"The patrol which is left at Gunstett announces that a strong column of infantry accompanied by a battery has been debouching since midday from Morsbronn and following the road to Würth. I have myself gone personally to the front, and I estimate the strength of the column that can be seen at present to be about four battalions; a squadron of Lancers having made its appearance near me marching through Spachbach prevented me from observing the entire column. I shall fall back towards the regiment as the proximity of the enemy may necessitate.

"Z., LIEUTENANT."

At 1.12 P.M. the 3rd squadron of Uhlans reported from Hofen that a squadron of Chasseurs had arrived at Leitersweiler, where it halted. The main body of the enemy's cavalry had dismounted at Kuhlendorf.

Lastly, at 1.17 P.M., another report from the brigade of Hussars stated :—

"*Nieder-Rödern,*

1st August, 1870. 12.15 P.M.

"The enemy, after having evacuated Selz, Nieder-Rödern, and Hatten, has continued to concentrate his retreat towards Forstfeld. He has altogether one battalion of Chasseurs-à-pied (13th) and four squadrons of the 8th Hussars. It appears as if he had the intention of guarding, provisionally, the bridges over the stream at Forstfeld. No other troops

are to be seen. The cavalry of the XI. Corps is at Selz. The brigade will remain in and near Nieder-Rödern until further orders, and will keep up the contact with the enemy.

“D., BRIGADIER.”

The brigadier commanding the heavy brigade, who had gone to the front to the 4th squadron of Cuirassiers, now also came up to the General Commanding Division near the battery of Horse Artillery and reported that according to the observations he had made, the enemy's infantry had already established its outposts along the edge of the plateau north of Reimersweiler, and that their line extended from that village to the Graswald. The troops, he added, must have their kitchens in rear and be in the act of cooking, as by the aid of field glasses long lines of low columns of smoke could plainly be perceived upon the plateau of Surburg and south of Reimersweiler.

Several reports had also been received from the Staff Officer of the regiment of Uhlans, who had been despatched to Sulz after the combat in the morning, in order to take the necessary steps there for the treatment of the wounded and the guarding of the prisoners. The *résumé* of these reports, as drawn up by the Chief of the Staff, gave the following results :—

1st. “The Cuirassiers who had taken part in the combat belonged to the 9th Regiment, which, with the 8th regiment of Cuirassiers, forms the 3rd Brigade of the Cavalry Division of the 1st Army Corps. This brigade was in cantonments for several days south of the forest of Hagenau; in consequence of an alarm, on the morning of the 1st August, it had marched by regiments towards Sulz.

2nd. “The prisoners taken at the Graswald by the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons belong to the 3rd company, 96th regiment of the line. This company had also left Hagenau, on the morning of the 1st August, with the whole regiment. The 1st Division, commanded by General F., has been in cantonments several days at Hagenau and its environs.

3rd. “Among the prisoners were also three men of the 18th regiment of the line, who had been taken prisoners by a patrol of the 1st Uhlans at Schwabweiler. According to the statement of these prisoners, their battalion had been during the past three days at Schwabweiler and Ober-Betsch-

dorf; it departed from there, owing to an alarm on the morning of the 1st August, and had retired towards the forest of Hagenau, where their company had occupied a mill and a bridge, and from whence they had been sent as patrols to the front a little later on."

These indications, joined to those received from the 1st Uhlans and the brigade of Hussars, gave the General Commanding Division at last a general idea of the situation, or at least made known to him those of the enemy's troops with whom he had up to this time been engaged and in contact.

It was now possible to state that the enemy's force standing in the first line for the observation of the frontier consisted of the 2nd Brigade of Light Cavalry, the 7th Chasseurs at Sulz, the 8th Hussars at Selz.

The advanced guard of the corps was formed of the 1st Division of Infantry of the 1st Army Corps stationed at Hagenau and of the brigade of Cuirassiers of the same Army Corps, and had occupied with advanced detachments the northern borders of the forest of Hagenau both for its own security and to cover the retreat of its patrols: on its right wing it had placed the 13th Battalion of Chasseurs-à-pied at Selz, Nieder-Rödern, and Hatten, and the 18th regiment of the line (wholly or in part) occupied the entrance of the main road from Selz and the neighbouring bridges over the Sauerbach.

The other regiment of the 1st Brigade, the 96th, was stationed at Hagenau, and was on the march to support these detachments.

To all appearance there were six battalions in the immediate front at Surburg and Reimersweiler.

It was, therefore, very probable that the columns reported as being on the main road Hagenau—Wörth belonged to the other brigade of the Infantry Division and the 1st Light Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division.

With regard to the latter, according to the reported *ordre de bataille*, there could scarcely be any doubt, but it was yet possible that the infantry on the road to Wörth might belong to another Division than the 1st.

In any case it was quite clear that the enemy considered the possession of the junction of the cross roads near Wörth of great importance, and that he deemed it essential to cover the main road from Sulz to Hagenau. But, to judge by the uneasiness he had manifested for the occupation of

Wörth, and as he did not immediately advance his whole force from Hagenau to Sulz, it was believed that he desired to remain on the defensive rather than take the offensive.

However, nothing certain was known on that point, as the movement towards Wörth might very well have been only a preparatory one, destined to cover his communications with that place in case of a real offensive movement being attempted.

These considerations indicated that the moment had arrived when the brigade of Hussars should be recalled. According to present appearances, nothing was to be feared from the direction of Forstfeld, as nothing indicated the appearance of large bodies of troops from that side; but all reports tended to show, on the contrary, that the main forces of the enemy might be expected from Hagenau and Wörth.

The presence of six hostile regiments of cavalry in front of the right column of the Division was already known; it would, no doubt, therefore, require the concentrated force of the whole Division to resist that cavalry with some chance of success, and to enable contact with the enemy's infantry to be still kept up. In consequence, General A. now sent a galloper, with four picked, well-mounted troopers of the 1st Dragoons, to the brigade of Hussars with the following orders:—

“1ST DIVISION OF CAVALRY.

“*Height north of Sulz,*

“1st August, 1870. 2 P.M.

“The advance of large bodies of hostile infantry and cavalry on the road from Hagenau has obliged the Division to retire beyond Sulz. The brigade of Hussars will move off immediately and direct its march towards Aschbach; from there it will establish communication with the left wing of the Division which occupies Hofen, and will await fresh orders. Three regiments of hostile cavalry are reported to be at Kùhlendorf: should these regiments commence a forward march during the movements of the brigade, the latter will attempt to join the Division, in case of necessity, through Nieder-Seebach and Ober-Seebach, avoiding as much as possible any engagement before joining the Division.

“A squadron of Hussars will remain at Nieder-Rodern;

it will keep contact with the enemy reported to be at Forstfeld, taking particular care to cover its right flank and keeping up communication with the cavalry of the XI. Corps at Selz, which is to be called upon to hold that town. Should the squadron be compelled to retire, it will do so by the road to Weissenburg, which passes through Tombach.

"A., LIEUT-GENERAL."

This order was just being sent off when the regiment of Uhlans from Merckweiler reported that the enemy's cavalry, which it had in its front, had halted at Diefenbach and established outposts. The General Commanding Division now also resolved to give the necessary rest to his troops, and dictated to his aide-de-camps the following order. It was then 2.10 P.M.

"Height north of Sulz,

"1st August, 1870. 2.10 P.M.

"The heavy brigade will observe the enemy on the right bank of the Selz (Hausauerbach); outposts extending from Sulz to Hofen, and these two points to be occupied. The post of observation at Merckweiler will be abandoned. One squadron only, placed in position at Lampertsloch or Lobsann, will watch the road from Sulz to Wörth as well as the hostile cavalry reported to be at Diefenbach. Communication will be kept up with the cavalry of the V. Corps, which is along the main road from Weissenburg to Wörth.

"The alarm post for the troops in cantonments will be at Schönenburg. Regiments to be re-organized as rapidly as possible. The battery Horse Artillery will remain with the brigade.

"The brigade of Hussars, after its arrival at Aschbach, will cover the ground on the left bank of the river Hausauer as far as the road from Fort Louis. Aschbach, Nieder- and Ober-Seebach can be occupied by the brigade. Alarm post west of Nieder-Seebach.

"The brigade of Dragoons will return to Hunspach and Ingolsheim, where it will take up cantonments. Alarm post at Hunspach.

"The two last-mentioned brigades will carefully reconnoitre the bridges over the Hausauer and the Selz respectively, and will send me the result of their reconnaissance by 9 P.M.

"The reports of the day, the casualty reports, and the

demands for ammunition will be sent in at the same time to the Headquarters of the Division at Hunsbach.

"The transport and baggage are parked at Altenstatt; the brigades can send for the necessary wagons, but they must be returned by 3.30 A.M. to-morrow, 2nd August.

"A., LIEUT.-GENERAL."

The Intendant of the Division was instructed to direct the supply of rations, forage, &c., to the different points assigned to the troops, so as to assist in completing the demands for supplies should the latter not be forthcoming in good time from the villages which had been requisitioned.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS BETWEEN 10 A.M. AND 2.10 P.M.

The enemy's infantry having emerged from the forest of Hagenau, the Division of cavalry accepted a combat in the ground extending between the Graswald and Reimersweiler.

We are now touching on one of the most important questions concerning the employment of cavalry during a course of operations, a question about which it is of the utmost importance that every cavalry leader should be perfectly clear.

It certainly will ever remain one of the first principles of war, *never to cede ground without absolute necessity.*

A body of troops should never be ordered to evacuate the ground on which it has taken up a position, unless any longer delay would endanger its retreat, or the troops are required elsewhere.

Such is the principle on which Cavalry Divisions preceding an army should act. The mission of the cavalry is not only to preserve constant contact with the enemy's troops when once it has been gained, but every effort must also be made to maintain the ground which they have already gained.

The question now, however, arises, *to what extent should the cavalry allow themselves to be engaged in order to do this?*

This question has already been exhaustively discussed as regards cavalry in the immediate presence of hostile cavalry. *In advancing, an attempt should be made to press the enemy back as much as your fighting powers will permit. If, on the contrary, you yourself have to give way because of the numerical superiority of the enemy, a combat should then only be accepted,*

as a rule, when the prevailing circumstances, especially the nature of the ground, offer some chance of success, or when other bodies of our troops are known to be in the immediate rear ready to receive the cavalry.

But the case is different when our cavalry meet with large bodies of infantry of the enemy's forces. A fight against their masses, whether in dismounted combat or by the charge, will always impose enormous sacrifices. A single obstinate attack will suffice to reduce a whole regiment to the strength of a single squadron, and should the combat assume larger proportions it may easily cause the ruin of a whole Cavalry Division.

A leader should certainly never hesitate to sacrifice a portion of his force, but on the sole condition that the losses thereby sustained will be largely compensated for by the result gained, or that the general interest demands the sacrifice.

This question will, however, require a different solution every time it presents itself to a Cavalry Division reconnoitring in front of an army, and in every case the most serious consideration should be given to it. Otherwise, if we allow ourselves to be drawn into an engagement through the natural desire which dwells in every leader to have a brush with the enemy, without first seriously examining and reflecting upon the situation, we may expose our troops to useless ruin.

In many cases, therefore, a Cavalry Division will do better—when opposed to a large body of infantry advancing against it—to abandon the ground foot by foot, rather than expose itself to great loss in the doubtful attempt to defend it.

Except under most exceptional circumstances the Division should never engage with infantry. Let us now look at some cases which have come under our notice in these studies.

If, for instance, on the 31st July, at the time when the Third Army was still in cantonments, and scattered over a large area, the 1st Cavalry Division had encountered the enemy's columns on the left bank of the river Lauter, it would then have been the duty of the cavalry at once to have attacked the hostile infantry in order to arrest its march, even should the Division be decimated in consequence.

If the Division encountered the enemy after the Lauter had been reached, its duty then was to make every effort so as to prevent the enemy from effecting his passage across

that river by dismounting the whole of the men armed with carbines.

Should the Division not, however, encounter the enemy's infantry until the forest of Hagenau was reached, and should it find it on the point of taking the offensive towards the north, it must on principle avoid such serious engagement with the adversary's infantry. The results to be obtained from such an engagement would rarely ever compensate for the enormous sacrifices which it demands. The distance from the forest of Hagenau to the cantonments of the Third Army is far too great to make it possible for the enemy to prevent a ready concentration of the forces of the Third Army already present.

During the period of the latter operations, the 1st Cavalry Division in fact arrived at the forest of Hagenau; its principal mission there was to watch most carefully the enemy's movements, and to ascertain his strength; no engagement with the adversary's infantry should have been accepted by the Division unless a very favourable opportunity presented itself.

Nevertheless, the fact must not be lost sight of that it is always useful to hinder the advance of the adversary, even should the general situation not imperatively demand it. By such a check to the enemy's advance time is gained, which is a valuable consideration under all circumstances.

In any case, however, a certain limit in carrying out such operations must not be exceeded, and losses thus occasioned must correspond to the results obtained thereby.

It is not imperatively necessary to engage with the hostile infantry in order to ascertain the strength and position of the enemy advancing against us. It will generally suffice if the latter's cavalry is prevented from masking the columns following them in rear, thereby forcing the infantry to deploy in first line. It will then be easy to gain a sufficient knowledge of the enemy's strength even if it be not quite so complete as might be wished.

In retiring foot by foot before an enemy's columns, the cavalry will at any rate be able to observe the direction of the adversary's march or the point where he halts, and also whether more or less strong bodies of troops are in the immediate front. A retreat effected under such circumstances would have enabled the Cavalry Division, while abandoning the ground which it had occupied, to gain the object in view without prejudice to the whole plan of operations.

When, notwithstanding all this, General A. decided to accept battle on the heights between the Graswald and Reimersweiler, the course he adopted must nevertheless be approved of.

The accidents of the ground were very favourable for the purpose of a temporary defence, and permitted both of checking the adversary's march and of probably inflicting on him some heavy losses.

We lay great stress on the cavalry only remaining *for a time* on the defensive, as it could never expect to repulse for any length of time the attack of infantry superior in numbers, as soon as that attack took a serious turn.

The Division could, in addition to its six guns, bring from 900 to 1,000 carbines only into action against an adversary at least six or seven times superior in numbers, and with an artillery three times as strong.

It is true the Division had one great advantage, viz., the enemy could only succeed in reaching the height by filing through the defile on the main road, or by climbing up the steep sides of the ravine. Such ground is always most favourable, as it permits of solving the otherwise difficult question of *breaking off a developed combat and securing a retreat in good time*. The danger of being drawn too deeply into the combat was not present here.

If we picture to ourselves that such a movement can be repeated as often as the accidents of the ground will permit it, and that large bodies of cavalry will thereby be enabled to repeatedly oppose columns of infantry marching against them, we shall readily understand how such tactics will effectually check the enemy's march from the moment when the latter's cavalry has been driven back in rear of its infantry.

The adversary is either continually obliged to deploy his troops the whole length of the line of defence in front of him, and to again re-form into column of route as soon as the temporary check has been overcome, or he must march for miles, with his troops deployed, across fields, &c., and always in attack formation. Whichever method he may adopt will always require double the time that a simple forward march would do. Add to this that the batteries of Horse Artillery marching with the cavalry, supported by a few squadrons, will always be at full liberty to take up a position at any favourable point here and there, and by doing so oblige some

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portions of the enemy's forces to seek shelter from its fire, and that an apparently strongly occupied point can only be attacked after thorough preparation by artillery fire, which must take some time. It will thus easily be seen that masses of cavalry possess the means *without engaging in a fight* of retarding an adversary's march, and at the same time of fatiguing his troops. It is of no small importance to be able to retard the march of an adversary in such manner that instead of completing a certain distance in about seven hours it may take him from ten to fourteen, or perhaps more hours to accomplish it.

Let us now for a moment study the action of the *Cavalry Division while on the defensive*, as regards its occupation of the position, the conducting and breaking off of the combat.

As regards the *occupation of the position*, it might perhaps be said that the commander of the Division ought to have made a different distribution of his force. If he decided to defend his position, he should have placed the brigade of Dragoons in first line, and that of heavy cavalry in reserve. We do not at all agree with any such argument. *Such a disposition would certainly have been desirable, but could not be made.*

It was solely in consequence of the combat in the early morning, and the subsequent movements resulting therefrom, that the brigade of heavy cavalry happened to be on the right, and that of the Dragoons on the left. Circumstances over which there was no control at the time having placed them there, they had to remain where they were, and to be employed accordingly.

It is to be regretted that owing to the present armament of heavy cavalry, it cannot always be employed in the same manner as light cavalry.

It would undoubtedly have been of the greatest advantage could about 400 carbines have been placed for the defence of the defile of the Graswald, instead of the 32 of the squadron of Uhlans; but the very fact that the heavy cavalry was not equal to such a contingency goes to prove that heavy cavalry, as at present armed, is not suitable for the work demanded of cavalry in modern warfare.

Had the five squadrons of Cuirassiers and Uhlans which were at the disposal of the General been armed with carbines, 500 men might have been available for dismounted combat, and could, with the assistance of the battery, have defended with very great success the defile itself, by occupying height

219 and the Graswald. As it was, as soon as the enemy approached, the defile had to be given up, and a movement much more difficult and less sure had to be carried out, viz., the cavalry was compelled to attack in order to prevent the enemy from debouching from the defile. With the 32 carbines of which the heavy cavalry could dispose, it could occupy *either* height 219 *or* the Graswald. The Graswald appeared the most important point, as from it the whole of the western slope of the plateau might be taken in flank, while the battery Horse Artillery could defend the plateau itself. As we have, however, already seen, the enemy ascended to the height (219) from the ravine east of Surburg, and so forced on a retreat; another proof that the heavy cavalry was insufficiently armed to effectually occupy the two most essential points, viz., the Graswald and height 219. *A few hundred men, however, armed with carbines might have held these two points—and thereby commanded the whole position—for some time at least.*

The brigade of Dragoons was placed on the left wing. At first it covered with one dismounted squadron the slopes which ascend to the plateau from the village of Reimersweiler; it secured its left flank—the only access to it—by occupying the village of Hohweiler with a second squadron, and held the remainder in reserve—*i.e.*, three squadrons of the 1st Dragoons and two squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons—at attack distance from the edge of the plateau.

Under similar circumstances, cavalry will do well not to employ all its forces at once, but to content itself at first with occupying the principal points only. Thanks to the rapidity of its movements, it is able to employ the remainder of the force at its disposal at the points most desired, as soon as the enemy has allowed the direction of his attack to be seen.

Let us now stop here, and consider, for a moment, a most important question, viz.: How much of its strength should a force of cavalry employ, as a general rule, for dismounted combat? It is evident that the reply will vary according to all the different positions in which cavalry may be placed; but *in all cases, if it is not the intention to sacrifice the troops destined for the purpose, it should be a rule that all cavalry employed on dismounted duty in action should be so placed as to be able to readily remount when required.*

If, for instance, a squadron defends a height with two-

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thirds of its men dismounted, and the remaining one-third be kept under cover in the immediate rear to guard the horses, the retreat of the former may be said to be sufficiently assured.

As to how far the squadron will profit by this great advantage will depend, however, on the manner in which the operations are carried out. Should the cavalry not evacuate their position until the last moment, when the enemy's infantry is already close upon them, it is quite certain that they will not profit by the close proximity in which they may find the horses. On the contrary, in such a case the horses should be sent to the rear as quickly as possible, as, should the enemy's bullets fall in the midst of this group of defenceless men and horses, at the moment the men are in the act of remounting, or even before then, a great part of the horses will gallop in different directions, and the squadron will not only be unable to form up for attack, but it may, moreover, run the risk of being completely destroyed. If in addition some of the hostile cavalry—even a very small number of them—should break through that infantry and charge, the danger will become still more serious.

The cavalry will also be subject to destruction should the adversary's cavalry during such an engagement succeed in throwing itself, by means of a flank movement, upon the men and horses placed in rear of the dismounted men.

For the purpose of dismounted combat it is therefore necessary not only to study the best position to be occupied from which to harass the enemy most effectually with small-arms, but also to pay the utmost attention to the security of the retreat of the dismounted men by so placing their horses as to allow them readily and safely to remount them. To ensure this, the peace manœuvres should be carefully adapted so as to correspond as much as possible to the different circumstances which may present themselves during actual service in the field.

This latter precaution is not without its difficulties, and it becomes, therefore, all the more necessary that during such exercises the most explicit instructions on the subject should be given, as during peace manœuvres the men will always get back easily to their horses and remount, and the squadron will trot off in good order and with closed ranks, although probably distant not more than 100 paces from the line of skirmishers.

Whenever cavalry, therefore, dismount to engage on foot, it becomes of the greatest importance to consider the protection

of the horses, and especially the circumstances under which during a possible retreat the horses may have to be reached.

They may be protected against the adversaries' fire by cover offered by the accidents of the ground, or failing that, by retiring them a sufficient distance from the firing line; from a sudden attack on the part of the adversary they may be protected by a closed support left behind for the purpose.

The remounting of the horses after a retreat can, however, be successfully carried out only when the position is not held up to the last moment, *i.e.*, if the retreat of the dismounted men is carried out in good time, or if a sufficiently strong mounted support is held in rear to secure the safe remounting of the horses, or if the nature of the ground be favourable to such operation, or, lastly, if the fire of the artillery can prevent the enemy from rapidly following up our men.

In the latter case, the horses should be retired in rear of the support or the artillery, and the dismounted men should continue their retreating movement until arrived within the line of the support or the artillery destined to receive them.

It will therefore be seen that the circumstances under which dismounted cavalry fight are quite different from those of infantry, and that therefore their combats demand a different method of execution. A closer examination of the circumstances attending a cavalry fight, even under the simple conditions under which it was here carried out, that is to say, as a defensive action, will, however, make this even plainer.

At the moment when the enemy debouched from Reimersweiler and proceeded to the attack, we remark that Major-General C. sent the three remaining squadrons of the 1st Dragoons to the edge of the plateau; there he ordered them to dismount and take part in the engagement, and had consequently left at his disposal the two squadrons of the 2nd regiment only. Should the enemy's infantry really succeed in ascending the slope, these squadrons would at least suffice to prevent its pressing forward on the plateau during the time necessary for the dismounted men to rejoin their horses, remount, and re-form in squadrons. To this end, or to ward off the danger of a flank attack on his dismounted men, the two squadrons of the 2nd regiment would suffice. The question now arises whether all the three squadrons in first line should have been at once engaged, or whether it would not have been preferable to act as is generally done with infantry, *i.e.*, to

successively reinforce the troops already under fire as occasion may require.

We believe that the principle here followed of engaging at once the whole of the dismounted men of the three squadrons was justified in this case.

On the defensive, dismounted cavalry combats will hardly ever have the same character, the same tenacity, as those of the infantry, where the first line is never reinforced except in case of necessity, where reserves are always kept intact as long as possible, and where a retreat is made foot by foot only and lost ground regained by an offensive movement the moment opportunity offers. We must not allow ourselves to be carried away by illusions; it is incontestable that in two of the most important factors in battle, infantry will always be superior to cavalry, viz., in the superiority of shooting and in the readiness and ease with which they can adapt themselves to every feature of the ground. A combat that sways to and fro is not the sort of thing adapted for cavalry.

However highly we may value the dismounted service of cavalry, it will rarely pass beyond a certain limit. *Cavalry can only conduct the defence of a locality by occupying the position with a first line, and in that line must be placed in action every available carbine.*

It is only by means of hurling a mass of projectiles at the enemy, and thanks to the power inherent to defensive positions in general, that cavalry can hope to hold its own against infantry superior to it in shooting and more skilled in the mode of fighting here in question.

We shall therefore find the characteristics of defensive action of dismounted cavalry embodied in the following:—

Those points that appear most important should at first be occupied by some detachments.

The whole of the remaining troops will be held in reserve; from this reserve will be told off half troops or squadrons if necessary to guard the led horses and to receive the dismounted men.

The whole of the reserve should be placed in first line as soon as the enemy attacks any part of the position held; a portion of the reserve should be kept in hand only when it is feared that ere long some other point or points may also be threatened.

The whole of the forces thrown into the first line should be employed in preventing the advance of the enemy.

The characteristics described above will be found clearly illustrated in the combat in which the brigade of Dragoons was engaged with the hostile forces which emerged from Reimersweiler.

A little episode happened on the right wing of the Cavalry Division, which must, however, be looked upon as a mere affair of opportunity.

Notwithstanding their small number, the Uhlands, who held the Graswald, forced the enemy's infantry advancing along the slope of the plateau to deploy its skirmishers. The success here gained by the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons shows the resources possessed by cavalry if it understands how to combine at the proper moment dismounted fighting with the mounted attack.

Surprise must always create a certain impression, especially when coming from a totally unexpected direction, and more particularly when the party engaged in its front finds itself suddenly fired upon from the rear.

Notwithstanding this trifling success, however, the right wing of the Cavalry Division was soon obliged to retire, as it did not possess the means of preventing the enemy from taking possession of height 219. It was consequently obliged to give up the direct defence of the defile, although the ground was especially favourable for a good defence.

Even now it was with great reluctance that the General Commanding Division gave up the defence to make his retreat good, but in consequence of the situation becoming more developed he was compelled to adopt that course. What might have happened had the adversary succeeded in establishing his infantry on the edges of the plateau near the defile and managed to place his artillery in position? The five squadrons of heavy cavalry certainly might perhaps have succeeded in attacking the first bodies of hostile troops which made an attempt to debouch through the defile, but the success of such an attack, executed as it would have been under fire of the enemy's skirmishers, against which nothing could be done, could at best be but very doubtful, and must in any case have demanded great sacrifices. Even supposing the enemy to sustain the loss of a few more men than the cavalry during such an attack, it would still be an advantage dearly bought, as a cavalry soldier cannot be so easily replaced as an infantry soldier, and *in any case a lasting success could never be obtained.* If the companies of infantry in the

first line had failed, they would certainly have been replaced by others, and eventually they must have succeeded in passing through the defile, even if the movement had been more carefully prepared, and more time taken for its execution. It was, however, by no means necessary for the Division to attempt to gain time at such a price. The moment at which to renounce the combat had arrived. The Division had kept the adversary at bay, and had inflicted losses upon him without itself sustaining serious ones, and the resolution of the General Commanding the Division can therefore be approved of as having been the correct one under the circumstances.

Among the other measures taken by the Division we notice especially the recall of the brigade of Hussars; this measure was fully justified now that the general situation had become so clear. It was also well that the brigade had been ordered to halt at Aschbach in place of rallying as far as Schöenburg, as by doing so the command of both banks of the Hausauer stream was retained. The command of both banks was all the more necessary as the enemy's cavalry reported to be at Köhlendorf might at any moment have advanced on the left bank, and would then have encountered no obstacle until they reached Weissenburg. In such a case the main body of the Division would have been compelled to retire behind Riedselz.

The situation along the banks of the Rhine was sufficiently known; nothing was to be feared from that side for the present. The squadron of Hussars that had been left at Nieder-Rödern, as well as the cavalry of the XI. Corps stationed at Selz, completely sufficed for the moment for the purpose of observing that region, even supposing that the Chasseurs-à-pied should again occupy the two points just named.

Large columns of the enemy's troops had been met with at Sulz and at Wörth; those points had now become the pivot for the Cavalry Division, and the columns encountered at those places claimed the attention of the whole Division.

The enemy not having pushed his movements any further, and the day being already far advanced—it was then 2 o'clock—the General Commanding was justified in giving his troops the necessary repose.

We shall criticise the dispositions made to the above end when we come to examine the positions assigned to the outposts.

THE DIVISION FROM 2.10 P.M. UNTIL NIGHTFALL.

The orders issued at 2.10 p.m. were carried out during the succeeding hours without any interference on the part of the enemy. The patrols uninterruptedly observed the latter, and nothing worthy of record was brought to notice. Here and there a few small encounters took place, and owing to the close proximity of the patrols on both sides to each other, shots could continually be heard.

At 4 p.m. a report was received from the brigade of Hussars stating that it had arrived at Aschbach with seven squadrons and the battery Horse Artillery, and had, after driving the hostile patrols back upon Leitersweiler, placed its outposts in the environs of the latter place as well as at Ober-Rödern and Bühl.

The General Commanding Division, who arrived at that time at Hunsbach, found there a telegram from the Headquarters of the Army, stating, "that the latter had during the morning been removed to Landau, and that the V. Corps had received orders to push strong forces towards Weissenburg to-morrow, the 2nd of August." It was now ascertained that the detachment of telegraphists which had the day before arrived at Weissenburg had to day continued its examination of the telegraphic communication along the railway. It had arrived at Hofen at the moment when the combat at Reimersweiler was at an end, and then returned to Hunsbach and put in working order the telegraph at the railway station north of that village.

Under these circumstances the following telegram was despatched direct to the Headquarters of the Army:—

"Hunsbach, 1st August, 1870. 4 P.M.

"The enemy's infantry having advanced along the main road from Hagenau, the Division was compelled to retire fighting as far as Sulz.

"The enemy's 1st Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division is at Surburg and Reimersweiler, the 7th Chasseurs and a brigade of Cuirassiers at Köhlendorf; three other cavalry regiments, followed by a strong column of infantry, have marched as far as Würth along the Hagenau road.

"The Division occupies the ground extending from Sulz to Hofen; the brigade of Hussars has been drawn into Aschbach; Nieder-Rödern and Selz are occupied by a squadron of the Division and by cavalry of the XI. Corps.

“The enemy occupies Forstfeld with the 13th Battalion of Chasseurs-à-pied and the 8th Hussars

“I very urgently request that another battery of Horse Artillery be attached to my Division.

“Headquarters at Hunspach.

“1st Cavalry Division.”

The reports as to the establishment of the outposts arrived in due course. The following positions were taken up:—

1. *On the Right Flank.—Heavy Brigade.*

Detached Squadrons.

The 2nd squadron of the 1st Uhlans in Lampertsloch and environs; a squadron of the Uhlans of the V. Army Corps had joined it there.

These two squadrons had piquets towards Preuschkdorf and along the borders of the Liebwald (230). They were in contact with the enemy by means of patrols in the direction of Wörth and beyond Merckweiler in the south.

Outposts.

a. West Section.—Colonel F., with the 1st and 4th squadrons of 1st Uhlans, at Sulz (placed in the outhouses of farms on the northern side), and at Retschweiler. The station at Sulz was occupied by dismounted men. Vedettes were posted on the edge of the plateau of Sulz. A piquet was also established on the height north of Ober-Kutzenhausen.

b. East Section.—Major Y., of the 1st Cuirassiers.

4th squadron of the regiment of Cuirassiers at Hermersweiler. Piquet at Hohweiler. Vedettes on the edge of the plateau. Non-commissioned officer's post at the exit from Hohweiler (east of that village).

3rd squadron of regiment of Uhlans near the railway bridge north of Hofen; the bridge occupied by dismounted men; the squadron 500 paces in rear, covered by a low spur. The parties patrolling beyond Hofen encountered continually those of the enemy coming from the direction of Kühllendorf.

Main Body of the Heavy Cavalry.

Three squadrons of Cuirassiers and the 2nd battery Horse Artillery at and near Schönenburg.

2. *On the Left Flank.—Hussar Brigade.*

Detached Squadron.

The 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars at Nieder-Rödern. Bridge over Selzbach occupied by a dismounted half troop. Patrols towards Forstfeld, communicating patrols towards Selz and Bühl.

Outposts.

Reserve; 1st and 2nd squadrons of 1st Hussars at Aschbach.

Piquets No. 1 at the bridge over the Saw Mills at Leitersweiler, No. 2, at Ober-Rödern, non-commissioned officer's post at Bühl.

Main Body of Brigade.

Staff of Brigade, 3rd and 4th squadrons of 1st Hussars at Nieder-Seebach. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd squadrons of 2nd Hussars and the 3rd Battery Horse Artillery at Ober-Seebach.

3. *General Reserve.—Brigade of Dragoons.*

Staff of Division and Brigade with the 2nd Dragoons at and about Hunsbach.

1st Dragoons at and about Ingolsheim.

A squadron of Cuirassiers from Schönenburg, and a squadron from the reserve of the outposts at Aschbach, were designated by the respective Brigadiers to follow the enemy up without loss of time whenever he might retire or attempt any flank movements.

The general positions of the outposts were a little modified in so far as the piquet of the Cuirassiers at Hohweiler found it impossible to hold its ground.

Small infantry patrols pushed continually along the ravine of Reimersweiler towards Hohweiler, and as they could not be opposed with sufficient force, they became bolder and at last penetrated right into the village. After several attacks, during which some vedettes had been killed and their horses wounded, the squadron from Hermersweiler arrived and attempted to dislodge the infantry, but in vain; the commander of the section saw himself consequently obliged to retire and post the vedettes on the height of Hermersweiler. The 4th squadron, which occupied this village, was also compelled to be constantly on the alert and prepared for action; men and horses were lodged in the large outhouses which are situated at the northern entrance to the village.

Some of the enemy's infantry patrols also advanced against the troops who occupied the railway station at Sulz, by moving along the western edge of the plateau and the wood of Ramsbach. Here also the vedettes of the Uhlans, posted on the edge of the plateau, were driven in by the fire of the enemy.

The 1st squadron of Uhlans at Sulz meanwhile pushed a detachment of twenty dismounted men as far as the edge of the plateau; this detachment being well under cover, soon surprised with its fire a fresh patrol of the enemy, which lost some of its men. This small success tended to make the enemy more circumspect at this point, and the annoyance ceased.

It was useless to send officers' patrols to the front, as they would not be able to learn more than could already be observed by the line of vedettes; the heavy and Hussar brigades therefore attempted to send some of these patrols round the flank of the adversary's position. They were, however, only able to confirm the fact that the adversary occupied Hölschloch in the west with infantry and Hatten and Rittershofen in the east with Cuirassiers.

On the other hand, several small Hussar patrols were observed north of Hölschloch, and Lancer patrols on the road from Wörth. For the moment it was believed that from the latter direction the Division was being seriously threatened, the advance of a hostile squadron being reported by the ~~half~~ troop of Uhlans stationed at Retschweiler, which had been pushed beyond that village towards Merckweiler.

Six ~~half~~ troops of Uhlans, partly belonging to the Division and partly to the V. Corps from Lampertsloch, marched against this squadron and forced it to retire towards Wörth. During the course of the day a report was also received from the detachment at Lampertsloch stating that the enemy had occupied Gürsdorf and Diefenbach with infantry, and that his Lancer vedettes held the crest of the ridge extending between these two villages.

In order to complete the information obtained regarding the enemy, it should be added that during the evening the 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars had sent the following report from Nieder-Rödern:—

"Forstfeld is still occupied by foot Chasseurs; the enemy's Hussars bivouac south of the town and content themselves with sending patrols towards Selz and Nieder-Rödern."

The General Commanding Division again went, towards

5 o'clock, to Hermersweiler, and thence by way of the Finken Mill north of Hofen to Aschbach, where he had given a rendezvous to General D., Commander of the Brigade of Hussars. The latter made his report on all that had taken place in his brigade, hitherto detached; we shall find this *in extenso* among the reports which were received during the evening. The brigade had already sent to Hunsbach several reports about the enemy's forces which it had found in its front. To sum up, it had found a piquet of mounted Chasseurs near Köhlendorf, and piquets of Cuirassiers near Rittershofen and Hatten, all being supported by strong supports established in these villages.

The adversary had at first, it is true, pushed his piquets more to the front and endeavoured to place his vedettes along the river Selz, but was prevented from doing so by the fire from the piquets of the Hussars, which had advanced as far as that river. The main body of the adversary's cavalry had retired in rear of the heights of Köhlendorf, and it was believed now bivouacked in the plain or had taken up cantonments in the villages on the northern borders of the forest of Hagenau.

The General Commanding Division profited by his interview with Major General D. to make the latter acquainted with the general situation as far as it had been ascertained during that day, and to impart to him his plans for the following day, which he had already found time to prepare. They were as follows:—

“According to the observations made, it is at present quite certain that the enemy has large forces in front of Sulz and at Wörth; at each of these points there are at least one brigade of infantry and three regiments of cavalry. It is not possible at present to say to what extent these troops may be followed by other columns. It is of course understood that we are bound to remain in close and constant contact with the enemy. This can be done without much difficulty if he remains to-morrow in the same positions that he occupied to-day, the more so as even supposing that his cavalry should attempt to drive us back, he must first of all concentrate it, whilst we have the advantage of having our forces already concentrated and are ready to throw them at any moment upon any given point. Our forces in cavalry are moreover at present equal.

“If, however, the enemy takes the offensive it is probable

that he will march concentrically upon Sulz, and that he will pass beyond that town, which will, however, not prevent him from sending a part of his forces, especially the cavalry which has been seen at Kühllendorf, on the left bank of the Hausauer stream.

"I must then at first retain command of both banks of the river by means of the brigade of Hussars and that of the heavy cavalry. The direction the enemy's movement takes will indicate to me on which bank of the river I must employ my reserve brigade. However, I shall very likely concentrate the whole of my forces on the left bank of the stream, should I be hard pressed, as by circling towards Lauterburg I shall have more room and liberty of movement than a direct retirement towards Altenstatt would allow of.

"Under these circumstances much will depend on your holding as long as possible the line of the river Selz in front of Ober-Rödern and Bühl, and on your ascertaining as early as possible the movements of the hostile troops in your front.

"The bridges over the Hausauerbach will be reconnoitred by the brigade of Dragoons, and the same should be done by your own brigade so as to enable you to cross at once to the other bank of the river by the nearest road."

The General added several explanations, and said that he would send a written order to the brigade; he then returned to Hunspach, where he arrived at 8 p.m.

A report was here handed to him showing the result of the reconnaissances that had been executed during his absence. One bridge had been found across the Hausauerbach, giving passage across the river from the station road at Hunspach to Ober-Seebach, and a second strong bridge at the Finken Mill north-east of Hofen; the two bridges were each about seven paces wide, they were built of wood, and sufficiently strong for heavy wagons; the cavalry could consequently traverse them at a trot three abreast.

There was also a ford; the road from the eastern exit of Hunspach to the mill of Hunspach led to this ford, without, however, continuing on the left bank of the river, but on reaching that bank a broad country road was met with which led—ascending very gradually—to the mountain ridge.

For the rest, the river ran through numerous grass lands, mostly meadows of a marshy nature, some of which could be passed with difficulty and delay only, and some could not be passed at all.

The reports of the brigade of heavy cavalry having shown that no change had taken place in the general situation, the orders to be issued for the following day could now be prepared. They were as follows:—

“1ST DIVISION OF CAVALRY.”

“*Headquarters at Hunspach.*”

“1st August. 3.30 P.M.”

“The enemy occupies Surburg and Reimersweiler. It is believed that at these points he has the 1st brigade of the 1st Division of Infantry, the 7th Chasseurs-à-cheval, and a brigade of Cuirassiers. Three regiments of cavalry and several battalions have arrived at Wörth by the Hagenau road; their outposts are at Görsdorf and Diefenbach. The 13th Battalion of foot Chasseurs and a regiment of Hussars have evacuated Nieder-Rödern and Selz, and have retired towards Forstfeld.

“To-morrow morning, the 2nd August, the 1st Division of Cavalry will continue to watch the movements of the enemy, and to maintain close contact with his principal forces.

“*The brigade of heavy cavalry* will reconnoitre the region comprised between Hofen and the hills; *the brigade of Hussars* that from Hofen to Nieder-Rödern. In case of a hostile attack, the latter brigade will watch the line of the river Selz between these two points and hold it.

“*The brigade of Dragoons* will assemble at 5 A.M. at its alarm post at Hunspach. The General Commanding Division will at the same hour be on the height north of Hofen.

“There are two strong bridges over the Hausauer, one at the Finken Mill north of Hunspach, the other on the road leading from the railway station at Hunspach to Ober-Seebach; there is also a ford about 1,000 paces below the last-named bridge. At break of day brigades and regiments will reconnoitre with the greatest possible care the roads which lead to these bridges.

“Wagons and baggage will remain on the left bank of the river Lauter north of Altenstatt; those of the brigade of Hussars will also be sent there. All carts called up from the transport column will, at the latest, be sent back by 3.30 A.M. to-morrow.

“A.,

“*Lieut.-General Commanding Division.*”

For the information of the brigades a general sketch of the outposts was also sent. The General Commanding the Division then sent the Chief of the Staff to Schönenburg to inform the Brigadier of the heavy cavalry of his projects for the following day.

This officer explained to the Brigadier: "That in case of an attack, the General Commanding held it essential to maintain himself on the left bank of the river Hausauerbach; the brigade of heavy cavalry could not therefore count upon the support of the brigade of Dragoons except under very exceptional circumstances. The movements of the enemy would decide upon which bank the General would find it necessary to employ the heavy cavalry; the General would, if possible, draw it on to the left bank; but meanwhile it was probable that it might be obliged to remain on the right bank to prevent the adversary from gaining access to the ground near Ingolsheim and Riedselz. Whatever might happen, the principal rôle of the heavy cavalry was to ascertain whether the enemy made any movement in the direction between Hofen and the hills. Should he come face to face with superior forces he was to retire slowly towards Ingolsheim and Riedselz."

During the course of the evening the various returns of the day's losses and expenditure in ammunition had come to hand, and the reports of the day's doings were also received from the various corps. The Commissary-General reported that the state of supply—rations and forage—was satisfactory, and the senior medical officer of the Division also reported that the men wounded at Sulz and Hohweiler had been transported to Weissenburg.

The Staff Officer of the regiment of Uhlans, who during the morning had been sent off to Sulz to act as Etappen commandant, remained there for the night on duty.

The results of the various reports and returns, although under the circumstances they could not be considered quite correct or complete, yet gave very useful indications.

The following is a *résumé* :—

I. CASUALTIES.

Dead, wounded, and missing:—

a. Brigade of Dragoons.

1st regiment of Dragoons—7 officers, 51 men, 59 horses.

2nd regiment of Dragoons—9 officers, 73 men, 61 horses.*

b. Brigade of Hussars.

(Mostly during dismounted engagement.)

1st Hussars—4 officers, 67 men, 9 horses.

2nd Hussars—3 men, 5 horses.

c. Brigade of heavy cavalry.

1st Cuirassiers—7 men, 11 horses.

1st Uhlans—1 officer, 12 men, 15 horses.

d. Horse Artillery.

2nd battery Horse Artillery—1 man, 3 horses.

3rd battery Horse Artillery—3 men, 5 horses.

Total losses—21 officers, 217 men, 168 horses.

A great number of the men, being slightly wounded, remained with their squadrons.

In the brigades of Dragoons and heavy cavalry, as well as in the artillery, the small loss in horses could easily be replaced by the horses that had been taken from the enemy. The great number of horses in the 1st Hussars which had become surplus owing to the losses in men during the dismounted combat were sent back under charge of an officer to Weissenburg, where they were destined to form a small provisional dépôt for the Division.

Of missing men, the different reports showed a large number, which are, however, all included in the list of the losses. It was not known at that time whether some of these men had been killed or taken prisoners, or whether they had lost their way and might possibly again rejoin their corps.

As the brigades suffered a diminution in their fighting strength owing to different services they were called upon to perform, such as escorts for spare horses, prisoners, wounded, &c.—although the men only slightly wounded were mostly detailed for these duties—they were ordered to send

* 3 officers, 32 men, and 29 horses of which belonged to the 3rd squadron.

(T. L.)

in by the following morning a statement of their effective strength.

II. PRISONERS.

It was easy to arrive at the number of men taken prisoners from the enemy's troops, as the brigade of Hussars had taken the precaution to immediately direct all those that could be sent back during the engagement towards Tombach, and the right column on its part had sent all the captured men, horses, and equipment to Sulz. Although this did not preclude the possibility of prisoners, &c., having also been sent back to other places by detached squadrons, still in the course of the afternoon the greater number of prisoners had already arrived in the villages occupied by our own troops, and could be assembled at the Headquarter Staffs. Perfectly accurate returns could of course not be expected, but the tolerably approximate number was arrived at of about 150 prisoners, 90 of whom were unwounded. They were classified as follows :—

7th regiment of Chasseurs	3 officers, 37 men.
9th " Cuirassiers	1 " 25 "
3rd " Lancers	3 "
8th " Hussars	5 "
18th " Infantry of line	1 " 76 "
96th " " "	3 "
13th battalion of Chasseurs-à-pied	11 "

Total—5 officers, 160 men.

Of the captured horses, 22 were fit for duty.

The Staff officer at Sulz had not found it possible to examine the prisoners thoroughly. As soon, therefore, as the Division had taken up its various quarters for the night, two men who appeared most intelligent—chiefly non-commissioned officers—from each corps from which prisoners had been taken, were sent to the headquarters at Hunspach, to be there interrogated by the Chief of the Staff. Men from the Hussars and foot Chasseurs were not sent, as these had already been examined by the Brigade of Hussars, and a *résumé* of their statements had been received at headquarters.

The result of the divers interrogatories confirmed the ideas that had already been conceived as to the strength and

movements of the enemy. According to the replies of the men of the Lancer patrol, who had been taken prisoners, it could be concluded with great certainty that the column of infantry that had marched towards Wörth was composed of the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division of Infantry; at any rate the Lancers stated that they had been in cantonments for two days in a village near Hagenau with men of the 10th Line Regiment, which latter corps had marched part of that day with them. According to the information received about the enemy's forces, that regiment belonged to the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division.

III. TRANSPORT OF WOUNDED, &c.

By 5 p.m. all the wounded that could be moved had been sent to the rear from Sulz and Tombach. There still remained 37 men (of both sides) seriously wounded at Sulz, 11 at Hohweiler, and 16 at Tombach. On the battlefield, west of Hohweiler, the effects, arms, and equipment had not yet been collected; however, the greater part of them had already been taken up and placed on the wagons which carried the wounded from Sulz to the rear.

The whole of the transport and the wounded were sent to Weissenburg.

IV. EXPENDITURE AND REPLACING OF AMMUNITION.

The artillery had expended 87 shells, viz., the 2nd battery 22, and the 3rd battery 65.

In the cavalry, the 1st Dragoons had expended 3,200 rounds, the 1st Hussars 7,500; the other regiments had fired so little that they did not require a supply. The officer commanding the artillery had the ammunition found upon the wounded men sent back from Sulz and Hohweiler to Hunsbach, handed over to the brigade of Hussars. The General Commanding, at the request of the officer commanding artillery, sent a telegram to the V. Army Corps requesting that one wagon of artillery and one of infantry ammunition from the ammunition columns of that corps might be sent to Weissenburg the next day in order to complete the ammunition of the Cavalry Division.

V. RATIONS, &c.

As the troops were scattered over a large area in villages which had not previously been requisitioned, it was expected
(T.L.)

that sufficient rations would be forthcoming without falling back on the iron rations and forage. There was no doubt entertained about this except as regards Ingolsheim, where our Dragoons had been in cantonment the day before, and Schönenburg, which had been occupied by the enemy's Chasseurs.

In order to prepare for any eventuality in this respect, the Intendant had already—towards noon—sent some wagons as far as Riedselz, and these wagons were in readiness, as soon as the Division had taken up its quarters for the night, to march immediately towards Ingolsheim and Schönenburg should they be required there.

VI. REPORTS AND RETURNS.

We will pass over the reports addressed by different corps to the Headquarters of the Division at Hunsbach, where they were received up to 10 P.M., as well as those that were sent by the General Commanding Division to the Headquarters of the Army, and the notes made in the diary during the day. We already know the substance of them, and we have also previously indicated how they should be written. We will content ourselves with giving here the despatch of the Brigade of Hussars, in order to learn the events that had taken place during the day with that brigade.

REPORT OF THE 3RD BRIGADE OF CAVALRY ON THE COMBAT OF NIEDER-RÖDERN, 1ST AUGUST, 1870.

In accordance with Divisional orders of the 30th July, the brigade quitted its bivouac at Schleithal on the 1st August at 5.30 A.M., and marched *via* Tombach towards Nieder-Rödern.

Two squadrons of the 1st Hussars were sent in advance in order to reconnoitre and obtain early intelligence of the enemy; the 1st squadron marched from Liegen towards Nieder-Rödern passing west of Neudorf, and the 4th squadron marched towards Selz, taking the road east of the village of Neudorf, at the same time keeping up communication with the cavalry of the XI. Corps, which latter—according to previous arrangements—was advancing from Lauterburg by the main road to Selz. The two other squadrons of the 1st Hussars formed the advanced guard of the brigade.

At the moment when the head of the brigade passed

through Tombach, rifle shots could be heard from a southerly direction.

Soon after, the 1st squadron reported that "patrols of the enemy's Hussars had been driven back towards Nieder-Rödern, which place appeared but weakly occupied by some dismounted men, and the squadron was then making dispositions to eject these men from the village."

When the head of the brigade arrived on the heights north of Nieder-Rödern, three ~~half~~ troops of the 1st squadron, dismounted, had already made an attempt to enter the village, but were repulsed with considerable losses. It was ascertained that the village was occupied by infantry—the 4th Company of the 13th Battalion of Chasseurs—as we learned later on.

At the same time the 4th squadron reported that there was also infantry at Schaffhausen and in the wood in front of Selz.

The Brigadier ascertained by means of a more complete reconnaissance that Nieder-Rödern was held by a comparatively small force, and that that force was apparently insufficient to occupy the whole of the outer circle of the rather straggling village. He consequently resolved to renew the attempt to dislodge the adversary.

Orders were given for the 1st squadron of the 1st Hussars to take up a position on the height dismounted, and to open fire against the defenders of the most advanced buildings. The 2nd and 3rd squadrons received orders to turn the village on the east and to advance along the river Selz towards the enemy's line of retreat. They were to effect this by crossing the bridge over the Selz which is situated about 1,500 paces east of the village. The battery Horse Artillery was also directed towards this point in order to enfilade the whole village, lengthways. The 2nd regiment of Hussars remained in reserve between the two separated wings of the 1st Hussars.

The enemy, seeing the dismounted men of the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the 1st regiment advancing along the border of the forest, soon evacuated the village under the fire of the battery and retired towards Forstfeld, pursued by small detachments of the 1st Hussars. It was then 7.15 A.M.

The Brigadier had directed the 2nd Hussars and the battery to march towards Schaffhausen, but had to renounce this object in order to face the adversary, who had returned

from Forstfeld with reinforcements, and was marching again towards Nieder-Rödern.

The three squadrons of the 1st Hussars occupied the southern border of the village. The battery took up a position on the heights to the north, from which it could shell the road as well as the borders of the forest.

The 2nd Hussars still remained in reserve, ready to ward off any turning movement of the enemy, or to send reinforcements into the village.

The attack of the adversary took place at 8.15 A.M. After three-quarters of an hour of hot firing he was again compelled to retire towards Forstfeld, towards which place he was pursued by our patrols.

During these events, information was received that Selz had also been evacuated and occupied by the squadron which had been sent towards that place, as well as by cavalry of the XI. Corps.

The adversary sustained serious losses at Rödern; 16 prisoners belonging to the 13th Battalion of Chasseurs and to the 8th Hussars fell into the hands of the brigade, without counting a number of Chasseurs-à-pied who were brought, severely wounded, to Nieder-Rödern.

According to statements of the prisoners and the result of observations, the enemy had stationed at Forstfeld—in order to protect that district—a detachment composed of a battalion of Chasseurs and a regiment of Hussars. Two companies were pushed in advance towards Selz, and two others towards Nieder-Rödern and Hatten, with some ~~half~~ troops of Hussars; the rest was held in reserve at Forstfeld.*

The attack against Nieder-Rödern was carried out by two companies.

The enemy occupied the bridges across the Sauerbach at Forstfeld and Beinhem.

Towards 3 P.M. the order was received from the Division to march towards Aschbach, leaving one squadron in rear of the brigade. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars remained at Nieder-Rödern, and the brigade arrived at 4 P.M. at Aschbach; there it occupied cantonments, as well as at Ober and Nieder-Seebach, and placed outposts along the river Selz. Opposite these outposts were the enemy's out-

* A battalion of Chasseurs was composed of 5 companies during the war of 1870-71. The number was subsequently changed to 4, but is now being raised to 6.—EDITOR.

posts (Chasseurs-à-cheval and Cuirassiers), which had established themselves at Kühlendorf, Rittershofen, and Hatten.

The losses of the brigade are as follows:—4 officers, 70 men, and 14 horses, dead, wounded, and missing. Of this number the 2nd Hussars lost 3 men and 5 horses, whilst the 1st squadron of the 1st Hussars suffered most, losing 2 officers, 33 men, and 7 horses.

D.,

Major-General Commanding Brigade.

Nieder-Seebach,

1st August. 9.15 P.M.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS BETWEEN 2.10 P.M. AND THE END OF THE DAY.

As we have seen, the General Commanding Division considered it necessary to withdraw the brigade of Hussars from Nieder-Rödern to Aschbach, at which place it arrived at 4 P.M. There its mission for the present consisted in watching the left bank of the Selz and the Hansauerbach.

This ground played an important rôle in the conceptions of General A. It cannot be denied that if that region were not sufficiently protected to prevent the enemy's cavalry from gaining access to it, the Cavalry Division could not any longer hold ground either at Schöenburg, Ingolsheim, or Riedselz; it must perforce retire without loss of time beyond Riedselz. It had, therefore, become a necessity to direct a force towards Aschbach, sufficient at any rate to retard the march of the adversary through that village. This measure would be especially necessary should the enemy take the offensive while the brigade of Hussars was still at Nieder-Rödern, as it would then be exposed to a complete separation from the main body of the Division.

From these considerations, if correct, it follows that when the Cavalry Division evacuated the plateau south of Sulz it was not judicious to send the whole force at disposal there back to its direct rear to remain in the environs of Hermersweiler. From this moment the leader's attention should have been mainly devoted to securing under any circumstances the reunion of the two wings which were at Hermersweiler and Nieder-Rödern respectively, and this could have been most rapidly effected by directing the main body of the right column to march at a quick pace towards Aschbach (or north of that village) immediately the evacuation of the plateau south of Sulz had been effected.

The situation between 2 and 4 o'clock might have

become most critical for the Division had the enemy attempted to push his advance further to the north. Where could the cavalry have united its two wings if the three regiments of the enemy's cavalry had found their way by 3 p.m. to Aschbach, whilst their infantry marched towards Sulz? And these movements could very easily have been effected.

The leaders of large bodies of cavalry will always find themselves exposed to the danger of similar situations if they fail to understand that they must take into their consideration the whole field of operations of their force, and not confine themselves principally to the events that take place in their immediate neighbourhood, and at a *single point*.

When in the morning the masses of the adversary's forces were being looked for, it was evident that the roads which these troops kept had to be followed up, *i.e.*, the main roads. Then it was still possible to unite the separated columns in good time by the aid of advanced squadrons. But as soon as the main body of the Division had been thrown into the first line, and the cavalry was not only in close contact with large bodies of the enemy's forces, but had already been partially driven back by the latter, it is evident that it was then the duty of the right column to move on to such ground as best permitted it to execute its further mission. That was incontestably the ground on the left bank of the Hausauerbach; the road Sulz—Weissenburg was at that moment only of secondary importance for the cavalry, and therefore comparatively small forces sufficed to protect it.

We would, then, have preferred to direct the brigade of Dragoons to Aschbach or to the north of that village, after the plateau south of Sulz had been abandoned. The brigade of heavy cavalry might have left some squadrons for a certain time on the line from Sulz to Hofen, to cover its retreat, and then retired to Hunsbach, ready to cross to the left bank of the Hausauerbach, should it become necessary. Under these circumstances, even supposing that the enemy's cavalry soon made its appearance, it would have been possible to reunite about Nieder-Seebach the whole of the forces of the Division, except a few squadrons detached on reconnoitring duties.

A combat could then have been engaged in with the whole of the forces. Far greater liberty of action would thus have been obtained than if the two isolated wings of the Division had been compelled to retreat as far as the Lauter.

The old proverb is still true—that *in war he has the best chance who makes the fewest mistakes*. If, when operations are over, we calmly criticise them, we shall always find, even during the most brilliant campaigns, that some mistakes were committed by the victor, who himself would probably point out the most important ones. But some of these mistakes are not quite so decided or foolish as unfair critics frequently would have the reader believe—critics who believe themselves to know more than others do.

The two adversary's forces are, as a rule, commanded by men of sound intelligence, officers who have been carefully educated for their high position, whose orders and dispositions, however, are generally dictated by the inspirations of the moment; and of the two leaders, success will be with him—all things being otherwise equal—who can most rapidly and completely comprehend and judge the situation as a whole.

War has one great peculiarity, that views and dispositions, although originally wrong, will, notwithstanding, gradually drift into the right channel, either one's own after-reflection leading in time to a correct view, or the counter measures taken by the adversary calling one's attention to what is right.

Then the essential question arises: is there yet time to take the necessary measures? Often it may be done, and the mistakes which have been made may then be retrieved without being felt or observed. It was so here in the case before us. The brigade of Hussars arrived in good time near Aschbach; the dispositions made during the evening permitted the hope that in case of necessity the brigade of Dragoons would be able to arrive quickly on the left bank of the Hausauerbach, and neither a separation of the two wings of the Division was to be feared, nor, should the enemy advance, would it be necessary to abandon any appreciable extent of ground. The left bank of the river was for all purposes the most important ground for the whole situation, and should the adversary take the offensive to-morrow morning, it was probable that his movements would naturally lead the main body of the Division to the place which it ought to have occupied to-day.

In the period which is now under our observation, there is yet another point which should be especially noticed, that is, that *the whole or nearly the whole Division is placed in cantonments*. This is all the more astonishing when we

remark that on the 30th July, when the cavalry was yet in the midst of its infantry, the entire Division was in bivouac, and also on the 31st July, when some few only of the enemy's squadrons had been met with, the greater part of the force was placed in bivouac. But now, when in presence of, and very close to, large bodies of the adversary's forces, the General suddenly conceives the idea of placing the Division in cantonments, except the piquets and supports.

We may suppose that the over-excitement to which a General will be a prey when invested with an independent mission for his Division will disappear from the moment when he actually finds himself in contact with the adversary, when, in fact, he is face to face with the latter; a fact which has been experienced in war by many a leader. Supposing that the General was labouring under this excitement on the 30th July, when his thoughts would be full of the gravity of the mission entrusted to him, and supposing that he was still so on the 31st July, when he found himself in the enemy's country, and the foe within a short distance in his front, still the moment of reflection at last arrives; he thinks of the fatigues to which the operations will subject his troops and the great sacrifices of men and horses which combats will demand, both of which cannot be avoided, and he does not wish to augment their sufferings by fatal nights in bivouacs. So it came about that on calmly surveying the whole situation the General was led to the decision to give his troops the benefit of cantonments, extending these over such an area as to ensure their being comfortably housed.

But, it will be said, has not the General rather fallen into the opposite extreme, and will the dispositions which he has ordered be really attended with so little danger as he appears to suppose?

We approach here a question of the utmost importance, and we propose to treat it fully. In order to do so we will take as a basis the distribution of the Division of Cavalry with its cantonments and outposts on the evening of the 1st August.

Let us suppose the enemy to have again made an attack during the course of the afternoon. His infantry would not march so quickly as to prevent a concentration of the Division in the desired time; if anything was to be feared, it could only be the result of a sudden attack of the enemy's cavalry.

It must not be forgotten that the distribution of the Division in cantonments is reckoned for *one night only*. The enemy is therefore only in a position to know the whereabouts of the outpost line, or at most the positions of some of the supports, and even after that information has been furnished to the adversary his reconnaissance is still very incomplete.

Supposing, now, that a large body of cavalry masses together south of the heights of Köhlendorf and Rittershofen, and moves off at 4 P.M. Its main body would march between Hermersweiler and Hofen, and send at the same time a column of considerable strength in the direction of Aschbach.

As soon as the columns arrive at Köhlendorf and Rittershofen, that is, towards 4.8 P.M., they will be perceived by our outposts, and will consequently be obliged to hasten their movements.

If we follow up the left column, we see that it has more than a mile of ground to get over before reaching the river Selz. There the head of the column will perceive that the railway embankment north of Hofen is occupied; then the squadron of Cuirassiers which is at Hermersweiler (4.16 P.M.) will be visible. The cavalry of the Army of the South would now be compelled to deploy its leading squadrons, should it not have already done so, and will direct single squadrons towards the two points occupied by us. This latter measure will be the more necessary as the squadrons of Uhlans lying in the region between Hermersweiler and Sulz, as well as north of Hofen, will soon be visible. But the enemy's cavalry cannot as yet distinguish how many squadrons of the 1st Division may be behind the outposts, and where they are stationed; it will then be obliged to deploy for the purpose of being ready for any eventuality. The distance and the nature of the ground to be traversed will not permit of its arriving on the heights of Hermersweiler before 4.20 P.M., that is to say, 12 minutes after having been discovered by our outposts. In this calculation an eventual formation of line, &c., has not been taken into consideration.

Now, supposing that the outposts sent reports, not earlier than 4.12 P.M., to Schöenburg and Hunsbach, the alarm could be given at 4.16 P.M. at Schöenburg, and even admitting that the signal was not immediately heard at Hunsbach, the report would arrive there at 4.20 P.M. at the latest.

In any case, once on the crest of Hermersweiler, the enemy's cavalry can only advance with great caution. It will perceive our squadrons in its front as well as on both flanks, the ravines formed by the Winzen brook do not permit it to continue its march at a trot, and the distance which it has already traversed, as well as the now steeper slopes, will likewise oblige it to march for a few minutes at a walk. Add to this that the 2nd Battery Horse Artillery, which is at Schöenburg, will be able to open fire by 4.25 P.M. and thereby oblige the adversary to push his artillery to the front and place his regiments under shelter. Under these circumstances the enemy's cavalry will probably make use of the cover of the Hermersweiler heights for the purpose of continuing its march to Sulz or Hunsbach. The most threatening direction which it can take for the Division is that towards Hunsbach. It will take the enemy, however, at least 15 minutes to arrive within 1,000 paces of that village, and he therefore could not reach it before 4.35 P.M.

But now we must take into consideration that not only the 2nd Dragoons stationed at Hunsbach will have joined at that point the brigade of heavy cavalry, but also that the regiment of Dragoons coming up from Ingolsheim will then be at the point of arriving there.

It is true that a concentration of the Division on a level with the first line could not be effected, but the dislocation of the troops as ordered could not in any way expose it to danger.

In the actual case before us, we cannot find fault with the dislocation of the Division over a large area, especially as the good dispositions made permitted an alarm being conveyed to all points much more rapidly than we have above supposed, and it is very probable that the march of the enemy would have taken longer to execute than we have just estimated.

We must also take into consideration that, owing to the unfortunate check which the cavalry of the South had that morning received, and the subsequent operations of the 1st Cavalry Division during the afternoon, the former had certainly become more cautious in its movements, and, further, the Division was not inclined to give up any more ground without pressing necessity, and was especially determined to keep possession of Sulz.

To-day the adversary will hardly undertake any further movements; besides, it is 4 P.M., his outposts are placed, and his troops have already gone into bivouac. Everything

indicates, therefore, that he has taken to rest, and that he will not disturb the Division, at least for the remainder of the day.

But even putting aside all these circumstances, and without pretending that bivouacs should have been resorted to, it certainly would have been advisable not to advance the line of outposts so close to the adversary's line, and consequently to select cantonments for the Division a little further in rear.

It is always a very great inconvenience to be unable to concentrate the Division on a level with the brigade placed in first line, a great portion of the Division being obliged to quickly turn about the moment the first signal of the enemy's approach is given. In addition to the moral effect which such a movement will always produce, and which we consider of great importance here, another series of inconveniences will result; men forming isolated detachments are left to themselves, effects are abandoned, wagons which cannot follow quickly enough are exposed to danger, rations are left behind, &c., &c.

Again, it must be well understood that bad weather, negligence of outposts, an alarm given too late, and other analogous circumstances could possibly, even in the actual case before us, have compelled the Division to concentrate yet further to the rear than we have supposed above. Lastly, in a position such as here described, every reconnoissance made by a strong party of the enemy will immediately be followed by the alarm being given to every part of the Division, in order that it may not be exposed to the danger of opposing him too late, should the squadrons which are perceived be followed up by larger bodies.

The main body of the Division is far too close to the outposts, and therefore the alarm will not be limited to the line of the latter when it is discovered that it is unnecessary to take more serious measures.

As useless alarms will continually occur, it follows that either the Division will not enjoy the repose it ought to have, or but little attention will be paid to the alarm, and in the latter case the Division will be exposed to the danger of neglecting the right moment for action when the situation becomes serious.

From these observations we may, then, deduce the following principles:—

Even in close proximity to the enemy, cavalry may without danger be quartered in villages, notwithstanding the numerous inconveniences resulting therefrom.

It will, however, be well for the reconnoitring cavalry not to place its whole force in cantonments when near the enemy, except under special circumstances; for instance, when the adversary has been met with to his disadvantage, or when circumstances demand that the ground occupied should be disputed foot by foot.

In all cases it will be the means of protection from disturbance to leave a little larger space between one's force and that of the adversary than was here done. It is not necessary to push the outposts so close to those of the enemy as to have the latter continually in view of the vedettes; this feeling of the enemy should be left to the patrols, which constantly pass beyond the line of vedettes; the rôle of securing the safety of the main body belongs chiefly to the vedettes, that of observation principally to the patrols.

Lastly, we repeat that when a Division of cavalry remains on the ground *one day* only, it may be permitted to take different measures for security and observation than when remaining in the same place for a longer period in front of the enemy; as in the latter case, although it will gain a more intimate knowledge of the adversary's position, the latter will do the same on his part and will be able to advance with much more audacity and rapidity than we have supposed to have been the case in our present example.

Including the cavalry of the XI. Corps, with which the Division was in contact, the latter, with its outposts and detached squadrons on the flanks, covered that night in a very effective manner an extent of ground of about sixteen miles.

The several squadrons detached at Selz, Nieder-Rödern, and Lampertsloch sufficed to observe an extent of ground of about nine-and-a-quarter miles, whilst for the rest of the ground (seven miles) the outposts (vedettes, piquets, patrols, and supports) required six squadrons. The employment of this considerable force was necessary owing to the close proximity of the enemy. While the detached squadrons at other places had, in addition to keeping up observation, nothing to protect but themselves, those stationed between Betschweiler and Bühl, on the contrary, had orders to cover the masses in cantonments in their rear, and especially to facilitate the ready assembly of the troops in cantonments,

by supporting the outpost detachments of the main body of the Division.

It will scarcely be necessary for us to say that such a long line of outposts, especially at so short a distance from the enemy, cannot be left under the command of *one* officer only. It is here necessary to organize the outposts in the direction of depth; and at the same time the front must be broken into several sections. The thing is very easily done if owing to accidents of ground the line is cut across by marked features such as the Hausauerbach, but, failing this, it must still be done on any ground, and it was on this wise that the heavy brigade here formed two outpost detachments or sections which had their common centre in their rear, in the main body of the brigade.

It would certainly have been far more agreeable to the General Commanding the Division to leave the brigade of Dragoons in first line for the night, instead of the Cuirassiers and Uhlans;* but when the movements of the day came to an end, the regiments of heavy cavalry were found to be in contact with the enemy; and this occurred through the course of events.

There must be very special motives to justify our employing as outposts other troops than those which were last in immediate contact with the enemy, and which must naturally possess the best knowledge of the enemy's situation. They know exactly where the troops are that are in front of them, where others have been observed, and to which side they have disappeared; they know the regiments which have shown themselves at the different points open to view, and distinguish pretty quickly whether bodies which are perceived at any other point are only detachments belonging to the former, or belong to fresh troops. Lastly, the general attitude of the enemy can much more correctly be judged by parties which have already observed him for several hours than by detachments who are suddenly brought into contact with him.

Nevertheless, it is incontestable that the light brigade is much more suitable for the service of outposts than the heavy cavalry, especially so when, as in this case, it becomes necessary to *keep possession of certain points*, and this can best be effected by making use of a sufficiently large number of firearms.

In our example General A. did well to be guided by

* Allusion is here made to the fact that the Cuirassiers were not armed with carbines, and the Uhlans only partly so.—EDITOR.

another consideration also, viz., that the Dragoons during the day had been engaged in a severe combat, and in all similar cases troops should be given, if it can be afforded, the time of rest necessary to quietly re-establish their interior tactical formation. The leaders of some squadrons have been wounded and their squadrons have received new commanders, others are required to be re-formed, or to be remounted, &c., all matters which can be got over well enough when the time to regulate them cannot conveniently be spared, but which should be done very carefully whenever the required time can be afforded; this is a matter which affects the troops seriously, and is of great moment.

In general, the lines of outposts of two adversaries are pretty quiet when, after a long fatiguing march and serious engagements, they intend to remain in the same position until the next morning only. It is quite certain that after severe fatigues one is little disposed to attempt a *coup-de-main* or other enterprise, as is often done during peace manoeuvres.

But the energy necessary to inflict a blow upon the adversary will soon revive when it is perceived that he is not able to defend himself effectively against musketry fire from a distance.

So it happened, very probably, that during the few hours that remained until darkness set in, the vedettes of the Cuirassiers had a pretty hard time of it, and could scarcely maintain themselves within the zone of fire of the enemy's infantry patrols, who were able to advance with impunity along the ravine of Hohweiler. The same holds good with regard to the vedettes of the Uhlans, who were stationed south of Sulz, as the enemy's infantry did not fail to show itself there also, and became more daring as time went on. It was only due, no doubt, to the little lesson the patrols of the infantry had received during the morning from our cavalry that the Cavalry Division was still in possession of Sulz.

The inconveniences and dangers to which a first line is exposed, when it is not in a position to keep the adversary at a respectful distance by means of an effective small arm fire, will often make themselves still more felt than was here the case. At any rate in this respect the heavy brigade is not so well fitted for the position as light cavalry, and in reality it may not always happen that events will pass off

so favourably as they are described above, especially if Cuirassiers are placed so very close to the enemy.

In conclusion, we will say a few words about the engagement of the brigade of Hussars at Nieder-Rödern. As the events at Reimersweiler and the Graswald permitted us to treat of the dismounted combat of cavalry on the defensive, so we shall now be able to study the question from another point of view, and to examine the *rôle* which dismounted cavalry should play when acting on the offensive.

As we have already seen, when the squadron of Hussars was sent to reconnoitre and perceived that Nieder-Rödern was apparently occupied by a weak force of infantry, it dismounted three ~~half~~ troops and sent them at once to the attack. From the moment that the attack was decided upon, nothing else, owing to the nature of the ground, could be done. The result was, however, far from satisfactory; the Hussars lost many men and were obliged to rapidly retire to the heights from which they had come.

By this example we are warned not to expect too much from a dismounted cavalry combat. Those who at all know what a very difficult and bloody work such an attack is, even for infantry skilled and continually practised in it, will only charge cavalry with such a task when forced to it by the most absolute necessity.

It has often happened, we know, that even large bodies of cavalry have been arrested and held in check before some defile held by a few small parties of infantry, and it is chiefly such cases as these that are quoted as a reason for claiming a good weapon for cavalry. But we must not mistake the proper manner of employing such a weapon, and ought to be well on our guard against making a false move in that direction.

It is certain that when the adversary is surprised in his cantonments, or when, owing to loss of discipline, parties of marauders swarm about the field of operations, or when after a severe defeat hundreds of fugitives and dispersed men gather in a village, under such exceptional circumstances the cavalry may act with greater audacity and expect to see dismounted fighting crowned with success. Further, we do not at all desire to contest the fact that a brigade of cavalry fighting dismounted, especially when it is well supported by horse artillery, will succeed by a direct frontal attack on a village in dislodging therefrom a company of infantry; but

such an attack, if carried out against an energetic adversary, will generally involve such losses as will reduce the effective fighting power of the brigade very considerably for some time.

We therefore repeat that a direct attack on villages, or other inhabited places which are adequately occupied, demands from officers and men now-a-days such thorough practice as the many duties now falling to the cavalry service will not permit of, and there is no other way of arriving at a certain degree of skill in these manoeuvres than by giving plenty of time to the practice of them; good theoretical instruction will facilitate the rapid acquisition of the necessary knowledge, but that alone cannot replace practical exercises. A good weapon will very considerably augment the independence of cavalry; still, that does not afford a sufficient reason for setting it to all the tasks, the solution of which is the duty of infantry. It would be just the same thing if we attempted to impose upon a company of infantry mounted on horses all the duties appertaining to cavalry.

In addition, it must not be forgotten that the loss of the brigade of Hussars, amounting to 70 men, requires another 20 men to be withdrawn from its effective strength, in order to lead to the rear the horses of the men who had become *hors-de-combat*.

We do not intend by these remarks to condemn as a general measure all offensive movements undertaken by dismounted cavalry. We simply desire to indicate the way which appears to us most likely to lead to favourable results, namely, an attempt to make a *turning movement* round the position which it is desirous of storming, thereby avoiding the dangers of a *frontal* attack.

Cavalry when attacking is often able to direct its offensive movements against points which cannot be reached by infantry, as the former can always take its horses from point to point and thereby gain much greater liberty of action.

The enemy perceives large bodies of cavalry in its front; it does not, however, know how many more are in their rear or may at any moment make their appearance. That, however, will not yet determine it to give up possession of the village. But if it perceives that the cavalry are attempting to get round its rear, and if it knows that several hundred men have dismounted in order to cut off its re-

treat, and fire into it from the most undesirable direction, then the moral effect thereby produced will make the infantry timid, and often they will prefer to avail themselves of an as yet open road, in order to evacuate the ground, rather than expose themselves to the danger of being surrounded in a village or a copse.

We have endeavoured to show what we think should be done in most cases when dismounted cavalry take the offensive, illustrating it by the attack of the brigade of Hussars on Nieder-Rödern as well as by the engagement of the 4th squadron of the 2nd Dragoons north of Surburg. Cavalry is generally able to direct its dismounted attack on the adversary's weakest point; it will be able to do so more effectively still when it knows how to profit by the fire of its artillery, and understands how to direct and place the mounted squadrons so as to enable the dismounted men to effect their retreat, in case of necessity, without any danger.

What we have remarked as regards combats of smaller bodies of cavalry when encountering the enemy's first line of observation is quite as applicable to all bodies of cavalry, however large, whether on the battlefield or in the theatre of operations; the results, however, will be far more important.

REMARKS ON THE ARMY OF THE SOUTH.

Notwithstanding the events of the 1st August, the position and intentions of the Army of the South are not yet sufficiently known to permit of a correct judgment being formed with regard to them. But there are some facts which have come to our knowledge which enable us to arrive at certain conclusions.

First of all, it is confirmed that a Division of Infantry and a Division of Cavalry are stationed in the environs of Hagenau, and that from thence a brigade of infantry has been sent forward on the main road towards Sulz. Its advanced guard has occupied the northern borders of the forest of Hagenau, and a regiment of mounted Chasseurs are at Sulz, charged with the task of reconnoitring as far as the frontier.

On the right wing a battalion of Chasseurs and a regiment of Hussars have been detached to Forstfeld, and both have occupied different points on the northern border of the forest, the Hussars patrolling towards Lauterburg.

The second day after the arrival of the 1st Division of Cavalry in the enemy's territory, the adversary had supported his advanced squadrons by a brigade of Cuirassiers. After seeing his cavalry repulsed and having again rallied them on the borders of the forest of Hagenau, he caused the villages on the heights facing the forest to be occupied a few hours later on.

The Army of the South at the same time sent strong forces from Hagenau towards Wörth, apparently destined to secure the debouches there.

On the right wing the Army of the South had evacuated Selz and Nieder-Rödern and had concentrated at Forstfeld the various detachments which had operated on that side.

In presence of these facts, it cannot be said that it was a judicious measure to have employed two regiments of cavalry only for reconnoitring towards the frontier and to have actually left five other cavalry regiments in rear of their infantry in first line.

It cannot as yet be stated with certainty whether these five regiments arrived at Hagenau in sufficient time to have been employed a few days previously nearer the frontier; but if so, then the cavalry of the Army of the South should have been directed to march, as a combined force, towards the river Lauter. Had it done so, it would not only have been in a position to oppose the 1st Division of Cavalry at the river with a certain amount of success, to have prevented the Division from advancing, and masked the movements of its own army, but would presumably also have been in a position to gain much important information for the Commander-in-Chief of its army, at least as far as the heads of the enemy's columns were concerned.

The Commander of the Army of the South by employing his cavalry as he did here had neglected the most important rôle of that arm; viz., *to ascertain the position and watch the movements of the main body of the adversary's troops.* The conduct of the Army of the South up to this period merely represents the duties of reconnaissance of an army desirous of remaining on the defensive.

For the rest, from what we have observed, we arrive at the conclusion that when two large bodies of cavalry are opposed to each other, and have been put into their proper places by their respective commanding officers, that side only which is superior in numbers can permanently fulfil its proper

mission, always supposing that the skill of the two adversaries be equal, and that their troops have been equally well trained and exercised in their duties.

A further conclusion arrived at is, that *every army should always place the whole of its cavalry in its front.*

The movements of the Army of the South on the 1st August showed, moreover, that it attached as much importance to the command of the road from Sulz to Hagenau as to the possession of Wörth. These two points being distant from each other four-and-a-half miles, the adversary is obliged to divide his forces. It would certainly have been much more simple to take up a central and more advanced position, so as to cover at the same time both points. It would have sufficed for that purpose to occupy Sulz with the whole Infantry of the 1st Division; this point was of itself of great importance, and was, moreover, the junction of several main roads.

Had the Cavalry Division of the 1st Army Corps of the Army of the South advanced in its entire strength from Sulz towards the frontier, their Infantry at Sulz would not have been exposed to any danger whatever, even supposing the whole of the Third Army to have taken up the offensive at once on a very broad front.

Let us finally remark that it would have been far more advantageous for the infantry brigade in first line not to have taken up a position on the border of the forest of Hagenau, but rather on the heights of Surburg and Reimersweiler, as it was on these heights only that it could find a favourable position whence it could assist its advanced cavalry with any degree of success, and command the whole of the ground as far as Sulz.

CHAPTER III.

THE 2ND AUGUST.

RETREAT OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION UNTIL 9.30 A.M.

DURING the night of the 1st and 2nd August the 1st Cavalry Division occupied the following positions:—

1. *Right Wing.* Brigade of heavy cavalry.

a. Detached Squadron. 2nd squadron of 1st Uhlans at Lampertsloch, near it a squadron of the V. Army Corps. Piquets in the direction of Preuschkorf, as well as at the western border of the Liebwald towards Mitschdorf.

b. Outpost Detachments. *Western Section,* Colonel F. with the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 1st Uhlans at Sulz and Retschweiler. Station at Sulz occupied, with vedettes pushed to the front; a piquet on the height north of Ober-Kutzenhausen. *Eastern Section,* Major Y., of the Cuirassiers, with the 4th squadron of Cuirassiers at Hermersweiler, having vedettes south of that village; 3rd squadron of Uhlans at the bridge over the railway north of Hofen.

c. Main Body of Brigade. Three squadrons of Cuirassiers and the 2nd Battery of Horse Artillery in and near Schönenburg.

2. *Left Wing.* Brigade of Hussars.

a. Detached Squadron. 4th squadron of 2nd Hussars at Nieder-Rödern.

b. Outpost Detachment. *Reserve.* 1st and 2nd squadrons of 1st Hussars at Aschbach, having its piquets towards the saw-mill of Leitersweiler, as well as at Ober-Rödern, and a non-commissioned officer's post at Bühl.

c. Main Body of Brigade. Staff, 3rd and 4th squadrons of 1st Hussars at Nieder-Seebach. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd squadrons of the 2nd Hussars and 3rd Battery Horse Artillery at Ober-Seebach.

3. *Reserve.* Brigade of Dragoons. Staff of Division and Brigade with the 2nd Dragoons at Hunspach. 1st Dragoons at Ingolsheim, also the ambulance at latter place.

A short distance in rear were the advanced guards of the V. and XI. Army Corps as follows:—

In and near Weissenburg, two battalions of the 17th Brigade, with one battery artillery, and three squadrons. (In place of the one squadron which at first was stationed there, the General Commanding V. Army Corps had sent the whole of the regiment of Uhlans of the 9th Division to Weissenburg, one squadron being detached to Lampertsloch.)

At Lauterburg and Scheibenhard, three battalions of the 41st brigade, three squadrons, and one battery of artillery (the rest of the brigade had remained with one squadron north of the Bien wood).

Of the enemy, it was known that Wörth was occupied by several battalions, and that three regiments of cavalry were there. It had also been ascertained that the 1st brigade of the 1st Division of the enemy's infantry was at Surburg and Reimersweiler, as well as the 7th regiment of Chasseurs and a brigade of Cuirassiers. The 13th battalion of Chasseurs-à-pied was, together with a regiment of Hussars, at Forstfeld.

Except a few unimportant skirmishes between opposing patrols, the night had passed pretty quietly.

Shortly after 3 A.M. the General Commanding Division received at Hunsbach the following orders from the Headquarters of the Third Army:—

“HEADQUARTERS OF THIRD ARMY. SECTION I., JOURNAL NO. .

Landau, 1st August, 1870. 9 P.M.

“The enemy has advanced during the day on the road from Hagenau to Sulz. A brigade of infantry and three regiments of cavalry are pushed as far as Surburg; other bodies of infantry and three regiments of cavalry have at the same time gained Wörth; a battalion and a regiment of Hussars are at Forstfeld.

“The 1st Cavalry Division is in close contact with the enemy between Sulz and Nieder-Rödern.

“To-morrow morning, 2nd August, the V. Army Corps will as early as possible advance the whole of the 9th Division of Infantry as far as Weissenburg; it will take up a position on the heights south of the town. The rest of the Army Corps will concentrate at Bergzabern.

“The 1st Battery of Horse Artillery of the 5th Regiment of Artillery will be attached until further orders to the 1st Cavalry Division.

"The XI. Army Corps will concentrate at Langenkandel; its advanced guard (41st brigade), which is at Lauterburg, will establish communication with and support the 9th Infantry Division.

"The 1st Cavalry Division will maintain constant and close contact with the enemy.

"In case it should be repulsed, the commander of the Division will direct his retreat either to Weissenburg or to Lauterburg.

"Whatever may happen, however, the Division must keep up communication with the advanced guards of the Army Corps.

"Orders have been issued for the concentration of the two Bavarian corps at Landau and Germersheim, and the Baden and Württemberg Division have been directed to proceed to Speyer.

"THE GENERAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF."

As regards the Cavalry Division this order did not necessitate any change in its present disposition; in its mission nothing had changed. As regards the general situation of affairs, however, the orders of the General Commanding in Chief, as well as the fact of strong detachments being pushed beyond the Lauter, indicated that there was a decided intention to maintain at all costs the position on the right bank of that river. The Division had simply to await the movements and ascertain the intentions of the adversary.

For the moment therefore, nothing remained to be done, except to establish closer connection with the 9th Infantry Division and with the advanced guard of the XI. Army Corps.

An aide-de-camp was consequently sent at 5 A.M. to Weissenburg, where he was to await the arrival of the commander of the 9th Division, and to communicate to him in detail the whole situation as well as the intentions of his General. He had instructions to call the special attention of the commander of the Division to the necessity of occupying at an early hour the ground near Riedselz with his infantry, as the 1st Cavalry Division might possibly be obliged to employ its two light brigades on the left bank of the Hausauerbach. In that case the 17th Infantry Brigade could no longer count on the heavy cavalry brigade in its

front holding the ground about Riedselz and Ingolsheim for any length of time.

The aide-de-camp received orders to return as quickly as possible the moment the dispositions taken by the 9th Infantry Division had been communicated to him.

A galloper was similarly sent to the advanced guard of the XI. Army Corps to arrange matters there. He was especially to ascertain how far the commander of the advanced guard purposed throwing his right wing forward, so that close communication might be established with it. This information was the more indispensable as circumstances might possibly arise which would oblige the cavalry to retreat upon the 41st Infantry Brigade.

The despatch from Landau had been received at 3 A.M. Its contents had required consideration, and the officers who had been sent off had also to be instructed. There was now consequently no time to take further repose after the interruption.

At 5 A.M., therefore, the General Commanding was in the saddle, and went up to the height south of Hunspach.

En route, the brigade of Dragoons reported its arrival at the alarm post at the north-west corner of Hunspach. Soon after the heavy brigade also sent in a report, in which it was stated that the officers sent on reconnaissances towards various points had found the enemy's vedettes at the same places they had occupied last night.

A little later on a similar message was received from the outposts of the Hussar brigade.

When the General arrived at the height, the morning fogs still covered the ground in the valleys, and the view of the horizon was consequently very limited. The outlines of some horsemen could certainly be distinguished here and there on the crest of Hermersweiler, but beyond that point the view was lost in the fog, and the adversary's outposts could not be seen even with a field-glass.

The General considered for an instant whether it was not advisable to at once order the brigade of Dragoons to cross to the left bank of the Hausauerbach. But on reflecting that it was not known whether the cavalry on the enemy's right wing might not advance under close protection of its infantry between Hermersweiler and Hofen, he abandoned this idea for the present, and preferred to leave the Dragoons where they then were in order to secure the retreat of the Cuirassiers.

6.30 A.M. Time went on, and at 6.30 A.M. the first important message was received from the brigade of heavy cavalry. This report was as follows:—

"1ST REPORT OF 2ND SQUADRON OF 1ST UHLANS.

Lampertsloch, 2nd August, 1870. 5.25 A.M.

"Hostile cavalry, in two columns, is just crossing the crest of the heights east of Wörth; one, composed of several squadrons of Dragoons, is moving in the direction of Mitschdorf; the other, consisting of two squadrons of Lancers, is marching towards Preuschdorf along the main road. The squadron of Uhlans of the V. Corps has moved towards the road Weissenburg—Wörth, and will, if hard pressed by the enemy, retire slowly towards Weissenburg. My squadron will also, according to the enemy's advance, retire in the direction of Memelshofen.

"X. CAPTAIN."

The brigade had added a postscript that it had received that despatch at 6.15 A.M., and that according to other reports received from its patrols the head of the column of Lancers had at 6 A.M. already reached the ground west of Ober-Kutzenhausen.

At the moment (6.30 A.M.) when this report was received by the Divisional Staff, a certain movement was perceived among the 3rd squadron of Uhlans stationed at the railway crossing at the foot of the height. The squadron of Cuirassiers at Hermersweiler was also seen to retire across the brook of the seven fountains and to join the main body of the heavy brigade at Schöenburg. An officer was at once sent in each of these directions. The one that had gone to the squadron of Uhlans came back first, reporting the approach of large bodies of cavalry from the direction of Köhlendorf. The fog having meanwhile dispersed, they could already be perceived by the aid of a glass descending the slopes between Leitersweiler and Stohweiler. Three large bodies could clearly be distinguished, the foremost of which, presenting a darker appearance than the others, was marching in the direction of Hofen.

The two other bodies followed, side by side, in rear of the left wing of the first; from the glitter of their bright helmets they were believed to be Cuirassiers. It was there-

fore concluded that the whole brigade which had the evening before been met with was now again on the march.

Subsequently attention was directed to a series of reports which arrived in quick succession. The aide-de-camp present with the General was entrusted with the duty of uninterruptedly observing the movements of the masses of hostile cavalry which were now in sight.

6.45 A.M. The various reports that had come to hand during the short space of time up to 6.45 A.M., and which had arrived sometimes separately and sometimes two or three together gave the following *résumé* of the observations made:—

1. *From the Direction of Würth.*

The 2nd squadron of the 1st Uhlans had retired about 6 A.M. towards the mill of Lobsann, behind the stream of Fröscheiler.

The enemy's Dragoons, whose strength was now known (one regiment), had followed them up from Mitschdorf and Lampertsloch; one of their squadrons was halted on the eastern border of the Graswald in front of our squadron of Uhlans. It was hoped that information as to the position of the remainder of the regiment would be communicated through the Uhlans of the V. Corps, which had left half a troop on the main road from Mitschdorf to Weissenburg, on which road but small hostile patrols were met with; the remainder of that squadron was at Lobsann, from which place it sent its patrols as far as Lampertsloch.

The Lancers, whose strength was estimated at more than a regiment, had advanced on the road from Würth to Sulz, and after a short halt had reached Nieder-Kutzenhausen at 6.15 A.M.

2. *From the Direction of Hagenau.*

At the same hour (6 A.M.) a squadron of Hussars, followed by a battalion and a battery, was on the march on the road from Hagenau to Sulz, and had already passed the defile of the Graswald. On the other side, a large body of infantry coming from Reimersweiler advanced through the ravine of Hohweiler, and its head had already debouched from the village.

It was also learnt at the same time that in presence of this movement of the adversary, the brigade of heavy cavalry had

drawn in its outposts and had retired on the main road in line with Hunsbach, the squadron on the right (2nd of Uhlans) marching towards Keffenach, and that on the left (3rd of same regiment) towards Hunsbach.

This brigade could already be seen retiring at a walk on the main road; the 3rd squadron of Uhlans had approached close to the point of observation where the General Commanding Division stood, and fronted there, the ~~half~~ troop stationed at the railway bridge still remaining in position.

As regards the body of cavalry coming from Köhlendorf, it had disappeared behind the heights north of the Selzbach. According to reports from patrols, and to judge by the movement of the regiment of Chasseurs on its right flank, it must have taken the direction of Hermersweiler. The last-mentioned regiment only could still be seen near Hofen.

Lieutenant-General A. now sent orders to the brigade of Dragoons to advance two of its squadrons as far as the southern exit of Hunsbach to support the 3rd squadron of Uhlans if necessary.

From the various reports that had been received, and from what had been personally observed, it was certain that the enemy was carrying out a concentrated movement towards Sulz from Wörth, Surburg, Reimersweiler, and Köhlendorf. Report thereof was sent to Weissenburg to be communicated to the V. Corps and the Headquarters of the Army, as well as to the advanced guard of the XI. Corps, it being at the same time added that the Division would gradually retire towards Weissenburg, according as it was more or less pressed by the adversary. This being the situation, the General congratulated himself that he had not this morning ordered the brigade of Dragoons to cross over to the left bank of the Hausauerbach. Should the adversary, as now to all appearance was his intention, remain on the right bank, it was probable that owing to the accidents of the ground his cavalry would either operate in separate columns or must execute a wide turning movement west of the wood of Schönenburg as soon as the two brigades opposed his advance. The heavy brigade would not have sufficed to keep the adversary in check, as it was already known that each of his two brigades consisted of three regiments; the adversary's united forces were therefore to our brigade as three to one.

On the other hand, the natural and correct desire not to cede a foot of ground voluntarily to the enemy was, under existing

circumstances, not without its dangers. First of all, the ground was certainly not suitable for the action of large bodies of cavalry, and sight must not be lost of the fact that the only line of retreat lay through the defile of Ingolsheim, which was but little over one mile in rear. The difficult railway crossing over the Schempen-stream could be used by large bodies of cavalry only if they were not pressed by the enemy. But if the two brigades and the battery should be compelled to retire in *one* column, they would form a mass more than 3,000 paces long, that is to say, the head of the column would be at Ingolsheim whilst the rear would still be at the brickfield north-east of Schönenburg.

By maintaining the Division a little longer in the position it now occupied, there was, however, a further advantage. It would then be possible to manœuvre the brigade of Hussars through Aschbach and Leitersweiler upon the flanks and rear of the adversary, thereby not only causing the latter to hesitate in his movements, but permitting the brigade to ascertain whether fresh bodies were advancing from the forest of Hagenau in rear of the force, now in view, whose strength had been ascertained yesterday.

In pursuing this course, however, the brigade of Hussars would, at the very moment when united action became imperative, slip out of hand, and it would, in its isolated position, be exposed to all sorts of eventualities, especially should further bodies of troops be really advancing from Hagenau. It was no doubt very desirable to gain information of any hostile troops that might be in rear of those now met with, but it would be far better to leave the duty of gaining such information to patrols than to endanger the whole force by entrusting such an exploit to an entire brigade.

The General considered it, therefore, more judicious, under the circumstances, to retire the two brigades in rear of the defile of Ingolsheim. In doing so, however, the bridges over the Hausauerbach would require to be occupied by a detachment of the Dragoons in order to cover the right flank of the Hussars.

7 A.M. These intentions were not, however, carried out. It was now 7 A.M. Further reports stated that the enemy's Lancers had reached Retschweiler and his infantry the heights north of Sulz. From the point of observation where the General Commanding Division stood, infantry could also be clearly distinguished at Hermersweiler, while numerous hostile

horsemen as well as several small parties of cavalry were observed on both sides of the village.

At this time attention was directed to the south-east, from which point suddenly a heavy artillery and musketry fire could be heard.

Over the roofs of the houses at Leitersweiler, situated in the valley below, a large number of guns in action (about two batteries) could be distinctly perceived on the plateau which descends from Rittershofen towards the valley of the river. Their shells exploded near Ober-Rödern as well as in the ground extending towards Aschbach.

The nature of the smoke which ascended from different points near the saw-mills at Leitersweiler indicated that an engagement between skirmishers was going on there.

Whilst the field glasses were exclusively directed to those two points, it was not perceived at first that something else of great importance was going on at the time.

It was first remarked by one of the officers acting as galloper that there appeared to be bodies of troops on the right of the batteries. Looking to that side, not only could a large body of Cuirassiers be distinguished halted about 1,500 paces north of Rittershofen, but a second body of Cuirassiers could soon after be seen moving along the plateau of Kühllendorf and marching towards Leitersweiler.

At first the presence of these Cuirassiers could not be explained. The belief was entertained that a single regiment only of the brigade with which the Division had been engaged the previous day, and which had been seen just now to disappear east of Hohweiler, had taken the direction of Hermersweiler, and that the other, on the contrary, was yet at Leitersweiler and Rittershofen, and that therefore the strength of the force now approaching had been miscalculated. It was, moreover, difficult at that moment to judge precisely of the strength of the still visible columns; but the more one looked at them, the more one became convinced that each of these columns consisted of one regiment at the least, if not of a brigade. Again, the officer whose duty it had been to observe the cavalry which had been perceived south of Hofen stated most positively that that cavalry marched behind the crest of Hermersweiler. It could, therefore, no longer be doubted that the adversary had also at his immediate disposal his Reserve Cavalry Division (four regiments of Cuirassiers,) which corresponded with the *ordre de bataille* as communicated by the Headquarters of the Army.

Under these circumstances, the General did not hesitate an instant to revert to his first plan, viz., to throw the brigade of Dragoons over to the other bank of the Hausauerbach. Sufficient was known as to the forces which were before him on the right bank of the river; in presence of the adversary's infantry and of his superiority in cavalry, the forces which he had at disposal were not sufficient to obtain more complete information, or to arrest for any length of time the march of the enemy's columns. The principal object of the General now was to maintain himself as long and as far advanced as possible on the left bank of the river, in order to gain information as to the fresh forces which followed the adversary.

The brigade of Dragoons accordingly received the order "to cross the river in two columns at the mill of Hunsbach and at the railway station north of the latter, taking care to occupy the bridges on the left bank after having arrived there."

The heavy brigade was informed of this, and was directed "to cover the march of the Dragoons and then to retire with its main body beyond the defile of Ingolsheim, without, however losing contact with the enemy."

7.30 A.M. At 7.15 these orders were being executed; at 7.30 the brigade of Dragoons had reached the left bank of the river, whither the General Commanding Division had also gone. The brigade of heavy cavalry had already commenced its retrograde movement. On the part of the enemy, a strong column of Lancers and a battery of artillery could be seen descending at a sharp trot, by the road from Sulz, towards the bridge across the Winzen brook; two squadrons which formed the advanced guard had already passed Schönenburg. The regiment of Chasseurs was still halted at Hofen. The large body of cavalry which had been perceived at Leitersweiler had commenced to move in its turn. As to that from Rittershofen, it was hidden by the heights, but its artillery still continued its fire.

Fresh reports had been received during these events; they were as follows:—

1st. The squadron of the 1st regiment of Uhlans on the right flank had reported that the cavalry patrols of the V. Army Corps had been driven out of the Liebwald by hostile infantry. Two hostile squadrons having crossed the Frösche-weiler stream at the mill of Lobsann, the squadron of Uhlans from that corps had quitted its position at 6.30 A.M. and retired through the wood north of Lobsann towards Drachenbronn.

2nd. A report from the brigade of Hussars from the height south of Aschbach (7 A.M.), stated that "large bodies of hostile cavalry, about three or four regiments of Cuirassiers, were visible on the heights north of Rittershofen, and that two batteries were also in position there firing towards the Saw Mills and towards Ober-Rödern, at which places we occupy the bridges with our advanced guards. Infantry is also seen at Leitersweiler, but for the moment it does not appear to be numerous."

An order was at once sent to the brigade of Hussars "to make every effort to prevent the enemy from breaking through the line from the Saw Mills to Bühl." It was at the same time informed that the brigade of Dragoons had gone over to the left bank of the Hausauerbach to support it.

The General Commanding Division had personally gone to the southernmost point of the hill (179) opposite the mill of Hunspach, where the brigade of Dragoons had taken up a position under cover between that hill and a height (184) situated a little to the east of the former.

From this point of observation the General perceived at once, west of Aschbach, the brigade of Hussars moving at a trot in the direction of the enemy, and he also saw a strong column of hostile cavalry marching along the valley of the Selz, in rear of the height of Hermersweiler, in an easterly direction towards Hofen.

A despatch was at the same time received from the brigade of Hussars announcing that hostile infantry had taken possession of the Saw and Finken Mills, as well as of Ober-Rödern, and that strong bodies of cavalry were passing at these different points, under the protection of two batteries. The General Commanding at once ordered the brigade of Dragoons, which had left a squadron at the two points where they had crossed the Hausauerbach, and which now numbered seven squadrons only, to march off at a trot to support the Hussars (7.33 A.M.).

But the latter, having suddenly arrested their movement and retired again behind Aschbach, a counter order was sent to the Dragoons. A moment after, an officer of Hussars arrived with the following report:—

"Two of the enemy's regiments of Cuirassiers have crossed the Engelbach at Bühl, while strong bodies of cavalry have already formed on the left bank of that stream and of the Hausauerbach, at Ober-Rödern and at the Saw Mills. The

Brigadier estimates the whole force of cavalry before him at from six to eight regiments, with three batteries."

In this state of affairs a repulse of the enemy beyond the Engelbach with only fourteen squadrons at disposal could not be thought of. The General considered it necessary first of all to unite the forces under his command, and then to seek for a position sufficiently advantageous to compensate for the disadvantage in numbers.

Consequently, he ordered the brigade of Hussars to "retire slowly, and without losing contact with the enemy, in the direction of Ober-Seebach, until on a level with the Dragoons" (7.35 A.M.).

The heavy brigade could at the same moment be perceived executing its retreat through Ingolsheim. A squadron of Uhlans (3rd) had crossed the Schempenbach at the railway bridge and halted north of it at the other side, occupying the bridge with dismounted men. At Hunspach and at Oberhof, patrols of Uhlans could still be seen face to face with patrols of the enemy's cavalry. A large detachment of the enemy appeared to have taken up a covered position at Schönenburg.

8 A.M.—In executing the order given to the Hussars, that brigade arrived at Ober-Seebach (with seven squadrons), and took up a position in two small valleys which lead from the southern entrance and from the centre of the village in a westerly direction; the battery had taken up a position, under escort of a squadron, about 500 paces in front on the heights near the road to Nieder-Seebach, and had unlimbered. Connection with the 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars, which had been at Nieder-Rödern, and which had been ordered to retire towards Tombach, was completely cut off. The two regiments of Dragoons were halted on the right and in front of the brigade of Hussars, behind heights 179 and 184; the General Commanding Division was on height 179.

On the right bank of the Hausauerbach the brigade of heavy cavalry had formed on the other side of Ingolsheim; its battery was in position on the height north of the village.

On the part of the enemy, the brigade of Cuirassiers which had passed by Bühl had arrived on the height south-east of Nieder-Seebach; a battery which accompanied it took position on this height and opened fire on the 3rd Battery Horse Artillery. Two other batteries had also come into action

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respectively north and north-west of Aschbach (178 and 176); large bodies of cavalry could be seen moving south of the village; heavy clouds of dust ascended at the same time at different points; it was therefore probable that the enemy was preparing to follow up his offensive movements, and might be expected to make his appearance at any moment. The distance and the nature of the ground did not permit of learning anything more of importance; one squadron of Chasseurs only moved along the border of the plateau and approached the point where the General stood.

On the other bank of the Hausauerbach, about two squadrons of Lancers had arrived in the environs of Hunsbach; a large body of cavalry, also Lancers, had followed the main road and taken up a covered position at Oberhof; the battery which accompanied it had gone to the front to the north of Oberhof, and was firing upon the battery at Ingolsheim. Further back, a large body of infantry was perceived on the plateau of Schönenburg. As to the regiment of Dragoons, it was not known what had become of it for the moment.

The favourable point of observation chosen by the General had permitted him to distinguish the movements of the enemy's troops as plainly as possible, *i.e.*, those that were in his immediate front.

It was quite clear that seven regiments of cavalry and three batteries of artillery were advancing along the left bank of the Hausauerbach (these were the four Cuirassier regiments of the Reserve Division, together with the brigade of Cuirassiers of the Cavalry Division of the I. Army Corps and the regiment of Chasseurs, which had marched from Hermersweiler and had passed beyond the Finken Mill).

On the other bank, in addition, there could be seen three other regiments of the Cavalry Division of the I. Army Corps. It could not at that time be ascertained what bodies of infantry—especially from Wörth—had followed them up. In any case it was pretty certain that the same brigade of infantry which had the day before arrived at Surburg and Reimersweiler would also to-day follow up the movements of its advancing cavalry. The General Commanding could not therefore now expect to maintain himself much longer on the two banks of the Hausauerbach; the general situation, however, demanded imperiously that the ground

south of the Lauter should not be abandoned. In presence of the great superiority of the opposing cavalry, there was no chance of keeping them in check for any length of time except by uniting the forces at disposal and by finding ground sufficiently favourable to leave nothing to fear on the score of a flank attack. But this concentration could not be effected except by retiring still further and at least as far as the environs of Riedselz and Oberdorf.

There the open ground narrows considerably. If the bridge over the Selz and Riedselz-Oberdorf were occupied by dismounted men, and also the narrow portion of the wood which runs along the road from Gutleithof to Schleithal, and if then a position for attack were taken up more to the rear of these points, there was reason to believe that the ground south of the Lauter could still be maintained, at least as long as the superior force of the enemy's cavalry only was opposed to the Division.

Already, at 8.5 A.M., the brigade of heavy cavalry had received orders to retire in rear of Riedselz. It was originally the intention of the General to wait until this movement was executed ere he directed the two light brigades to retire; but it was already 8.12 A.M., and the heavy brigade could still be seen halted near Ingolsheim. Owing to the movements now visible on the part of the adversary, it was impossible to allow the light regiments to remain any longer in their present position. An order was consequently sent to the brigade of Hussars to march round Ober-Seebach and take up a position east of the village across the road to Fort Louis in order to parry any turning movement which the Cuirassiers might attempt on that side; the brigade of Dragoons, on its part, was ordered to retire along a country road in rear of height 190, distant about 3,000 paces.

At 8.24 A.M. the Dragoons commenced their movement; three minutes later the Hussars began to move off. At 8.55 A.M. both brigades had gained their new positions, and the heavy brigade could now be seen to commence its retrograde movement.

At the same hour information was also received that the 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars, which had been detached at Nieder-Rüdern, had rejoined its brigade. This squadron had, owing to the advance of the hostile Cuirassiers beyond Bühl, to cut its way through the enemy's lines. It had been

fortunate enough to surprise and disperse a squadron of the enemy's Cuirassiers in the environs of Tombach. It had then made a detour through Siegen and Frohnackerhof and rejoined the Division without further hindrance.

During this general retrograde movement of the several brigades, the enemy had also gained more ground. The Cuirassiers which had arrived at Nieder-Seebach had moved towards the main road from Fort Louis, and were now advancing on both sides of that road, while their battery was unlimbered east of the road between it and height 177, exchanging shots with the 3rd Battery Horse Artillery, which had taken up a position at a distance of about 2,500 paces on the same side of the main road on the road leading from the northern part of Ober-Seebach to Frohnackerhof.

The large body of Cuirassiers which had been seen at Aschbach had moved off from that village at a trot and advanced (8.25 A.M.) as far as heights 179 and 184, which had previously been occupied by the brigade of Dragoons. Their two batteries, supported by some squadrons of Chasseurs, were in position east of height 184; while on that height a large group of horsemen could be perceived—presumably, a superior staff; a small party of Chasseurs was also seen near the edge of the valley at height 179.

On the other bank of the Hausauerbach the Lancers had approached Ingolsheim, but the adversary's infantry had been lost sight of.

About this time the 1st Battery of Horse Artillery of the 5th regiment of Artillery arrived at Riedselz-Oberdorf, an arrival which was very welcome to the Division. As General A. had already decided to continue the retrograde movement, he ordered the battery to take up a position on the height north-east of Riedselz-Oberdorf in support of the retreat of the light brigades.

At 8.30 A.M. the latter received orders to commence their movements. The brigade of Hussars was ordered to retire slowly along the road from Fort Louis and to show a front east of the road on a level with the 1st Battery Horse Artillery. It was ordered at the same time to occupy with a dismounted squadron the south-east extremity of the wood which lines the road from Gutleithof to Schleithal.

The regiments of Dragoons were ordered to retreat along the road near which they were now halted, behind height 190, and to retire in rear of height 185; they had orders to

occupy Riedselz-Oberdorf and the bridge over the Selz with two dismounted squadrons.

The two brigades were also to observe the enemy without interruption by means of officers. The General Commanding the Division, after leaving behind one of his aides-de-camp with three orderlies for the purpose of observation, and having ascertained that his orders were now being executed as directed, left his position on height 190, and followed the brigade of Dragoons on the road of which we have just now spoken.

En route, the aide-de-camp who had early that morning been sent to Weissenburg rejoined him. This officer had awaited the arrival of the commander of the 9th Division of Infantry until 8 A.M. The favourable news which he brought considerably changed the still very critical situation of the Cavalry Division. The main body of the 17th brigade had arrived with two batteries at Weissenburg. The brigade being now again concentrated, the commander had occupied, with detachments, the debouches from the mountain, the town of Weissenburg, as well as the bridges of Altenstatt and Saint-Rémy; the rest of the troops, that is to say, 4 battalions, 3 batteries, and 3 squadrons, were ordered to gain the heights of the Geisberg and to occupy the bridge at Riedselz.

The rest of the 9th Division was still on the march, and the head of the column was timed to arrive at Weissenburg at 10.30 A.M. Orders had been given to the batteries marching in rear to hasten their march.

We should add, that half-an-hour ago orders had been given to the transport, &c., of the Cavalry Division to quit the left bank of the Lauter and to march five miles to the rear on the road to Landau.

The light brigades were enabled to execute their retreat at a walk without being pressed by the enemy; towards 9 A.M. they had reached the new positions which had been assigned to them north and north-east of height 185, and had placed themselves on each side of the road. The infantry of the 17th brigade could already be perceived descending the height of Shaffbusch Farm by the main road and approaching the bridge at Riedselz.

The heavy cavalry had retired a quarter of an hour earlier in rear of Riedselz. The Cavalry Division was now in a position to oppose the enemy, sword in hand, should he

attempt any offensive movement; the General therefore resolved to concentrate the whole of his Division for the combat which appeared to be imminent.

Consequently he sent the heavy brigade orders to rejoin rapidly the main body of the Division, as soon as the ground at Riedselz was occupied by the infantry. At 9.15 A.M. this movement had already been carried out. The Commander of the brigade reported that his whole brigade was ready, and informed the General that Uhlans of the V. Corps covered his right flank, that the enemy's regiment of Dragoons had principally moved between the main road and the road from Wörth to Weissenburg, on the latter of which it had left a squadron, and had then joined the brigade of Lancers which was still halted at Ingolsheim. He added, besides, that only three squadrons of Dragoons in all had been perceived, and that as regards the squadron of Hussars which had that morning been reported as coming from Surburg, nothing more had been seen of it. As to the ambulance, which had passed the night at Ingolsheim, Major-General B. had directed it towards Gutleithof.

Under the pressure of events, the Staff of the Division had completely neglected to take any steps regarding this detachment, which was the more to be regretted as the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 1st Hussars had had a serious combat with the enemy's infantry at the Engelbach, and had suffered heavy losses.

The heavy cavalry was placed behind the light cavalry. The enemy having during these events halted on both sides of Ober-Seebach, about 4,000 paces distant, the brigades were ordered to dismount; two squadrons, one of Hussars and one of Dragoons, were sent to the front to cover the brigades and to observe the enemy's movements with their patrols. The whole of the batteries under the command of Major L. were unlimbered east of the height 185. The enemy's artillery could not be seen, and the firing had ceased along the whole line.

Such was the situation at 9.30 A.M. Nothing had been heard of the XI. Corps, but the Commander of the 9th Infantry Division arrived about that time to have an interview with the General Commanding the Cavalry Division.

A telegram, embodying the situation as existing at that moment, and reporting the appearance of the enemy's Reserve Cavalry Division, was prepared and sent to Weissenburg,

to be immediately transmitted by wire to the Headquarters of the Third Army.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE RETREAT OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION UNTIL 9.30 A.M.

During the early hours of the morning of the 2nd August, in presence of the gradually increasing superiority of the enemy, the 1st Division of Cavalry saw itself obliged to renounce all idea of taking the initiative, and to regulate its movements according to those of the hostile forces opposed to it.

It would appear at first sight that the conduct of the Division as the situation developed itself, both as regards the measures ordered and their execution, might be called free from blame, and that it correctly responded to the various demands exacted by the changing situation.

Judging by the result this opinion might well appear perfectly sound, as although the adversary commenced his offensive movement at 5 A.M., yet at 9.30 A.M. the Division had retired but five miles, and had not experienced the least check in doing so.

This result was obtained, under the very eyes of the enemy's cavalry, owing to the brigades having been continually ready for combat, having shown a bold front at every important point, and having abandoned ground only when the enemy's great superiority rendered it imperatively necessary.

The fact, however, must not be lost sight of that the Cavalry of the Army of the South followed up but very slowly.

However that may be, the result obtained under the particular circumstances in which the Division was placed appears to be satisfactory.

Nevertheless, when we examine more closely the operations of the Division, we shall probably be obliged to confess that either it had from the beginning of the day been placed in an entirely false position, or that grave faults had been committed in the dispositions which were made in order to free it from such position.

Of course it must be conceded that when one is obliged to regulate one's movements by those of an adversary, all one's intentions and dispositions will vary as often as a change of circumstances presents itself—we take, so to speak, the colour, the shading from our adversary.

But when, by doing so, we are placed in a situation which requires constant modification of our original intentions, and but seldom allows those intentions and dispositions to be executed at all, then it is merely by a lucky chance that we can hope to get out of the dilemma successfully.

That was precisely the case here.

At first the General Commanding Division awaits quietly the moment when the enemy will disclose his projected movements, in order to move his reserve—the brigade of Dragoons—accordingly, i.e., either to let it remain on the right bank of the Hausauer, or direct it to cross over to the left bank.

But as between 6 and 7 A.M. the enemy is seen to debouch simultaneously from Wörth, Surburg, and Reimersweiler, Lieutenant-General A.'s plan receives a check, and he perceives that he cannot reasonably hope to remain any longer in front of Ingolsheim; he decides therefore, to retire with the heavy and Dragoon brigades in rear of that place.

This intention was not, however, executed; the enemy's right wing is seen to be reinforced by his reserve cavalry, and the danger which threatens from that point is at once recognised.

It is now believed to be necessary to send the regiments of Dragoons to the left bank, and to retire the heavy cavalry in rear of Ingolsheim. Should the adversary press hard during these movements, danger would probably result.

Under these circumstances the brigade of Hussars is ordered to prevent, with all possible energy, the enemy from advancing beyond the line Sawmills-Bühl.

But it is soon ascertained that the strength of the brigade is not sufficient to carry out these orders.

The Dragoons, who have only just arrived on the left bank, are ordered to support the Hussars.

But this project is abandoned before it can be put into execution, because the Hussars are soon compelled to retire (7.33 A.M.).

The only plan that appears under these circumstances to promise some success is that of retiring the brigade of Hussars as far as Ober-Seebach (7.35 A.M.).

Scarcely has the latter taken up its new position (8 A.M.) when it is perceived that the idea of opposing the enemy in his forward movement between Ober-Seebach and the Hausauer must be renounced, owing to the threatening turning movement on the part of the adversary's right wing.

The General now sees the impossibility of maintaining the Division any longer on both banks of the Hausauer, and shortly after 8 A.M. gives orders to concentrate the Division in rear, which movement is executed by 9 A.M. During the whole of this time the intention of retiring in the direction of the XI. Corps, notwithstanding the importance previously attached to this movement, is never thought of; the course of events had naturally caused that plan to be entirely lost sight of.

From what has here been stated we may justly conclude *that it was by a mere chance only that the Division was enabled to reach without danger the environs of Riedselz-Oberdorf.* As luck would have it, nothing was done precipitately, nothing was misunderstood, no isolated measures were taken by any of the separated columns—as might well have been done in a perfectly legitimate way—every movement on the part of the enemy happened to be ascertained in good time, even if not till the last moment perhaps, and every order, the execution of which was of great importance, was correctly interpreted and effectually carried out.

But the main thing, that is to say, the reason why the enemy did not advance more rapidly and with more energy, was unknown and beyond the control of the General Commanding Division.

How far blame may be attached to the adversary on account of his movements, or whether his conduct was, perhaps, regulated by existing circumstances, we shall learn later on when we gain more insight into the situation as it then really existed. In order, however, to make it perfectly clear to what danger the 1st Cavalry Division exposed itself in acting as it did, let us just take one particular instance out of many which occurred during that morning, and let us closely examine what the consequences might have been.

For this purpose we will take the situation as it stood at 8 A.M. At that moment the brigade of Hussars had arrived west and south-west of Ober-Seebach respectively; the brigade of Dragoons was to the right front of the Hussars, in rear of heights 184 and 179, with its right upon the edge of the valley of the Hausauer stream. On the other side of the river the brigade of heavy cavalry held the ground near Ingolsheim.

In the face of these positions, the enemy had a brigade of

Cuirassiers on the heights south-east of Nieder-Seebach, and five other regiments south of Aschbach. Should these masses of cavalry take the offensive at 8 A.M., the four regiments of light cavalry would be obliged to retire in all haste in presence of the great superiority of the enemy and owing to the danger of being taken in the left flank. Should the enemy, pursuing his movement, not encounter any resistance, he could advance in half-an-hour, that is, by 8.30 A.M., as far as the farm of Geitershof and the railway station of Riedselz-Oberdorf, and his right wing might even be 2,000 paces further advanced.

It cannot be denied that the light brigade would have been able to make their retreat good in perfect security. But can the same be said of the heavy brigade? Supposing that General A., fearing an imminent attack, a little after 8 A.M. had sent an aide-de-camp to the heavy brigade to order them to retire behind the defile of Riedselz, and that this officer had left at 8.5 A.M. As the presence of Lancers at Hunspach had already been noticed, the other bank of the river could not be gained except by the bridge south of the railway station Riedselz-Oberdorf. Considering the difficulties of the ground, the necessity of ascending and again descending the slopes on either side of the valley, it would take this officer under the most favourable circumstances nineteen minutes to traverse a distance of 7,500 paces, which distance he would have to cover in order to arrive on height 196 north of Ingolsheim, and—always supposing that Major-General B. had already arrived on this height—he could not fulfil his mission before 8.24 A.M. If to the above time we add but one minute more—during which the message would be delivered and the necessary orders issued by Major-General B.—and admit that the regiment of Cuirassiers commenced its movements at that hour, the regiment, which then would have been a little to the east of height 196, could at a trot reach the bridge over the Selz brook with its leading squadron about seven minutes later, that is to say, at 8.32 A.M.

If we add to this, that the battery of Horse Artillery and the two squadrons of Uhlans which had occupied Ingolsheim would follow immediately in rear of the regiment of Cuirassiers, leaving the two squadrons of Uhlans which were detached to the flanks to find their own way to the rear, we shall have a column in retreat along the main road measuring about 1,700 paces in length. Marching at a trot,

the rear of the column could not reach the defile of Ingolsheim until 8.38 A.M.

Although we have admitted in our calculations much more latitude than under existing circumstances would really have been given, yet we are driven to the conclusion that *the two brigades of light cavalry should without hesitation have attacked the superior forces of the adversary's cavalry on the left bank of the Hausauer, in order to permit their own heavy brigade to execute its retreat in safety.*

Our conclusion would not be in the least modified even if the heavy brigade had effected its retreat at a gallop. *Let us here remark, that nothing is more dangerous for cavalry than to execute a retreat at a rapid pace; whenever circumstances permit, cavalry should effect it at a walk.* If, on the contrary, the gallop is resorted to, especially when in column of route, and if by bad luck some shells should fall among the ranks, the retreating troops will often fall into disorder, and the movement may even degenerate into a complete rout.

To the observations which we have made above, the reply may be made that it is not rational to suppose that the two light brigades would have effected a continuous retreat in presence of the enemy, and moreover, by giving the heavy brigade instructions different to those issued, it might have been enabled to effect its retreat sooner.

There may be much to be said for these two objections, but it is difficult to admit them under the circumstances which presented themselves here.

As regards an attempt on the part of the light brigades to retard the enemy's advance, *i.e.*, to check *without combat*, it is quite true that the march of an adversary, even superior in numbers, may often be checked without engaging in actual combat. It would be so, for instance, supposing the troops of the two adversaries to be equally good, when the superiority in numbers is not too considerable, or when the weaker side finds ground which compensates for inferiority in numbers, especially when the adversary attempts a frontal attack only.

But these considerations did not exist here. The superiority of seven regiments and three batteries against four regiments and one battery is far too great. Besides, the ground enabled the cavalry of the Southern Army to advance on a broad front; they had the advantage of a field favourable for the attack, and were, in addition, from the commencement in a position to direct considerable forces against the flanks

or rear of the adversary. Under such circumstances it is impossible for the weaker side to maintain its ground for any length of time. It is *carried back*, so to speak; it cannot make a halt, except the adversary should do so, or unless more favourable ground be reached or reinforcements arrive.

As regards the issue of different instructions to the brigade of heavy cavalry so as to permit it to retire in good time, that could only be effected by giving instructions beforehand

But there are difficulties in the way of doing this. Instructions are not issued to troops beforehand, except when the leader has reason to suppose that direct orders cannot be communicated to such troops at the desired moment, so as to ensure ready execution. That plea is not, however, admissible here with troops that are in position under the leader's eyes.

Had it been desirable to give instructions of this nature in advance, the officer commanding the heavy brigade could only have been told, "You will evacuate the position at Ingolsheim and retire in rear of the ground at Riedselz as soon as the brigade of Dragoons on the left bank has commenced its retreat."

But instructions of such a nature might have occasioned grave consequences. Major-General B., who necessarily took his stand north of Ingolsheim, would be distant about 3,500 paces from the brigade of Dragoons. Several hill-tops, some of which were covered with low trees, steep slopes, and deep ravines, obstructed the view. The General was therefore never able to observe satisfactorily the actual position of the brigade, still less could he have it every moment under his eyes.

He was liable to mistake a simple change of position of some squadrons, for a retrograde movement, and supposing that the General Commanding had been compelled, owing to the movements of the enemy's troops, to send the brigade of Dragoons north of Ober-Seebach, to the east side of that village, the Brigadier would infallibly, from the point where he made his observation, have taken such a movement for a retreat, and would have believed the moment to have arrived when he was to evacuate his position at Ingolsheim.

Such instructions should be issued only when the troops to which they are addressed are in a position to clearly and distinctly observe the movements of the body of troops by which their own are to be regulated, as, for instance, in the case of a second line in rear of its first line.

From these observations it may be concluded that the leading of the Division during the first hours of the morning cannot be approved of, notwithstanding the success obtained, and that, had the enemy handled his troops differently, the Division might have had to pay dearly for its dispositions.

We must now point out where mistakes had been committed.

If we, first of all, consider the different rendezvous assigned to the troops for assembly during the morning of the 2nd August, their relation to each other, and their relative position as regards the outposts and the enemy's lines, we shall arrive at the following figures:—

The rendezvous of the two brigades placed in first line, the heavy brigade at Schöenburg, and the Hussars at Aschbach, were, as the crow flies, within 7,000 paces of each other, and were separated by the Hausauerbach; they could not, in fact, mutually support each other except by a circuitous route.

The regiments of Dragoons which formed the reserve were at Hunsbach, about 2,500 paces from the heavy cavalry, and nearly 6,000 paces from the brigade of Hussars.

The nearest vedettes were 2,500 paces from Hunsbach and from Aschbach, and the extent of the whole line of outposts, not counting the detached squadrons, was about seven miles.

The enemy's outposts had the same extent, and were not farther off than 2,500 paces.

It must, then, be evident that, although the brigade of Dragoons was enabled, in case of necessity, to give support to the heavy cavalry, neither one or other of these two could have in any shape given opportune assistance to the Hussars, and similarly the brigade of Hussars on its part was unable to support the other two brigades.

It is true that at first six cavalry regiments only were believed to be in the immediate front, and it was supposed that these, separated by a wide space of ground, would require the first few hours of the morning to unite their forces, in order to make a forward march. But sight was thereby lost of the most important point; *it had been forgotten that the Division was in front of the heads of columns of a whole army on the march.* Although on the evening of the 1st August it had been already ascertained what forces were in the enemy's first line, it could not be at all predicted, considering the extent of the line he occupied, from what points

and with what forces he would advance on the morning of the 2nd August.

In the face of this uncertainty, the leader of the 1st Division of Cavalry should above all have taken such measures as would have ensured his having his forces completely and firmly in hand, *i.e., he should have placed his brigades in such close position to each other as to be able in accordance with his orders to give mutual and immediate support, irrespective of any events that might subsequently happen.*

But such a result could never be obtained as long as it was intended to keep command of both sides of the Hausauer stream, as in that case it became necessary to cover at the same time the road Sulz-Weissenburg and the whole of the ground between the stream and the road from Fort Louis, each with one brigade, thereby necessitating the separation of the Division into two columns.

The result of these remarks goes to show that instead of selecting, as was done here, three rendezvous at points so far distant from each other, it would have been preferable to unite the whole Division in the environs of Riedselz-Oberdorf. It is, of course, quite evident that the outposts could not then have remained on the heights of Sulz and Aschbach, but would have been replaced by advanced guards of, say, two or three squadrons, each pushed to the front along each bank of the river.

The adversary could then have been uninterruptedly observed in the same manner as we have already described on previous occasions.

This view of the situation again confirms the opinion already expressed as regards the cantonments for the troops, namely, that it would have been better if on the evening of the 1st August the cantonments had been chosen a little further distant from the enemy, and if, correspondingly, the outposts had been thrown a little further back.*

As a general result of these observations it is clear that —*the Cavalry Division must remain concentrated while retiring*

* Here we have alluded only to what has already been remarked as to the position of the Division (p. 285). We have already shown there how much more preferable it would have been, in presence of the superiority of the enemy, to choose cantonments within a narrower radius and further in rear. The events that happened in the early morning of the 2nd August demonstrate in detail the necessity for such a course.

before a superior adversary, and it is not always in a position to remain with its larger bodies of troops in immediate contact with the enemy.

We are of opinion that a clear distinction must be made between "manœuvring" and "evolutions."

In sight of the enemy, i.e., in his immediate presence, the time for manœuvring cavalry has generally passed, and that for evolutions has arrived, that is to say, for movements which will at any moment admit of the combined action of the whole force against the adversary.

Certain habits are contracted during times of peace which, owing to the fact that the tactical decision can only be indicated in peace exercises, lead to the execution of manœuvres before the very eyes of the enemy. There is a very great tendency to carry such ideas into warfare, and it is precisely for this reason that we have endeavoured to indicate in our remarks the dangers to which such ideas will lead. As long as it is only a question of going in search of the enemy on a broad front, as long as we can throw our feelers half a day's or a day's march to the front, so long, it is evident, can a Division of cavalry deploy its forces over a certain frontage.

But as soon as contact with the enemy has been established, and the situation will not allow you to fulfil your mission without fighting, the security of the Division demands a certain concentration of its forces.

The nearer the enemy is approached, the closer should that concentration be, especially if the adversary is also strong in cavalry. Notwithstanding the inherent rapidity of its movements, cavalry, once in presence of the enemy, is no longer in a position to execute manœuvres extending over a large space of ground with separated forces; the eventuality of a combat must be foreseen and the whole force must be held ready for action in one concentrated mass. The necessity for reconnoitring all ground outside the radius within which a combat may be imminent still exists, however, and must be carried out by means of small detachments.

During a retreat, the delay of the enemy's advance can only be effected by means of artillery fire and by deploying the troops. But for this object the ground must be well chosen.

Once the artillery has limbered up, the adversary will

gallop quite as fast as we do, as there is no infantry fire to keep him at bay 1,000 or more paces in rear, to force him to come to a halt and permit our troops in rear to effect their retreat in all possible security and prepare to cover the retreat of the rear guard at a suitable place. A halt with all the forces of a Cavalry Division should therefore never be made when in close proximity to the enemy unless the ground in rear allows them to retreat without necessarily forming in column of route. If the latter be the case, the main body of the Division should always be halted at a great distance from the enemy, and not more than one brigade or one regiment should be left with the artillery as a rear guard in the neighbourhood of the enemy.

In abnormal positions—for instance, when the enemy's cavalry is composed of rather inferior troops—these proceedings may, of course, be materially altered.

We have seen in our studies how the Division extended when it advanced in order to reconnoitre the country between the mountains and the Rhine.

Thanks to its numerical superiority, it was enabled to drive the enemy's cavalry back upon their infantry and to ascertain the position of the heads of the enemy's columns. But, from the moment the enemy took the offensive with considerable forces of all arms, the Division could no longer remain deployed on such a broad front, and was obliged to concentrate its forces.

Yet that the Division took but half measures in this respect, that it even remained up to 9 A.M. on the morning of the 2nd August in a certain state of semi-concentration, must be censured as a very grave fault indeed.

Had the Division concentrated at an early hour on the left bank of the Hausauerbach it would, perhaps, not have felt the superiority of the adversary so much; in any case it would have been in a position to seriously retard the enemy's march, which would have been of great importance in the particular position in which it was then placed. It would have sufficed to let some companies of infantry come up from Weissenburg to prevent the hostile cavalry which operated on the right bank of the river from passing beyond Riedselz. Even some dismounted squadrons might have been able to guard the defile.

It would have mattered little, really, whether the advance of the enemy's cavalry which preceded his columns could

have been temporarily arrested or not, as owing to the further advance of these columns of the Southern Army the moment was certain to arrive eventually, when the 1st Cavalry Division would be unable to fulfil *one part* of its mission.

That moment had now arrived; *the movements of its advanced infantry could now no longer be masked from the enemy.*

From this moment, however, the Cavalry Division enters into a new phase of its rôle, which forms the basis of its subsequent conduct, viz., *acting as the advanced guard of an army in intimate connection with the Infantry Division pushed to the front for a similar object.*

As regards the movements of the Army of the South, we are not in a position to describe them here as clearly and completely as could be done later on in the course of operations and after the publication of the history of the war.

However, even without a thorough knowledge of the whole situation, an explanation may here be given of the motives which guided the action of that army on the morning of the 2nd August.

The Reserve Cavalry Division (two brigades of Cuirassiers of two regiments each, with two batteries of Horse Artillery) had arrived on the afternoon of the 1st August near the right wing of the advanced guard Division, and had been allotted quarters at Rittershofen and Hatten as well as at Nieder and Ober-Betschdorf, and occupied bivouacs near those villages.

The orders of the General Commanding the Army of the South for the movements of the cavalry on the 2nd August were as follows:—

" . . . General X. will assume command of the whole cavalry of the I. Army Corps and of the Reserve Division (except the detached regiment of Hussars). General X. will order the brigade of cavalry which arrived at Wörth to-day to join his force; he will then at once take the offensive and force back the enemy's cavalry upon the advanced guards of its army; the position of the latter he will ascertain as exactly as possible."

In executing this order, General X. had directed the three regiments of cavalry stationed at Wörth (2 of Lancers and 1 of Dragoons) with one battery Horse Artillery, to move off at 5 A.M. and march towards Sulz by the main road, carefully covering their left flank.

The two regiments of Cuirassiers and the regiment of
(T.I.)

Chasseurs stationed at Köhlendorf and Reimersweiler (with one battery Horse Artillery) received orders to concentrate at Köhlendorf and be in readiness to advance.

The Reserve Cavalry Division was instructed to assemble at the same hour south of Rittershofen.

As the General knew that his adversary disposed of but six regiments, and that these regiments were located on both banks of the Hausauer stream, he resolved, first of all to wait until the regiments on the march from Würth should be sufficiently near to him to ensure their support. As soon as this was satisfactorily arranged, the six regiments of cavalry of the I. Army Corps should then advance along the right bank of the Hausauer stream from Sulz to Weissenburg against the four cavalry regiments which had been seen there the night before.

The Reserve Division was ordered to cross the Engel brook, at the same time driving the enemy's Hussars back from that place, and to continue its march in the direction of Weissenburg.

In executing these orders the Cavalry Division of the I. Army Corps concentrated at 6.45 a.m.

The adversary's advanced troops were driven in from the heights of Sulz, the brigade of cavalry from Würth had at that time arrived north of Sulz, the brigade of Cuirasiers stood in a covered position in rear of the heights of Hermersweiler, and the Chasseurs near Hofen.

The Reserve Division was on the march from Rittershofen to Ober-Rödern; as the bridges over the Engel brook were occupied by dismounted Hussars, it had been obliged to await the arrival of some companies of infantry whose support had been asked for from Reimersweiler on the previous evening. The companies had at that time only reached the ground north of Rittershofen.

Had not the Reserve Division here encountered such resistance as it was powerless to overcome, owing to its not being armed with carbines, it would at that time, according to the General's reckoning, have been at least at Aschbach.

This delay must therefore not be attributed to the troops themselves, but to their organisation as regards armament, the Division being solely composed of heavy cavalry.

However, the General cannot be held free from all blame. He had overlooked the fact that the squadrons of Chasseurs

with their carbines were much more requisite at the passages across the Engel brook than in the environs of Hermersweiler. There, in fact, the infantry columns were at his disposal, whose aid he might at any moment call into requisition; it was unnecessary to have cavalry armed with carbines at that point, but they would be required where the Reserve Cavalry Division was bound to cross the Engel brook, the bridges over which were known since the previous afternoon to be occupied by hostile dismounted Hussars.

During these events, General X. had gone to the front to reconnoitre. It was his intention not to press the adversary too hard in front at first. As he rode forward, the ground became rather difficult to get over, especially owing to numerous watercourses, which cut up the ground in a most unpleasant manner. The further operations along the right bank of the Hausauer must therefore take the form of manœuvring rather than that of an aimless advance against the adversary. A look at the map, however, showed that, on the other hand, on the opposite bank the conditions were much more favourable.

It seemed therefore desirable to wait until the Reserve Division had crossed the Engel brook and was in a position to act on the opposite bank of the stream.

During this reconnaissance, however, the General observed that the adversary sent reinforcements from Hunsbach on to the other bank. Under these circumstances it became necessary to direct the brigade of Cuirassiers to that place as well as the regiment of Chasseurs, the more so as it could distinctly be seen that the bridge at the Saw Mills had already been taken (towards 7.15 A.M.).

At 7.20 A.M. the necessary orders had already been given. The regiment of Chasseurs covered the march of the brigade of Cuirassiers, the head of whose column arrived at the bridge at the Saw Mills at 7.30 A.M.; the Chasseurs also, a little later on, passed across the bridge at the Finken Mill to the other bank.

At 7.42 A.M. these three regiments were again united at about 1,000 paces east of the latter place, their battery taking up a position in advance on height 184. General X. had also gone to that point, having previously ordered the brigade (Lancers and Dragoons) left on the other bank of the stream to follow the retreat of the enemy and to maintain touch with him uninterruptedly.

(L.T.)

Let us now review the conduct of the Reserve Division up to this time.

Its commander having discovered that morning by means of his advanced patrols that all the bridges over the Engel brook were occupied by hostile dismounted Hussars, was obliged to await the arrival of the infantry for which he had requisitioned. In order, however, not to remain idle, he had despatched at daybreak several officers with orders to reconnoitre the Engel brook. One of these officers reported that south of Bühl it was possible to ford the brook at several places, and that on the other bank but a small Hussar patrol could be perceived.

A brigade of Cuirassiers was therefore immediately sent there, being covered during its march by the heights of Hatten, and reached the brook south of Bühl at 7.15 A.M. At this moment the bridge at Rüdern had also been taken, and at 7.20 A.M. the rest of the Reserve Division was in the act of effecting its passage across the stream with the head of the column.

The bridge having been hastily reconstructed, the passage of it demanded great precaution, the horses having to be led.

Owing to these difficulties, and although the leading squadrons moved forward without delay, the rear of the Division did not reach the left bank until 7.42 A.M. The battery could not rejoin the brigade until some time later on.

General X. now united the two brigades (five regiments) at disposal at Aschbach; the two batteries present with the brigade were sent to the heights in front, north of the village, being escorted by two squadrons. The brigade on the extreme right of the Reserve Division which had crossed at Bühl received orders to continue its march east of Nieder-Seebach towards Ober-Seebach. At 7.50 A.M. the junction of the two brigades was effected at Aschbach, the right wing approaching Nieder-Seebach.

It was now intended to attack the adversary's cavalry which was visible in rear of heights 179 and 184, as well as at Ober-Seebach. All the officers had already been carefully instructed to that effect, when a report was received from the detached Cuirassier brigade, stating that hostile cavalry had been seen on its right flank south of Tombach, and that that cavalry had surprised and dispersed the Cuirassier squadron which was employed in covering the flank on the main road there.

An immediate advance under these circumstances was for the moment thought imprudent, as there was the danger of being, perhaps, taken in flank and rear by fresh bodies of hostile cavalry debouching from Tombach. Further reconnaissance had first to be made, and a certain loss of time put up with, before it was learnt that the hostile cavalry consisted of but one squadron of Hussars, which had cut itself a passage through from Nieder-Rödern in order to reach the road to Weissenburg. In this way it happened that it was not until 8.25 A.M. that the main body of General X.'s forces arrived south of heights 179 and 184, the places which the enemy's batteries had shortly before occupied, while the detached brigade of Cuirassiers reached the ground south-east of Ober-Seebach.

The enemy, who had during these events retired, again fronted about 3,500 paces further off, in rear of height 190, as well as in line with the latter position on both sides of the road. The fire from one battery completely commanded the ground between Ober-Seebach and the valley of the Hausauer. In order to open the attack, it was necessary, first of all, that the batteries of Horse Artillery should be brought nearer to enable them to silence the adversary's guns, or at least to compel him to retire. Before this intention could, however, be carried out, the adversary again began to retire at 8.30 A.M. This retreat being effected under the protection of two batteries, he could only be followed up with the greatest caution, in order to avoid the troops being exposed to heavy and useless losses. It also now appeared preferable that the main columns should be directed upon the road from Fort Louis, where the ground was much more open and less undulating. For this purpose the Reserve Division was concentrated on that road in line with the northern exit from Ober-Seebach, while the three regiments of the 1st Army Corps provisionally took up a covered position in rear of height 190. Such was the position of the cavalry of the Army of the South, now under consideration, at 9 A.M.

Meanwhile, however, the enemy's infantry was perceived descending the Geisberg; it was also observed that Riedselz-Oberdorf and that part of the wood west of Schleithal were occupied. That the last-mentioned two points were occupied by dismounted cavalry only was not discovered.

Under these circumstances, seeing now the whole of the hostile cavalry concentrated before him, General X. believed

it imprudent to follow up the advantages which he had gained up to the present.

He consequently sent orders to the commander of the Cavalry Brigade of the 1st Army Corps, which was still on the other bank of the stream, not to pass beyond Ingolsheim, but to endeavour to ascertain by means of patrols the position and strength of the enemy's forces in his front.

As the result of these observations it is obvious that the cavalry of the Army of the South, especially owing to the tardy arrival of its infantry at the Engel brook, and its insufficient reconnaissance on its right flank, met with serious delay in its forward movements.

With better dispositions and suitable precautions this would not have happened, and it would then have been very difficult for the 1st Cavalry Division, dispersed as it was, to maintain itself so long on the ground and carry out without accident the concentration of its forces. On the other hand, considering the situation, it is only too evident that had the 1st Cavalry Division been concentrated in good time on the left bank of the Hausauer, it would have had an opportunity of gaining a grand success over an adversary much superior in numbers. The moments most suitable for this purpose were especially while the cavalry of the Southern Army debouched from the passage across the Engel, and during the extended movement carried out by the extreme right wing on the road from Fort Louis.

EVENTS FROM 9.30 TO 11 A.M.

COMBAT OF THE UNITED DIVISION.

(See sketch, Appendix VII.*)

During the meeting of the two Divisional commanders east of Riedselz-Oberdorf, the events which had occurred up to the present and the dispositions taken in consequence were reviewed and discussed.

It was thus ascertained that according to a report sent in by the Uhlans of the V. Corps, the enemy's infantry also

* This sketch differs a little from the plan given in the account of the general staff on the engagement at Weissenburg. The different phases of the combat here described should, therefore, not be followed up on the latter plan, as otherwise, owing to the shading of the ground therein, the positions would not be quite correctly described.

had reached the environs of Drachenbronn, near the Brünner Mill.

The hostile cavalry had halted, roughly speaking, on the line Kleeburg—Ingolsheim—Ober-Seebach; some squadrons only and a few patrols had advanced beyond that line.

The General Commanding the 9th Infantry Division had caused Riedselz-Oberdorf and the bridge on the main road over the Selz stream to be occupied by a battalion of Rifles, and Rott by a battalion of infantry, while the remainder of the main body of the 17th Brigade (three battalions and one battery) was held in a position of reserve on the heights of Schafbusch. His regiment of Uhlans had been transferred to the other bank of the Selz stream; of the rest of the brigade, one battalion occupied Weissenburg and two companies each Weiler and Altenstatt.

Both Generals were determined to oppose at all cost a further forward march of the enemy. Although the position was very extended, yet owing to the deep valley of the upper Selz it was at places pretty strong.

As soon as the other brigade of the 9th Division should make its appearance there certainly would then be a prospect, even in presence of a great superiority of the enemy's forces, of resisting successfully for some time. General A. undertook to cover the left flank of the infantry by occupying the not unfavourable ground between the Niederwald and the road Weissenburg—Sulz, and by maintaining touch with the XI. Corps.

As it was mentioned that the bend of the wood along the road Gutleithof—Schleithal was already occupied by dismounted Hussars, the General Commanding the 9th Division offered to relieve them by a company of Rifles, which offer General A. gladly accepted.

It was now believed that the expected advance of the enemy's infantry could be quietly awaited. The last that had been seen of it was parties of it west of Drachenbronn as well as on the heights of Schönbühl.

It was supposed that they would either make a long halt, or that the columns, still separated, would first reunite, and the field glasses were directed with eager attention to the heights north of Ingolsheim, which completely hid the ground in its rear.

Meanwhile, at 10 A.M. the aide-de-camp who had that morning been sent to the XI. Corps, had at last returned,

accompanied by a Staff Officer from that Army Corps and some orderlies. According to the aide-de-camp's statement the 41st Infantry Brigade was fully informed of all that was going on on the left bank of the Hausauer stream, thanks to the activity of its own patrols and the reports received from time to time from the Cavalry Division. The 21st Division could not hope to be concentrated at Lauterburg before 10 A.M.; the General Commanding that Division did not therefore believe himself to be in a position to afford active support at any point prior to that time. But, as soon as the parts of the Division now on the march had arrived, he would take up a position of observation with the whole of his troops between Nieder-Lauterbach and Neuweiler, so as to be able to support the advanced guard of the V. Corps. Since 8 A.M. Hussars were again continually seen in front of the XI. Corps: they came from Selz and Nieder-Rüdern.

The Staff Officer of the XI. Corps added that he had orders to remain near Weissenburg, and to keep his General informed of passing events.

It should also be mentioned that the General Commanding the 9th Division had, prior to the arrival of these officers, gone to the heights of Schafbusch. The Staff Officer of the XI. Corps was sent to him to let him know the situation of that Corps.

The situation in front of the Cavalry Division had meanwhile changed but little. From time to time only some isolated cannon shots from both sides could be heard whenever the advanced squadrons marched without precaution and neglected to avail themselves of the natural cover of the ground.

Meanwhile heavy clouds of dust had been perceived west of Ober-Seebach, travelling in the direction of the road from Fort Louis; the reports of the patrols also indicated a concentration of the main force of the hostile cavalry on that road.

General A. momentarily conceived the intention of taking the offensive with his three brigades, now concentrated, and of marching to the attack. The opinion of the Division was unanimous on that point. Since touch with the enemy had been established, the success obtained over him in the combat at Sulz (Hohweiler), as well as in the small encounters, had excited in no small degree among the Division a feeling of superiority over the enemy.

It was quite well understood why the Division had retired that morning, but now that it was concentrated, it was gene-

rally believed that it could hold its own against the adversary, and there was a burning desire to measure swords with him and to regain the lost ground.

Nevertheless, the General Commanding did not allow himself to be carried away by these sentiments, which animated him as well as his subordinates. He was influenced by the consideration that the enemy's infantry was every moment expected to make its appearance, and to attack the position of the 17th Brigade, and for this eventuality, which really meant a combat for the retention of the ground south of Weissenburg, he desired to preserve his forces as intact as possible. One quarter of an hour, however, succeeded another, and the hostile infantry did not make its appearance. Whatever conjectures might be made to explain this seeming delay on the part of the adversary, his real intentions at that moment could not be divined. The General now believed it to be his duty to ascertain the position of the body of troops which had been in his front in first line the previous evening. To effect this object, however, it was first of all necessary to drive back the hostile cavalry in his front.

These considerations, joined to the general feeling of his officers and troops, decided the General to march to the attack. At 10.15 A.M., when he observed the approach of the still missing brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, General A. sent the General Commanding that Division information as to his intention. He caused him at the same time to be informed that he intended to execute his attack along the road from Fort Louis, and begged of him to secure his possible retreat.

East of the road from Fort Louis, the ground, still covered with pretty high standing corn, gradually ascends a few feet from the foot of the Geisberg up to the farm of Geitershof, which consists of but three unimportant buildings, and from here to Frohnackerhof the ground forms an almost perfectly level plain, with its greatest breadth in the direction of Schleithal. South of Frohnackerhof and of the road leading from thence to Ober-Seebach, the ground forms several undulations running across the plain. In rear of these the main body of the enemy's Cuirassiers could be clearly perceived, but the details of their position were completely hidden.

West of the main road, the ground, sloping down, forms a narrow valley, which runs from Geitershof towards the

lower level of Ober-Seebach, the houses of which could be seen only from height 185. About 2,000 paces south of the latter height a second crest (190) rose up, which, with its slopes towards Ober-Seebach and the Selz stream, completely shut out the view beyond.

Both these heights are joined by a narrow ridge, from which various steep watercourses descend towards the valley of the Selz in such a manner as to render this ground in a high degree impracticable for the movements of large bodies of cavalry. The real arena for the attack of the Division had therefore to be looked for east of the road from Fort Louis.

But the further an advance was made on that side the greater became the danger, should the enemy meanwhile debouch west of Ober-Seebach, as then no other line of retreat remained for the Division than the narrow neck formed between the Geisberg and the Niederwald.

It became therefore necessary to thoroughly secure at all hazards the space comprised between the main road and the railway. General A. believed that the best way to do so would be by employing his artillery here, whose fire, although limited in front to an extent of 2,000 paces, would yet, he thought, be able to prevent any hostile troops from gaining access to the crest. The position was at the same time most favourable for the batteries for commanding the whole of the presumable battlefield of the cavalry on the other side of the road; their own security was considerably enhanced by the fact that the station at Riedselz—Oberdorf was occupied by a battalion of Rifles.

The road from Fort Louis was, at least as far as could be seen, lined on both sides by a pretty deep ditch with steep sides, but dry at the bottom; trees there were none. With due regard to these accidents of the ground the General gave his orders.

He ordered Major L. to take up a position with his three batteries on the southern slope of height 185, and eventually to follow the movements of the regiments west of the road.

A squadron of Dragoons (1st of 1st Dragoons), which had at that time already advanced west of the main road, was ordered as a special escort for the Horse Artillery. In every other way the advance of the Division east of the main road was ordered to be executed in the formation laid down in the Drill Regulations, viz., the brigade of heavy cavalry in first line, the brigade of Hussars in second line outflanking the

first on the left, and the brigade of Dragoons as third line. The advance was to be executed in such a manner that the right of the first line should rest upon the main road. The 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars was in a covered position in rear of the slope of the plateau which descends towards Schleithal (near 170).

At 10.30 A.M. the troops received orders to move off. Major L. went to the west of the main road at a gallop, with his three batteries, advancing until level with the Geitershof, and executing a half wheel, unlimbered in such a position that the left wing battery stood on the edge of the ravine descending in the direction of Ober-Seebach (10.33 A.M.). The heavy brigade, deployed in line of squadron columns, the Cuirassiers on the right, the Uhlans on the left, had at the same time moved off at a walk, soon afterwards breaking into a trot. At 10.33 A.M. it had arrived with its right flank at the angle formed by the road at 800 paces north-west of Geitershof. Its left flank reached nearly to the country road which leads, about 1,200 paces to the east and parallel to the main road, from the Niederwald to the plateau. (See sketch.)

Two squadrons of the 1st Hussars followed as succour squadrons 150 paces in rear, the 1st squadron in rear of the Cuirassiers, the 2nd squadron in rear of the Uhlans, both squadrons in column formation.

The remaining five Hussar squadrons were placed 300 paces from the first line, outflanking the left of the 4th squadron of Uhlans. At first they were obliged, owing to the narrowness of the ground, to march each regiment in line of squadron columns at close interval, the regiments at deploying interval, but were now in the act of deploying into line of squadron columns, two of the squadrons thereby extending beyond the country road we have mentioned above.

150 paces further in rear, consequently 450 paces from the first line, and in rear of the centre of the latter, followed the brigade of Dragoons (seven squadrons) in line of squadron columns at close interval, the regiments without deploying interval.

The Commander of the Division, who with his Staff had galloped a considerable distance to the front, was on the left front of the first line. Major-General B. marched in front of the centre of the brigade of heavy cavalry. Fighting patrols, or in some places isolated troopers, preceded the attack in front and on both flanks.

The enemy's cavalry just then commenced moving off. Some isolated Cuirassiers could be perceived in the neighbourhood of Frohnackerhof, south of the road leading from the latter place to the northern end of Ober-Seebach; a battery took up a position south-east of the farm. On the other side of the road, two other batteries in position on the small plateau west of the village opened fire against the batteries of the 1st Cavalry Division, which had just come into action (10.33 A.M.).*

At first the Division continued its movement at a trot without interruption. Meanwhile General A. perceived that on the ground east of the Warschbach a mass of Cuirassiers was in the act of advancing. At the same time he received a report from the 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars, which squadron had been pushed forward to the left front, that "a regiment of Cuirassiers and a battery were advancing at a trot from the main road, across the Warschbach (these were probably the same men that had been seen by the General), and the squadron was marching against the flank of that regiment under shelter of the crest sloping towards Schleithal."

The General Commanding called the attention of the Brigadier of the Hussar brigade to these masses, and ordered him to keep a sharp look-out on the adversary in that quarter. He then went personally at a gallop to the heavy brigade, which, after having performed some evolutions necessitated by the sharp angles formed here by the main road, had just given the signal to deploy, and now approached the road from Geitershof to Schleithal. During his ride he observed that the enemy's Cuirassiers advancing between Frohnackerhof and the main road were also in the act of deploying their line, apparently filling up the ground nearly as far as the main road. The sharp pace of the ride, however, the distance, and the rising clouds of dust did not permit of estimating whether these troops were formed in one continuous or in several lines. The General had just time to call out to Major-General B. in passing that "hostile Cuirassiers were also approaching from the east of Frohnackerhof." The 1st Uhlans, which had wheeled a little to the left shortly before deploying, had already crossed the road east of Geitershof and marched to the attack (10.36 A.M.).

* The deployment at 10.33 A.M. is indicated on the sketch by the figure 33; the other phases are similarly indicated by the number of the minutes.

The 1st Cuirassiers, which at the same time had made a slight wheel to the left, followed, also deployed in echelon to the right rear of the Uhlans, but at short distance.

On the right wing of the Cuirassiers a very perceptible wavering and some slight disorder—apparently caused by hostile shells—manifested itself. The fire from our Horse Artillery batteries rapidly increased against the enemy's cavalry, the strength of which on this ground could now be estimated at one brigade, other bodies apparently following.

The General Commanding had ridden in such a direction as to place himself in the interval between the two regiments. He now let them pass by, and awaited the arrival of his reserve brigade, to which he had already shortly before sent orders by an officer to follow the centre no longer, but to move in rear of the left flank of the heavy brigade. But, before the Dragoons could arrive at the road which emerges east of the Geitershof, the first shock of the Uhlans with the enemy's Cuirassiers had already taken place, about 500 paces south of that road, at 10.37 A.M.

General A. himself galloped up to the brigade of Dragoons, which he ordered to open out into line of squadron columns ready for attack. Let us stop for an instant and look at the combat as it now developed before the eyes of the General Commanding Division.

The 1st regiment of Uhlans and the enemy's Cuirassiers had closed, the succour squadron (2nd of 1st Hussars) had also been drawn into the *mêlée*, out of which isolated groups of men had already escaped close up to the front of the Dragoons. The 1st Cuirassiers had pushed on further south, and had there encountered a fresh adversary. But the right flank of the Cuirassiers had thereby, as could plainly be perceived, got the worst of it. Disorganized by hostile artillery fire, which was principally directed on this flank, the troopers retired rapidly towards the Geitershof. The succour squadron (1st of 1st Hussars) at once took the place of the squadron of Cuirassiers. The charge of the two regiments of the heavy brigade, as far as it could be observed, gave the impression of having been successful. The mass of Uhlans and 1st Cuirassiers galloped on in a southerly direction for several hundred paces without stopping. But soon after, it appeared as if the pursuit had been interrupted by the arrival of fresh bodies of hostile supports, and that the fight had now become stationary. The clouds of dust,

however, and the *mêlée* did not permit of a clear distinction as to what was really passing (10.40 A.M.).

During these events the Hussar brigade had also entered the fighting line. The rest of the 1st Hussars (3rd and 4th squadrons) had turned towards the Cuirassiers who had emerged east of Frohnackerhof and menaced the left flank of the Uhlans, but at the first shock the Hussars had to give way before the heavy Cuirassiers (10.39 A.M.). The three squadrons of the 2nd Hussars, which had moved in half column formation and taken too much ground to the left, arrived a little late in the fighting line; however, they even then compelled the adversary at this point to turn about, being much assisted, as could plainly be perceived, by the detached Hussar squadron on the left flank having thrown itself upon the enemy. General A. had, with the brigade of Dragoons, followed in the direction of the interval which had formed between the two brigades in first line, when suddenly the fight on the left flank appeared to waver, and the Hussars soon after again turned about. At this moment (10.41 A.M.) the Dragoons were still 1,200 paces north-west of Frohnackerhof, that is to say, still about 300 to 400 paces distant from the combatants.

The General Commanding Division at once ordered the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th squadrons of the 2nd Dragoons to execute a half left wheel, to deploy, and as soon as each squadron was formed in line, to charge the adversary, who now in consequence turned about.

While General A. was still issuing these orders to the Dragoons, he perceived that the fight in the west of the battlefield also seemed to have taken a bad turn.

Here Uhlans, Cuirassiers, and Hussars, mixed up with hostile troopers were rushing in complete disorder to the rear. To stem this torrent the 2nd and 3rd squadrons of the 1st Dragoons were ordered to execute a half right wheel, and form line; they then, having allowed the head of the mass to rush past, threw themselves on to the flank of the moving mass of fugitives (10.42 A.M.).

The General Commanding now ordered "Front" to be sounded, and soon after the "Rally" for the heavy brigade. These two signals were not immediately obeyed by the whole of the men. The attack of the Dragoons had, however, compelled one part of the moving mass to turn about at once, a second part—owing to the direction from which the shock

took place—had been pushed nearer to the main road, while a third part—consisting of the foremost men and of troopers who had fought further west and had consequently been least affected by the shock—continued the retreat in a northerly direction. The General Commanding, fearing that under these circumstances the one squadron of Dragoons would not suffice for the protection of the Horse Artillery batteries, sent the 4th squadron of the 1st Dragoons in that direction (10.43 A.M.), so that now but one single squadron (1st of 2nd Dragoons) was left at his disposal. Although some single troopers continued to press on towards Altenstatt, yet the successive attack of the three squadrons of the 1st Dragoons, supported by those of the Uhlans, 1st Cuirassiers and Hussars, which had fronted, succeeded in forcing the fighting mass on this flank to move in a southerly direction. A large number of the hostile troopers now wandered across the main road, and, being here received by the fire of the artillery, threw themselves for shelter into the ravine leading towards Ober-Seebach.

General A., having been obliged to engage nearly the whole of his third line, had meanwhile occupied himself with the immediate formation of a fresh reserve.

The exertions of his Staff had already succeeded in assembling about a hundred troopers, mostly Uhlans, with some Hussars and Cuirassiers.

About 500 paces to the west another group of men had formed, which indicated that there also another rally was being effected, although part of the Uhlans and Cuirassiers were still in pursuit of the adversary.

As soon as the tumult around the General Commanding had calmed down a little, and the rising dust had dispersed, the brigade of Hussars was discovered in the act of rallying about 700 paces off in an easterly direction, while in the south-east a large number of men still continued the pursuit, their traces being easily distinguished by the large clouds of dust which rose up east of Frohnackerhof (10.46 A.M.).

The General Commanding Division sent orders to the brigade of heavy cavalry to effect its rally as quickly as possible at the point at which it then stood, while the Hussars were directed to place themselves again as soon as possible in rear of the heavy brigade as a second line. General A. then went at a gallop with the last remaining squadron of Dragoons in the direction of Frohnackerhof, in

order to reconnoitre the ground in front of it, and to observe what was going on there.

Before, however, he could arrive at the farm in question, he perceived on both sides of the Warschbach some of the foremost men turning rapidly about and retreating, being followed up by some closed bodies of the enemy's cavalry. Although he at once sent fresh orders to the rear to hasten the rallying of the brigades, yet that could not be effected as quickly as was wished for, as the plateau was completely swept by artillery fire from Ober-Seebach as well as from the east of the Warschbach. The General Commanding Division now went personally to the heavy brigade, leaving the 1st squadron of the 2nd Dragoons behind, in order to secure the retreat of the retiring troopers.

Fortunately the enemy's closed bodies contented themselves with pursuing the dispersed troopers but a short distance, and the hostile squadrons (three of whom only could be counted on both banks of the stream), which had again advanced, remained south of the road from Ober-Seebach to Frohnackerhof.

On his arrival at the heavy brigade (10.50 A. M.) General A. found it already rallied, although not quite complete, the whole of the men present being formed ready for attack; but he observed at the same time that the troops on the plateau suffered useless losses from the heavy artillery fire. It became, therefore, necessary either to effect the re-formation of the Division a little further in rear, or to renew the attack. The latter was not, however, quite so easy of execution, as the adversary's artillery placed on his two wings commanded the whole field of attack to such an extent, that any renewed attack would demand considerable preparation and careful direction of the movements of the troops.

The Division, besides, was not yet, as a whole, completely at disposal, indeed the brigade of Dragoons was far from being re-formed.

General A. therefore considered it most prudent to again concentrate his troops beyond the effective range of the enemy's fire, and there to complete the re-organization of the Division.

The brigade of heavy cavalry consequently received the order to retire in rear of the road Geitershof—Schleithal until it found shelter under the slope which descended from the plateau towards the Niederwald. One squadron was

ordered to remain at the Geitershof in observation of the enemy, and to facilitate the retreat of the wounded and those whose horses had come down.

The brigade of Hussars was also ordered to retire as far as that slope, and there to take up a position on the left of the heavy brigade, so as to be able to fall upon the enemy's flanks should he advance on to the plateau; it was also directed to push one squadron as far as possible to the front to observe the enemy, and secure the retreat of the wounded.

The brigade of Dragoons, some parts of which had already commenced to rally at various points, was ordered to assemble in rear of the heavy brigade.

The brigades at once commenced their retrograde movements (10.51 A.M.), which, notwithstanding the enemy's fire, were effected at a walk. Shortly after 11 A.M. the brigades reached their newly assigned positions about 1,200 paces north of the Geitershof. The enemy did not follow up at any point.

A battalion of infantry of the 17th Brigade had arrived in the little ravine which leads from the railway up to the main road.

As the continuation of the artillery combat under existing circumstances could serve no useful end, the horse artillery batteries were also retired into the position they had occupied prior to the commencement of the attack.

Counting from the moment the Division had first marched off to the attack, it had, within half-an-hour, reached a point about 700 paces in advance of that from which it had started. The combat proper, reckoning from the first shock to the moment when the Dragoons were repulsed in their pursuit, had lasted about 12 minutes. As the Division had virtually returned to its former position, so also the adversary's troops appeared to occupy their original ground. The whole combat appeared, therefore, to bear at the end the character of a great cavalry duel without any decisive result.

The forces engaged on both sides during the fight had proved themselves, as regards the leading of the troops as well as regards their strength and valour, pretty equally matched. As matters now stood, there was no chance for the present, unless circumstances should alter, for either side to force back the adversary by a renewal of the attack. The principal object appeared to be to re-form the men into their respective squadrons, without any consideration of their

original positions, to form the squadrons into regiments, and to readjust the various commands. Although the combat had been of but very short duration, yet the losses were very severe. The Brigadier of the heavy brigade was left on the field, the colonels of the first Uhlans and 2nd Hussars were wounded, the commander of the 1st Hussars was missing (killed, as was ascertained later on); the 3rd and 4th squadrons of the 1st Hussars especially had suffered very severely. The exact number of the total losses could not as yet be ascertained, as dismounted and wounded men continually descended from the plateau, a certain number of men had gone further to the rear as escorts for prisoners and wounded, and others had dispersed, especially towards Schleithal and the Niederwald.

Notwithstanding these losses, a very high feeling prevailed in the Division. Amidst the exciting *mêlée* of the cavalry combat, the phases of which constantly changed even in the case of each individual man, the men of the rank and file felt very strongly their own personal value, the support of comradeship, the force of discipline, and a higher regard for their superiors, who had set them such a brilliant example.

The General Commanding Division took care to have some kind of words of acknowledgment for the various regiments, expressing however, at the same time his disapprobation of the manner in which the rally had been effected, viz., not as quickly as it ought to have been done, and with far too much noise.

The details of the combat could not at the time be properly ascertained; much of it had completely escaped the observation of the General Commanding Division. Thus he only now learned that on the right wing also, in front of the Horse Artillery batteries, the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons had been engaged with hostile Chasseurs, and that the 1st squadron of Cuirassiers, which had at the commencement of the attack been broken up by the fire from the Artillery, had quickly rallied, and re-entered the fighting line on the right wing in good time—in fact at the moment when the Dragoons went to the attack to disengage the heavy brigade. It was further stated that Ober-Seebach was occupied by hostile infantry—at least, the Hussars advancing along the main road affirmed that they had received musketry fire from that place. It was even said that the Dragoons, which had pursued on the extreme left wing, had taken a gun; but

further inquiries instituted on the subject did not confirm the report; the Dragoons had certainly passed by an abandoned gun, but they had not had time to attend to it, as soon after they had themselves in turn been repulsed by the adversary.

Meanwhile, the ambulance detachment had, from the moment the rally on the plateau had commenced, hurried up, and at once entered on its duties. A very necessary support was afforded it by the arrival of the ambulance detachment sent up from the V. Corps. The care for the large number of wounded was, notwithstanding, an extremely difficult task.

The ambulance could not be placed in the farm of Geitershof, as the enemy's shells had set it on fire, and it had therefore been installed north of height 185, where a battalion of infantry which had arrived at that point furnished the men necessary for carrying water and other necessaries from Riedselz-Oberdorf. Great help was also afforded by the Commissary-General of the Division, who had since 9 A.M. been constantly occupied in requisitioning wagons for the transport of the wounded at Altenstatt, Gutleithof, and Riedselz-Oberdorf, some of which had already arrived at the place where the ambulance was established.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS BETWEEN 10.30 AND 11 A.M.

Since 9 A.M. the perfectly isolated rôle that had hitherto been allotted to the 1st Cavalry Division had ceased; its operations since that hour are linked with those of another body of troops of the army. The mission with which it had occupied itself until now cannot, for the present, be fulfilled any longer. The adversary has established contact with our most advanced infantry; the Cavalry Division has no longer been able to mask their presence or even to maintain the touch previously gained with the hostile infantry. Unless there is a complete change in the general situation, it cannot regain its independence in front of the army.

As the next step, it has now become necessary, in concert with the infantry of the advanced guard, to oppose an energetic resistance, not only to the adversary's cavalry, but also to those columns which follow it.

Notwithstanding this, however, we see that after a short time the 1st Cavalry Division again takes the offensive by engaging singly, consequently isolated to a certain extent, in a combat of serious dimensions.

(T.L.)

The motives for the resolution formed by the Division to attack at all must here be principally considered.

It was, of course, quite natural that an endeavour should be made to drive the adversary back now that it was pretty certain that the Division was numerically a match for him.

The general circumstances of the situation were also taken into consideration, at any rate in so far that the commencement of the attack was delayed until it had been ascertained that the possession of the ground south of Weissenburg was secured by the arrival of the infantry. Should the attack succeed in repulsing the enemy's cavalry, the position of the heads of its infantry columns might perhaps be ascertained, and consequently information of the very highest importance be gained for the General-in-Chief Commanding the Army. The hope might even be indulged in that the cavalry would be enabled to screen its infantry again, and so hide their position from the enemy's view.

The result of the engagement certainly did not realize any of these hopes. After the combat, both sides were exactly in the same position as they had occupied before the commencement of the whole episode. After making due allowance for the good moral effect the fight had produced on the troops, no advantage whatever had accrued to the general situation, and in addition considerable losses had been sustained.

The resolution of the Cavalry Division to take a certain initiative from the moment it saw its retreat secured by the arrival of the infantry must however be approved of, as this resolution was prompted by a desire to change the turn events had taken, in order to resume its former mission.

It must also be approved of, that in order to gain this object the most energetic means—a combat—was resorted to. It is always advisable to encourage ardour for the fight, at any rate whenever a reasonable pretext exists for it, and we would never dream of discountenancing or discouraging it by fault-finding criticism. The love of danger, the desire to close with the adversary, must always be the foremost wish of every horseman, otherwise he is useless.

However, in presence of the negative result of the combat, it is permissible to inquire whether the object sought after could not have been obtained by any other means.

Up to the present it was known that the enemy's infantry had moved off from Surburg and Reimersweiler; later on,

one of these corps had been observed on the plateau of Schönenburg, and lastly, it had been ascertained that the wood east of Drachenbronn was occupied.

It was probable that at present this infantry was still on the right bank of the Hausauer. But whether its concentration was being effected at some particular point under protection of advanced detachments, or whether it was making a short halt only, and its further advance might soon be expected, of all this nothing whatever was known at present. Just as meagre was the knowledge as to whether other Infantry Divisions might not meanwhile have arrived.

This much was, however, quite certain, that if any knowledge on these points was to be gained at all the quickest and most thorough method to obtain it was by operating on the right bank of the Hausauer.

The 1st Cavalry Division was certainly in every way in a position to carry this out. As after the arrival of the brigade of the 9th Infantry Division the position near Weissenburg could be looked upon as sufficiently secure for the present, there was no further obstacle now to prevent the cavalry from crossing the Upper Selz and obtaining on the right bank of the Hausauer the wished-for insight into the position of the enemy.

It was known that the adversary disposed of three cavalry regiments only on that bank, against which twice that number could be opposed. As to the other six Cuirassier regiments which were at Ober-Seebach and on the road from Fort Louis, the distance and the difficulty of passing from one bank of the river to the other would hardly have allowed them to arrive in sufficient time to support the three regiments.

Should the infantry be in the district north of Sulz it would certainly be very easy to ascertain their positions, and to some extent, perhaps, their strength, in the narrow zone (six miles) which separated the Hausauer stream from the mountains. Should it, however, have again retired during these events, the whole ground as far as Sulz could again be taken up, and the Cuirassier brigades and the Chasseurs of the adversary would probably be indirectly compelled to rapidly retire in rear of the Engelbach.

Consequently, by adopting this course, crossing the Upper Selz, and operating on the right bank, the 1st Cavalry Division had a more certain chance of procuring important

information for the Commander-in-Chief than could be gained by entering into an engagement on the left bank of the Hausauer, the issue of which could at the most be but very doubtful.

But it often happens that moral factors predominate over theory in such manner that with due regard to the former the demands of the latter cannot be complied with.

Under the circumstances in which the Division was here placed, being at last reunited after a long and uninterrupted retreat, it is difficult to admit that the leader should have again turned the Division about in the immediate presence of the enemy and trotted off under cover over the heights of the Geisberg in order to cross the Upper Selz. Every trooper would have felt that an immediate contact with the enemy was declined. Such sentiments had, however, to be avoided at any price, especially during the first few days of the campaign, and the first time that the whole of the troops were concentrated and faced to face with the enemy.

Officers and men must to-day learn each other's worth; the chances of the combat were not all unfavourable, and in bloody battle the mutual confidence between officers and men must have every chance of being more closely cemented. The opportunity was favourable, and the chance could not be allowed to escape.

We can, therefore, only approve of General A.'s resolve to prefer gaining his object *that day* by a direct attack instead of by means of indirect manœuvres. There was plenty of time to employ other means during the course of the campaign, should analogous occasions present themselves; when mutual confidence had once been established, there would be no further fear of shaking it should the Division execute a movement the object of which must appear incomprehensible to the men.

In concluding these remarks we should say that although the General did not attain his object through the combat, he was still at liberty to recur to the means which we have indicated above.

Although, therefore, we would ourselves in this case have advised the General Commanding the Division to proceed to the attack, yet we must raise a warning voice against being carried away by a peculiar feeling to which we continually do give way at peace manœuvres—the magnetic attraction which two opposed bodies of cavalry always exercise toward each other.

It would certainly be wrong to blame the cavalry soldier for preferring to attack cavalry rather than infantry or artillery.

In the cavalry combat, when the collision has taken place, man fights against man; his courage, strength, and skill are brought into play; while face to face with infantry or artillery, the bullet or shell will reach him while still at a great distance from his adversary. Still this very natural feeling must not be allowed to determine our action on the battlefield. There, on the contrary, everyone must be employed as the general good demands.

Of course, our cavalry will have to fight the enemy's cavalry wherever he is found, in order to prevent him from getting a view of our position or to enable us to gain an insight into his. But when it is no longer possible to obtain this result, other considerations come into the foreground, especially if the combat should enter such a phase as may demand the assistance and combined action of all arms.

It is not at all necessary in that case that the cavalry should always be on the wing on which that of the adversary has made its appearance, nor is it judicious that our cavalry should throw itself upon the hostile cavalry whenever the latter threatens to attack our infantry. The latter possesses in itself the means of much more effectually repulsing such threatening attacks.

On the other hand, when our infantry has been shaken and is retreating, and it is necessary to free it from the pursuing enemy, or when the adversary himself turns about after having failed in his attack, and it is desirable to carry disorder into his ranks in order to complete his defeat, or lastly, when there is hope of gaining success at some points or other from a sudden surprise, then is the real opportunity for the effective action of cavalry. *To recognize and appreciate such situations is the task whose solution will best serve the general interest; in this case, however, the enemy's cavalry must be considered only in so far as it obstructs the action of our own cavalry.*

After this digression let us return to the combat of the Cavalry Division as narrated in our studies. In order to judge of the whole, we shall first of all take a general view of the entire fight and give the detail of the adversary's situation, although such knowledge can only be gained from the history of the war furnished later on.

The Cavalry of the Army of the South, which was engaged on the left bank of the Hausauer, was composed as follows:—

1st. Of the 3rd Brigade of the Cavalry Division of the I. Army Corps; the 8th and 9th Regiments of Cuirassiers.

2nd. Of the Reserve Cavalry Division:—

1st Brigade.

4th and 5th Regiments of Cuirassiers.

2nd Brigade.

6th and 7th Regiments of Cuirassiers.

3rd. Of the 7th Regiment of Chasseurs-à-cheval.

To each cuirassier brigade was attached a battery of Horse Artillery; the regiments had each four squadrons, except the Chasseurs, who had three only.

At the beginning, the 4th and 5th Cuirassiers only were (with one battery) east of Ober-Seebach; the rest of the cavalry was concentrated west of the village.

As soon as General X., who commanded the whole cavalry, perceived infantry on the height of Schafbusch, as well as at Riedselz-Oberdorf, and when he had learnt that the wood west of Schleithal was also occupied by infantry (this information was, however, erroneous)* he renounced his intention of pushing his troops further forward. After having carefully reconnoitred the ground, he decided upon leaving two batteries only with the regiment of Chasseurs west of Ober-Seebach, and to unite all the Cuirassiers on the other side of the village. When this junction was effected, and as there was not sufficient space to deploy between the road and the Warschbach, the 1st Brigade of the Reserve Division was directed to cross with its battery to the left bank of the stream, the 2nd Brigade was placed in first line on the right bank, the brigade of the I. Army Corps remained as a reserve in rear of it.

Before these movements had been executed, the advanced patrols reported the approach of the adversary. General X. at once resolved to attack him. The two brigades of the Reserve Division were ordered to advance as a first line from both banks of the Warschbach, the flank regiments being thrown back in echelon; the brigade of the I. Army Corps was to follow as a reserve west of the stream at 600 paces in rear.

* It was later on that infantry appeared at this point; at first there was a dismounted Hussar squadron of the 1st Division at that place, which had caused this report.

Before, however, this order could reach the 1st Brigade, on the other bank of the stream, the 2nd Brigade had at once set off at a trot, and consequently encountered the enemy first. During some minutes the 2nd Brigade, while advancing to the attack, was shelled by the hostile batteries in position west of Geitershof, notwithstanding the endeavours of the guns of the Army of the South in position west of Ober-Seebach to draw this fire away from their own cavalry. So it happened that the 6th Cuirassiers of the Division of the Southern Army were already much shaken when they closed with the 1st Uhlans, and were the less able to withstand the shock of that regiment, as the latter had already been effectively reinforced by the 2nd squadron of the 1st Hussars. The 7th Cuirassiers, who followed on the left of the 6th Cuirassiers, suffered still more from the fire of the hostile artillery near Geitershof. They were, therefore, still less able to oppose a serious resistance to the right wing of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The 8th and 9th Regiments of Cuirassiers had followed the attack of the 2nd Brigade of the Reserve Division on the western bank of the Warschbach at a considerable distance.

The 8th Cuirassiers, having executed with its right wing a short half right wheel, in order to avoid being ridden over by the retreating men, threw themselves together with two squadrons of the 9th on to the approaching masses and drove them back again. The two remaining squadrons of the 9th Cuirassiers had, while still in column formation, been exposed to the hostile artillery fire, and were thrown into the most complete disorder. They had to be re-formed before they could be sent into the fighting line.

As we know, the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, General A., had successively launched three squadrons of the 1st Dragoons against the flanks of the mass of men who had passed, pell-mell, close by him, but had also, at the same time ordered the "rally" to be sounded for the heavy brigade.

The right flank squadron of the 1st Cuirassiers, which had previously fallen out owing to the artillery fire of the Southern Division, had also again advanced from the main road and attacked. The Cuirassiers of the Southern Division in their turn were now repulsed and pursued principally by the Dragoons, although a great number of men of the heavy brigade and of the Hussars who had taken part in the fight

at that point also took part in the pursuit without hearing the signal to "rally."

But as soon as the foremost of the victors were seen to be menaced in flank by the two squadrons of the 9th Cuirassiers of the Southern Army, which had meantime been re-organized and had not as yet been engaged, the troops that followed soon came to a halt, and turned about in order to rally further in rear.

The two squadrons of the 9th Cuirassiers pursued but for a short distance, and halted close to the road Ober-Seebach—Frohnackerhof, as masses of men of the 1st Cavalry Division, already rallied, could plainly be seen here, and a compact squadron (4th of 1st Dragoons) even advanced to encounter them.

During these events another combat had taken place a little to the east.

There the five squadrons of Hussars of the 1st Cavalry Division, which followed the first line in echelon, had been received by the fire of a hostile battery in position south-east of Frohnackerhof. The columns of Hussars offered, however, but small isolated objects to aim at, which rapidly advanced in a straight line in the direction of the guns; and a few moments after the first shot, the guns were masked by the 5th Cuirassiers of the Southern Army, which debouched close to the farm, and deployed to the right. As we have already seen, the only two squadrons of the 1st Hussars which were here (3rd and 4th) attacked the 5th Cuirassiers in order to cover the left wing of the heavy brigade, but were at once enveloped by them on both flanks and driven back.

The three squadrons of the 2nd Hussars had executed a flank movement and engaged a little too late in this combat. Moreover, part of them, as well as their detached squadron, which operated more to the left, were obliged to encounter the approaching three squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers of the Southern Army.*

The fight on this wing assumed a stationary character at the part furthest east, whilst at the part more to the west the 1st Hussars retreated in hot haste. The commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, General A., however, launched three squadrons of his reserve (2nd, 3rd, and 4th of 2nd Dragoons) against this point from a flank, thereby compelling the adversary to turn about. The effect of this last charge

* The 4th squadron of this regiment (4th Cuirassiers) was at the time detached for scouting duties, on the right flank.

made itself immediately felt by the squadrons at the extreme eastern end of the fighting line. Here, also, the Cuirassiers gradually turned about, and followed the torrent of fugitives.

The Hussars sounded the rally; but the Dragoons, as well as the men of the left flank squadron of the 2nd Hussars, continued the pursuit. The latter, however, soon came to a standstill when they perceived themselves suddenly taken in the left flank by a compact squadron of hostile Cuirassiers. This was the squadron of the 4th Cuirassiers which had been employed on reconnaissance beyond Siegen.

The Hussars first turned about; the Dragoons sounded the "rally," which, however, had to be effected a good deal further in rear; the enemy's Cuirassiers contented themselves with cutting down those who had advanced too far or whose horses were exhausted, and then came to a halt in a line with the Frohnackerhof farm.

The battery of the Southern Army, which was in position on that flank, had limbered up as soon as it saw itself masked by the advancing Cuirassiers, and had awaited the issue of the battle. When, after some time, it perceived its own cavalry turning about, it also retired at a gallop. In doing so, one gun was left on the field. When, however, the flank attack of the last squadron of Cuirassiers had again cleared the front, and while the rest of that brigade was in the act of rallying, it returned quickly to the front, and covered with its shells the ground where the adversary attempted to re-form his troops, with an effect most annoying to the latter.

It now remains to speak of a little episode which happened in the meantime west of the road from Fort Louis. There was already stationed the 1st squadron of the 1st Dragoons, which had been advanced before the commencement of the attack to the ground north-west of Ober-Seebach. Covered by this squadron, the three Horse Artillery batteries of the 1st Cavalry Division advanced in a line with the Geitershof, from which position they responded to the fire of the two batteries of the Southern Army posted west of Ober-Seebach. The distance was found to be 2,800 paces; but the commander, Major L., had at the same time taken the precaution to throw some shells from the left flank battery into the ground on the other side of the main road, in order to calculate the distance to certain prominent points there. Up to the moment when the first line of the 1st Cavalry Division—the heavy brigade—was formed on the other side of the main road, in a line with the

artillery, three minutes in all had remained for the latter in which to execute the above.

When the 2nd Brigade of the Reserve Division (Southern Army) marched against that first line, it was received by the fire from the whole of these three batteries, and compelled to deploy in line without delay. Thanks to this assistance given by the artillery, it was an easy task for the Uhlans and Cuirassiers of the 1st Cavalry Division to repulse this first attack. The artillery of the Army of the South, on its part, although in a less favourable position, had yet directed its fire upon the advancing first line of the 1st Cavalry Division, but was only enabled to reach the extreme right flank. This was, however, thrown thereby into complete disorder. The Hussars, who replaced this flank squadron when it fell out, were entirely masked by the left wing of the 7th Cuirassiers (Southern Army).

Directly after the shock, the guns at Ober-Seebach again directed their fire upon the opposing batteries. Major L. responded to this with his right battery, while the attention of the others was directed to the probable arrival of the adversary's reserves. As expected, they came up immediately; the 8th Cuirassiers, however, were covered partly by the squadrons already engaged in the oscillating combat, and partly owing to the half right movement they had executed, while the 9th regiment, which advanced closer to the main road, was received by very heavy fire. Before the two left wing squadrons could deploy, their columns were dispersed by the shells.

Meanwhile, the 7th regiment of Chasseurs had endeavoured to enter the fighting line west of the main road. One of its squadrons had dismounted and occupied the slopes north of Ober-Seebach, the two other squadrons, which were to the west of the guns, approached height 190 in two lines, and attempted to emerge suddenly from the rear of it. But here they were received by the fire from Major L.'s right flank battery, and at the same time by the fire from the Rifles at the railway station, the latter having occupied a low knoll close to it.

In addition, the escort squadron (1st of 1st Dragoons) had at once advanced to encounter them. The leading squadron of the Chasseurs gave way under this cross fire and rallied upon its second squadron. On seeing them retire, the Dragoons sent their 4th ~~half~~ troop only against them. In presence of

the adversary's support, however, this ~~half~~ troop soon ceased the pursuit, and the combat at this point ended by the two sides again occupying their original positions.

After this description of the course which the fight took on both sides, let us now examine the more important general features of the combat ere we enter into details.

As we have already observed, this combat in the end proved but a grand cavalry duel without a decisive result, in which the forces on both sides had shown themselves equally matched as regards the leading of the troops as well as in numbers and skill.

We are first concerned principally with the leading of the troops.

As far as the general disposition for the attack went—and it must certainly be approved of—it was of a very simple nature. The brigades were generally led in the direction assigned to each, and each brigade, as well as the artillery, had its special mission to fulfil, and acquitted itself without losing sight of its object; the reserve entered the fighting line, at the opportune moment, at the different points at which its action had become necessary, and the “rally” was effected the moment it was at all possible to carry it out.

The nature of the ground was as favourable as could possibly be desired for cavalry combats. On both sides the forces at disposal were pretty equal in strength, and equally bold and efficient.

The question now arises, whether, without uselessly complicating the dispositions, the leader of either force might not have handled his troops more effectively, and whether this being so, it would have materially changed the ultimate result.

The superior skill of a leader can only be demonstrated by his ability in handling the various parts of his forces, so as to produce the highest possible effect at the moment of the shock. *This result can, however, only be obtained by skilful evolutions executed whilst the troops are marching to the attack.*

It cannot be denied that there exists in the nature of things as well as of men a certain repugnance to evolutions. Certainly the most simple means—and the nearest to hand—is to be found in deploying as soon as the adversary is approached, and endeavouring to overthrow him by a powerful shock. And it is just as certain also, that in addition to the highest degree of flexibility and handiness of the troops, a practised eye, great *sang-froid*, and a habit of deciding promptly how to act are required on the part of a leader before he dare wheel his

line into column in presence of an adversary approaching with an imposing front, in order to gain his flank, and so bring his troops to act against him in the most effective manner.

It is precisely this which constitutes the difference between mediocre—or to speak more properly, perhaps, everyday—leading and good or brilliant leading. For a leader whom nature has endowed with a spark of genius it is easy to habituate his troops to evolutions, and to make use of the latter at the decisive moment. But a less skilled leader may attain the same result by means of constant exercise; and it is not necessary in order to effect this to have recourse to complicated formations, but it will suffice to make use of the regulation movements in the most convenient and effective manner. It is, however, all the more necessary to practise these movements, as in course of time our cavalry has lost the habit of manœuvring in large bodies. If these exercises are only generally and sufficiently made use of, every difficulty will disappear, and with it also the ordinary repugnance generally shown against these evolutions, as nothing is difficult in execution except what one does not know. If we know that we possess a perfect knowledge of the use of the formations and movements laid down in the regulations, it then becomes materially easier in the presence of immediate danger to take the necessary resolution.

Now we believe that by a more skilful and effective handling of the troops on one side or the other, a much more decisive result of the combat would have been obtained; and we will endeavour to demonstrate our meaning by tracing a tableau of events which might have been produced, and will compare them with those already given in the text.

Let us now go back to the point where the 1st Cavalry Division stood at the commencement of the attack. At the moment when it moved off, its right flank rested on the main road, and perceived the adversary's first line while still at a long distance from it. It is easily understood that even at such a long distance there is a certain natural attraction during the advance between two approaching adversaries, and their movements are regulated accordingly. It is this tendency which caused the heavy brigade to wheel slightly to the left, and which may have led the adversary's first line (6th and 7th Cuirassiers) into making a corresponding movement.

But the second and indeed the principal point which ought

to engage the mind of the leader of the heavy brigade now becomes more pressing at every pace he moves forward: how can he most effectively direct his troops—that is, give their shock the greatest possible effect? It is clear that this end would be best gained if he succeeded in taking the adversary in flank.

It is no doubt most essential that the attack should be delivered at the highest speed and with closed ranks, but evolutions do not at all preclude this condition, as their only object is to deliver the shock with the highest effect on the enemy's most vulnerable point.

We have now arrived at the moment when the skill of the leader can and must have recourse to evolutions in order to secure the most favourable chances. It only now remains to be ascertained on to which of the hostile flanks it would have been best, in the present case, to direct such an attack.

According to the situation as exposed in our text, it would appear that the best way would have been to attack the adversary's *right* flank. In confirmation of this opinion we would adduce the following considerations:—

The necessity for liberty of movement is the first essential element for the action of cavalry. Favourable and sufficient ground can here only be found towards the east. To the west the ground is more limited, owing to the steep banks of the main road, and the less favourable nature of the ground for cavalry movements. Add to this that on that side the cavalry would be most effectually exposed to the hostile artillery fire, and would at once mask that of its own batteries. But the artillery can there exercise a most important and even decisive influence, and every cavalry leader must always take care that the highest possible effect is given to his artillery, and must not lose sight of the fact that this effect will be the greater the less the batteries are exposed to continual changes of position.

If the heavy brigade had endeavoured to gain the adversary's right flank, the latter would have been uninterruptedly exposed to artillery fire until the very moment of the shock. It is very probable that the fire from these eighteen guns—which had already obtained the range—would have had the effect of compelling the adversary to turn about even before the shock; in any case, even if actual collision occurred, it would have shaken him very much.

There is yet another motive which can be adduced in

favour of this attack being delivered on the right flank of the adversary, namely, that it had been perceived that the lines which followed the adversary's first line outflanked his left wing. The heavy brigade could consequently by a left or half left wheel escape the attacks of these lines, and should it succeed in bringing its attack effectively home upon the adversary's right flank, the 6th and 7th Cuirassiers would probably have been driven back in a south-easterly direction upon the 8th and 9th Cuirassiers, and thence on to the other side of the main road, within the effective range of the artillery, and eventually been obliged to seek shelter in the ravine leading to Ober-Seebach.

Under these circumstances it would undoubtedly have been much more advantageous for the leader of the heavy brigade to have attempted to act against the right flank of the regiments marching against him.

In fact, it was the duty of the General Commanding the Division to exercise his guiding influence in that direction. If he does not do so at such moments he allows the entire control to slip out of his hands, as he will ultimately find himself obliged to follow the impulse initiated by the Brigadier of the leading brigade, and will have no other course open to him but to regulate the movements of the other brigades accordingly.

The two light brigades would of course conform or be regulated in their movements so as to follow up those of the heavy brigade, should the latter act as we have proposed above.

It will, of course, be understood that the half left wheel of the heavy brigade necessarily imposed the same movement upon the second line; the brigade of Dragoons, however, would have to take its orders as to taking ground to either flank from the General Commanding Division. Everything here indicates that it would have been of most use in rear of the right flank of the heavy brigade, outflanking it completely. The unprotected flank of the Division would then have been covered, and the reserve would have had the best opportunity of throwing some squadrons in the most effective manner on to any desired points in the *mêlée*, without reckoning the immense advantage of being able to pierce the adversary's centre. In addition, the reserve would then be occupying the ground which it was indispensable should be held in order to secure the retreat, and from which the other

brigades—should their attack prove unsuccessful—could be disengaged by means of flank attacks.

As regards the second line, the brigade of Hussars, it would not be necessary that it should execute an inward wheel, supposing it to have previously made a left or half left wheel, not even at the moment when the heavy brigade went to the attack. In the account given in our text, the brigade executes a further partial evolution by throwing two squadrons against the front of the 5th Cuirassiers, and four others against its flank and that of the 4th Cuirassiers which followed it. But that was but a half measure, and might have been employed with much more considerable effect.

The frontal attack executed by the two squadrons of the 1st Hussars does not appear to have had sufficient motive. The six squadrons would have done better if they had been formed in column of half troops from the left, and had endeavoured by taking an oblique direction to gain the flank of the 5th Cuirassiers. Then three or at the most four squadrons should have wheeled inwards into line and been launched upon this regiment; the three (or two) then remaining squadrons would have formed a reserve and opposed the next approaching hostile regiment (three squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers). The slope descending towards Schleithal* would have masked that movement from the eyes of the adversary, who was still, at the moment when it would have been commenced, south of the road Frohnackerhof—Schleithal; a surprise would in this way have been all the more easy of accomplishment, as his attention must have been involuntarily attracted to the shock of his 6th and 7th Cuirassiers with the heavy brigade. According to the sketch, at 10.36 A.M. the Hussars were still about 2,200 paces distant in a direct line from the Cuirassiers; each of the two adversaries had therefore still 1,100 paces to traverse before they closed with each other. Supposing that they did this at a gallop, the Cuirassiers, after having traversed that distance, would have been at the point indicated on the sketch by a circle and the Hussars at the cross +. There the former were still 500 paces from the point where the shock of the 6th and 7th Cuirassiers with the heavy brigade took place, and the Hussars at the most 300 paces from the left of the 5th Cuirassiers. By

* A look at the map (No. 3) will suffice for the purpose of following this description.

wheeling into line at a gallop, and at once charging the latter, the three squadrons of Hussars must almost for a certainty have succeeded in throwing the Cuirassiers back upon the *mêlée* already engaged in the west, which latter itself would have received an impulsion towards the west or south-west. Three squadrons would then still have remained at disposal which might have been employed against the 4th Cuirassiers.

In any case, the Brigadier of the Hussars was in a position to readily execute the movement which we have indicated, as he had heard in good time the approach of the enemy's Cuirassiers from east of Frohnackerhof, that is to say, before the general shock took place.

It might be objected, it is true, that if the adversary had kept a sharp look out and acted correctly, he would probably have been in a position to meet in good time the movements of the 1st Cavalry Division which we have here sketched. But this does not at all weaken the argument that of two adversaries the one who is most skilled in evolutions has much more chance of turning the combat in his favour.

Let us suppose, however, that this movement had not succeeded as sketched out, and that consequently the first line had at first been repulsed. According to the description of the situation given in the text, it might have been repulsed in a north-easterly direction if the echelons on the adversary's left wing had attacked; and in the case of the movement which we proposed above, this would almost certainly have been the case. But a retrograde movement in that direction would have exposed the brigade of Hussars to the danger of being completely mixed up with the 1st line, if it did not execute the wider movement we have spoken of above. If, on the contrary, this movement were successfully executed, the 5th Cuirassiers would be driven back upon the whole of the fighting mass, and would have compelled the latter at least to come to a halt and perhaps even to turn about.

A skilful employment of the reserves must then have turned the combat in favour of the 1st Cavalry Division. Even supposing that the flank attack by the Hussars had not succeeded, and that even they were driven back, the possibility still remained of bringing the enemy to a halt by means of successive attacks of Dragoons against the left flank and rear of the hostile masses, who would be moving helter-skelter towards the north-east, thereby disengaging both the heavy and Hussar brigades, and so turning the tide of the combat. This would evidently be possible only when the reserve was

placed in rear of one of the wings and not in rear of the centre. As we have already remarked, its proper place under the actual circumstances was in rear of the right wing.

Had the combat, however, taken a favourable turn from the beginning, it is probable that the arrival of a couple of squadrons of Dragoons would have sufficed to bring about a decisive result. Five squadrons of that brigade, or, if the former were not required, even the whole brigade with its seven squadrons, would then have been ready to advance as a compact body, and in concert with the wing squadrons of the other brigades which had taken up the pursuit, reap the full fruits of the victory. If, meanwhile, the main body of the heavy and Hussar brigades had rallied with all possible despatch and followed as a reserve, the combat would in all probability have produced brilliant results, and the adversary would have fled in all haste as far as the Engelbach.

According to the facts of the combat as given in the narrative, the heavy brigade had really, for an instant, the intention of threatening the adversary's flank, but it did not carry it into execution, while the Hussar brigade but partly carried out the same intention.

In this manner twelve squadrons, on the whole, were employed in the first and second lines for the frontal attacks. It is just these frontal attacks which generally lead, all other things being equal, to those undecided cavalry duels which degenerate into a scrimmage on a grand scale, followed by very considerable losses, and having no result whatever for the general good of the operations.

Only FLANK attacks will ever give DECISIVE results in cavalry combats. Frederick the Great again and again insists on this point in his instructions, and it was the skilful use of them which made Seidlitz's reputation.

Having examined the more general features of the cavalry fight under observation, let us now more closely look into the details of the combat.

We have already treated of the general characteristics of cavalry fights in a previous part of these studies, when describing the combat of Hohweiler. We shall now occupy ourselves mainly with the main units of a Division, that is to say, with the lines formed by the different brigades, both as to their special rôle and their combined action.

Here we have intentionally chosen the formation laid down by the new Regulations (Part V.) for the Exercises of

the Prussian Cavalry.* It is not intended to invent new formations, but it is of much greater importance to see how the formations and instructions laid down in the regulations respond to the exigencies of real warfare, so far as this can be done in a purely theoretical discussion. The Division, in accordance with the regulations, advanced in three lines, each line being composed of a brigade.

Let us first consider the first line.

It is composed of eight squadrons of the heavy brigade. 150 paces in rear of each regiment follows a succour squadron (a squadron of Hussars taken from the 2nd line). The brigade advanced in line of squadron columns. As circumstances permitted the formation of the Division at its leisure, the heavy brigade was placed in first line, in order to give the first shock the greatest possible power. It would be useless to demonstrate the superiority, all other things being equal, of the horses of heavy cavalry over those of light cavalry during a shock. This superiority, however, is very much diminished in the field by the fact that the heavy cavalry horse is less able to undergo fatigues, to traverse heavy soil, and to leap obstacles, and—especially in the case of the Cuirassiers—he has to support a heavy weight, which in certain circumstances considerably reduces his powers.

At the beginning of the advance to the attack it is impossible to foretell the point at which the first shock with the adversary will take place, or even to state for certain whether there will be a shock at all. The principal object on first moving off to the attack is to lead the brigade in the direction in which the enemy is expected to be met with, and to march in as concentrated and orderly a formation as possible. The pace is maintained without hurry, the intervals between squadron columns carefully preserved, and where lost corrected during the march. In order not to unduly narrow the range of the artillery fire, the right flank is ordered to rest on the main road, and the brigade is placed at a right angle with that road before marching off.

But it must not be thought that the Division will be enabled to maintain this original direction throughout its advance to the attack; on the contrary, it will have to be continually modified.

* Allusion is here made to the Cavalry Regulations of 1876. For a brief account of the changes introduced by the Regulations of 1886, see note, page 422, and "Notes on the German Cavalry Regulations of 1886" (official).—EDITOR.

The adversary certainly is seen in front, but the distance is still too great to observe his formation. Perhaps a considerable number of squadron columns may be perceived, but without one's being able to distinguish how many there are in first and how many in second line. In addition, the adversary is for a few minutes still in a position to modify his formation or to change the direction of his movements.

The first line is therefore compelled to execute various evolutions, either according as it more closely approaches the adversary, or as a knowledge is gained of the latter's formation. It should be added to this that, in our example, after a short distance the main road made a bend, and that the new direction formed with the previous line a salient angle, which necessitated a half left wheel.

From here, however, the 6th Cuirassiers of the leading hostile brigade could be perceived as it emerged from the ravine of the Warschbach and passed with its right wing close to the west side of the farm of Frohnackerhof, the 7th Cuirassiers following it in echelon. These two regiments extended over a frontage of from 800 to 900 paces; the distance of the farm from the road is about 1,200 paces. Their left wing was therefore still several hundred paces from the main road, and exposed to being enveloped by the 1st Cuirassiers. But, on the other hand, the adversary could also envelop the left wing of the Uhlans.

To this it might be replied that the brigade of Hussars followed the left wing as a second line, and that it is one of the duties of that brigade to support the first line. But it is not usual to place part of one's forces wilfully in a bad position, and it is preferable to ward off a threatening danger with one's own proper resources. In any case, by adopting the latter course we are sure that measures will really be taken, whereas the protection that is expected from some other supporting body of troops will often fail owing to circumstances drawing these troops away in some other direction. Although it would have been preferable as matters turned out if the Brigadier of the heavy cavalry had attempted to surround the adversary's right flank, still we must approve of his attempt after giving up the above resolution to secure his left wing from the danger of being outflanked. He orders each regiment to execute a half left wheel, and then, as the new alignment was reached, at once deploys them and advances to the attack. Should the adversary not

immediately ward off this movement by an analogous one, the heavy brigade will fall with all its weight upon the 7th Cuirassiers, with the additional advantage that the other wing of the adversary which outflanks the heavy brigade will become an easy prey to the brigade of Hussars. Whilst the regiment of Uhlans thus executes the first attack, the 1st Cuirassiers, which follows in echelon but a few paces to the right rear, will be able to act at once in the most effective manner.

For the rest, we would call attention to the fact that the General's leading under these circumstances was far from perfect, in the sense that he was exclusively pre-occupied with the thought of warding off the danger which threatened him. This must certainly be taken into account, but in first line the chief consideration must always be how most effectually to threaten the adversary. Otherwise, the movements would simply be dictated by the adversary.

The movement of the first line ($\frac{1}{4}$ th wheel) which caused the two regiments to be formed in echelon did not affect the position. Had the General desired to execute this movement with his whole brigade and then advance to the attack with his two regiments simultaneously, the movement would have demanded much more time and afforded the adversary an opportunity to take measures to ward off the danger.

If, however, it is believed that the adversary can be more advantageously met by executing a skilful evolution than by making a simple direct frontal attack, recourse can be had to this measure up to the moment that the distance at which the adversaries have approached each other demands that the attacking pace must be resorted to. In order to make this attack under the very best conditions, it must be executed so that the trumpet sound "deploy" is immediately followed by the sound "charge."

*It is essential, however, that sufficient space should remain to be traversed at the charge to deliver the shock with the highest possible power.**

* We will cite, as an example, the following passage from the pamphlet of Major Kaehler (Berlin, 1873), entitled, "The Cavalry in the Combat of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour":— . . . "The commander of the 13th Prussian Dragoons soon perceived that the hostile Hussars were endeavouring to gain the right flank of his regiment. To ward off the movement, he ordered 'half troops right wheel,' pushed on for some distance at a trot, then wheeled into line, and threw himself at once at a

To attain this, from 100 to 150 paces will suffice to be traversed at the charge. The longer the line of squadron columns is preserved, with due regard to the above condition, the greater facility exists for the line to execute evolutions during its advance to the attack. But, as is proved by the example quoted in the foot-note, such movements need not be renounced even when line has already been formed; they can still be resorted to by wheeling into column or half column.

It is evident that it may often be useful to deploy earlier, when exposed to a heavy artillery fire; but even in this case it will generally suffice to make some changes of direction, which, however, are always more easily executed while still in column formation.

It is not always necessary, however, to extend the deployment to a whole brigade, especially when a part of the attacking column only is exposed to artillery fire.

The wing squadrons may be able, according to circumstances, to play an important rôle during the attack. We have already indicated how important it is to envelop an adversary's flank. The wing squadrons have special opportunities of menacing the adversary's flank or opposing a similar movement on his part if they but watch their opportunity and are well led. To this end the squadron which so operates must momentarily separate itself from the regiment. Should it observe, for instance, the approach of one of the adversary's detached squadrons, with the intention of supporting the frontal attack by an attempt to fall upon our flank, it must wheel outwards and parry that attack, as it is the more dangerous of the two. If we outflank the adversary's line, our flank squadron will as a matter of course throw itself wholly or in part upon his flank and rear. But even supposing the two lines marching against each other to be of the same extent of front, the flank squadron can yet make efforts to play an important rôle. In this case, by increasing the interval which separates it from the next squadron, it may move so as to gain the adversary's flank. Its shock there will have a much more decisive influence than a simple frontal attack would have.

This rôle demands, however, an intelligent initiative on gallop upon the approaching adversary. . . . The 7th (French) Hussars avoided the onslaught, partly making for an open gap, and partly falling upon a regiment which came up at a rapid pace in column."

the part of the squadron leader. It is not sufficient that he should gallop with the general mass and restrict his action to carrying out the direct orders of the Brigadier. During cavalry combats opportunities exist for a moment only, and it does not always do to wait for orders, which may arrive too late. It is important, therefore, that the leading of the squadron should be in complete harmony with the general end in view, and its commander must himself take the initiative and act whenever and wherever he may be able to further the general plan.

It is quite evident that movements of this kind can only produce the required effect when they are executed at the proper moment. This demands, however, that the flank squadrons should in themselves possess a certain independence of the others, and should operate clear of the rest of the line. It is in this position only that squadron leaders can properly judge of the situation and profit by the few moments of which they may be able to dispose, and the flank squadrons will, in nearly all cases, have to move off in time at a sharper pace than the remaining squadrons of the brigade.

During the *rencontre* of large bodies of cavalry, these movements will always demand a certain amount of precaution, especially on the flank which is not followed by the second line. If at this point the adversary has a supporting body in rear of him, it may easily happen that the squadron operating as we have just now described is itself taken in flank by this hostile support before it has been able to effect the desired object.

From these considerations it will be seen that the execution of the first attack is not quite so easy as is generally supposed. The great importance of the first attack is clear. But in order to make sure of all chances which human skill can create, a certain faculty is required to enable one to recognise the adversary's formation at a glance, to divine his intentions, and to calculate time and distance, so as to be able to judge the limits within which evolutions may be resorted to with impunity; and it further requires the power of making rapid resolutions, and troops which are habituated to manœuvre with certainty and skill.

With such troops a talented General may resort to evolutions even up to the very last moment, and this with all the more assurance of success when intelligent peace manœuvres have developed his tactical skill. *In their skill in executing*

evolutions lay the certainty of victory of the squadrons of Frederick the Great.

The entry into the fighting line of the succour squadrons follows immediately upon the shock of the Uhlans with the hostile Cuirassiers. Each of the two regiments of the heavy brigade carried this out in a somewhat different manner. The right squadron of the 1st Cuirassiers gave way under the artillery fire directed against it; the empty space was at once filled by the succour squadron (1st of 1st Hussars). This measure appears all the more rational as the 1st Cuirassiers must advance against the second echelon of the adversary (7th Cuirassiers), and the latter would otherwise have overlapped them by a squadron.

The 2nd squadron of Hussars, however, which served as a succour squadron to the Uhlans, was bound in our opinion, to act in a very different manner.

This latter regiment executed its attack calmly and with closed ranks; it had left no blank spaces which demanded the entry into the fighting line of the whole or even part of the succour squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the regiment and had preserved its original distance of 150 paces from it. The squadron deployed at the same time as the regiment, and halted at the moment when the Uhlans broke into the charge. As the enemy's Cuirassiers had been shaken by the fire from the batteries much more than the Uhlans, the latter were more concentrated at the moment of the shock. Although the greater part of the Cuirassiers were at first driven back, still a certain number of them pierced the line of the Uhlans at different points. The leader of the succour squadron now ordered two of his *half* troops to wheel respectively half right and half left, and at a gallop launched them upon those hostile horsemen who had broken through the line. When, a moment after, he perceived that the combat had taken a more serious turn for the 4th squadron, he himself went to its aid with his two remaining *half* troops. This charge sufficed to force the adversary to turn about at this point also.

From these considerations we deduce the necessity that, if even it is not possible to take the succour squadrons from the first line, they should none the less be placed under the orders of the commander of that line. We might ask, further, whether it was better to take the two supporting squadrons from the 1st Hussars, or to have taken one from each of the

two regiments. This will generally depend on the circumstances in which the Division is placed the moment it forms up for the combat, as they will naturally be taken from the line nearest to hand.

As we have seen, the first *rencontre* of the Uhlans with the adversary's troops took place at 10.37 A.M. These (6th Cuirassiers of the reserve Division) were supported by the 7th Cuirassiers, who marched 150 paces to the left rear, while the 8th Cuirassiers of the brigade of the I. Army Corps followed directly in their rear. This latter corps was originally 600 paces in rear, but the reserve had executed its movements more calmly, it had not commenced to gallop quite so soon, and the 8th regiment had, moreover, moved a little to the right, in order not to remain immediately in rear of the combatants, so that the distance was gradually augmented until it reached about 700 paces.

In this manner the shock of the right wing (1st Cuirassiers and one squadron of Hussars) of the 1st Cavalry Division with the 7th Cuirassiers of the South Division took place between 10.37 and 10.38 A.M.

At both points, by the 1st Uhlans as well as by the 1st Cuirassiers, the adversary was driven back, and the majority of the men galloped off in a southerly direction. But the movement of this body, owing to mixture with the enemy, and the hand-to-hand fighting, began to get gradually slower. On the other hand, the foremost regiment of the hostile reserve, the 8th Cuirassiers, had, during these events, deployed, so that it came about that the *rencontre* of the Uhlans with this latter regiment took place one minute later, that is to say, at 10.38 A.M., at about 350 paces south of the point where the first shock with the 6th Cuirassiers took place. About half or three-quarters of a minute later the 1st Cuirassiers were also reached by two squadrons of the 9th Cuirassiers, which constituted for the present the last reserve of the adversary.

Both regiments of the heavy brigade, as well as their succour squadrons, were then engaged in a serious *mêlée*, in which the superiority of numbers (fourteen squadrons against nine), the good order of the attack, as well as the direction given to the last troops that had entered the fighting line, were greatly in favour of the adversary.

We may now well ask whether this momentarily unfavourable situation could have been avoided on the part of the 1st Cavalry Division. As far as the second and third lines

are concerned, the answer will be given later on when we examine the rôle of these lines. In the meanwhile it will be interesting to see whether the heavy brigade possessed in itself the means of getting out of this false situation from the moment that it had abstained from directing its attack against the adversary's right flank.

We believe we are correct in saying that it was not in a position to do so.

The situation would evidently have been different had the adversary turned about *before* the shock. The mass of the 1st Uhlans and 1st Cuirassiers would have remained entirely in the hands of their leaders, and the pursuit taken up by a couple of squadrons would have sufficed to complete the defeat. The drill regulations can designate beforehand, during times of peace, the squadrons which should take up the pursuit in such cases, or it might be left to the commanding officer of the regiment to do so at the proper moment. There is no doubt that the wing squadrons are most suitable for the purpose.

But in the imaginary tableau which we have sketched, we have supposed a reciprocal penetration by the men of both sides, and we have done this for the reason that such penetrations create the most difficult situations which a leader can be called upon to surmount.

But disorder is inseparable from every shock, and in this case the victorious side is recognised only by the majority of the adversary's troops giving way, attempting to draw off from the fight, as far as that is possible, and taking to flight.

In our example we have given the 1st Uhlans and 1st Cuirassiers one minute for this purpose, and have allowed them to have gained 300 to 400 paces of ground. It is only now that it would have been possible, under the above circumstances, to push on the wing squadrons in pursuit and to rally the others. If the leader desired to get the latter again into his hands, it would have been indispensable to rally them, as every squadron was in a certain state of disorder. But just at this moment six fresh hostile squadrons arrive and charge the foremost Uhlans and Cuirassiers who are engaged in the pursuit, and render the rally perfectly impossible. Supposing the most favourable case, that the officer commanding the regiment, charging at its head, has broken through the hostile first line, and is safe and sound after the charge, that none of the enemy's men attack him

and absorb his attention, and that he will consequently be able at once to recognise by the rising clouds of dust the approach of the enemy's reserve. Supposing, further, that a trumpeter has remained alongside of him, and that it was possible to quickly sound the "rally"; this signal would only be heard by a comparatively small number of men; the greater part of them, being still engaged in hand-to-hand conflict with the adversary, could not be in a position to obey the sound immediately. But it is here a matter of a few seconds only, the more so as by continuing to rush on, the men will meet the approaching fresh hostile troops half way.

If the rally is to be effected at the spot where the colonel has halted, barely a handful of men will have assembled here before the fresh adversary reaches this point. If, on the contrary, the commanding officer wished to make the attempt a few hundred paces in rear, it would be equally impossible for him to do so in the face of these fresh victorious troops charging along. In both cases the result of the signal would simply be the recall in hot haste of such of the Uhlans as heard it and could manage to disengage themselves from the adversary, which of course would further contribute to the disorder already existing among them.

The first success obtained by the charge was thus voluntarily transformed, after the lapse of scarcely one minute, into a veritable check.

Under such circumstances only one chance remains, and that is, that the men of the 6th and 7th Cuirassiers, after having been repulsed in their first charge, would under existing circumstances ride into the 8th and 9th Cuirassiers, who were galloping up to their support, and so provoke a certain disorder among them, and that then the 1st Cuirassiers and the 1st Uhlans, still continuing the velocity of their first shock, would succeed in overthrowing this hostile reserve also. This supposition is all the more probable when the hostile reserve directly follows in rear of the first line.

But if one vigorous shock does not succeed in overthrowing the hostile reserve as well, the combat will at any rate remain, for some moments at least, stationary, and the second and third lines of Uhlans, &c., will gain time and opportunity to come up and strike a decisive blow.

The principle must always be maintained that the first condition of the "rally" is that there must be time to effect it. It can consequently be carried out only when the adversary

allows the necessary time, or the attack of our own support ensures it. *But to rally at an inopportune moment will produce no other result than to facilitate the adversary's victory.*

We will also add, that in *rencontres* of large bodies of cavalry, the rally cannot always be immediately effected at any desirable moment. This, however, does not affect the principle that an immediate rally should be effected whenever circumstances will permit of it.

At the moment when the adversary turns about, whether voluntarily or from being forced to do so, the pursuit should be continued by part of the forces only; the remainder must rally as quickly as possible, since it is with formed compact bodies of troops only that the leader can hope to exercise a decisive influence upon the course of a cavalry combat.

In the present case the signal had not been given either by the Brigadier of the heavy brigade or by the officer commanding the regiment of Uhlans. The *mêlée* of the first line of the Cavalry Division with the two brigades of the adversary lasted for nearly four minutes, counting from the first shock, viz., from 10.37 to 10.41 A.M. From that moment the fight at this point, although still retaining the characteristics of a *mêlée*, showed a tendency to move the whole mass in a northerly direction, which indicated that the squadrons of the 1st Cavalry Division fighting here were no longer a match for their adversaries. This retrograde movement at first operated very slowly; but the pace soon sensibly increased.

The fight of the two regiments of the heavy brigade with their adversaries formed but one common mass.

As we know, General A. was compelled to launch fresh troops in order to change the tenour of the combat. Therefore, before pursuing the events of the present first line any further, we will consider the conduct of its immediate support. This brings us, then, to the second line.

The second line of the 1st Cavalry Division was composed in our example of two squadrons of the 1st Hussars and three squadrons of the 2nd Hussars. The 4th squadron of the latter regiment, which had, from the commencement, been advanced to the front to observe the adversary, was, it is true, detached, but it was nevertheless in a position readily to enter the fighting line at any moment, so that the total strength of the second line amounted to six squadrons.

The first mission of the second line is to support the first. This support may be afforded directly, in so far as the second line may intervene immediately in the combat of the first, or it may be given indirectly by its taking measures to protect the advancing or already engaged first line.

Here the question arises as to which is the proper place of the second line, and what formation should it be in?

If the second line directly follows the first, we shall undoubtedly, under certain circumstances, be able to keep the adversary in ignorance of our strength.

It will however, in many cases, hardly be possible to do this, as it will be very difficult to prevent his advanced patrols on the flanks from reconnoitring our strength; it may also be said that even when the second line is overlapping the flanks of the first, it will frequently happen that its strength can to some extent be concealed, and its movements masked, if a skilful use is made of the accidents of the ground. In our example the height sloping towards the Niederwald certainly permitted the possibility of doing this.

But it is certain that if the second line desires to produce any useful effect at all, it can only do so from beyond the flanks of the first line, and that the propitious moments which may occur are easily lost if the second line is not moved out to the flank and deployed until the last moment. In addition to which the following of one line in direct rear of the other within the sphere of combat will also expose the rear troops to the greatest dangers. The shells of the artillery destined for the first line will reach the line following it even while still at a long distance, and two targets in direct line with each other can but increase the effect of the shots.

Again, the least disorder which manifests itself in the first line will make itself felt in that which follows. A misunderstanding in the delivery of an order there, or an unsuccessful evolution, will not fail to leave its traces in the second line. Or, should a panic occur in front, or a sudden attack or unexpected firing compel the first line to turn about, or, lastly, should it fail in its attack, and the retreating troopers fall back upon the second line, so that the latter is unable to deploy, then it also will get mixed up in the disorder and ultimate flight, without being able to avoid it, and without even having seen the enemy.

There is but one way to guard against these evils, and that is to insist in the most positive manner that the *method*

*of allowing the second line to follow in rear of the first must unhesitatingly be abandoned the moment the troops are within attacking distance of the adversary.**

The second line should always be moved out in rear of a flank when within at least 1,500 paces, or, better still, within 2,000 (the old Prussian attack distance), of the adversary. It now remains to be determined to which flank it should be moved.

During the combat at Hohweiler, which we have previously described, as well as during that of the united Division which we are now considering, this question could be solved without difficulty. It will, in fact, be so in most cases. Either the ground itself will offer some support on one or other of the flanks, as happened on the 1st August, owing to the ravine at Hohweiler; or, from the order of battle itself, that is, the presence of other bodies of troops, one of the flanks may be protected. But in almost every case the Cavalry Division possesses in itself, *i.e.*, in its artillery, means quite sufficient to protect one of its wings. But even should this not be the case, the formation adopted by the 1st Cavalry Division during its march to the attack was well calculated to meet every eventuality. If, for instance, we suppose the artillery on both sides to be occupied at some other point of the battlefield, and the cavalry of the Southern Division, instead of debouching on to the road from Fort Louis, to make its attack from west of Ober-Seebach, then the heavy brigade would be compelled to make a half right wheel. The brigade of Dragoons would at the same time place itself in second line, outflanking the first on the right, while the Hussar brigade would form the reserve.

It should here be remarked that the formation taken by the Division when advancing enabled it to meet all and every eventuality. If, for instance, the adversary debouched suddenly from the direction of Schleithal, the Division would, with the whole of its brigades, make a simple wheel to the left. The Hussars would then form the first line, the heavy brigade the second line, outflanking the first line on the right, and the Dragoons would remain in third line as a reserve.

We leave it to the reader to pursue the examination of further hypotheses; by the formation in three lines, each being composed of a brigade, and by bearing in mind the

* Compare note, p. 422.—EDITOR,

normal relation and duties of each of these lines, the means are undoubtedly gained to satisfy every exigency, with all desirable speed, and we obtain thereby the immense advantage of always effecting this in the identical formation to which officers and men are already habituated. It is essential that each brigade—forming a line—should remain intact in the hands of its leader.

We therefore disapprove of the formation which makes use of the two leading brigades by placing them side by side with their extreme flank regiments following in echelon.

This formation means the renouncing of the attack formation in three parts, on which the great mobility of a Division principally rests. The first and second lines would no longer exist as independent lines except in name, but would in reality form but one very rigid mass under different leaders.

In the following considerations, therefore, we shall base our remarks on the formation in which the second line follows the first, outflanking one of its wings; and let us examine closer the rôle which it then should and can fulfil.

It is first of all desirable that the first line should have a support, if the adversary marching against it has the superiority of numbers and consequently outflanks it.

In this case the second line must furnish direct support to the front line in some shape or other. In all cases, this support will certainly be most effective if the second line can take in flank, and at the proper moment, that part of the adversary's first line which outflanks ours. But in order to attain this result, we may, perhaps, be obliged to make a very extended movement, and then possibly we might arrive too late. We may easily imagine cases where it would be preferable to support the first line by the most direct action, viz., by the second line attempting to extend the first line by advancing some squadrons in line with it. If the second line is 300 paces distant the thing will only be possible when the squadrons detailed for this purpose gallop up to the front before the first line has broken into that pace. But even supposing that they could not arrive in time, the approach of these squadrons alone will suffice to force the outflanking part of the adversary's line to turn against them, and will so prevent them from throwing themselves upon the threatened flank of our first line. For the rest, *the best method to meet the danger of being outflanked by an adversary is to make a breach into that part of the line which threatens your own,*

should circumstances not permit of having recourse to a flank attack.

It is, however, of the utmost importance that the attack should be executed with the greatest possible impetuosity and with closed ranks. This will ever remain the first condition, and can never be left out of consideration.

The prolongation of the first line by the second is, then, a ready method of meeting a threatened attack on the exposed flank.

But a dangerous movement against a flank, the most vulnerable part of a line marching to the attack, can also be threatened by the second of the adversary's lines or his reserves, which our second line would then have to face. It is impossible to say how much of its forces should be allotted to this task; it will entirely depend on circumstances. In our example we engage all the squadrons of the brigade of Hussars which are in hand, owing to the adversary debouching with large bodies east of the Warschbach. *But in all cases the commander of the second line should take care never to employ more squadrons than are absolutely necessary for the purpose in view.*

He is often strongly tempted to be led away—when he observes a whole brigade advancing to the attack—into throwing all his disposable forces against the fresh bodies of hostile troops just arriving. It is evident that the more troops are employed to overpower the adversary, the greater are the chances of victory; but it must not be forgotten that a cavalry combat—at the instant that the shock takes place—produces disorder, and that the troops for the moment slip out of the leader's hands, whereas in the very next moment, perhaps, more important exigencies may present themselves which cannot be satisfactorily met unless fresh and compact squadrons are still at disposal.

The direction from which the right flank brigade of the Southern Division made its attack, caused a second combat to take place at a point some distance from the first, which was going on further west, a circumstance which will often happen.

On this occasion the six squadrons of Hussars attempted to make a kind of evolution. This evolution was in principle justified, and we can only once more reproach them with not having executed their flank movement with the whole of their squadrons and profited by the hill sloping towards the Niederwald in order to hide their movement.

Within what limits it is at all possible to assure the

simultaneousness and precision of converging attacks, &c., is a point which requires to be cleared up. At peace manœuvres we hear continually that the flank attack was not made at the proper point; that it either shot past and beyond the frontal attack, or that it passed in rear of the first line. But it always will be so, seeing that it cannot be performed with mathematical precision. Where it succeeds at all it requires an amount of lucky chances, which, especially on the battlefield, no man is able to command; thus the troops attacking in front must at the moment of the charge be equidistant from the enemy with those which are launched against the adversary's flank; the ground to be traversed must be the same in both directions; it is also necessary that the troops detailed to execute the flank attack should not have been perceived by the adversary in time; that the latter should not have sufficient forces left in hand to oppose the attack, or should not be sufficiently skilled to know how to make the best use of them at the proper moment, &c.

If, for instance, the first line has already broken into a gallop, how can a squadron of the second line possibly throw itself on to the adversary's flank at the same moment as the first line closes with him in front?

With the best will in the world it must take at least three-fifths of a minute to traverse the regular line distance of 300 paces, and if the squadron has to execute a wheel, it will not even arrive until one minute after the first line.

It is, then, such squadrons only as are already well to the front, and clear of the first line, that can act exactly at the moment of the shock with perfect success on the flanks; the result will be the more decisive when it has been possible to mask the movements, and when consequently the squadrons are enabled to throw themselves unperceived on to the adversary's flank. It seems, however, much more advantageous that the flank attack should *precede* the frontal attack than that both should be made simultaneously. In the first case the shock acts with all its force upon the adversary, while in the latter case it must also be partly directed against such of our men as are on that flank of the frontal attack. For the rest, a flank attack launched against a pursuing enemy or into the *mêlée* itself, if even our attacking line should have turned about or be still engaged in the *mêlée*, will always be of the greatest possible utility.

We have up to the present spoken of the direct inter-

vention of a fraction of the second line during the combat of the first. But, in general, when large bodies of cavalry come in conflict with each other, the action of the second line will nearly always be immediately required in order to meet the adversary's second and third lines. Should the latter not launch his supports, then it becomes the duty of our second line to look for them and attempt to paralyze their action.

During the fight of large cavalry masses, special value should therefore not be given to the intervention in force of the second line in the combat of the first. The situation will most likely develop itself in such wise that the first line will be already engaged with that of the adversary, while, half or three-quarters of a minute later on, the second lines of both sides will likewise close with each other somewhere on the flank and a little in front or rear of the former.

The mission of the second line, to protect the first line from attacks on its flanks and rear, will during the fight of large cavalry masses in most cases lead to the breadth of the theatre of combat being considerably extended on one or other flank. But in this case also the leader of the second line must never lose sight of the rule indicated above, viz., *never to employ more of his forces than are absolutely required for the moment.*

This rule does not at all exclude the execution of flank attacks by isolated squadrons; it is, moreover, for the already detached squadrons—such as the 4th of the 2nd Hussars—the most propitious moment to make the adversary feel their influence very sensibly.

Thus the second line should take a direct part in the combat of the first line only if the latter turns about before or at the moment of the shock, or when the enemy's foremost line is not followed by reserves, or the latter are still a long way off.

If our first line turns its back to the adversary, it then becomes an immediate necessity to put a stop to the pursuit of it as quickly as possible, in order to give the retreating men time to rally. The second line will then at once wheel inwards* with a part of its force and will launch it, if time is given, upon the flanks of the pursuing adversary. The rest of this line will meanwhile cover the execution of this attack, by throwing itself against the fresh squadrons which the enemy may send into the fighting line.

* That is, towards the first line, and so towards the enemy's first line. See foot-note, p. 373.—EDITOR.

If, on the contrary, the latter has no second line, or if the one he possesses is too far in rear or to the flank to intervene, then the second line should immediately give direct support to the first line already in the *mêlée*. This may be done by successive attacks of single squadrons, or by simultaneous attacks of several squadrons. These squadrons will then direct their attack upon those points where the combat has become most intense, or upon those where our troops seem to be hard pressed, or, lastly, where the adversary has made the largest breach in the line.

If we desired to apply these principles of cavalry combat to our studies, we should say that a case in point would have presented itself here if, for example, the 1st brigade of the adversary's reserve Division had not yet reached the left bank of the Warschbach at the moment that the *rencontre* took place north-west of Frohnackerhof.

If the adversary had not at once given way under the shock of the 1st Uhlans and 1st Cuirassiers, and had the opposing lines remained closed with each other for some time, the result would have been decided much more rapidly if the leader of the Hussar brigade had launched the 3rd and 4th squadrons of his 1st regiment into the *mêlée*, and even, if it became necessary, the 1st and 2nd squadrons of the 2nd regiment also. The 3rd squadron of the latter, to which might even be added the detached squadron (4th), on the left flank, would then have formed the reserve of the Brigadier.

If we accept the other hypothesis, that is to say, if it is supposed that the heavy brigade—forced, perhaps, by the artillery fire—had turned about before closing with the adversary, the five squadrons of the Hussars must then immediately have executed a half-right wheel and have thrown themselves upon the flank and rear of the enemy's Cuirassiers launched to the charge. In this manner the heavy brigade would have quickly become disengaged, it would have had time to re-form, and time would also have been given to the reserve—the third line—to conform in its movements to the new situation. It is evident that, even in this case, the 4th squadron of the 2nd Hussars should have been recalled to cover the left flank of the Hussars.

By employing his second line in these different ways, the leader of the Division is enabled to keep his reserve—third line—intact as long as possible, and to meet all those eventualities which are inseparable from a cavalry combat.

Finally, we would point out that while the whole of the troops composing the second line were successively engaged, the General Commanding Division had not for one moment been in a position to give any orders to the commander of the brigade of Hussars. It is only by mere chance that he can inform him of the approach of the enemy's Cuirassiers from the east of the battlefield. Their movement had, however not escaped the Brigadier of the Hussars. This shows the perfect independence the commander of the second line must always possess, and how he must, of his own initiative, regulate his movements, and understand how to adapt them to the *ensemble* of the situation.

We have up to the present occupied ourselves with the place and *rôle* of the second line; it now remains to speak of its special formation and of the distance which it should keep from the first line. As the latter, as we have already shown, is often compelled to change its direction or to execute evolutions, the second line must constantly conform in the most exact manner to its movements. It will be all the more easy to satisfy this exigency if the masses of the second line are kept as concentrated as possible, that is, formed in line of squadron columns at close interval.

The second line must of course, be able to join in the combat as rapidly as possible; the deployment into line of squadron columns must therefore not be delayed too long. It will indeed be well if this movement be executed at the moment when the first line deploys into line for the charge. At the same time there are cases in which it will suffice to let the regiments of the second line remain in line of squadron columns at close interval, but with deploying intervals between regiments, particularly when it can be foreseen that the parts of the second line will be required for successive action. In such a formation the line will at any moment be ready to throw a couple of squadrons into the *mêlée*.

As regards the distance which the second line should keep from the first, the distance of 300 paces fixed by the regulations will in our opinion suffice for all exigencies. A shorter distance would rob both lines of their independence, as it would be difficult to keep them separate, and the second line would not have sufficient space if any movements had to be made towards the inward flank.* Too great a distance, on

* "Inward" in the German military sense of the term, that is, nearest to the neighbouring body of troops (first line). It should

the other hand, might easily expose it to the danger of arriving too late in the fighting line. If the whole Division advance at a trot, and it should become necessary to extend the front of the first line, the squadrons of the second line designated to effect this could in one-and-a-half minutes gallop up to a level with the front line then still trotting. If the latter break into a gallop, and 500 paces further on close with the enemy, the second line will then be in a position to arrive three-fifths of a minute later on at the point at which the shock took place.

It will therefore be advisable to keep in principle to a distance of 300 paces. But we must not deceive ourselves and imagine that we shall always be able to preserve this distance in practice.

Above all things, it must not be forgotten that the commander of the second line, in order to conform constantly to the movements of the first, must first of all ascertain exactly what the intentions of the latter are, and consequently he cannot order the movements of his own line for some moments after those of the first line have taken place; in addition, the second line does not move over the same ground as the first, and owing to this also its distance from the latter may be influenced to a sensible degree.

Generally speaking, all figures laid down for distances and intervals apply to normal situations only. Every effort must be made to conform to them whenever possible, but the nature of the ground will frequently modify them, and every endeavour must be made to re-establish the regulation distances and intervals when they have been lost. This is the special duty of leaders of leading ~~half~~ troops, directing squadrons, &c.; for the rest of the squadron leaders and superior officers it will suffice to glance occasionally at their troops in order to control and assist wherever necessary.

Special care must be taken to avoid paying too minute attention to this, as otherwise the necessary attention would be diverted from the direction of the enemy.

In conclusion, there is something interesting in a close

be borne in mind that whereas in English military language the term "inward flank" is generally applied to that which is nearest to the enemy, and towards which the Division, &c., is chiefly working (the "threatened flank", of our Cavalry Regulations, on which the supporting line is placed), and the term "outward flank" to the presumably protected flank, these meanings are reversed in German drill.—EDITOR.

study of the period of time within which the movements of the second line, the Hussar brigade, took place.

As we already know, the heavy brigade at 10.36 A.M. crossed the road which leads from Geitershof towards the east of Schleithal, its regiments executing a slight left wheel in doing so; the five squadrons of Hussars were at that moment 300 paces north of the road in echelon in line of squadron columns, in rear of the left wing of the Uhlans.

At 10.37 A.M. the Uhlans closed with the adversary's Cuirassiers, about 500 paces south of the road in question. The Hussar brigade had meantime been compelled, in order to conform to the left wheel of the Uhlans, to incline the heads of its columns a little to the left, and owing to this diagonal movement had not at that moment quite reached the road to Schleithal.

At 10.38 A.M. the Uhlans had driven back their adversary about 350 paces towards the south; they were therefore on the whole about 850 paces south of the road. The Hussars having previously been informed of the approach of the Cuirassiers emerging from the ground east of the Warschbach, marched to encounter them. The squadrons of the 1st Hussars, still at a trot, took full intervals and then deployed in line, and not till the last few moments did they break into a gallop.

In this manner at 10.38 A.M. they were about 300 paces south of the road. The 2nd Hussars moved towards the left front in half column, thereby attempting to gain the adversary's flank.

Now, while the combat of the heavy brigade remained stationary from 10.38 A.M. to 10.41 A.M., that of the Hussars took the following turn:—

At 10.39 A.M. the two squadrons of the 2nd Hussars and the foremost of the enemy's regiments (5th Cuirassiers) closed at 800 paces south of the road, and nearly on a level with the point where the Uhlans had first encountered the adversary. Between 10.39 A.M. and 10.40 A.M. the flank attack of the 2nd Hussars took place; at 10.40 A.M. the 4th regiment of the enemy's Cuirassiers, following in echelon on the right, attacked; and, lastly, at 10.41 A.M., the Hussars gradually retired. This compelled the General Commanding Division to send part of his reserve into the fighting line.

Let us now direct our attention to this reserve, that is to say, to the third line of the 1st Cavalry Division.

The Dragoon brigade, which formed that line, had first of all detached one of its squadrons to escort the artillery.

As regards the line from which this escort should properly be taken, that will principally depend on the particular circumstances which demand support for the batteries. Often it may be necessary to take one or more squadrons from the nearest regiment. But if we have full choice in the matter—and that will generally be the case—it is preferable, in principle, that the escort should be detailed from the third line. The first line, which has to effect the principal shock, must remain as strong as possible; the second line is already enfeebled, owing to the two squadrons detached as succour squadrons to the first line, and it is consequently upon the reserve of the Division that the duty in question will devolve.

Another question is, how strong this escort for the batteries should be. Here also the reply must vary with circumstances.

In the case before us, the nature of the ground and the proximity of the advanced Riflemen were important factors for consideration. On the other hand, if the batteries had been employed on the left flank of the Division, it would, perhaps, have been preferable to have protected them with two squadrons; these would then have been in a position to oppose any turning movement on the part of the enemy along the heights sloping towards the road from Schleithal. Besides, on that side the ground in front was sufficiently open to admit of stronger forces being brought to bear upon the batteries. Under such conditions the leader may, perhaps, even deem it necessary to detail more than two squadrons as escort.

The remaining seven squadrons of the Dragoon brigade, massed in line of squadron columns at close interval, followed the first line at 450 paces.

Wherever the ground permits, it would be very advantageous to allow the third line to outflank one or other of the wings. The *ensemble* of the situation will decide on which wing this should be done. In all cases the worst disposition that could be adopted would be to follow directly the first line, which would confine the execution of an attack by the third line to the same direction as that taken by the first line.

Everything that we have said to this effect as regards the second line is also perfectly applicable to the third line.

In the case under notice, by making the third line follow in rear of the heavy brigade, the principal forces of the Division took, no doubt, the direction from which most was to be feared, should the adversary pierce the first line. But the Dragoon brigade was thereby very much restricted in its movements, and the result of its intervention rendered very doubtful.

It was owing only to the diverging directions in which the two advanced lines executed the attack upon the adversary, and to the resulting wide gap separating the two battle-fields, that the reserve brigade in this case was at all enabled to make its action usefully felt in rear of the centre of the whole line of combatants. But similar circumstances cannot always be counted upon, and it would certainly have been preferable had the Dragoons chosen another position where they would not have been exposed to the danger of being dragged away by the retreating mass of combatants.

When at 10.36 A.M. the heavy brigade crossed the road from the Geitershof, the advancing Dragoon brigade was still 450 paces north of that road, marching by a diagonal movement towards the left flank of the first line in conformity with the order received from the Division. In this way the reserve brigade had therefore still nearly 650 paces to traverse ere it could reach the point on the road where the left of the Uhlans had crossed it; consequently, at 10.37 A.M.—that is, at the moment when the first shock of the Uhlans with the foremost of the adversary's regiments took place—it was, supposing it to have performed the movement at a trot, about 650 paces from the point where the shock took place. If the combat had at once resolved itself into a *mêlée*, it must have been more than a minute ere the Dragoons could have intervened, without taking into calculation that they had not yet deployed in readiness to enter the fighting line.

Meanwhile, the Uhlans drive the adversary back with the first shock; it is not now necessary that the Dragoons should intervene and they can quietly continue their half left movement. The Uhlans pursue and encounter at 10.38 A.M. the foremost regiment of the enemy's reserve, about 850 paces south of the road, while the Dragoons, still at a trot, had nearly reached the road, the Hussar brigade being about 500 paces to the left front. From 10.38 A.M. the *mêlée*, properly speaking, commenced, first with the heavy brigade and soon after with the Hussars. Before this combat,

at 10.41 A.M., took an unfavourable turn for the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division, the Dragoon brigade might easily have exerted great influence if it had at once broken into a gallop and hastened up the moment it perceived the two lines engaged in front. But nothing of the kind took place at first; the brigade remained at a trot, deployed, and when at 10.41 A.M. the retreat became certain, it was still 300 paces from the *mêlée* in which the two other brigades were engaged. It was only now that the Dragoon brigade took part in the combat.

The comparison of these relations of time and distance leads us to various considerations as to the relation of the third line to the other two. Here also we have to consider pace and formation.

In all great cavalry fights it is imperatively necessary for the second line to intervene in the fighting line as early as possible; the third line forms, consequently, the reserve properly so called, and should be ready to support the combatants in front at all and every point. The distance at which this reserve follows is originally 450 paces. But if it remains still at a trot while the first line, when within 500 paces of the adversary, breaks into a gallop, this distance will increase to 650 paces; the third line cannot then possibly arrive at the point where the first encounter takes place until $1\frac{1}{2}$ minutes later on. It should be understood that we here speak only of the intervention of single squadrons of the third line, whether it be in line of squadron columns at close or full intervals. If the deployment of the whole brigade takes place at that moment, its intervention will not take place until a minute later.

It is quite different, however, when the support of the third line has to take another direction to that which we have supposed here.

The extent of front of two brigades deployed side by side will amount to about 1,800 paces; when they are engaged in a *mêlée*, 2,000 paces or even more. From this it results that if the reserve brigade is placed in echelon in rear of one of the flanks, it will certainly take five minutes to intervene at the opposite flank; while if, on the contrary, it follows in rear of the centre of the two brigades, as soon as the second line has come into the fighting line on a flank, it will take but two minutes to enter that line on either hand.

But this advantage disappears in presence of the danger to which such intervention will expose it. If the two fore-

most brigades are repulsed, they will infallibly draw the reserve following them in rear of their centre into the vortex, thereby making it impossible for it to be of any use. If, on the other hand, it is on one of the flanks, it will be able to let the torrent pass by and render great help by throwing itself from the flank upon the pursuing enemy.

General A. would therefore perhaps have acted more wisely had he continued the half left wheel of the Dragoons, or placed them on the left flank from the beginning.

Movements of this kind will often be inevitable for the third line. But they will augment the original distance in a few moments (in our example from 450 to 650 paces), and the reserve will arrive later in the fighting line. It is only in case the shock of the first line produces a stationary combat that the lost distance can be regained.

It will, then, be seen that the distance of the reserve from the first line cannot always be maintained at 450 paces; and if it is desired to get at a clear idea of the time and distance at which the third line can intervene, the variation to which the distance is subject must be specially taken into calculation in every separate case requiring decision.

Of course by breaking into a gallop in good time, the third line will generally be able to restore the original distance. But it must not be overlooked that it is not always possible to have recourse to that pace. Besides, it cannot always be known exactly whether the third line will not have some other and more extended movements to execute before entering the fighting line. The power of the horses must therefore be preserved until the proper moment for the charge arrives. As a rule, therefore, the normal pace for all movements of the reserve is the trot, and the gallop should be employed exceptionally only. In situations analogous to that in our example, the distances, however, are by no means so great that the gallop may not be resorted to with impunity. Seidlitz was often much more exacting with regard to this matter than we are now-a-days.

If the first and second lines are already engaged, the third line must approach them as rapidly as possible in order to succour them in good time. During the interval, however, the combat may have taken an unfavourable turn; the brigades in the first line may give way, be forced by artillery fire to turn about, or, perhaps, be repulsed by the adversary's first shock.

The worst possible formation in which the reserve—if

following in rear of the centre—can then be found, is “line.” This formation has little consistence, and the reserve will find itself thrown into disorder or considerably obstructed by the hastily retreating men.

Under such circumstances it is preferable that the reserve should approach in line of squadron columns; the great intervals which separate the columns will give free passage to the fugitives. Every man will take care not to throw himself upon these columns, but will make for the openings, unless indeed he has completely lost his head or no longer possesses command over his horse.

The principle that a body of troops should deploy at the moment it is about to enter into action is founded, without doubt, on the nature of the combat itself. But in our case such action would not be free from certain dangers which cannot be passed over in silence.

In order to become convinced of the truth of this, let us try to imagine the impression under which every single man labours with regard to the situation, the feelings which take possession of every individual mind even when the combat in front takes a normal course.

The troopers of the third line during the advance to the attack have not as yet seen the enemy distinctly. The columns of the first line, the rising clouds of dust, the distance from the adversary, all combine to hide him from their view. Shells explode on the ground which the troops are in another moment to traverse; soon some pass close by or perhaps fall in the midst of the advancing third line. Already every man feels that the decisive moment is approaching.

This sentiment increases from moment to moment, and the third line at a gallop now takes its full intervals.

The first lines are seen to deploy in line, to break into a gallop, the clouds of dust which rise up prevent the actual moment of the shock being perceived, and it is felt as if the signal for the charge, heard in front, is also intended for those who follow. The pace of the third line has during these events involuntarily increased; every trooper desires to get as quickly as possible out of range of the hostile artillery, the shells from which now fall more copiously, all timidity disappears, and even the less brave now desire to close with the adversary.

Some dismounted men and riderless horses are already

seen rushing towards the rear, and even hostile Cuirassiers are seen in the intervals.

The *mêlée* in front has not confined its limits to a single line, in an instant it has thickened like a cloud and gained in depth. The General cannot as yet distinguish whether it is necessary to engage part or the whole of the reserve, or at which point it should intervene; he is even doubtful whether it is not more urgently required on one of the flanks.

In any case, it is clear to him that unless he will allow the whole brigade to be thrown into the *mêlée* and so get out of the control of its leader, the very last moment has arrived for sounding the halt.

But "the very last moment" for the signal to halt soon transforms itself into "too late."

The front of the third line in line of squadron columns extends, in fact, to about 900 paces; the original distance from the first line has now disappeared in consequence of the disorder produced by the shock and subsequent *mêlée*, which has dispersed the adversaries over the whole of the ground in front and rear of the original first line.

The influence of the General over the whole of the units of his brigade now becomes impossible. Individual squadron leaders suddenly perceive in their front or flank, in the midst of the rising clouds of dust, retreating men of the first line or even whole groups of the enemy's. Support at these points is now urgently needed, but over-excited personal feeling generally carries the day, and immediate initiative is the consequence. It is owing to this cause that many of the squadrons will throw themselves headlong into the *mêlée*, and it will be by dint of the greatest efforts only that the Brigadier will succeed in keeping under control the squadrons which are nearest to him, and these only under certain circumstances.

The scene thus depicted will certainly not be observed during a cavalry field-day, but the reality will be seen on many a battlefield, whenever the supports follow in the immediate rear of the attacking line.

If we look closer into this picture we shall discover one of the sources which give to the real cavalry combat this character of a most irregular and disorderly struggle, which, as a rule, causes the forces to be prematurely and unreasonably wasted.

We have intentionally described this tableau in detail, in

order to demonstrate the necessity for placing the third line nearer the flank from the moment that the Division arrives within the zone of the enemy's attack, and to show that it must then no longer follow immediately in rear of the lines in front.

If the first and second lines are engaged at two different points at a certain distance from each other, we might then be inclined to direct the reserve into the opening thus created, as happened with the brigade of Dragoons in the case under observation. But the great danger which in such a case menaces the brigade should be carefully noted. It was very lucky for the Divisional commander that he still had the different parts of the Division in hand, and that they had not by sheer force of circumstances thrown themselves on their own account into the *mêlée*.

The amount of space required to give full liberty to his movements was only gained by the successful first attack of the heavy brigade, which drove the enemy further back. But the matter might have turned out differently; if the echelons following the adversary's front line had enveloped the right flank of the heavy brigade, it would in all probability have been thrown back upon the Dragoons, and if, besides, the Hussars had been taken in their left flank and also been forced back upon the Dragoons, the reserve brigade would have been completely paralysed, and would have been unable to deploy a single squadron.

The manner in which the adversary disposed his reserve, when west of the Warschbach, by ordering it to follow its foremost brigade, was equally dangerous. If the 1st Cavalry Division had adopted the movement which we have proposed in our studies, and attempted to envelop the right wing of the 6th Cuirassiers, the whole brigade in front line, in case of success, would have been driven back upon the following line, and would have carried it away with it. But even as related in the text, the Southern Division ran a great risk of seeing the 6th and 7th Cuirassiers—repulsed by the powerful shock of the heavy brigade—driven back upon the 8th and 9th Cuirassiers, who would then have been carried away by their comrades. It was owing to this that the 8th Cuirassiers attempted at the last moment to ward off the danger by a half right wheel. As regards the brigade following it adopting an echelon formation, there was no object in doing so; the reserve should remain as concentrated as possible in the hand of its Commander.

As to distance, it is quite clear that the further the third line is distant from the point where the shock of the first line takes place, and the more it remains concentrated, the easier it is to keep it in hand and guard it against premature intervention in the combat. There are, however, certain limits as to the distance at which the third line should remain. From the very character of the *mêlée*, as we have already described it in a previous part of our studies, it follows that the action of a supporting body will be all the more effective if it takes place before the fight has already pronounced for failure or success. The third line must therefore offer this aid as soon as the combat shows indications of remaining stationary at certain points, or when the enemy has somewhere broken through with large bodies of men. The necessity for the intervention of the third line may arise at the shortest notice—one minute can change much—and it is therefore necessary for this reserve to approach the combatants sufficiently close to enable portions of it to be engaged in the *mêlée* in less than a minute.

Under these conditions we would say that the reserve should be distant 300 to 400 paces from the *mêlée*. If the reserve during its movements up to that point perceives that its support is required at certain places, the squadrons designated for the purpose will continue their movement without checking. *As for the remainder of the third line, we can only here again state that it is indispensable that its movements should be arrested for some instants*, as we have previously pointed out at another place in our studies. However much objection may be taken to this manner of proceeding, it is the only means left to the leader in order to make his action decisively felt during a great cavalry fight, and to prevent the whole of his forces from being blindly and prematurely launched into the fight, thereby encountering great dangers with doubtful results.

During the infantry combat, the engagement of the troops which first encounter the adversary is of an introductory character, a preparatory step towards the final decision. When the adversary is shaken, the reserves give the decisive blow. But the thing is different during a cavalry combat. Here, everything depends on the first shock with the adversary; the rôle of the reserves principally consists in bringing support to those points where the shock did not succeed; they act, therefore, for the most part, not by engaging the whole

force at a single point, but by some of their parts acting at various points. It is only at points where the lines in front fail, that the reserve takes up the rôle and place of the former. But in this case its intervention can be crowned with success only when its attack is made from one of the flanks.

In order to do this, however, it does not appear to be indispensable that the third line should deploy early. The brigade of Dragoons in our example can quietly approach to within 300 to 400 paces of the two great groups in which the two leading brigades are already engaged in the *mêlée*; no difficulty would be created in accomplishing its mission owing to its remaining in line of squadron columns at close intervals.

No doubt it intervened a little late, namely, not until the heavy and Hussar brigades had already begun to give way in the *mêlée*. If we follow its further movement on the sketch, it will be found that at 10.40 A.M. it was but 400 to 500 paces distant from the troops engaged in the *mêlée*. Some single squadrons might then easily have been thrown at once into the fighting line. But the minute in question is sacrificed to the deployment of the brigade, and at 10.41 A.M. the retreat of the two other brigades was already a *fait accompli*.

As, however, for the present it was a matter of engaging a few squadrons only, it was not necessary to have recourse to a preliminary deployment. Whenever it becomes necessary to intervene in different directions, and to execute a half left and half right wheel, the two squadrons on the left flank and the two on the right flank of a line of seven or eight squadron columns at close interval can at any moment deploy while on the march, without first taking full intervals. The two squadrons on each flank have simply to deploy outwards. Should it become necessary to engage more troops, it will not be found inconvenient if the remaining squadrons enter the fighting line a little later on, especially as they will have to be sent to other points.

It was in this manner that three squadrons of the left wing regiment (2nd) of the Dragoon brigade were first employed to disengage the Hussars, then two others, and soon after the third, from the right wing regiment (1st), to support the heavy brigade, until the commander of the Division, having thus successively used up his forces, had in the end but one squadron left him as a reserve.

The attack of these squadrons turns the tide of the combat; the hostile Cuirassiers go about and again stream to the rear.

But considering that the reserve is almost entirely engaged, this is the moment when it is urgent that the dispersed forces should be rallied, that is, if the advantages obtained are not to be again lost through the arrival of the enemy's approaching reinforcements. This is also the first moment at which the rally could really be considered practicable.

The General Commanding Division comprehends this as well as the Brigadier of the Hussars. For the latter as well as for the heavy brigade the "rally" sounds. The squadrons of the last engaged troops, the Dragoons, now take up the pursuit.

But the arrival of fresh or rallied forces of the adversary soon puts a stop to this pursuit. However, his forces have also considerably melted away, and his comparatively small bodies of troops are no match for the masses of the 1st Cavalry Division, which, although not yet quite re-formed, are seen at some distance.

The adversary, besides, perceives the last intact squadron of Dragoons, which General A. now quickly sends to the attack.

In this way the impetuous combat of two cavalry masses dies out; the forces on both sides have exhausted themselves in the equally matched fight; the troops which remain are too insignificant to exercise any great influence under present circumstances. Without doubt a well-disciplined squadron will throw itself without regard to consequences into a confused mass, however numerous it may be, and whatever turn the struggle may take. But that a single squadron, with its 150 horses, should precipitate itself upon an adversary who is in the act of rallying some thousands of troopers a short distance off, is quite another matter; the moral effect of such an enormous superiority is too great.

After the attack of the Dragoons no further result could be expected, unless a certain number of fresh squadrons had still been at disposal. Under the actual circumstances, it was not within the range of possibility that such a support could be furnished sufficiently quickly by the brigades of heavy cavalry and Hussars. There is no doubt, however, that whichever of the two adversaries could have disposed of a *sufficient* reserve, able to be launched into the fight before the other had had time to rally his main force, would have remained master of the field, and would further have been able to reap the full advantages of the victory.

In all probability the 1st Cavalry Division would have had a sufficiently strong reserve at disposal had it acted as we have suggested in these observations.

It is almost certain that then one regiment at least of the brigade of Dragoons, perhaps even more, would have remained intact and at disposal for the pursuit of the adversary.

This was not the case, however, and so ended this cavalry duel fought with equal bravery and with almost equal forces, but without producing any decisive result.

THE ARTILLERY.

As to the share of the Horse Artillery in this affair, the part taken by it during the operations and during the combat is very different.

During the advance towards the forest of Hagenau the first object was to look for the enemy; the Division was therefore obliged to advance on a certain front, and while the main body took the direction of Altenstatt and Sulz, the brigade of Hussars directed its march towards Nieder-Rödern. The latter by so doing was distant from the main body about eight miles, and in this isolated position was obliged to give battle independently. On that occasion we have seen the decisive effect produced by the battery attached to it, first in the taking of Nieder-Rödern, and later on in the defence of that village.

When next the brigade of Hussars was recalled as far as Aschbach and the vicinity of Ober and Nieder-Seebach, and when a little later on the mission of the brigade on that ground had become a most important one, we did not enter in our observations into details, including the special action of the 3rd battery of Horse Artillery, but confined ourselves to the consideration of the complicated circumstances in which the Division as a whole was then placed. Nevertheless, the important services which the Artillery rendered during the different phases which the combat assumed can easily be imagined. First, it certainly held the masses of the enemy back at a great distance south of the Engelbach; it contributed to the defence of the defiles, and compelled the adversary to debouch cautiously and with much loss of time. Further, the greatly superior masses of the adversary would apparently have repulsed the brigade of Hussars much more rapidly than they did, had the former not been obliged, owing to the

presence of the battery, to advance with much circumspection, and so to sacrifice much time in their movements. The Division of the Southern Army saw itself reduced, in order not to expose itself at a great distance to useless losses, to covering its troops by the ground, and to first placing its batteries in position.

It is true that the 3rd Battery of Horse Artillery could not hinder the forward march of the enemy for any length of time, but the forces which were at that time on the left bank of the Hausauerbach were themselves insufficient for that purpose. As soon as the adversary had crossed the Engelbach, the brigade of Hussars had for its mission the task of attempting to retard the adversary's march to the utmost. The Hussars could effect this by their immediate presence only, but the battery could, on the contrary, play an effective rôle at a distance.

It certainly could not allow itself to be drawn into a decisive combat with the much superior hostile artillery; its action had rather to be restricted to the task of continually gaining good positions in rear, against which the enemy's batteries would only be able to advance under difficulties. Then the latter required time to again get into action, and would lose additional time in the attempt to ascertain the correct range. It is during these retrograde movements especially that Horse Artillery attached to cavalry must show great skill and great mobility.

From what we have said, it appears that a Cavalry Division must be provided with sufficient artillery in order to satisfy every exigency which the detaching of a brigade may produce. It is of course understood that the main body of the Division, upon which—if the dispositions are properly made—the principal rôle devolves, must retain for itself a sufficient number of guns. The conclusion thus arrived at—in reply to the question raised at the beginning of our studies—is that a single battery is insufficient for a Cavalry Division of six regiments; under circumstances it may be able to do with two batteries, but it is desirable that three should be attached to it.

With regard to the last number, it must be observed that circumstances may occur under which the three brigades may be required to be formed together in first line, and of this we have seen an example in our studies at the time when the brigade of Hussars, during the retreat of the Division,

took up a position north-east of Ober-Seebach on the road from Fort Louis, in order to oppose an enveloping movement threatened by the enemy's extreme right. In this situation each of the three brigades had tasks allotted to it, to fulfil which, without artillery, would scarcely be possible.

The brigade of heavy cavalry is on the right bank of the Hausauer stream, face to face with hostile cavalry superior to it in numbers; its principal object is to endeavour to retard the advance of the heads of the hostile infantry, a task which could hardly be accomplished without artillery. The brigade of Hussars placed on the road from Fort Louis must at all hazards retard the rapid advance of the approaching hostile Cuirassiers until the Division had assumed a position corresponding to the change of situation. While these are the tasks of the two wings, the Dragoon brigade is in the centre between the Hausauer stream and Ober-Seebach, face to face with the main body of the adversary's cavalry, and should the latter succeed in breaking through at this point the whole of the 1st Cavalry Division will be dispersed.

If it is not practicable to attach 18 guns to each Cavalry Division, and if 12 only can be given to it, we should even prefer an organization of Horse Artillery batteries with four guns each to the present organization with six guns, as the former would better meet the exigencies of actual operations.

We have seen that the Division cannot keep its artillery together either during its advance or during its retreat. The necessity of employing it at various points overcomes the natural desire to keep it concentrated as much as possible. Here the necessity had arisen of compelling the deployment of the adversary's troops at divers points, breaking his partial resistance, and retarding his march. But as soon as the whole Division becomes engaged, the conditions of combat, which demand during the *rencontre* of large masses the highest possible development of power of the different arms, are the foremost consideration. The artillery, in order to satisfy this demand, must bring into combined action the whole of its guns. In principle, the Cavalry Division must therefore unite for the combat the whole of the batteries attached to it.

A more complete examination of the demands which the course of the combat imposed upon the artillery—as detailed in our studies—will lead to the same conclusion.

The first and principal *rôle* of this arm must always be to make every effort towards preparing the victory for its own side. As soon as the Division marches to the attack, its artillery must endeavour to help it by shaking the adversary's advancing cavalry. Under certain circumstances the action of the guns may produce an effect sufficient to compel a part, or even the whole, of the adversary's leading line to turn about.

It should therefore matter little to the artillery, in the case under consideration, how severe the loss may be which it meanwhile sustains from the fire of the adversary's guns. But it matters very much indeed to the cavalry leader should the hostile guns during the same time cause a similar effect on the 1st Cavalry Division while the latter is marching to the attack.

The artillery, therefore, has for its primary object a double and inseparable mission, viz., to divert the fire of the enemy's guns from its own cavalry and to shake the enemy's approaching cavalry.

This requires that during the rapid succession of the various phases of a cavalry fight, at one moment the one, and at another moment the other, object must be pursued whenever it is not possible to attain both at one and the same time.

If we desire to occupy the hostile batteries and divert their fire, they must be covered with a shower of well aimed projectiles, and this demands the united action and direction of the whole of the guns at disposal.

If there is plenty of time we may possibly succeed in paralyzing the enemy's artillery to such an extent that all the guns may be directed upon the advancing hostile cavalry even before the shock of the two opposing lines takes place. Should we not succeed in this, nothing remains to be done but to fire upon the hostile cavalry—with the whole or part of the guns—as soon as they arrive within effective range.

To this the following objection may be made:—The cavalry of the Southern Division has placed two batteries on its left, against which the batteries of the 1st Cavalry Division direct their fire; meanwhile, another of the enemy's batteries on his right flank acts against the advancing Hussar brigade without being replied to from our side. The situation is certainly not a very pleasant one for the Hussars. Although its small squadron columns, continually in rapid motion, do not offer a very good aim to the artillery, their situation is nevertheless much more unfavourable than that

of the heavy brigade. But, on the other hand, the batteries of the Division thus have a numerical superiority over the artillery in position at Ober-Seebach, and exercise a very sensible action on the first line of the adversary's Cuirassiers. As we know, the shock of the first lines produces the most important effect, and the co-operation of the artillery can here be of the greatest assistance. The detached battery on the adversary's flanks might, without doubt, have advanced further and reached the 1st Uhlans also, but this separation of the opposing artillery would carry with it further inconveniences.

If cavalry on the march to the attack brings artillery into action on both its flanks, the guns must have their special escort at those two points. But in such a case, the liberty of movement and the chances of an opportune intervention on the part of the second and third lines become extremely limited. They will either mask their own artillery while advancing, and so place it out of action at the most important moment—as happened on the right wing of the Division of the Southern Army—or the action of these lines will be reduced to a direct following and engaging in the fight of the first line.

Another question now arises, viz., how far should the artillery advance? If it desires to exercise a decisive action on the enemy's guns, it must approach sufficiently close to the latter from the commencement, and must precede the cavalry rapidly and at the earliest opportunity. But this close distance, that is to say, under 2,000 paces, has its limits also. Should some squadron hidden away by any accident of ground suddenly break forth, the artillery will lose valuable time through galloping about here and there, or else will be exposed to danger; in order to protect the artillery the escort squadron will throw itself upon this adversary, and the nearest regiment will then hurry up; but the adversary, on his part also will oppose fresh forces, and in this manner a great irregular cavalry fight will almost certainly develop without affording the forces present an opportunity of acting in perfect order and under the best conditions.

In our example the Horse Artillery commenced firing three minutes before the moment at which the first line arrived on a level with it, and certainly continued it for another half minute against the adversary's front line, during which time its own first line proceeded to the attack proper. If the heavy brigade had carried out a flank movement

against the approaching adversary's right wing, as we have proposed in our observations, the artillery might have continued its action against the latter for a considerable time longer, and its influence would have been still greater. At the moment when the artillery unlimbered at the Geitershof (10.33 A.M.) the adversary's artillery was about 2,300 paces off, and the foremost hostile Cuirassier brigade nearly $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile distant. Had the artillery uninterruptedly continued its advance for three minutes longer, it could (as the gallop is already taken into consideration in the former movement) have unlimbered 900 paces further south (10.36 A.M.). Here it certainly would have been in a position to act with perfect success against the hostile artillery, being then but 1,400 paces distant from it. But it must certainly be admitted that under these circumstances the nearest regiment of hostile Cuirassiers, which was close at hand, would at once have thrown itself upon the artillery, and would have reached the latter before the heavy brigade of cavalry could have opposed it there.

The most favourable case is no doubt when the artillery is permitted to continue its fire up to the moment of the shock from the position it had first taken up; but it cannot always be predicted where the shock will take place, as this will depend upon the adversary as well.

It can, therefore, only be laid down as a general rule that the artillery must advance until it finds the most favourable position from which to act upon the enemy's lines of advance; the latter, at any rate may be recognized in good time. It must not, however, approach the adversary so close as to enable the latter to reach it sooner than its own first line could possibly do.

With regard to this advance, we may add that the relations of the Horse Artillery and the Cavalry Division to each other will always remain a matter of the highest importance. It is the particular circumstances which prevail at the time which must decide which of the two arms must regulate the movements of the other.

Let us suppose, for example, that the superiority of the Cavalry Division of the Southern Army was so considerable that General A. could not undertake to attack it at all. The 1st Cavalry Division must, nevertheless, have maintained itself south of the Lauter, as that ground was to be held at all hazards. In this situation the enemy's cavalry

takes the offensive. The General must now fall back upon his artillery to repulse the attack. This arm will now look for a position which will permit it to enfilade the whole of the ground over which the attack can be made. Such a position would, perhaps, have been found on one of the sides of the road from Fort Louis, on a level with Riedselz-Oberdorf. The chances of resistance would depend above all on the effect which the batteries could produce, and the brigades, kept more in rear, would be in readiness to profit by their success.

A similar situation would have been produced if the cavalry during its independent advance had been obliged, when in presence of the enemy, to deploy for action from column of route. At such a time the artillery will first enter into action, while the advance of the Division must be regulated chiefly by the position taken up by the artillery. It must not be forgotten with regard to this that the effect of artillery fire principally depends upon the correctness of its aim, and that this arm, therefore, will only change its position for the purpose of obtaining better results at some other point or when absolutely compelled to do so. It is true that at cavalry manoeuvres in times of peace the artillery is often where it is not wanted, and at such times we frequently hear the cry, "Get out of the way." But in war, where it is very satisfactory to hear the first shots from one's own artillery, and where every one knows how to appreciate its services, such language is never heard, at least not during a combat. There the cavalry too is quite ready to regulate its movements according to the position taken up by its batteries. Even during reconnaissance or outpost duties the first question formulated by those interested is often, "You are going to give me a couple of guns, I suppose?"

The situation is quite different, however, in the actual case here. The 1st Cavalry Division desires to repulse the adversary; its masses must therefore be directed to such ground as will best permit it to deploy and act effectually, and the artillery plays a supporting rôle only. By reason of these circumstances, and of the general situation, it is not on the ground east of the road, which offers the most extensive field for its fire, that the artillery comes into action, but west of that road.

It is quite superfluous to mention that the employment of artillery *on the flanks*, and not *in front*, of the cavalry is

the most effective and favourable. The more the advancing hostile cavalry can be taken in flank, the greater the effect in itself. Let us add to this that the artillery which is placed in *front* of the Division can do little after the first shock of the cavalry has taken place, and that it is, moreover, exposed to great dangers which it cannot ward off with its fire.

On the other hand, the artillery which is placed on the flanks can take a very effective part in the combat even after the first shock.

As has already been shown in the text of the narrative, it will often direct its fire upon the succeeding hostile lines, whose flank attacks against the threatened wing it is thereby enabled to repel, while it can also to some extent prevent their direct attack.

It is therefore desirable that the batteries should quietly remain in their position even during the shock of the first line. The good intention of conforming to the various phases which the combat may assume, and which may cause a frequent change of position, serves no good purpose.

But, on the other hand, the artillery lost a capital opportunity of rendering itself useful. This offered when the intervention of the squadrons of Dragoons turned the combat in favour of the 1st Cavalry Division. While the heavy brigade was in the act of rallying, then was the moment to limber up, gallop as fast as the horses could go, and gain a position in advance of the Division. The last hostile squadrons which succeeded in arresting the pursuit would then in all probability have been repulsed, the artillery combat might have been rendered decisive, and, more important than all, the masses of hostile cavalry then in the act of rallying might have been fired into and compelled to retreat further off.

Had such a course been adopted, the end of the cavalry combat would have terminated in a victory for the 1st Cavalry Division.

As it was, nothing of the kind took place, and as circumstances then shaped themselves, nothing remained but to order the artillery to rejoin the Division. It would have been perfectly useless under prevailing circumstances to continue a combat with the hostile artillery.

Lastly, we must here again insist upon the important services the batteries can render to a Cavalry Division by furnishing for the latter a solid support for one of its flanks,

and by so doing render one part, at least, of the ground which has to be taken into calculation entirely impassable for the adversary.

It is quite certain that for the divers missions allotted to a Cavalry Division, the cavalry is the principal arm; the artillery is but an auxiliary, although an indispensable one. Notwithstanding this, however, the latter will find many opportunities, as we have already sketched above, when it may exert a most decisive influence.

In conclusion, taking into consideration the whole of the demands which circumstances may make on the artillery, special stress must be laid upon the necessity, when framing the *ordre de bataille*, of placing the batteries as a corps under the immediate command of the General Commanding the Division, instead of attaching them to brigades.

In real warfare it so frequently happens that guns are required at various points, that, in order to admit of their being again concentrated at the decisive moment, such an organization must be resorted to as will ensure their re-concentration after the object for which they were detached has been gained, and thus enable them to combine their action so as to produce the greatest possible effect.

The ultimate issue of the combat of the 1st Cavalry Division will mostly repeat itself in all cases in which neither of the two adversaries presents any marked superiority as regards strength, constitution of troops, or skill in handling them. The intervention of the various parts of the forces will certainly follow each other in rapid succession, the combat will undergo constant changes in favour of one or other of the adversaries, during which the last remaining compact fractions of the forces may certainly succeed in disengaging the combatants, but will not possess sufficient power to achieve a decisive success in face of the large number of troopers already engaged in the scuffle. In the end the pursuer comes under the infantry fire, or the artillery on both sides, as soon as it again finds a suitable field for its fire, will enter on the scene, and cover the whole battlefield with its projectiles, thereby compelling the rallying troops to retire further to the rear, and so driving the adversaries still further from each other.

The history of war presents a great number of cavalry duels, in which both parties claimed the victory, but which in reality ended by the adversaries rallying their respective forces at the point from which they had originally marched to the attack.

But it is also rich in examples which prove that the superiority of the leader on one side ensures brilliant and decisive results, and show that even inferior forces which understood how to operate cleverly against the adversary's flanks have gained a victory over greatly superior numbers.

It will always, however, be necessary to pay great attention to the avoidance of useless combats, and in all cases to be clear beforehand as to the object aimed at and the utility of a combat.

The object of a cavalry fight is not merely to measure swords with the adversary, and prove our valour in the gay combat, but rather to gain thereby a result which will have a distinct bearing on the situation of affairs. Then the not inconsiderable losses inseparable from a cavalry combat will not be without their ultimate fruit. But in all this the skill of the leader in the handling of his troops is of the very greatest influence.

The bold dragoon is very strongly tempted, when he perceives the hostile cavalry, to advance and attack it at once irrespective of the then prevailing circumstances. Due homage, no doubt, must be rendered to this chivalrous sentiment, which certainly deserves to be cherished with the greatest care, but it is indispensable that this feeling should be guided and regulated by a reflection upon the general military situation; otherwise, the cavalry will run a chance of being prematurely ruined and rendered incapable of executing the mission which later on will fall to its share, and on the efficient solution of which grave issues will depend.

But another side of the question is that this brave spirit should manifest itself at the proper time and place, and in a manner corresponding to the necessities of the combat. The troops which will hereby reap the greatest advantage will be those whose "regulations" provide most thoroughly for the realities of war, and whose system of training during times of peace causes body and soul to be most thoroughly imbued with the spirit and forms of these regulations.

But, above all, it is imperatively necessary that Generals of cavalry should be possessed of the spirit of these regula-

tions, and by practice should have attained perfect skill in the application of them.

It is quite clear that exercises during times of peace cannot perfectly represent a complete picture of a cavalry combat with all its details.

It must be left to the imagination to sketch for oneself a picture of the reality. The more perfect such picture is, the more correctly will be the conclusions drawn therefrom as to which of the established regulations are absolutely necessary.

In the foregoing studies an attempt has been made, taking as a basis our own present regulations, to examine as closely as possible the divers requirements of a great cavalry combat as regards the formation and conduct of the troops.

If we compare the result thus obtained with the principles and forms laid down in the new Part V.* of our cavalry drill regulations, the above theoretical sketch shows that the exigencies of real warfare, as far as they have been touched upon in the preceding narrative, are never in a single important point in contradiction with those principles, but, on the contrary, can be met to their fullest extent.

It is evident that this part of the regulations, like every other regulation, is susceptible of improvement, but the essential part for us is first of all to find a certain basis which will satisfy the necessities of reality. We are now fortunate enough to possess such a basis, and the next step is to endeavour to engrain its principles into the flesh and blood of our troops. The rest can and must be left to gradual development. The old saying must not be forgotten that "the best is the enemy of the good."

Although theoretical exercises can give a deep insight into much that cannot be illustrated at the camp of exercise, yet one thing they can never give to the leader, that is, *perfect confidence in the application of the established regulations*. This can only be acquired by practice in the field. In the cavalry, however, where decision must be come to like lightning, and where mistakes and want of skill can but seldom be redressed, it is just this training which is the most difficult. It is, therefore, all the more urgently needed that all cavalry regiments should annually have an opportunity of practice in Division, and of course the exercises should be conducted on a model common to the whole army.

* This refers to the Regulations of 1876.—EDITOR.

THE CAVALRY DIVISION FROM 11 A.M. TO THE END OF THE DAY.

While the Division was occupied in re-forming, strong columns were perceived approaching from the direction of Schweigen towards Altenstatt; a few moments later, the General Commanding the V. Corps and his Staff appeared this side of the Gutleithof, to which place General A. at once went. There he learned that, owing to the reports received, the General Commanding had ordered all those of his troops which were still in rear to hasten up, and that the columns now visible were composed of the troops of the 10th Infantry Division, which was already arriving.

Both Generals now agreed that the Division of Cavalry should remain south of the Gutleithof, as long as an attack from the enemy was to be feared. Should the latter attempt an attack, the V. Corps would oppose him in first line, undertaking at the same time the defence of the ground lying between Riedselz-Oberdorf and the Niederwald. As soon, however, as it became certain that no further advance on the part of the enemy need be expected that day, the Cavalry Division would take up its cantonments at Altenstatt, Schweigen, Rechtenbach, Schweighofen, and Saint-Rémy, and maintain contact with the enemy as well as communication with the XI. Corps by means of a few advanced squadrons only.

Scarcely had this disposition been decided upon when information was received that "the enemy's Cuirassiers were retiring on the road to Fort Louis," and that "they were followed up by the advanced squadron of Hussars which had been left in observation on the left flank."

Soon after some cannon shots were heard in a south-easterly direction.

The two Generals retired to the little knoll (185) north-east of Riedselz-Oberdorf. From there, by means of glasses, a hostile battery could be seen at a distance of about 6,000 paces on the road to Fort Louis, the fire from which was apparently directed towards the east. Some projectiles also burst near the battery, but the guns which fired them could not be seen.

In any case there was no doubt that some troops of the XI. Corps had arrived in the environs of Siegen.

It was not for the present deemed necessary to take part in this fight with the troops now about Weissenburg, as the Cuirassiers could distinctly be observed in the act of

retiring; their columns already traversed the ground between Ober-Seebach and Nieder-Seebach, where they disappeared in the hollow ground.

The clouds of dust which could be seen rising further to the west confirmed the supposition that they continued their march in the direction south-west of Ober-Seebach, although the undulations of the ground in the immediate front did not permit a view of that part of the country.

The squadron of Uhlans which was still in front of the Cavalry Division remained near the Riedselz-Oberdorf station; its patrols could not, however, go over much ground, as they were held in check by the enemy's Chasseurs.

Should the troops of the XI. Corps advance still further, however, it would then become necessary to support them with the Cavalry Division, and the General had already made dispositions for again advancing his regiments, when he received a despatch from the advanced guard of the XI. Corps which rendered the measure quite unnecessary.

This despatch stated that "the advanced guard, having heard the report of guns (during the cavalry combat), was in the act of advancing into the district between Siegen and Ober-Lauterbach, in order to be ready to intervene at the right moment."

To this a reply was sent that "the firing had occurred in a fight in which the cavalry had been engaged, and that there was no intention on our side to continue the combat; besides, it appeared as if the enemy on this flank were in the act of retiring."

The latter supposition was, in fact, confirmed. The enemy's battery in position on the road to Fort Louis had already ceased its fire, and had followed up its other troops, accompanied by a party of Cuirassiers; the Chasseurs slowly retired towards the south before the patrols of the squadron of Uhlans, and soon after the squadron of Hussars which had pushed beyond Frohnackerhof reported that "the hostile Cuirassiers continue their march in the direction of Aschbach, and the squadron has established communication with the advanced guard of the XI. Corps, the latter having halted near Siegen."

Meanwhile the commander of the V. Corps had received various reports from the 9th Infantry Division, which stated that the enemy's cavalry stationed on the right bank of the Hausauer was also in the act of retiring towards Sulz.

The General went at once, accompanied by his staff, to the plateau of the Geisberg, in order to make such further dispositions as the situation might demand.

Under these circumstances the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division now believed that he was justified in giving his troops that rest which they so much needed. It was already past midday, and the heat had become intense.

Although the duty of further observing the enemy had now devolved upon the outposts of the V. Corps, General A. also desired to be constantly kept *au courant* as to the position of the enemy. He consequently gave the commanding officer of the 2nd Regiment of Hussars the following orders:—

"You will remain with two squadrons of your regiment, including the one already pushed to the front, on the left bank of the Hausauer, and from there you will closely follow up the adversary's movements until it has been ascertained where his outposts are placed; you will then leave patrols in observation, which must never lose sight of the enemy's outposts, and you will immediately follow up every one of his movements so as to be able to indicate his positions at any given moment. I leave it to your discretion to pass the night at such place as you deem best; but it is essential that I should know where to find you. If you think proper you may even fall back upon the advanced guard of the XI Corps. In any case you must keep up constant communication with the latter; you will send back the squadron of Uhlans to its brigade at Saint-Rémy as soon as your Hussars have relieved their patrols."

A squadron of the 1st Dragoons was detailed to act independently in a similar manner on the right bank of the Hausauer. It was directed to move for the present towards Steinselz.

The General specially enjoined both detachments to send frequent reports to him at Altenstatt, as well as to the Headquarters of the V. Corps at Weissenburg.

The Chief of the Staff of the Division had meanwhile indicated to the brigades their several stations; Schweigen and Rechtenbach were assigned to the brigade of Dragoons, Altenstatt and Les Picards to the brigade of Hussars, the farm of Bayrischhof to the artillery, Saint-Rémy and Schweighofen to the heavy brigade. The Ambulance Detachment, after completing its work on the battlefield, was to retire to Weissenburg, where the wounded had already been sent.

There its assistance might be most useful, and in addition it would be able to replenish its stores quickly.

The brigades then marched to their respective quarters. In order not to interfere in so doing with the march of the approaching mass of the 10th Division, the Dragoons were directed to pass through Weissenburg and the Hussars through Saint-Rémy.

Altenstatt was designated as the place where to receive orders at 7 P.M., and General A. left for that place.

As regards the 10th Division, one brigade bivouacked near the Gutleithof; the main body of its outposts across the road to Fort Louis, in a line with Riedselz-Oberdorf, which place was occupied. The second brigade in cantonments at Weissenburg.

The 9th Division occupied Riedselz and the villages above it on the Selz stream, as well as Rott, and formed bivouacs with its main body on the heights south of Weissenburg. Special detachments were charged with the protection of the roads towards Klimbach and in the valley of the Lauter; the Corps Artillery also occupied bivouacs south of Weissenburg.

The unwounded prisoners—who, however, amounted to 2 officers and 37 men only—were thoroughly interrogated at Altenstatt, to which place they had been sent. The interrogatories gave the following result:—

A definite idea as to the composition of the enemy's cavalry was now arrived at.

The cavalry of the I. Army Corps comprised three brigades:—

1st brigade: 2nd regiment of Uhlans and 1st regiment of Dragoons.

2nd Brigade: 7th regiment of Chasseurs and 8th regiment of Hussars.

3rd Brigade: 8th and 9th regiments of Cuirassiers.

Each regiment consisted of four squadrons; from each of the light cavalry regiments one squadron had been attached to the infantry Divisions. The reason why the 7th Chasseurs had only shown three squadrons in the field could now be explained, as well as the presence of a squadron of Hussars with the infantry which had marched to Sulz.

The Reserve Cavalry Division comprised in two brigades the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Cuirassiers; two or three batteries of Horse Artillery were also attached.

The Reserve Cavalry Division had been called up into first line, from Hagenau, in two forced marches, and had arrived south of the Engelbach on the afternoon of the 1st August.

The infantry which had been observed near Würth the day before was the 2nd brigade of the 1st Division.

As to the other corps which had been met with, a non-commissioned officer of the 4th Cuirassiers had made a statement which at first appeared insignificant, but which in fact, turned out to be of the utmost importance. According to this non-commissioned officer's statement, "on the 1st August, at the time that the Reserve Cavalry Division was passing through Hagenau, it was obliged to halt for a considerable time in order to allow strong columns of infantry and artillery to pass." On being further questioned whether these columns had followed the same road as the cavalry, through the forest of Hagenau, he replied, "No, they came from the right, and passed across our front on a main road, which led towards the left." As the march of the 2nd brigade of the 1st Division towards Würth had, on that day, been observed by our troops, it was at first believed that these were the columns to which the non-commissioned officer alluded. A closer examination, however, as to the time at which the non-commissioned officer had seen them, and also the fact that he had counted four batteries of artillery, appeared to render this very unlikely.

The gist of these interrogatories was now connected with what had been observed by us during the 1st and 2nd August, and with all other information about the enemy that had come to hand.

The enemy appeared to have had his troops at first in the environs of Strassburg and echeloned from there towards the north.

In this formation he might have the intention of crossing the Rhine, or of taking the offensive towards the north, or he could also directly oppose an offensive movement of the Third Army towards the south.

The first few days had, however, shown that a crossing of the Rhine was hardly intended, as scarcely anything whatever had been done in the immediate vicinity of the river to secure the protection towards the north which in that case would be necessary.

From the observations made on the 1st August it might

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apparently be taken for granted that the adversary did not expect that such an early offensive movement would take place; a comparatively small number of cavalry appeared at Sulz, and these made their appearance successively by single regiments.

Next, the presence of strong forces of all arms on the borders of the forest of Hagenau indicated that the adversary attached the greatest importance to the direction Weissenburg—Hagenau.

But soon after, his efforts to secure, above all things, the possession of Würth were noticed, *i.e.*, of the junction of roads which formed the main artery of communication across the Vosges mountains in the west.

Having attained this object, the enemy on the 2nd of August advanced his troops in first line only a short distance, the left column about 6 and the right column about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The infantry which was sent into the first line formed with the very strong body of cavalry an advanced guard which at this moment covered the road Weissenburg—Sulz as well as Weissenburg—Würth.

The movements of the main body of the Southern Army were thus effectually masked, and it now remained to discover the intentions of the adversary under the above circumstances.

These intentions might be of an offensive or of a defensive nature. Should the enemy desire to retake the Lauter, or even to press beyond it, the short forward movement carried out by him during this day indicated that he had not as yet completely grouped his columns for such an operation, as, otherwise, he would most certainly have pressed forward beyond Drachenbronn and Sulz, since every minute lost in doing so must be a gain to the Third Army.

To judge from the value which the enemy apparently attached to the road *viâ* Drachenbronn, but especially from the circumstance that east of Sulz only strong forces of cavalry had been observed, it was inferred that the concentration of the main body was more likely to take place near Würth than in the direction of Hagenau.

Even admitting that he desired to remain on the defensive, the position taken up by his advanced guard equally indicated an assembly of the main body of his forces in the direction of Würth.

A position near Würth appeared, besides, to offer considerable advantages. There, the adversary remained in

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communication with his main army, he had in his rear one of the great highways which cross the Vosges, and he was at the same time in a flank position which the Third Army dare not leave unnoticed, and from which he could effectually defend Alsace.

To sum up, the conclusion was arrived at that the early advance of the 1st Cavalry Division had apparently surprised the enemy, had hastened and most probably precipitated his movements.

Whatever intentions he might have at that moment, so much appeared certain, that in order to fight him it was necessary to advance the columns of the Third Army by a concentric movement in the direction of Wörth and Sulz.

The events of the day, and the conclusions drawn therefrom, were communicated to the Third Army in the following despatch, which completed the telegram which had previously been sent to it.

"TO THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE III. ARMY AT LANDAU.

"Altenstatt,

"2nd August. 1.30 P.M.

"After a severe combat with the Division, the enemy's cavalry, which had been pursued as far as Ober-Seebach, is now in retreat through Aschbach. The infantry has halted at Drachenbronn and Schönenburg. Numerous indications point to a retrograde movement of the main body of the enemy's army in the direction of Wörth. The Division is in cantonments at Altenstatt and north of that village. The V. Corps is concentrated south of the Lauter. The advanced guard of the XI. Corps has arrived at Siegen. The adversary is continually being watched. Our losses are not inconsiderable.

"A., LIEUTENANT-GENERAL,

"Commanding 1st Cavalry Division."

During the course of the afternoon, numerous reports came to hand from the squadrons still in contact with the enemy, which, joined to those received from the outposts of the V. Corps, contributed towards a further clearing up of the situation.

According to these reports the great body of the cavalry on the adversary's right flank appeared to have retired to the other bank of the Engelbach; they had only left outposts

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on this side of the stream, consisting of Chasseurs and Cuirassiers, in line with Aschbach—Stundweiler.

Schönenburg was occupied by infantry; east of that village, as far as the Hausauer stream, cavalry vedettes (Lancers) were visible; infantry piquets had been observed on the mountain ridge Keffenach—Birlenbach, and a small camp, about one battalion and one battery, at Drachenbronn. The two banks of the Hausauer were lined with numerous cavalry patrols.

The officer commanding the 2nd Hussars reported, besides, that he had advanced with his two squadrons as far as Nieder-Seebach, and had then retired as far as Riedselz-Oberdorf, where he would remain for the night. On his right, the squadron of Dragoons had advanced as far as Bremmelbach, and having there gained information that bodies of hostile infantry were present on the ridge south of Birlenbach and at Drachenbronn, had retired to Steinselz. The two detachments kept up uninterrupted contact with the enemy by means of their patrols.

The XI. Corps, with which a closer connection had been established, and which had been supplied with every information about the enemy that had already been obtained on this side, sent information that its advanced guard was occupying bivouacs west of Ober-Lauterbach, outposts had been pushed as far as Tombach and Neudorf, and a flank detachment occupied Winzenbach. The main body of the corps had been advanced to Lauterburg. The regiment of the enemy's Hussars which up to the present had been in front of the XI. Corps was observed on the march from Nieder-Rödern towards Bühl.

During these events the staff of the Division had made good use of the time to carry out certain arrangements and to prepare for others. Thus the further transport of the wounded and prisoners had been arranged; it was also thought advisable to move the depôt of horses which the Division had formed at Weissenburg, and which during the day had been augmented by a considerable number of horses, further to the rear.*

The Commissary-General made his report to the Commander of the Division as regards the provisioning of the troops. In order to provide for any shortcomings, each brigade, as soon as their respective cantonments had been

* We omit details here, as we have already fully entered into the subject.

decided upon, had been furnished with several waggons of provisions. Any deficiency in stores still existing was to be made up from the magazine at Weissenburg.

The organization of a provisional convoy of transport waggons had already made great progress; the latter, as well as the convoy of provision waggons, had been stationed in the villages north of Rechtenbach.

As regards the replenishing of the ammunition, the General had directed the officer commanding artillery to communicate with the V. Army Corps. The latter had directed one of its ammunition columns to march towards Bayrischhof, but it had not as yet arrived. The cavalry regiments had been directed to inform the artillery as soon as possible as to the number of rounds of ammunition each required to complete. The Chief of the Staff had already prepared a general account of the events of the day; various necessary details were, however, still wanting, but it was expected that they would be brought in by the officers attending for Divisional orders.

These officers arrived about 7 P.M., and as they brought reports from their respective brigades, a statement of the losses sustained during the day could now be approximately arrived at; they had been pretty considerable, and amounted to the following figures:—

Corps.	Officers.	Men.	Horses.
Staff	2	1	2
1st Cuirassiers	5	73	61
1st Uhlans	9	97	91
1st Dragoons	3	42	20
2nd Dragoons	6	51	43
1st Hussars (including combat in the morning)	10	128	102
2nd Hussars	4	31	38
Horse Artillery	1	13	21
Total	40	436	378

As the V. Corps had already been communicated with as to the contemplated operations for the following day, the necessary orders could now be issued to the assembled officers to take back to their respective brigades. These orders directed,

to mention only the essential points, that the Division would form at 7.30 A.M., at Gutleithof, ready to march to the front, the baggage, &c., to be assembled at 7 A.M., at Windhof (north-east of Weissenburg), their present escort to be relieved by others of similar strength.

The commander of the Division intended, should the reports received from the advanced squadrons not necessitate an advance of the whole force, to reconnoitre, with strong bodies, so as to get more precise information about the hostile infantry. To this end he proposed to move the masses of his cavalry to the right bank of the Hausauer, sufficiently far to the front to allow of an opportune and effectual support to the various reconnoitring parties. The General Commanding the V. Corps had been informed of the proposed movements, and the two Generals had given each other rendezvous at the castle of the Geisberg by 7 A.M. the next morning, in order to discuss any further steps then to be taken.

As soon as the aides-de-camp had received the Divisional order, as well as instructions about the other matters referred to above, and had given information on various points connected with their corps, they returned to their respective brigades. The Chief of the Staff finished his report, which was sent to the army headquarters, and he next discussed with the General Commanding Division the dispositions which might probably become necessary for the following day. While they were still occupied with this discussion, an officer of the Headquarter Staff of the V. Corps, from Weissenburg, arrived at 8.30 P.M., and brought the following army orders which had been received there:—

“HEADQUARTERS OF THIRD ARMY. No. .

“*Landau.*

“*2nd August. 6 P.M.*

“The enemy's infantry has this day reached the two points Drachenbronn and Schönenburg on the roads Wörth—Weissenburg and Sulz—Weissenburg; his cavalry (about seven regiments), which had pushed as far as Ober-Seebach, has, after a severe combat with the 1st Cavalry Division, retired beyond Aschbach.

“The V. Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division are concentrated near Weissenburg; the XI. Corps has its advanced guard at Ober-Lauterbach, its main body at Lauterburg.

The other corps have completed their concentration at Landau, Speyer, and Germersheim.

"The Third Army will to-morrow, the 3rd August, approach the V. and XI. Corps; both these corps will, for the present, remain in the positions they respectively occupy to-day, and will maintain touch of the enemy.

"The II. Bavarian Corps will advance to Weissenburg, when it will go into bivouac north of the Lauter on the road from Landau, keeping in view in doing so the probability of a march to Wörth, *via* Rott. Any detachments or transport columns of the V. Corps, which may still be north of the Lauter, will be moved on to the road Schweighofen—Kapsweyer.

"The I. Bavarian Corps will move from Germersheim to Langenkandel; it is destined to act as a reserve, on the 4th August, to the II. Bavarian and V. Prussian Corps.

"The combined Baden and Württemberg Corps will march to Rheinzabern.

"The Headquarters of the army will to-morrow, at mid-day, proceed by railway to Weissenburg.

"The XI. Corps, as well as the 1st Cavalry Division, are, until further orders, placed under the command of the General Commanding the V. Corps.

"THE GENERAL COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF."

This order terminated for the present the independence hitherto enjoyed by the 1st Cavalry Division. Further instructions had now to be obtained from the V. Corps, and an aide-de-camp was therefore at once despatched to Weissenburg for this purpose.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE EVENTS BETWEEN 11 A.M. AND THE END OF THE DAY.

The first thing that strikes us is that in view of fresh fatigues to be encountered, a natural desire is perceptible on the part of the Cavalry Division to obtain some rest. It certainly must be said that this is not wholly unjustifiable, as, since the 30th July, the Division has been uninterruptedly in contact with the enemy, and in addition to the severe combats, the days have been very fatiguing. Notwithstanding

this, however, the last breath must be sacrificed as long as any mission of importance remains to be accomplished. The question is whether such is the case here, whether there are signs that the enemy will probably not make another attempt against the V. Corps to-day. Another question is whether the advanced squadrons will suffice to maintain uninterrupted contact with the enemy, and whether the main body of the Cavalry Division will again be enabled to follow up readily the enemy's movements.

We are of opinion that when the advanced guard of the XI. Corps arrived in the environs of Siegen and Ober-Lauterburg, the 1st Cavalry Division found itself in the best possible position to again make a forward movement and to retake possession of the ground which it had previously been compelled to give up.

The mere appearance of this advanced guard of the XI. Corps on the right flank of the enemy's larger bodies of cavalry had already caused the latter to clear off the road from Fort Louis and to retire into the ground west of Nieder-Seebach. A pressure in front was all that was now required, and if the 1st Cavalry Division had effected this, the great probability is that the enemy's cavalry would have immediately retired beyond the Engelbach.

The work of the day might then well have been ended by the heavy and Hussar brigades remaining at rest near Ober-Seebach, while the Dragoon brigade might have been pushed as far as west of Nieder-Seebach, with orders to keep up communication with the XI. Corps, to observe the adversary in its immediate front, and to throw at least two squadrons on to the opposite bank of the stream.

Of course, in that case the greater part of the Division would have had to bivouac; but notwithstanding all that we have said previously against such a measure, yet in moments which precede great decisive events, it is often unavoidable. It is true that the Division would not then pass the night as tranquilly as if it were behind the Lauter; but it is not thereby exposed to any danger. On the other hand, every single trooper would feel that the masses of the enemy's cavalry before whom that morning we were forced to retreat have now in their turn been driven back by the Division to the point from which they started. The whole of the ground as far as the Engelbach would again be taken possession of, as, should the whole Division advance, the adversary would hardly be

able to maintain his outposts on the line Aschbach—Standweiler.

The right flank of the Cavalry Division would also have been protected by the Hausauerbach as well as by the presence of the V. Corps; the latter would have secured its retreat, and its left flank would have rested on and been supported by the advanced guard of the XI. Corps. But, above all, it would have completely closed up the otherwise open space between the two Army Corps, thereby secured communication between them in the most effectual manner, and masked every movement which any other corps might make in rear.

Lastly, the Division in this manner actually remains face to face with the adversary, close to the ground where it will probably next find its work, ready at any moment to reconnoitre the enemy's movements and to profit thereby, a result which could not be expected from the few squadrons pushed to the front.

Such isolated advanced squadrons as the two squadrons of Hussars on the left and the squadron of Dragoons on the right bank of the Hausauerbach, mentioned in the text, can be made very useful, no doubt; but when armies approach each other, the masses of cavalry on both sides must be closely opposed, and the *rôle* of single detached squadrons then is to act more on the flanks.

But should the retreat be continued to the other bank of the Lauter, as actually happened, it was then certainly necessary that the commander of the Division should still, through the means at his own disposal, obtain every possible information about the enemy. The three squadrons which have been left in observation, sufficed for the moment to watch the general movements of the enemy, and that was their particular *rôle*. Should the adversary, however, again advance, they would not have sufficient power of resistance to oppose or check his march, and especially would they be unable to indicate his whereabouts should he oppose them with superior forces while in the act of retiring. Much time must naturally be lost ere the Division could be informed and enabled to push forward.

Here especially we would point out the essential difference in the *rôle* of the Division when the two armies are still at a great distance from each other, or when their troops in first line are liable to come face to face at any moment.

In the first case, it will suffice if at the end of the day the advanced Cavalry Division has obtained a general idea of the enemy's movements as far as it was possible to do so. In the second case, the movements of the adversary once unmasked, it is indispensable that his trace be not lost for a single moment. If in the former case, it matters not so much whether the Division after one or several hours takes up the direction in which the advanced squadrons follow up the track of the enemy, in the latter case it becomes an imperative necessity to at once follow up the enemy's movements, as otherwise the Division will be overtaken by events, whose coming it ought to have foreseen.

With due regard to all the fatigues the Division had undergone, and the losses it had sustained, yet it could not expect as a matter of course the rest which its retreat to the opposite bank of the Lauter would give.

The closer armies approach each other, the greater and more important will be the services which their leaders will demand from the cavalry. When Army Corps are still at a great distance from each other, false movements can mostly be rectified in good time, but this becomes impossible when they are in the immediate presence of each other. It is then that the cavalry must make every effort to furnish uninterrupted every possible and desirable information; these are the moments when it can least afford to slacken its energies and relax its efforts, or think of allowing its rôle to be taken over by an Army Corps.

If, notwithstanding, the commander of the Division did not wish to make a forward movement, and push as far as Ober- and Nieder-Seebach, he might at least, have passed the night at Schleithal and at Salmbach, which would certainly have been better than retiring to the other bank of the Lauter.

As regards the replenishing of the ammunition, the bringing up of the necessary provision wagons, and the movements of the transport, that might have been carried out without difficulty if the Division had remained at either Ober-Seebach or Schleithal.

There is also one further especial point in the space of time here dealt with which should attract our attention.

The 1st Cavalry Division and the XI. Army Corps have been placed under the orders of the General Commanding the V. Corps. The reason on which this order was founded is that it was thereby desired to ensure unity of action in case the

corps nearest the enemy should become engaged prior to the arrival of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

It is clear that this is a point which deserves great attention, one that in many cases must be most carefully borne in mind in order that at places where several Army Corps during their operations come into contact with each other, the forces may act in perfect accord, and that there may be no disturbing friction in the movements to be executed or in the field of battle.

However, in the case under consideration, there does not appear to have been any cause for this measure. The adversary still required several hours to set the main body of his forces moving; it would have sufficed, therefore, if the Headquarters of the Army, for the short time which would elapse before its arrival, had contented itself with simply issuing an order such as this:—"The V. Corps will hold the heights south of Weissenburg. Should the enemy advance to attack them, the XI. Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division will take part in the engagement with the whole of their available forces."

After receipt of the first telegram announcing the march of the enemy, the Headquarters would certainly quit Landau and hasten up without delay. It is possible that on its arrival it might find the V. Corps already engaged, the Cavalry Division would be already formed up, and the XI. Corps would have commenced its forward march. Consequently all the measures which the Headquarters could have taken, even supposing it to have arrived earlier, would already have been put *en train*, and it could now take in its own hands the further guidance of the action.

The case is, however, otherwise when bodies of infantry (Divisions or Army Corps) are detached with a Cavalry Division to fulfil an independent and special mission which separates them from the main army. Then it is indispensable to place the Cavalry Division under the orders of the Army Corps commander.

When two Divisions, the one infantry and the other cavalry, are detached at the same time, the seniority of the two Generals then will decide, unless a special commander is appointed to command both.

Otherwise, however, as a matter of principle, the conduct of the Cavalry Division should always remain in the hands of the commander of the army; the latter should consider

it as an independent and separate Army Corps, and direct it accordingly; it is only exceptionally that the Division should be placed under the command of an Army Corps commander.

Further, experience has taught us that in the latter case great inconveniences often arise. If that course is pursued when the whole army is still concentrated, the cavalry will more often be employed in the interest of the particular Army Corps under whose commander it is placed than in the general interest of the whole army, and it will in every other respect be badly looked after. It is only the cavalry leader who does not feel personally competent, and who is afraid of the great responsibility of his mission, that is desirous of sheltering himself under the command of an Army Corps commander.

Of course, as soon as the Cavalry Division is called upon to act, it requires certain instructions in order to learn the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief as well as the general situation of the army.

But once the Division comes in contact with the enemy, its mission for the present still remains the same, viz., to preserve uninterrupted touch of the enemy. Our 1st Cavalry Division did not therefore require any fresh instructions for the 3rd of August, and if its independent position is at this moment at an end it is very probable that to-morrow its independence must be given back to it, even if it has not to resume it of itself owing to the enemy's movements.

But if the enemy leaves the initiative to the III. Army, the II. Bavarian Corps will probably march *viâ* Rott, hiding its movements by means of the mountain roads, the V. Corps will march to Sulz, both being followed by the I. Bavarian Corps as a reserve. The Cavalry Division would then find nothing to do between the Hausauerbach and the mountains; it would remain on the left bank of the Hausauer, and would operate, like the XI. Corps, upon the flank and rear of the adversary.

In conclusion, we will say a word regarding the losses of the Cavalry Division. These losses, according to our calculations, amounted during the 2nd August to about 470 men (inclusive of officers). The different figures we have given are not imaginary ones, but are taken from the real losses on similar occasions in the field.

If we add thereto the losses sustained during the preceding days, and the approximate number of non-effectives, viz., sick

and men who have been sent back to the depôt with surplus and sick horses, we arrive at the considerable total of about 775 men and 550 horses. Consequently, during the first three days of the campaign, before the infantry could enter the fighting line, the Division had lost one-fifth of its effective strength.

Here is a fact the reality of which cannot be too strongly insisted upon. It will and must inevitably repeat itself whenever the two adversaries employ their cavalry from the beginning of a campaign, and to the proper purpose. We ought to familiarize ourselves with the thought that similar losses will occur even before the larger bodies of troops meet, lest when such losses actually happen our decisions should thereby be injuriously influenced. Otherwise, we may easily incline to the view that "the cavalry will be ruined before the decisive moments arrive," and the consequence of such a view would be that the cavalry would be kept back in order to save it, that is to say, it would not be sufficiently made use of.

Every arm, however, should be employed where its aid will best serve the general interests. Should our cavalry, notwithstanding all possible pains to replace losses in its ranks, sink lower and lower in its effective strength during a campaign, it will be noticed that the same state of things is going on in the ranks of the enemy's cavalry also. But missions which the Commander-in-Chief has confided to it must be executed, even should the effective strength of regiments be reduced to as low a figure as 200 horses or even less.

If, however, real warfare—as we have shown—even when the troops on the whole are skilfully handled, reduces the effective strength in such a rapid and wholesale manner, useless losses will fall much more heavily into the balance.

Such losses, most deeply to be regretted, do, however, happen when bivouacs are made frequent use of, when large bodies of troops are continually harassed with marches and countermarches, or when they are uselessly sacrificed in combats that have no object. But those losses which are experienced by a cavalry of which proper use is made and which are unavoidable, are never without a corresponding useful result, and always contribute towards the general good.

These things, however, which have always reproduced

themselves in every campaign in which cavalry has been employed on a large scale and to good purpose, impose the obligation of pushing the cavalry to the front as rapidly and in as great strength as possible, and with an organization ready and perfect in every particular.

In our present example, the 1st Cavalry Division would not have been so much weakened had the III. Army been in a position to send a second Division of cavalry to the front from the commencement. Then, for instance, the combat of the Hussars at Nieder-Rödern would have been fought by the latter, and those heavy losses to the 1st Cavalry Division would have been avoided; it is even pretty certain that there would not have been a combat at all at Frohnacherhof, but that the enemy would have been pressed back upon his infantry by the two united masses of cavalry. How much more extended would the insight into the enemy's position then have been?

Even admitting that in such a case the total figure of the losses might have been just as high as in our example, it must be remembered that they would not have fallen upon one Division only, but probably both would have borne their share.

Should the demands so far imposed upon the Cavalry Division repeat themselves, and should they be accompanied by similar sacrifices, as certainly might be calculated upon, then the whole Division would very soon be placed in a non-effective state. If, on the contrary, the demands upon this one Division are shared by two, the strain on each Division must be less, and the losses will diminish in the same proportion. These Divisions may become weakened, but they will nevertheless still be in a position to act effectively. For the rest, we have seen that the 1st Cavalry Division at first completely fulfilled its mission, but that it leant on the support of the V. and XI. Army Corps from the very moment it had a chance of doing so, that the cavalry of these Army Corps was obliged to advance into first line on the two extreme flanks of the zone to be reconnoitred, and that later on it became necessary for the infantry of these Army Corps to occupy Weissenburg, as well as the bridges across the Lauter and Riedelsz-Oberdorf, &c.

We can now reply to the question which we asked in the first part of this book, that, considering the space of ground which the theatre of operations of such a large force as the

Third Army requires, one Cavalry Division is not sufficient to fulfil all the missions demanded of that arm.

If we further consider that the theatre of operations is contracted between the Rhine and the mountains, and presents but a narrow front, we must again come back to the oft-repeated principle that *an army should place in its front the whole of its available cavalry forces from the very beginning of a campaign.*

This observation leads us, in conclusion, to consider a most important question arising out of our studies :—

"Have the comparatively heavy losses which the 1st Cavalry Division sustained whilst fulfilling its duties during those three days of operations been compensated for by the result obtained?"

In order to reply to this we have only to ascertain whether the Third Army has gained any special advantage by pushing its cavalry so early to the front.

In the situation in which the Third Army was placed on the 29th July, that is to say, on the day on which the Cavalry Division received the order to commence its operations, it must have been of the highest importance for it to gain information as early as possible as to any approach of the adversary's troops. At that time the various component parts of the Third Army were not completely formed, nor were those parts present as yet sufficiently concentrated to oppose a serious resistance.

Should the adversary at this period take the offensive, the concentration of all the forces present would first of all be necessary in order to be able to offer resistance. *The act of sending the cavalry to the front gave some security that the proper moment to effect this concentration would not be missed.* That security became greater in proportion as the cavalry gained more ground to the front. The general concentration could now be quietly carried out by means of the railways as laid down in the plan of mobilization. It does not require any explanation to show the disorder and disastrous consequences which any modification of the above plan at such a critical period would produce. Such modifications would, however, have been rendered necessary if the enemy, always supposing that he made the best use of his cavalry masses, had shown them in front of the outposts of the Third Army, and thereby caused the latter to expect an immediate attack from the hostile infantry.

It was an influence of this nature which the sudden

appearance of the 1st Cavalry Division in the enemy's territory had exercised upon him. The delay around Strassburg, from which place he could not even cover his frontier, and the fact of his holding back his cavalry, indicated a certain apprehension lest he should come in contact with the Third Army, which can be explained only by the fact of the Army of the South not being as yet in readiness to commence operations.

His attitude during the last few days, the successive appearance of his cavalry, the precipitation with which Wörth was occupied, the cautious advance of the heads of his infantry on the 1st and 2nd August, all this tended to confirm this view of his situation. *The advance of the 1st Cavalry Division had then, no doubt, seriously inconvenienced the concentration of the Army of the South, and probably entailed disadvantageous consequences, such as forced marches, irregularity in the provisioning of the troops, &c.*

To this must be added that the Cavalry Division entered far into the enemy's country, thereby debarring the civil authorities from rendering assistance to their own State, that it took temporary possession of some of the railways and telegraphs, that it lived at the expense of the enemy's country, agitated the populace, and caused alarm far and near.

Yet another important, although indirect, advantage was gained through this early advance, *it was in this manner only that the Third Army was enabled to occupy the strong position of Weissenburg, without shedding a drop of blood, before the adversary could establish himself in the place, although it was situated in his own country.*

In order to show this more clearly, we must go back to the general situation on the 31st July, when the Cavalry Division crossed the frontier. Having due regard to the complete concentration and readiness for operations of the Third Army, the 3rd August was originally fixed as the date on which to take the offensive, a date which, in fact, as we have seen, was adhered to by the main body of the Third Army. On the 31st July, therefore, the latter was not in a position to engage in any serious combat near Weissenburg which might demand a permanent support. It was for this reason that the General Commanding V. Corps gave the infantry detachment which followed General A. the most distinct instructions not to allow itself to be drawn into an attack against that position. (See page 39.) He authorized the

occupation of that town, only in case the advancing cavalry did not encounter the enemy. These instructions coincided perfectly with the situation; every serious combat, therefore, for the carrying out of which sufficient forces were not at disposal, was to be avoided.

However, the advance of the cavalry confirmed the fact that for the present nothing was to be feared from the adversary; it was therefore directed to occupy Weissenburg. Once a firm footing was established there, the desire to keep the place would follow as a natural consequence. When in the place, it could very clearly be seen that had the enemy previously installed himself in it, or should he now drive the detachment of the V. Corps out of it by means of superior forces, it would cost disproportionate sacrifices to retake the position. Perhaps even a battle might have to be fought for its possession, which under certain circumstances might be lost.

If the cavalry had not advanced, the enemy would have been able to throw strong bodies of troops into Weissenburg on the 1st and 2nd August, as was actually the case during the war of 1870. But as the Cavalry Division was already south of the Lanter on the 31st July, the thing was no longer possible, as we have already admitted in our studies, and it would in all probability not have taken place in reality.

It may be taken for granted that the Army of the South, being in its own country, would very quickly have been apprized of the occupation of the place by hostile infantry, without, perhaps, learning the exact strength of the force. But even supposing the latter to have been the case, this infantry already in possession might at any moment have been reinforced. But the same reasons which caused the Third Army to abstain from sending troops to Weissenburg before the cavalry had gained sufficient information no doubt influenced the commander of the Army of the South also.

The latter was not in a position to advance a perfectly isolated Army Corps to the attack of so strong a position as the Geisberg, and, in face of the probability of encountering considerably superior forces, expose it to a catastrophe.

We consider, then, that we have in these observations fully established the assertion made at the beginning, viz.:—*that the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division gained for the Third Army the important possession of Weissenburg without having recourse*

*to a battle, which latter might have been fought under difficulties and with serious losses.**

We must also allude to another advantage of no less importance which the Cavalry Division gained, viz.:—that it enabled the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to direct the movements, &c., of the main body in the manner most suitable to the situation, at a period when it was still two days' march from the enemy's advanced guards.

Let us here point out that the views held by Lieutenant-General A. regarding the movements of the enemy's troops, which he communicated by telegraph to the Headquarters of the Army, subsequently turned out to have been perfectly correct. The Army of the South, from its first point of concentration near Strassburg, was not in a position to advance its Divisions towards Weissenburg in order to defend the frontier; it had further abstained from running the risk of advancing one of its Infantry Divisions too far, and completely isolating it from the remaining infantry, for the purpose of retaking the strong position already held by the enemy.

The dispositions of this army for the 2nd August, of which we have already explained that part which related to the cavalry, simply set the 1st Infantry Division the task of taking up a position on the right bank of the river Fröschweiler (Lobsann—Sulz), in order to cover the concentration of the army near Wörth. The outposts of this Division had, in conformity with this order, been pushed as far as the line Drachenbronn—Schönenburg.

It was under protection of this advanced guard of infantry that the remaining portions of the Army of the South executed their movements towards Wörth, which they reached on the 2nd and 3rd August.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army, however, now knew exactly the direction in which the enemy was to be found. He could consequently now advance his various corps in that direction and gradually draw them closer together as they neared the enemy in such a manner as to cause them to act in concert at the decisive moment. A too premature concentration of the masses of an army always carries with it a great number of inconveniences with regard to transport and lodging; it was in this respect, therefore, of far-reaching importance for the Third Army to be able to give its orders with all possible certainty, and for this certainty it had to thank its Cavalry Division.

* In 1870 the Third Army was not able to accomplish this, as its Cavalry Division was not formed until later on.

From these considerations we may conclude that the losses which the Cavalry Division sustained during its period of independence were not without result, but were suffered in the interest of the Army, for which they procured very considerable advantages.

In the foregoing study we have endeavoured to follow up in all their details the various missions which may devolve upon a Cavalry Division when detached in advance of an army, and the different situations which await it in the theatre of operations.

As to the principles of organization which were discussed at the beginning of this study, the practical application of them to particular cases has shown that the formation of a Division into three brigades of two regiments each, with a detachment of Horse Artillery,* will in every case answer every requirement which may present itself, whether during operations or on the field of battle, and that inconvenience has never arisen therefrom.

Of course, all the circumstances in which an isolated Cavalry Division may find itself during a campaign are by no means exhausted in these studies. The most essential situations, however, those which most frequently recur, have been touched upon.

Among these must be reckoned the mission given to such a Division, and the various reflections it imposes upon its commander, which will constantly lead him into the field of great operations, and exact from him a ripe understanding of them.

Next, we spoke of the advance of the Division for the purpose of first of all gaining and maintaining touch of the enemy, and of reaching the limits within which support from infantry can be relied on. We have seen how the enemy's cavalry was driven back upon the advanced guard of its army, the conduct of the Division in the presence of the latter, how it retired before the advancing hostile infantry columns, and how, lastly, it retires before the superior cavalry of the adversary and falls back upon its own advanced guard.

This outline offered an opportunity for examining further

* See pages 387 388 — EDITOR.

details, and especially for touching upon the fighting power of cavalry *versus* cavalry, from an isolated squadron up to an entire Division, as well as dismounted combat on the offensive and defensive, and the *rôle* of Horse Artillery.

If we have preferred in our narrative to suppose frequent faults during the course of operations, this was done purposely, to allow the course of events to be fully developed, in the same way as frequently happens in reality, and also in order to point out the principal errors which will continually occur at the beginning of a campaign, and are caused by an insufficient training during time of peace.

Here we end this chapter on the *rôle* of a Cavalry Division. Its independent action for the present ceased on the evening of the 2nd August; its work during the next few days, even if it be placed on an independent footing, will be in close connection with the other great bodies of the army, as the further advance of the Third Army will very soon lead it within the fighting zone of the hostile infantry. Then encounters in which the Infantry Corps and Cavalry Division take a joint part are unavoidable, and will eventually end in battle.

These encounters are followed by pursuits, or by operations for covering the retreat, according to the turn the battle has taken. These are all, of course, occasions on which the cavalry will play an important *rôle*.

Our work, which here ends for the present, will only be of value if we have succeeded in imprinting the stamp of reality upon imaginary movements; the latter were intended to form one connected picture, in which the greater part of the scenes which it was desirable should be pointed out would permit of being discussed in turn. If this plan has been successful, if the tableau which we have exhibited awakens some of the images which a campaign has left in the recollection of the cavalry soldier, then only shall we have the right to hope that the observations on these events will be of use to the reader.

The observations made and propounded in these studies are but individual opinions of the Author; they have—we again repeat it—no pretension to be always correct.

If they only excite the reader's attention and cause him to meditate and form his own opinion upon some of the most prominent matters connected with the cavalry service—a service at once so important, so brilliant, and so full of difficulties—this book will not have been written in vain.

In any case, even in wider circles, it may make known the important demands made upon a cavalry leader. The General Commanding a Cavalry Division will continually find himself in situations demanding of him profound knowledge of all matters appertaining to the greater operations of war, such as will be required of the General Commanding an Infantry Division under exceptional circumstances only.

The rapidly changing episodes and vicissitudes of a cavalry fight demand the most perfect harmony between troops and leaders, and the highest degree of flexibility and facility in manœuvring. No other combat demands so much talent on the part of a leader as does that of a Division of Cavalry, and to our mind there is no more difficult task in the leading of troops.

The more pressing, therefore, the necessity for giving the cavalry every possible opportunity of preparing sufficiently in every particular for war; such preparation, too, should be in the organization in which it will make its appearance on the theatre of war, and the troops should be trained by those officers who are destined to lead them to battle.

NOTE ON THE GERMAN CAVALRY REGULATIONS
OF 1886.

The main points of difference between the attack formation of the Cavalry Division against cavalry as laid down in the German Cavalry Regulations of 1876, and that prescribed in the Regulations of 1886, are as follows:—

1. Whereas the three lines were formerly directed to be of equal strength, it is now laid down that they will generally be of unequal strength, the 1st consisting as a rule of three regiments, the 2nd of two, the 3rd of one. The distribution of the troops in these lines is to be decided by the Divisional leader in each case, according to the object of the attack, the strength and formation of the enemy, and the conditions imposed by the ground.

2. The normal line distances, when ground and other circumstances do not necessitate another arrangement, remain as hitherto, viz., 300 paces from 1st to 2nd, and 450 from 1st to 3rd line. It is, however, now laid down that these distances are not to be increased when the shock of the 1st line takes place, and therefore it is allowable to diminish them suitably during the advance to the attack.

3. According to the 1876 Regulations the tactical advantage of the formation in three lines was that it allowed an economical employment of one's forces, combining great resisting power and the ability to envelope the enemy; the 1886 Regulations lay down that the formation therein prescribed has for its object only to ensure the success of the 1st line under all circumstances, and to prevent its being repulsed.

4. The 1st line having to deal the chief blow against the enemy is, if possible, to be stronger than his 1st line, and will contain as a rule, at least one-half of the total available number of squadrons.

The principal rôle of the 2nd line is to ensure the success of the 1st line by direct and timely assistance, so as to prevent its being thrown back, and the hitherto accepted idea of the 2nd line covering the retreat of the first is no longer entertained. The 2nd line will absorb two-thirds of the rest of the Division.

The 3rd line, usually one-sixth of the whole, remains in the hand of the Divisional leader, who is now directed not to

hesitate to throw it into the combat if its intervention can be decisive.

5. If the 1st line outflanks the enemy, the outflanking portion of it must surround the enemy's flank as soon as the shock is over, and cut into his flank and rear.

The 2nd line will be formed with the greater part of its squadrons outflanking the 1st line on one or both flanks, forming the flank protection of that line; the rest of the 2nd line will follow directly in rear of the 1st line, a considerable interval being preserved between squadrons. If the greater part of the 2nd line is placed in rear of one flank only of the 1st line, then at least one of the squadrons which follow the 1st line with increased intervals is to outflank the 1st line on the other flank. If one flank of the 1st line is especially threatened, the outflanking part of the 2nd line may be moved up to half line distance.

The 3rd line will follow in rear of one flank or of the centre, as may be directed by the Divisional leader.

6. In the old Regulations special succour squadrons were authorized, detached from one of the rear lines (usually the 2nd) and following the 1st line at 150 paces distance, one of their objects being to fill gaps that might occur in the 1st line during the advance to the attack. These squadrons find no place in the new Regulations, but the squadrons of the 2nd line which directly follow the 1st to some extent take their place; they are to throw themselves upon any bodies that break through the 1st line, and are specially to act by bringing about a favourable decision when the issue of the *mêlée* after the shock is doubtful; but they are not intended to fill gaps that may occur in the 1st line during the advance.

The outflanking portions of the 2nd line will best protect the flank of the 1st line by falling on the exposed flanks of such of the enemy's troops as may attempt to take the 1st line in flank.

7. In case of the enemy retiring before the shock takes place, these squadrons are not to join in the pursuing ranks of the 1st line, but to follow as compact formed bodies ready to meet a counter attack.

8. Until it is decided which flank of the 1st line ought to be strengthened, and consequently how the 2nd line is to be formed, it may be advantageous to make the two rear brigades follow the 1st in echelon on both flanks, at the same distance. Then the brigade which reinforces the 1st line by its inward

regiment (*i.e.*, the one nearest to the 1st line) will employ its outward regiment as part of the 2nd line to outflank the 1st line, while the other brigade will cause its inward regiment to follow the 1st line (squadrons disposed at increased intervals) to complete the 2nd line, and its outward regiment will take up the position of 3rd line. In this case the command of the 2nd line will be divided between the two rear brigade leaders.

9. The command of the 1st line must be invested in one leader only. The disadvantage of splitting up the rear brigades is more than compensated for by the more important object of having a strong 1st line.

10. On the pursuit sounding, all troops engaged in the *mêlée* are to pursue, the attempt to tell off certain squadrons to pursue and the rest to hold back being found impracticable before the enemy.

11. Lastly, the new Regulations abstain from giving a graphic representation of a normal disposition in three lines, the object being no doubt to prevent leaders adopting anything like a fixed scheme of attack; a sketch showing the relative position and arrangement of the three lines, as shadowed forth in those Regulations, will, however, be found in the editor's "Notes on the German Cavalry Regulations of 1886," issued officially.

C. W. BOWDLER BELL,
Colonel.

APPENDIX I.

ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

General Commanding: Lieut.-Gen. A.

Chief of the Staff: Major V.

Aides-de-Camp: (1) Captain P.; (2) 1st Lieut. G.

1ST CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Commanding: Major-General B.

Aide-de-Camp: 1st Lieut. R.

1st Cuirassiers: Lieut.-Colonel E. Commanding.

1st Uhlans: Colonel F. Commanding.

2ND CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Commanding: Major-General C.

Aide-de-Camp: 1st Lieut. S.

1st Dragoons: Colonel G. Commanding.

2nd Dragoons: Major H. Commanding.

3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE.

Commanding: Major-General D.

Aide-de-Camp: 2nd Lieut. T.

1st Hussars: Colonel I. Commanding.

2nd Hussars: Lieut.-Colonel K. Commanding.

Horse Artillery Batteries of 5th Field Artillery Regiment.

Commanding: Major L.

2nd Battery, Horse Artillery: Captain M. Commanding.

3rd Battery, Horse Artillery: Captain O. Commanding.

Half 3rd Bearer Company of V. Army Corps.

In charge: Senior Staff Surgeon Dr. N.

1st Provision Column, V. Army Corps.

Commanding: Lieut. P.

Total: 24 Squadrons, 12 Guns.


NOTE.—Each regiment consists of 4 squadrons, each battery
of 6 guns.

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PROJECTED ORDER OF MARCH OF THE RIGHT FLANK COLUMN AFTER PASSING THE OUTPOSTS OF THE 5TH ARMY CORPS.


Appendix

Advanced Detachments 1st & 4th Squadrons 1st Dragoons.




Depth of Column from Head to Rear 6717 Paces. Time necessary to form up at a Trot on a level with the leading squadron in two lines at 300 paces distance, the regiments of each Brigade side by side - 20 minutes.

Appendix C
Sketch 1.



Sketch 2.



M A P of the Ground between the River Lauter and the Forest of Hagenau.

